The UK in Afghanistan

[Ken White]

...I suspect that we have seen a de facto politicisation (small 'p') of the armed forces in the sense that Iraq was a very unpopular war. This translated into a great deal of political pressure not to take casualties which had the effect of reducing the amount of risk that commanders were willing to take.

Quite true. That occurred in the US Army as a result of Viet Nam. That actually had some precursors in Korea where, after the lines stabilized and the Outpost war began in late 1952, a lot of senior people found they had little to do and began to worry and fret a great deal about very little.

It was, as you say, exacerbated in Iraq and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan. I think that's partly attributable to the adversarial media-military relationship which has always existed but gets more credence today due to more widespread and rapid communication capability. Your follow on point is also correct. It's a mixture of good and bad, not terribly harmful in these kinds of wars and will disappear fairly quickly in major combat operations...

As for the inability to impose decisions. A hallmark of British command style has been the misapplication of 'Mission Command' where 'Tell them what to do but not how' has resulted in subordinate units going somewhat rogue.

Also true with respect to the US. Though in our case, it has an interesting permutation due to the extent of bureaucratic reach. Subordinates are allowed maximum tactical latitude -- and take it, as they should -- but are administratively constrained to behave in certain ways. The effective result is remarkable compliance on unimportant minutia and somewhat remarkable lack of compliance on things tactical.

Then there's the human aspect. As a friend of mine once told me "When I was a Lieutenant, I told people one time and things got done; when I was a Captain, I had to tell 'em twice. As a Battalion Commander, it took three or four times and as a Colonel, even more. Sometimes it didn't get done at all..." As the relative rank (and / or experience) of the subordinate increases, the perceived latitude to do it their way increases. Probably exponentially.

Consider also that in an existential war, noncompliance brings death, destruction or, at a minimum, relief for cause. In the Armed Forces of democratic societies involved in lesser situations, there is little to no punishment or penalty for failures to obey. Relief is frowned upon, requires the Personnel Wallas to additional work. Add the fact that often, the 'noncompliance' is generally not really harmful other than to the ego of the very senior personage whose wishes were at least partly ignored and it's a perfectly natural and understandable phenomenon.

The real downside of selective application (or, if one thinks negatively, selective neglect...) is that, in peacetime, it inadvertently and unfortunately encourages excessive centralization, micromanagement and over supervision; UAVs that peer over Commander's shoulders; decisions to deny support from TOCs miles away from the action...

It can be partially ameliorated by less bureaucracy and better training. It can be less a perceptual problem if senior people realize "...it doesn't have to be my way to work." IOW, we talk 'mission orders' but a lot of folks -- too many -- don't really mean it when they say that...

[JMA]

As for the inability to impose decisions. A hallmark of British command style has been the misapplication of 'Mission Command' where 'Tell them what to do but not how' has resulted in subordinate units going somewhat rogue. Another way of putting it is that orders are very often seen as the basis for discussion and not necessarily implementation.. So superior HQ says 'do X'. Subordinate says 'I am doing X' but does 'Y', and the superior HQ does not enforce the doing of 'X'. Confused? I am and that is why it so often 'muddles along' in a typically British fashion.

Its all a little like asking when does delegation become abdication.

As to 'Tell them what to do but not how'. I suggest the more conventional the type of operation or if the level of experience the subordinate commander has generally or in the specific theatre is low then the more "guidance" required.

In a COIN setting it is sometimes difficult to know what tasked units are actually doing. This gets worse when circumstances, or the lack of will, prevent senior commanders visiting their 'forward' units and sub-units.

During the time when I was a young troop commander (dealing harshly with dissidents) my OC was a Sandhurst Sword-of-Honour. He would brief me and then say I should go away and make my plan and then come back and let him know what I proposed to do. This worked two ways. It gave him the chance to steer me (and no doubt the others) if needed and it allowed him to mark the Ops map with routes, emergency RVs and the like in case a situation developed. Debriefs were pretty solid too with going maps and the like marked up and passed on where necessary.

