The UK in Afghanistan

[Red Rat]

Being forced to cross open ground and to habitually walk on it are two different things.

I quite agree,which is why we don't do it unless it is unavoidable and then it is covered by armed observation (ie 'eyes on' with the ability to bring effective fire to bear on all likely firing points if required).

They like drug dealers will continue to effectively use children until such time as effective counter measures are found. Knowing about it and thought about it are not enough.

What are the effective counter-measures? I saw the same thing happening in: Glasgow, Inverness, Dundee, London, Liverpool, N. Ireland, Kabul and Basra. In Glasgow they used to whistle to alert people if strangers and police were in the streets, in Basra they woud fly kites or release pigeons. Of course now everyone has mobile phones. Suspecting you are being 'dicked' and proving it are two different things. We cannot shoot suspected 'dickers' and we cannot normally catch them either (little blighters move fast and have an uncanny ability at launching rocks too).

Yes I agree but would add to that the arrogance factor of the non general staff officers coming through who are always questioning what the "old f*rts" know anyway. It seems from Afghanistan that the Brits split comes at Lt Col level where as they (and the more junior officers) are on the ground know it all and all those above are merely relics of past wars and campaigns and are hopelessly out of touch.

I think I understand what you are saying here (I was confused to the reference to 'non-General staff officers', which can either be everyone below the rank of full (bird) colonel or everyone not serving in a staff appointment! We continue to have a problem in the UK army with too much 'doing' and not enough 'thinking about' what we are doing. That is a centuries old problem and is rooted in the British Army's psyche. It cannot be changed overnight, probably not even in the course of one campaign. Add to that there is arrogance of youth and the arrogance of the current practicioner. My recommendation is that we sack people where required, are more honest and blunt about ourselves and become more professional (and holistic) in our officer education. That is also probably why I am not yet a General! Although most of it is not directly relevant there is a lot to learn from old farts and military history, and I for one wish we did more (military history, - old farts... well depends how smelly they are).

[Red Rat]

My experience, that is Journalists are generally not good at assessing information, in a military or operational context. They have a need to write stories, and report "facts"- and they never have any responsibilty for what they report, so mistakes are normally cost free. That generally disqualifies them from the necessary rigour and objectivity of an analyst or a commander.

The advent of 24 hr news in the UK has lead to what one very well respected TV journalist told me was the 'comercialisation of gossip'. The UK media is not so interested in the analysis as the emotions of the affair. News items are now intensively covered, but for a very short period of time; once the footage and the grief dries up so does the coverage. Analysis tends not to appear in the mass media now. The advent of television in the Houses of Parliament has completey skewed our politics, seeing the rise of the telegenic 'soundbite' politician; the same is now being seen elsewhere. MG Flynn may complain about the use of powerpoint to put across complex concepts and theories in AFG, but in the UK we have to do pretty much the same in presenting complex concepts and situations to the mass public in 30 second soundbites.

Having said that, a lot of commanders and analysts lack objectivity and rigour as well!

I am not sure about the analysts (our in house bunch are pretty good), but I would agree with many of our commanders!

[JMA]

I quite agree,which is why we don't do it unless it is unavoidable and then it is covered by armed observation (ie 'eyes on' with the ability to bring effective fire to bear on all likely firing points if required).

Again the DS answer

Ok, lets leave it there as I don't think we will achieve much on this matter here.

What are the effective counter-measures? I saw the same thing happening in: Glasgow, Inverness, Dundee, London, Liverpool, N. Ireland, Kabul and Basra. In Glasgow they used to whistle to alert people if strangers and police were in the streets, in Basra they woud fly kites or release pigeons. Of course now everyone has mobile phones. Suspecting you are being 'dicked' and proving it are two different things. We cannot shoot suspected 'dickers' and we cannot normally catch them either (little blighters move fast and have an uncanny ability at launching rocks too).

Why do the drug dealers use kids as runners? Because they are almost impossible to prosecute and they are cheap. Apart from the obvious which no one but the Taliban are prepared to do... but when this is happening does anyone still believe the locals are on sides?

