David, Brit soldiers have died for less. Personally I believe that the "liberation" of Afghan women has been brought in to get western women behind this war.Originally Posted by davidbfpo
I believe it is worthy if any changes to the status of women can be permanent. I fear though that on the day after the ISAF forces leave many of the advances forced on the Afghan people by the West will be reversed in quick succession.
I would go further and say the it is the Pashtun people both in Afghanistan and Pakistan that are not worth dying for. The original aim of the intervention in Afghanistan (I keep reminding myself) was to prevent the then Taliban government from allowing Al-Qaeda safe-haven and a springboard for conducting operations against the US and the West.
What was learned from that strike against the then Taliban Government was that it is relatively simple to destroy the government structures of a small/third-world/Micky Mouse country whose government is out of control/committing gross human rights abuses etc etc. and force the government to hide in the hills somewhere.
But yes... it is near impossible to reconcile the current state of affairs in Afghanistan with the original intention.
Now if there was a leader waiting in the wings (like Mustafa Kemal Atatürk or Peter the Great) who was prepared to drag the Afghan people kicking and screaming into the 21st century then the West should consider providing long-term support. But for the Karzai government and its narco state? Nah.
No way to treat an amputee veteran...
Army hero who lost a leg in Afghanistan denied a disabled parking permit by council bosses 'because he might get better'
Quote:
A hero soldier who lost a leg in Afghanistan has been denied a disabled parking badge three times by council bosses...
When he first applied to Nottinghamshire County Council for a blue badge, he was advised he was young and 'may get better'.
Taliban -v- UK SAS
Maybe "spin" as the UK press annual "silly season" ends.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...targeting.htmlQuarter of senior Taliban killed by SAS in 'kill or capture' targeting
The Taliban in Helmand are being killed by the SAS on an "industrial scale" with a quarter of senior commanders killed since spring, leading to a dramatic drop in British casualties.
davidbfpo
I hope there is more this than a Ramadan influence only. There is no question that the "black army" high on resources must perform and make a considerable impact to justify their existence. The SAS properly tasked will do just that.
As to targeting the Taliban leadership. A good plan in that the experienced tactical commanders will be replaced by inexperienced kids which will play into the hands of the Brits in Helmand.
British guns used against Nato forces in Afghanistan
I do wonder why this information is in the public domain, helped by the headline above and starts with:The article indicates an in country theft, so placed here; if it had been diversion on the haul up from Karachi I would not have been so surprised.Serious questions are being asked about a cover-up by commanders in Helmand after the 59 Minimi machine guns were not reported missing for almost a year. The theft was revealed only when American forces recovered two of the guns following a battle with the Taliban.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ghanistan.html
davidbfpo
If one considers the reports on how elements of the Soviet forces sold just about anything to anyone one must anticipate that the same (maybe to differing degrees) will be happening with Brit and US equipment.
If those in the logistic chain are involved then of course you will not know what is missing because they will not report it.
As this this:
Now who really cares about Liam Fox's emotions anyway?Dr Fox was said to be “livid” and “hit the roof” when told about the incident.
Lost or stolen?
I do recall viewing some Taliban propaganda footage which showed a layout of captured and maybe "acquired" UK military equipment. On show were SA80 rifles and various items of non-lethal kit. I can from an armchair understand the later being lost or dropped, but the rifles? Yes, it was propaganda and not to be taken as accurate.
davidbfpo
Ex-Army Boss Blasts Blair And Brown On Troops
Another tell-all book, this time from General Sir Richard Dannatt
History needs to judge Dannatt and other Brit generals on what they said and did whilst in the service rather than after when their pensions were secure.The former head of the Army has accused Tony Blair and Gordon Brown of letting down British troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.
General Sir Richard Dannatt calls Mr Brown "malign" for inadequately funding the armed forces.
He also says Mr Blair lacked the "moral courage" to make his then Chancellor deliver the money needed.
Finally the Brits are out of Sangin
Something I have been saying for some time:
Blame the generals and politicians for this mess. But our soldiers can hold their heads up high
Now when I said this...(On the 20th September) The 1,000-strong British garrison of Sangin surrendered responsibility for the town, hub of a region where 106 UK personnel have died, 36 of them this year, to the U.S. Marines.
Max Hastings (the author of the article) ends thus:U.S. Marines and army officers profess to admire British soldiers, but scorn their commanders. One says of British difficulties in Helmand: 'It is their senior leadership, their officer corps and counterinsurgency doctrine that is causing the problems.'
It is impossible to fight any war without mistakes and losses, as Winston Churchill would testify. But a British officer compares our modern follies in Helmand to the Charge of the Light Brigade.
The point was made to the Iraq Inquiry last week when I gave evidence. "The quality of military strategic advice given needs to be assessed and clear accountability established for the decisions made".
Currently there is no 'Helmand Inquiry'.
Having just eavesdropped on the Brigade Commanders Course I saw further evidence of the vigorous debate ongoing in the British Army about how we got ourselves into the something of a pickle we were in. Debate is healthy and I like debate!