Also I believe if the type of tasking is "routine" there is understandably less interest from higher commanders as to what is going on all the time. We have discussed this elsewhere and (I say again) patrolling for the sake of patrolling is a sole destroying form of soldiering. Of course the whole situation gets worse when forces are widely dispersed to the extent where even more control is lost.

So it is indeed a delicate balancing act. As a commander I used to deploy with the troops if the op involved two thirds of my force (is this not still the rule of thumb?). Either attach my self to a call sign of take three men and go and command the op from on top of a nearby hill.

We need to remember the aim. As the commander I have to ensure that my command achieves the mission given to me. I then need to make sure my men do what is necessary so we succeed. I can't sit back and let subordinates just get on with it.

Interesting bit of history for you on this the CO of 1RAR (Rhodesian African Rifles) - from a WW2 Gurkha Regiment and then Malaya - fired three of his company commanders after the first big insurgency op "for not having what it takes". (Man did he knock that battalion into shape.)

So one does not need to micro-manage but one has to command in battle. And for those who don't know the difference should be put on a plane back home without delay.

There is a bit of a clear out happening at the moment and lots of these practices are being sorted - people being shown the error of their ways!

This process will become clear as it develops no doubt.

[Red Rat]

It was, as you say, exacerbated in Iraq and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan. I think that's partly attributable to the adversarial media-military relationship which has always existed but gets more credence today due to more widespread and rapid communication capability.

Certainly the UK's media efforts appear to be poor for a variety of factors. The main emphasis on the Ministry of Defence Press Office is to minimise embarrassment to the Government. Good news story's are okay, but anything hinting of controversy has to be cleared at a high level, which means it is inevitably:

• Late
• Discredited - through attempts to minimise any controversy and paint a rosy picture.

Subordinates are allowed maximum tactical latitude -- and take it, as they should -- but are administratively constrained to behave in certain ways. The effective result is remarkable compliance on unimportant minutia and somewhat remarkable lack of compliance on things tactical.

Good point. I have noticed that at battalion and brigade level US units have much much more leeway then UK units for tactical aspects, but seemingly less for the minutiae; with the UK the opposite appears to be true.

Then there's the human aspect. As a friend of mine once told me "When I was a Lieutenant, I told people one time and things got done; when I was a Captain, I had to tell 'em twice. As a Battalion Commander, it took three or four times and as a Colonel, even more. Sometimes it didn't get done at all..." As the relative rank (and / or experience) of the subordinate increases, the perceived latitude to do it their way increases. Probably exponentially.

I think the Uk is exactly the same here, although this current crop of brigade commanders is reigning in the unit commanders somewhat.

Consider also that in an existential war, noncompliance brings death, destruction or, at a minimum, relief for cause. In the Armed Forces of democratic societies involved in lesser situations, there is little to no punishment or penalty for failures to obey. Relief is frowned upon, requires the Personnel Wallas to additional work. Add the fact that often, the 'noncompliance' is generally not really harmful other than to the ego of the very senior personage whose wishes were at least partly ignored and it's a perfectly natural and understandable phenomenon.

Yup. We tend to shuffle people quietly sideways if they do not perform. I continue to be vociferous in UK army circles at my surprise at how few commanders at all levels have been relieved since we started ops in 2002. The rate is nowhere near the historical rate of 1940 or the Korean Conflict. Part of it is I suspect the impact of 6 month tours (or less for many commanders) where it is easy to 'muddle through' and weaknesses are not highlighted.

It can be partially ameliorated by less bureaucracy and better training. It can be less a perceptual problem if senior people realize "...it doesn't have to be my way to work." IOW, we talk 'mission orders' but a lot of folks -- too many -- don't really mean it when they say that...

Agree with the better training. I think the British Army is currently chronically undertraining and the training is focused almost entirely on Afghanistan. This is resulting in a lack of breadth and professional depth. Units and commanders are not getting the chance to experiment and learn their profession. I fear we are storing up chronic problems for the future.