I think I understand what you are saying here (I was confused to the reference to 'non-General staff officers', which can either be everyone below the rank of full (bird) colonel or everyone not serving in a staff appointment! We continue to have a problem in the UK army with too much 'doing' and not enough 'thinking about' what we are doing. That is a centuries old problem and is rooted in the British Army's psyche. It cannot be changed overnight, probably not even in the course of one campaign. Add to that there is arrogance of youth and the arrogance of the current practicioner. My recommendation is that we sack people where required, are more honest and blunt about ourselves and become more professional (and holistic) in our officer education. That is also probably why I am not yet a General! Although most of it is not directly relevant there is a lot to learn from old farts and military history, and I for one wish we did more (military history, - old farts... well depends how smelly they are).

Yes thanks, I meant anyone from full colonel and above.

Have you read Patrick Hennessey's "The Junior Officers Reading Club"? I agree with Tukhachevskii's review here.

Its a horror story of everything that can go wrong with how a young officer can develop on his first combat tour. The rank arrogance comes through strongly from playing the old soldier after 2 months in Helmand to the know-all attitude virtually from the outset. This should be required reading on how to recognise a head case. (I tend to agree with Tukhachevskii that the book was "packaged". Its like he read Rumors of War, Dispatches and John Masters' Bugles and a Tiger and then watched Apocalypse Now 10 times then wrote the book. The horror... the horror... give us a break Hennessay)

Then in T E Lawrences Seven Pillars I remember him complaining that he found British officers to be "too much body and not enough mind".

Once you fix that at Sandhurst level it will take you 30 years to fix the army.

You know we always talk about sacking people and I do too but really its just a case of putting pound pegs in round holes. If an officer is assigned to a ASO3 or ASO2 post (or whatever they are called now) and he doesn't like it then he is free to leave and find work elsewhere. Remember we put people in these positions and maybe rather than punishing them we should look towards those who failed to see that they were setting the poor bugger up for failure.

Its not easy and I'm sorry the thread on officer training died as there was potentially some good stuff to come out there. (Something about academies?)

[William F. Owen]

Then in T E Lawrences Seven Pillars I remember him complaining that he found British officers to be "too much body and not enough mind".

Once you fix that at Sandhurst level it will take you 30 years to fix the army.

T.E. Lawrence? Why do we keep harking back to this guy? He was merely a good self-publicist. All the officers who actually did better work than he did, just kept quiet after the war.

....and how many contemporary British Officers do you actually know? As much as I am critical of many aspects of Command, training and doctrine, I know a good many very smart and able British Army Officers.

Their is not problem with the Sandhurst level. The problem, if one exists, is arguably far higher up. Yes, Sandhurst is a complete waste of time and money, as in we can do a better job, if it did not exist, but that's another issues entirely. Sandhurst doesn't make you incompetent. It just wastes time.

[Infanteer]

My recommendation is that we sack people where required, are more honest and blunt about ourselves and become more professional (and holistic) in our officer education.

Those three pretty much sum it up, IMO.

1. We need to be more selective earlier on - assessing and sacking guys at the 2 year mark is easier than doing it at the 15 year mark. The big problem I notice is that in career armies, they tend to stick around and -surprise- pop up again.

2. 360 degree evaluation seems, to me, to be one step forward.

3. Yup. I think promotion exams and "go/no go" courses instead of "all will go/all will pass" staff college is a start.

Anyways, I digress....

[JMA]

2. 360 degree evaluation seems, to me, to be one step forward..

Not sure about this. Seems to be that latest gimmick fad that is passing through various companies and the military. The problem with this is the often fairly rapid movements of military staff and the time that they have been known to those required to rate them.

[JMA]

UK troops in Afghanistan to pull out of Sangin

The military insists the move is a redeployment, now there are more US troops on the ground, but the Taliban are certain to portray it as a defeat.

and

British troops to pull out of Sangin, leaving Afghan hotspot to Americans

British military commanders have been agonising for weeks over the decision to pull UK troops out of Sangin. They had hoped the US would reinforce British soldiers and marines there, because they did not want it to appear as though they were leaving when the situation got too difficult having been saved by the Americans.