RR
"War is an option of difficulties"
Interesting to get a US perspective on this, because that is most definitely not the message being received by us (UK Mil) from the wider US military establishment.U.S. Marines and army officers profess to admire British soldiers, but scorn their commanders. One says of British difficulties in Helmand: 'It is their senior leadership, their officer corps and counterinsurgency doctrine that is causing the problems.'
As for doctrine - nothing wrong with UK COIN doctrine in 2001 or now; however our understanding and application of it has certainly left something to be desired.
A senior commander with experience of Iraq and Afghanistan at tactical and operational levels summarised the UK problem as being:
- A lack of appetite to take risk
- An inability to make quick decisions
- Once decisions are taken and inability to ensure that they are carried out.
All three points are inter-linked. The latter two points are not new to UK military culture and history. The first point is relatively new and relates to a phenomena thsat started off with the unpopularity of the Iraq Conflict which translated itself into an over-riding political drive not to see casualties which permeated its way all the way down the chain of command.
As for the UK Helmand strategy - that is deserving of a whole other thread in itself, looking at national strategy versus NATO strategy and the effectiveness of the C2 systems in place.
RR
"War is an option of difficulties"
Are you able to pin this malady down to a specific grade or rank level?Interesting to get a US perspective on this, because that is most definitely not the message being received by us (UK Mil) from the wider US military establishment.
As for doctrine - nothing wrong with UK COIN doctrine in 2001 or now; however our understanding and application of it has certainly left something to be desired.
A senior commander with experience of Iraq and Afghanistan at tactical and operational levels summarised the UK problem as being:
- A lack of appetite to take risk
- An inability to make quick decisions
- Once decisions are taken and inability to ensure that they are carried out.
All three points are inter-linked. The latter two points are not new to UK military culture and history. The first point is relatively new and relates to a phenomena thsat started off with the unpopularity of the Iraq Conflict which translated itself into an over-riding political drive not to see casualties which permeated its way all the way down the chain of command.
As for the UK Helmand strategy - that is deserving of a whole other thread in itself, looking at national strategy versus NATO strategy and the effectiveness of the C2 systems in place.
Are we to expect some 'retirements' anytime soon? May even break open the bottle neck for a quick advance for some young and up and coming majors?The point was made to the Iraq Inquiry last week when I gave evidence. "The quality of military strategic advice given needs to be assessed and clear accountability established for the decisions made".
Currently there is no 'Helmand Inquiry'.
Having just eavesdropped on the Brigade Commanders Course I saw further evidence of the vigorous debate ongoing in the British Army about how we got ourselves into the something of a pickle we were in. Debate is healthy and I like debate!
The risk aversion started at the strategic level and percolated down.
The slowness to take decisions has always been apparent in British military history but has I think been exacerbated by an unduely complex Defence Crisis Management Organisation which has seen overlap and duplication between the Ministry of Defence (which as well as a department of state is also an operational HQ...), our Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) and the single service HQs and Chains of Command (where again there is overlap and complexity. Overlay an ineffective (until 2009) ISAF command system and you have a recipe for mismanagement.
The inability to enforce decisions on subordinate HQs has been a hallmark of many British Generals since the 19th century. A confusion over Mission Command (what not how) leading to a marked reluctance to get involved in what is happening lower down - witness the Gallipoli Suvla Bay fiasco.
Faults at many levels, but primarily I would point at 3 star and above over the period 2003-9. I hasten to add that these views are my own and most certainly do not reflect those of Her Majesty's Government or Her Majesty's Armed Forces!
As for retirements - lots expected but that as part of an overdue pruning of senior ranks and nothing to do with performance (or not) on operations. Sadly even fewer promotion opportunities for this old and bold major!
RR
"War is an option of difficulties"
Once Chilcot and the Defence Review is finished I believe that will be the time when the military internally and in private should deal with the issues which have been exposed through Basra and Helmand. Just quietly get on with the job and do what is necessary. Important this is completed before NI comes to the boil again.The risk aversion started at the strategic level and percolated down.
The slowness to take decisions has always been apparent in British military history but has I think been exacerbated by an unduely complex Defence Crisis Management Organisation which has seen overlap and duplication between the Ministry of Defence (which as well as a department of state is also an operational HQ...), our Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) and the single service HQs and Chains of Command (where again there is overlap and complexity. Overlay an ineffective (until 2009) ISAF command system and you have a recipe for mismanagement.
The inability to enforce decisions on subordinate HQs has been a hallmark of many British Generals since the 19th century. A confusion over Mission Command (what not how) leading to a marked reluctance to get involved in what is happening lower down - witness the Gallipoli Suvla Bay fiasco.
Faults at many levels, but primarily I would point at 3 star and above over the period 2003-9. I hasten to add that these views are my own and most certainly do not reflect those of Her Majesty's Government or Her Majesty's Armed Forces!
As for retirements - lots expected but that as part of an overdue pruning of senior ranks and nothing to do with performance (or not) on operations. Sadly even fewer promotion opportunities for this old and bold major!