[Ken White]

It appears both our Armies may have that problem:

Agree with the better training. I think the British Army is currently chronically undertraining and the training is focused almost entirely on Afghanistan. This is resulting in a lack of breadth and professional depth. Units and commanders are not getting the chance to experiment and learn their profession. I fear we are storing up chronic problems for the future.

[JMA]

Agree with the better training. I think the British Army is currently chronically undertraining and the training is focused almost entirely on Afghanistan. This is resulting in a lack of breadth and professional depth. Units and commanders are not getting the chance to experiment and learn their profession. I fear we are storing up chronic problems for the future.

We have been through this all before. The argument that Afghanistan deployments are distracting Brit training for other types of warfare in other locations is just the outcome of yet another poor decision.

If a brigades worth of troops, support and relevant HQ had been permanently stationed in the theatre from the get go then the armour and other units would have been able to continue their normal training for the next war without the distraction of a 6 month Afghanistan tour every 2 years.

There are certainly enough warriors in the Brit army (or available to the Brit army) across all ranks to have done this successfully while allowing the "professionals" to training in earnest for some future unknown war which may never come without the annoying distraction of actually fighting a real war in between.

Another Brit own goal I'm afraid.

[Ken White]

We have been through this all before.

In the course of which several people have told you that what you suggest is tactically and militarily sound and a great idea but unfortunately it is politically impossible in today's soft western societies (plus the Wives get upset and they vote...) so it just is not going to happen.

Another Brit own goal I'm afraid.

Uh, no -- one of yours, I'm afraid.

Or to paraphrase Einstein, writing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results is futile.

[JMA]

In the course of which several people have told you that what you suggest is tactically and militarily sound and a great idea but unfortunately it is politically impossible in today's soft western societies (plus the Wives get upset and they vote...) so it just is not going to happen.

I disagree.

The Brits are about to undertake major changes and reforms within their military. The economic climate and the failures out of Basra and Helmand will help them to think a little out of the box.

I raised the point (again) because a problem has been identified which has been caused by churning a number of units through Afghanistan on 6 month tours. It would be too much to expect the Brits to review in some critical detail what burns up the 18 months between Afghanistan tours that could distract from the preparation for some theoretical future war so I chose to stick with what I know would work.

The Brit PM says that he expects a Brit military presence in Afghanistan up to 2015. They can fix this problem right now if there was the will.

Here is an example of the debate that is happening in the UK right now:

British failure in Sangin

[davidbfpo]

A partial citation from JMA:

The Brit PM says that he expects a Brit military presence in Afghanistan up to 2015. They can fix this problem right now if there was the will.

Leaving aside the lack of public support for the Afghan campaign (80% plus opposition) and the lack of political will my own suggestion is to recruit the Brigade of Gurkha's back to full strength and deploy them. Add in other units on shorter tours. Yes, they are mercenaries, Buddhists and there area a host of issues involved.

[JMA]

A partial citation from JMA:

Leaving aside the lack of public support for the Afghan campaign (80% plus opposition) and the lack of political will my own suggestion is to recruit the Brigade of Gurkha's back to full strength and deploy them. Add in other units on shorter tours. Yes, they are mercenaries, Buddhists and there area a host of issues involved.

Good thinking David. I would certainly post the two battalions permanently there and let them rotate internally. To achieve this one would need to increase the size of each battalion by two companies so as to ensure that there are always four rifle companies supported by elements from and also enlarged Support Company always on ops. Not difficult to achieve.

[Ken White]

They can fix this problem right now if there was the will.

That would seem to be the problem -- and it's totally political...

As would be increasing the Gurkhas...

[JMA]

That would seem to be the problem -- and it's totally political...

As would be increasing the Gurkhas...

Only partially political. If the military thought it through and presented it as part of the defence review it would most likely be accepted. No real additional costs just a different application of forces.