[davidbfpo]

The as always succinct 'Defence of the Realm' comments:http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.co...s-victory.html

Ends with:

That aside, however much British politicians and the military care to dress it up, even Con Coughlin admits it still doesn't look good. The mockery has already started and, if they do manage to avoid the taint of defeat, the military sure as hell cannot claim that this has been a victory.

[JMA]

Love him or hate him Simon Jenkins is right on the button again:

Afghanistan is a catastrophe. But we will have to wait for a new Chilcot to admit it

"Sangin should now, after three years of "hearts and minds", be safe in the hands of Afghan army and police units. It is not, any more than is the rest of Helmand..."

[jmm99]

I have to tiptoe into this a bit, since the topic is sensitive and underlies some of the heat we've seen in this thread. It deals with only a brief comment in Simon Jenkins' article.

First off, my comments are not directed at things British military. As to that, our family's nearest connection was my grandfather's 1st cousin by marriage, who served during WWI with the 18th Royal Hussars (Queen Mary's Own) (his father was Royal Navy) and left service 2 Mar 1919 - probably prudent for a resident near Cork City (where by then the graffitti began to pronounce "Join the RAF and see the World; join the RIC and see the Next"). In short, we have been long removed from that sphere (60 years removed by WWI).

Here is what caught my attention from the SJ article:

It led to a woeful lack of troops, armoured cars and helicopters, and an appalling attrition rate of one in four soldiers killed or wounded.

Well, yes, as to the number for the rate - our local sapper unit in Astan got hit a bit higher (fortunately no KIAs). The emotive word is "appalling" - which is where we get into sensitivities.

What is or is not "appalling" is frankly situational. One fine Oct day in 1944, my dad's rifle company took 70 casualties (plus much of an attached MG platoon) - most in the first hour of the assault and amounting to over 40% of the company's TOE. When that campaign ended two weeks later, his company had taken roughly 140 casualties - not including that unfortunate MG platoon - making some 80+% of TOE (including him; fortunately a bad WIA and not a KIA which it should have been - he was a lucky Mick that day ).

Now, were those casualties "appalling" ? First off, for each family affected (e.g., the widow of the newly-married kid who was with my dad and got his head taken off by the same shell), each of them was "appalling". However, from a military standpoint, they were not. Why ?

My dad's company was the little can opener ("tip of the spear"), which alliowed the bigger can openers (Bn, Regt and Div 30ID) to crack the Siegfried Line at a seam and enlarge the gap north of Aachen to allow the Combat Commands of our 2nd Armor to penetrate. So, the C-1/117-30ID casualties of 2-18 Oct 1944 were a "military necessity" (better viewed as a "military advantage") - and thus not "appalling".

So, if Simon Jenkins is finding the Astan casualities "appalling" for lack of an end showing military advantage, I'd be inclined to agree. If he is simply bemoaning a 25% casualty rate, I'd suggest his analysis is unsound.

Regards (in a tough subject matter area)

Mike

[Infanteer]

Re: Sangin Pullout by Brits.

Ho hum - no news here.

No different than the Canadian pull out of Zharei, where we fought our biggest battles between 2006 and 2009. The Americans took it because they had the manpower and the resources. RC(S) and (SW) are American shows now, and it is only natural that they'll take the "main efforts" for themselves to handle.

The news seems to imply a specific British tactical failure, when Sangin is no better off many of the districts occupied by other ISAF forces since 2006.

[JMA]

I have to tiptoe into this a bit, since the topic is sensitive and underlies some of the heat we've seen in this thread. It deals with only a brief comment in Simon Jenkins' article.

[snip]

... where angels fear to tread. Yea, I know.

We left the "green and pleasant land" in 1793. My grandfather passed through on his way to France in WW1 and my dad and uncle passed through on their way to WW2. We answered the call of the drum. Mercifully we are distanced just far enough to be free of blind emotional loyalty under any circumstances response of so many. So Mike it is better that you comment on this thread than those who are hopelessly unable to be objective in any shape or form.

Here is what caught my attention from the SJ article:

Well, yes, as to the number for the rate - our local sapper unit in Astan got hit a bit higher (fortunately no KIAs). The emotive word is "appalling" - which is where we get into sensitivities.

What is or is not "appalling" is frankly situational.