Interesting.
From the trends that were quite visible before I retired and for this now outsider looking in, I'd say that for the US Forces (Yes, Virginia, the Marines as well...) those same three factors are major problems that impact everything else, not only operationally but, more importantly for the future, training and education wise.
It is my perception that those factors are forced by societal pressures, legislative failure, only marginal training and flawed personnel systems that insist everyone of like grade or rank can do everything required of that rank and which virtually dictate a head in sand approach while strongly discouraging the summary firing of the inept.
The first two factors are beyond the control of the Forces; the last two generally are not.
UK Parliament holds its first full Afghanistan debate
I've been away from the news and the web, so catching up.
Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den for the reference to the debate:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot....irst-full.html
There is a link to the official Hansard record too.
A Labour MP and critic is cited:Now, as for the departure from Sangin, which was announced sometime ago and happened after the debate. Yes, there have been a series of comments and reports - none are persuasive, even Max Hastings. Nor am I convinced the USMC with greater resources have the answer.We have heard optimism, and nothing but, year after year and in debate after debate, when they have told us that we have turned the corner. The Deputy Prime Minister used the same expression the other day, saying that things are going well now and we just have to hang on. We have turned so many corners that we have been around the block half a dozen times in Afghanistan, but we are still in hell and the situation is still getting worse. We believe in the possibility that the Afghan national army can take over, but it is mainly drug addicted and it routinely oppresses its own people.
(My emphasis)In one incident, 300 members of the Afghan army were guarding a convoy when they were attacked by seven members of the Taliban and they fled, with their commander saying, "Why should they sacrifice their lives and kill fellow Afghans in order to defend a corrupt leader from a different clan and to promote the policies of a foreign country?" Indeed, one is entitled to ask that.
At the weekend there was a flurry of reports on the Army deflecting cuts in its strength, to enable the Afghan campaign to continue and thanks to a knowledgeable outsider that still means a tour every two years. This is one story, sorry 'spin":http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/arti...scape-axe.html
davidbfpo
I have been thinking about this.
Risk taking in war should be calculated. If a commander does not have the info and intel on which to base the decision to take a calculated risk then should he just blunder in and to hell with the consequences? I don't think so. However, if the indecision is based on a character defect then the question should be how the selection system failed to screen these people out.
Decisions. I remember the DS standing over us as officer cadets on field exercises shouting "what are you going to do now?" I can remember the looks on the faces of those who were overawed by the situation they found themselves in while those who were able to read the situation and make a quick plan were the ones that made it through to commissioning. I remember later as a DS myself searching the faces of assorted cadets in similar situations for the spark we were looking for. Then there was the school of thought that said any decision is better than no decision. One should move one step further and select for those who can make educated decisions rapidly in the heat of battle. It starts at the lowest level where the commander in the field constantly asks himself "if we came under fire now what would I do?" Then all the way up the line commanders should constantly be asking themselves "what if?" Then to be fair it appears that having to seek authority from higher command to do just about anything is sure to take the edge off the best warriors. A good commander would of course seek pre-authorisation of what he anticipates.
I'm not sure I understand exactly what the third point is about. Can it be anything other than incompetence?
Last edited by JMA; 09-24-2010 at 08:28 AM.
David, we discussed the ANA briefly earlier in another thread where there was evidence of blind optimism of the potential of the ANA in certain quarters.
The quote from the MP:
ISAF are on a hiding to nothing with this shower.In one incident, 300 members of the Afghan army were guarding a convoy when they were attacked by seven members of the Taliban and they fled, with their commander saying, "Why should they sacrifice their lives and kill fellow Afghans in order to defend a corrupt leader from a different clan and to promote the policies of a foreign country?"
Risk. Risk is calculated, if there is no element of calculation then it sees to be 'risk' and becomes a gamble. I suspect that we have seen a de facto politicisation (small 'p') of the armed forces in the sense that Iraq was a very unpopular war. This translated into a great deal of political pressure not to take casualties which had the effect of reducing the amount of risk that commanders were willing to take.
It is a moot point as to whether this was entirely bad as at the strategic level too many casualties may well have resulted in the collapse of the government and a unilateral withdrawal from Iraq.
However it is felt that we may have developed some risk averse commanders, and it is also felt that the relationship between very senior officers and their political masters needs reassessed and put on a new footing. They quite possibly failed to carry out their respective functions adequately; a case of mutual incomprehension perhaps?
As for the inability to impose decisions. A hallmark of British command style has been the misapplication of 'Mission Command' where 'Tell them what to do but not how' has resulted in subordinate units going somewhat rogue. Another way of putting it is that orders are very often seen as the basis for discussion and not necessarily implementation..So superior HQ says 'do X'. Subordinate says 'I am doing X' but does 'Y', and the superior HQ does not enforce the doing of 'X'. Confused? I am and that is why it so often 'muddles along' in a typically British fashion.
There is a bit of a clear out happening at the moment and lots of these practices are being sorted - people being shown the error of their ways!
RR
"War is an option of difficulties"
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