Yes increasing the Gurkhas may be a hard sell if not thought through in detail and presented as part of the review. An additional four companies of Gurkhas should be possible if the army has the will.

[Red Rat]

This is almost entirely political!

• The politicians would have to increase the size of the the Gurkha contingent at a the same time as they make lots of British citizens redundant within the military. That has political connotations.
  
• Gurkhas are no longer cheaper then British soldiers - so we increase one part of the military (at cost) while we decrease other parts... Again a difficult one to sell politically.
  
• The move would imply a degree of concrete commitment to Afghanistan that the UK Government would, I believe, find it difficult to make (all Governments find it difficult to make concrete commitments ); a political issue.
  
• Stationing troops permanently in Afghanistan would mean there is no Afghanistan rationale to maintain the envisaged 6 brigade structure, therefore it is hard to see how the army could maintain its current force structure; we would become a 4 brigade army (currently we have 7 manoeuvre brigades not including 3 Cde Bde (Fleet)). This is inter-service politics

I am not saying that your idea does not make good operational sense, and I get as frustrated as anyone else by some of the things that both the Army and the Government are or are not doing. The question is repeatedly asked, how can an army of 100,000 only commit to 10,000 on enduring operations - it is intuitively not efficient.
Sadly operational logic only goes so far. For example the ongoing Strategic Security and Defence Review is noted by lacking any sort of coherent strategic thought and being driven almost entirely by Treasury 'bottom line' issues - despite the fact that the Government cannot even decide what the 'bottom line' is, and whether the 'Trident replacement' (£20bn) is included in this bottom line or not.

[Red Rat]

talking about the context of current UK defence planning made two pertinent points:

• As a country we are almost bankrupt
• The 'Main Effort' (Afghanistan) is not the only effort

[JMA]

This is almost entirely political!

• The politicians would have to increase the size of the the Gurkha contingent at a the same time as they make lots of British citizens redundant within the military. That has political connotations.
  
• Gurkhas are no longer cheaper then British soldiers - so we increase one part of the military (at cost) while we decrease other parts... Again a difficult one to sell politically.
  
• The move would imply a degree of concrete commitment to Afghanistan that the UK Government would, I believe, find it difficult to make (all Governments find it difficult to make concrete commitments ); a political issue.
  
• Stationing troops permanently in Afghanistan would mean there is no Afghanistan rationale to maintain the envisaged 6 brigade structure, therefore it is hard to see how the army could maintain its current force structure; we would become a 4 brigade army (currently we have 7 manoeuvre brigades not including 3 Cde Bde (Fleet)). This is inter-service politics

Great Scott!

Remind me if you will what I would have been taught about appreciations which under "Own Courses" had no advantages and all disadvantages?

So here we have 4 disadvantages and no advantages.

I think I would have been sent off to look for some advantages, yes?

OK, so I went along with Davids idea of increasing the the Gurkhas when my initial comment did not specifically include them. So maybe just exclude them or... maybe try to introduce a Commonwealth component into the Brit contribution to Afghanistan. Haven't India got some 39 Battalions of Gurkhas?

I am not saying that your idea does not make good operational sense, and I get as frustrated as anyone else by some of the things that both the Army and the Government are or are not doing. The question is repeatedly asked, how can an army of 100,000 only commit to 10,000 on enduring operations - it is intuitively not efficient.

But the question that should be asked is why can't an army of 100,000 sustain a 10,000 man presence in Afghanistan? That would direct the attention to the 18 months between Afghanistan tours. I would suggest that a long list of "nice to do" stuff could be excluded there. Take a big thick red pen to that list!... and accept that the army is there for just such an eventuality as Afghanistan and get in there with your head down for as long as it takes.

Yes I know part of the Afghanistan problem has been the attrition rate (both KIA and grievously WIA) 70% of which were IED related. Is there any progress as to the acceptance that more tactical innovation could have reduced the scale of this particular carnage?