[snip]

So, if Simon Jenkins is finding the Astan casualities "appalling" for lack of an end showing military advantage, I'd be inclined to agree. If he is simply bemoaning a 25% casualty rate, I'd suggest his analysis is unsound.

Regards (in a tough subject matter area)

Mike

Yes the choice of that word is interesting. To the Brits the loss of the battleship HMS Hood in 1941 and 1,415 of its crew of 1,418 in about one second was appalling. Then the US the casualties at Ia Drang were probably seen as appalling. In Rhodesia we lost 17 (14 plus the South African aircrew) when a Puma helo was shot down, that was for us appalling.

That said I think I understand what he means and that is the attrition rate.

An attrition rate sort of creeps up on you. No one big battle just the steady piecemeal loss of life.

25% is pretty bad. I think I have mentioned it before where I worked through a 1977 photo of my RLI sub-unit with and old mate and worked out that by the ceasefire (end of 1979) just more than one third of those in the photo had been killed or wounded. That was over a 2 and a half year period. I assume that the Brit figure is over their 6-month tour. That IS pretty appalling.

We need to give the man a hearing.

Did the following reference to the next Chief of General Staff not send shivers down your spine?

"The Helmand fiasco was both predictable and predicted. When I (and others) spoke to the Nato commander, General David Richards, in Kabul in early June 2006, his blithe self-confidence was unnerving. He was about to implement the order of the then defence secretary, John Reid, to send 3,000 British troops south to "establish the preconditions for nation-building". Richards was dismissive of such US operations as Enduring Freedom and Mountain Thrust. They just bombed villages and recruited Taliban. He promised to win hearts and minds by "creating Malayan inkspots"."

[jmm99]

Not to beat this horse more than it already has; but I don't think metrics justify much at all. They are equivalent to some lawyer attempting to put a price on a wrongful death by recitation of an accounting formula.

BTW: I'm not trying to equate WWII ETO (a very conventional war) with what is going on now in Astan, where victories are much harder to define (if at all definable). Tom Odom once told me - we are not advancing to the Elbe in these wars - a good point which I acknowledged then and now.

However, metrics do not in themselves define a victory. They will, if bodies and weapons are counted, provide some sense of how the unit is doing tactically.

The Bn (1/117) started its ETO tour when C-1/117-30ID embarked for Omaha Beach 13 Jun 1944; and ended its combat phase via A & B coys engaging isolated snipers at Magdeburg on the Elbe on 18 Apr 1945. During that 10 month tour, the Bn (1/117) sustained 1686 casualties (not including sick to hospital) - roughly 200% TOE. Charlie (C-1/117) sustained 518 casualties in the same period - over 250% TOE.

Were those casualties "appalling" (leaving aside the personal family context where one casualty is "appalling") ? Again, I'd say not.

Curlew (the Bn) and Charlie (the Coy) conducted themselves honorably in that tour; engaged in three major engagements (Mortain, Siegfried & Stavelot; the first and third vs Liebstandarte); received Distinguished Unit Citations for Mortain and Siegfried; and via the 117 Inf Regt a Unit French Croix de Guerre for Siegfried. Curlew did everything that was asked of it - and more.

In short, by the time it reached the Elbe, Curlew's soldiers could truly believe that they had accomplished their mission. "Mission accomplished" is a very intangible (and fragile) term - as we (US) have learned. It is very much a matter of perspective.

Similarly, whether casualties are "appalling" or "acceptable" is very subjective and dependent on the context and whether one views them from point A or Point B.

-------------------------
BTW: I don't have any kill ratios for either Curlew or Charlie. For Ardennes (basically Stavelot + St.-Vith, Dec 1944 -Jan 1945), Curlew sustained 225 casualties (28 KIAs); and Charlie, 85 casualties (8 KIAs).

At Stavelot, Curlew cut the MSR of Kampfgruppe Peiper (directly engaging elements of schwere SS-Panzerabteilung 501 - Tiger II, attacking piecemeal); and destroyed the 1 SS Pz recon and armored infantry units which counter-attacked to remove the block.

The Regt's after action report (for Nov-Dec 1944) beat the drum quietly - and was more interested in weapons than bodies.

Stavelot 1-117 RIP.jpg

Stavelot 117 AAR.jpg

You'll probably need to enlarge your view to 150% to read the AA Report (had to cram a bit to meet the KB limit).

If anyone counted the German KIAs (other than the unfortunate 150 SS swimmers), I do not have the numbers. When the smoke cleared, Curlew did not need a body count to inform it that it had won the engagement.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

Not to beat this horse more than it already has; but I don't think metrics justify much at all. They are equivalent to some lawyer attempting to put a price on a wrongful death by recitation of an accounting formula.

BTW: I'm not trying to equate WWII ETO (a very conventional war) with what is going on now in Astan, where victories are much harder to define (if at all definable). Tom Odom once told me - we are not advancing to the Elbe in these wars - a good point which I acknowledged then and now.

However, metrics do not in themselves define a victory. They will, if bodies and weapons are counted, provide some sense of how the unit is doing tactically.

[snip]

Were those casualties "appalling" (leaving aside the personal family context where one casualty is "appalling") ? Again, I'd say not.

Curlew (the Bn) and Charlie (the Coy) conducted themselves honorably in that tour; engaged in three major engagements (Mortain, Siegfried & Stavelot; the first and third vs Liebstandarte); received Distinguished Unit Citations for Mortain and Siegfried; and via the 117 Inf Regt a Unit French Croix de Guerre for Siegfried. Curlew did everything that was asked of it - and more.

In short, by the time it reached the Elbe, Curlew's soldiers could truly believe that they had accomplished their mission. "Mission accomplished" is a very intangible (and fragile) term - as we (US) have learned. It is very much a matter of perspective.

Similarly, whether casualties are "appalling" or "acceptable" is very subjective and dependent on the context and whether one views them from point A or Point B.

[snip]

Mike

So what constitutes "appalling" in the context of casualties?

I would go with what the civilian response is back in the land where the casualties come from.

I would further add that the number of casualties the UK are suffering in Afghanistan is moving steadily towards the "tipping point" of public opinion. That would be a very serious situation.

[davidbfpo]

JMA stated in part:

I would further add that the number of casualties the UK are suffering in Afghanistan is moving steadily towards the "tipping point" of public opinion. That would be a very serious situation.

Most UK press reports refer to 70% opposition to our presence in Afghanistan and IMHO opinion can only worsen if casualties mount, especially after a "spectacular" like the downing of a troop-carrying Chinook and a hostile press response. I read elsewhere that 500 dead is now cited as the limit or "tipping point". The blogsite:http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/ has a long-running commentary on this issue.

The new (2007) UK charity Help for Heroes has tapped into the public support for those fighting; their website is:http://www.helpforheroes.org.uk/

[jmm99]

this:

from JMA
So what constitutes "appalling" in the context of casualties?

which I can only exemplify from my points of view, which I'll try to lay out as objectively (and briefly) as I can.

Viewpoint A - the Big Picture (Astan) - all IMO and totally subjective.

I can't see a US national command policy that is clear enough to support solid "continuations" either political or military (McCuen Rule #1 being violated). The political side of the Astan ledger is FUBAR. The military side is not as hopeless as some make it, but we are assured that there will be no "victory" (in a WWII sense); and if a "mission accomplished" has been defined, I know not the definition.

So, looking as Astan ISAF from Viewpoint A, all casualties are "appalling" and no casualties are "acceptable" at this point in time. Exception: the direct action campaign against AQ leadership targets, which is required by principles of retribution, specific deterrence and reprobation.

Viewpoint B - the Local Cheerleader (Sappers) - again all IMO and totally subjective.

We have taken hits in our local NG sapper unit (fortunately no KIAs). I obviously support what those folks are doing - and they support what they are doing. What they do saves lives (both military and civilian). So, no matter what you think about the national command policy (or lack thereof), you can support their efforts as they see them. Once you get there, their casualties are "acceptable" (they have to be since they go with the mission) and are not "appalling". I think Mike Few has made a similar point, but with more personal force because his "boys" (and they are) are fighting there.

Viewpoint C - the Individual Casualty - again all IMO and totally subjective.

Since I've no one in Astan or Iraq (and am not a father-surrogate either), the personal effect of a family casualty (always "appalling") is not going to be in my viewer. The nearest I've come (since I'm 1 to 2 generations removed from the troopers) was with one of our NG SNCOs who got pretty well banged up in an OIF tour by an IED. He's a friend of my paralegal and dropped in the office to visit.

I've spent my share of surgical and hospital time; so, we had a commonality of experience there. From that viewpoint, I found his wounds "appalling". On the other hand, he was going to beat them (he did), and return to duty (he did). So, from that standpoint, his wounds were "acceptable".

All of this (IMO) is too subjective to establish "tipping points" based on absolute or relative casualty numbers. We do not want to replicate "Big Mac" (the MACV computer, which was to provide all the answers, similar to the "millions made" signs at Big Mac restaurants). A friend of mine in MI worked on the real one; maybe also my 1st cousin who was in MI, but he doesn't talk about Nam. I hate to see casualties turned into some kind of half-a$$ed accounting project.

I don't believe there is an objective answer to JMA's question.

Regards

Mike

[davidbfpo]

A Daily Telegraph reporter visits a Royal Marine Troop base overlooking Sangin; the full title is:

Keeping sane in Sangin: life and death in Afghanistan's most perilous military posting

More British troops have been killed in Sangin than anywhere else in Afghanistan. Thomas Harding visits a base where marines eat, rest, sleep, fight - and sometimes die.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news...y-posting.html

Full of little details at the tactical level.

[Red Rat]

So what constitutes "appalling" in the context of casualties?

I would go with what the civilian response is back in the land where the casualties come from.

I would further add that the number of casualties the UK are suffering in Afghanistan is moving steadily towards the "tipping point" of public opinion. That would be a very serious situation.

I think it is less a matter of casualties and more a perceived lack of progress:

1) The number of casualties tied to one identifiable locale (Sangin) with no public perception of progress in the campaign.

2) The government sensitivity based on how they measure public opinion - focus groups and questions; much depends on the questions asked. IMHO the govt is more sensitive then the public because of this mechanism. My gut feel from the civilians I talk to (and they are not all middle aged and middle class!) is that the great British public is less concerned about the casualties and more concerned by the lack of progress.

3) Wars are expensive. Being involved in an expensive war, with no end in sight, which does not appear to be making progress at a time when the Public Sector (Government) is trying to make 25 - 40% cutbacks is hard to sell to the electorate.

There is also the fact that the public is confused as to why we are in Afghanistan, the government having given on average a different reason every 12 months for our presence there.

[Red Rat]

the attrition rate[/B].

An attrition rate sort of creeps up on you. No one big battle just the steady piecemeal loss of life.

25% is pretty bad. I think I have mentioned it before where I worked through a 1977 photo of my RLI sub-unit with and old mate and worked out that by the ceasefire (end of 1979) just more than one third of those in the photo had been killed or wounded. That was over a 2 and a half year period. I assume that the Brit figure is over their 6-month tour. That IS pretty appalling.

I quite agree, but do not confuse the attrition rate for Sangin (where we suffer a high attrition rate) with the overall attrition rate; I will see if I can dig out the figures, but there is a big difference. Apocryphally I would say that Sangin sub-units score an attrition rate of up to 40% on a bad tour (KIA, WIA and DNBI (Disease, Non-Battle Injury)) whereas other areas 5-15% is the norm.

[Red Rat]

Love him or hate him Simon Jenkins is right on the button again:

Afghanistan is a catastrophe. But we will have to wait for a new Chilcot to admit it

"Sangin should now, after three years of "hearts and minds", be safe in the hands of Afghan army and police units. It is not, any more than is the rest of Helmand..."

We are presuming that the Iraq Inquiry will be robust in its findings

In the good old days there would be robust questioning in the Houses of Parliament over the conduct of campaigns, the consequences perhaps of having parliamentarians with military experience. Now robust questioning appears to be seen as disloyal to the soldiers on the frontline and there is a misperception that the military is infallible and therefore unquestionable. Actually most of what we do is common sense and should be open to greater scrutiny. I like the US system of congressional hearings for military appointments.

We have made some shocking mistakes in Afghanistan, at every level (Strategic, (IMHO especially resourcing and aims), operational and tactical).
Some have been resolved, some have not. Some have figured on these boards, many have not !