Efficiency is a product of how the troops are used. If the Brit army can't maintain 10% of its troops in a war theatre then I suggest the Brit army has bigger problems than they care to admit... and the problem is not Afghanistan. See earlier comment about best use of 18 months between tours and the casualty issue... and then turn the PTSD factor into finite factor and not allow it to be used as an emotional bogey man only for emotional effect.

Sadly operational logic only goes so far. For example the ongoing Strategic Security and Defence Review is noted by lacking any sort of coherent strategic thought and being driven almost entirely by Treasury 'bottom line' issues - despite the fact that the Government cannot even decide what the 'bottom line' is, and whether the 'Trident replacement' (£20bn) is included in this bottom line or not.

"Bottom line issues"? Well if any military managed quite well on next to nothing it was our little Rhodesian army/air force. There are a number of originally Sandhurst trained and now retired types lurking in the UK who could pass on a few tips... if asked. But that would never happen would it.

But maybe its just an excuse that the army will use for not presenting an intelligent case to treasury in the first place? Maybe the military needs to go "outside" and get help from these corporate turnaround specialists. For that to work the military would need to be prepared to address some of its scared cows. How close to the edge the Brit economy needs to go before it will force the military to extract digit time only will tell.

[JMA]

talking about the context of current UK defence planning made two pertinent points:

• As a country we are almost bankrupt
• The 'Main Effort' (Afghanistan) is not the only effort

Near bankrupt? Simple, borrow money from China (ask them/beg them to buy government bonds).

Only 10% of the effort needs to be directed at Afghanistan. Ring fence it and allocate the 10% in the correct and intelligent manner and then let the rest play war games and prepare for the next big war which may never come. Make this the project for the next Command and Staff Course. It is as easy as that.

[Red Rat]

Great Scott!

Remind me if you will what I would have been taught about appreciations which under "Own Courses" had no advantages and all disadvantages?

So here we have 4 disadvantages and no advantages.

Yup, but I was only raising the issues which had a political dimension, not advantages and disadvantages. I did say that I recognised there were operational advantages!

OK, so I went along with Davids idea of increasing the the Gurkhas when my initial comment did not specifically include them. So maybe just exclude them or... maybe try to introduce a Commonwealth component into the Brit contribution to Afghanistan. Haven't India got some 39 Battalions of Gurkhas?

It is not a Commonwealth problem per se, so I doubt the Commonwealth would wish to get involved. As for Indian troops in Afghanistan - Pakistan would never countenance that. The ISI appears convinced that India lies behind most of its Baluchistan problems, let alone their FATA problems.

But the question that should be asked is why can't an army of 100,000 sustain a 10,000 man presence in Afghanistan? That would direct the attention to the 18 months between Afghanistan tours. I would suggest that a long list of "nice to do" stuff could be excluded there. Take a big thick red pen to that list!... and accept that the army is there for just such an eventuality as Afghanistan and get in there with your head down for as long as it takes.

Most of the stuff between tours is training, and yes we can be more efficient at it, much more. But the more efficient we are the smaller we will be. Currently we have circa 10,000 troops in Afghanistan. If we did year on, year off with 10,000 then we need 20,000 to meet the overall operational commitment and a little more to meet the training and home defence requirements. Lets be generous and say another 20,000. So we need an overall army size of 40,000 to meet the commitment instead of the current 100,000. Immediately the pressure is on to cut 60,000 troops

But maybe its just an excuse that the army will use for not presenting an intelligent case to treasury in the first place? Maybe the military needs to go "outside" and get help from these corporate turnaround specialists. For that to work the military would need to be prepared to address some of its scared cows. How close to the edge the Brit economy needs to go before it will force the military to extract digit time only will tell.

The problem is that is should not be the Army going to the Treasury. It should be the Government telling Defence what tasks it needs to do in order to help enable the Government's strategy to maintain our National Interests. Defence (tri-Service plus) then goes off to resource this and comes back to the Treasury with the bill; at which point the haggling starts. Currently however we do not know what our National Interests are, let alone what strategy we should adopt!

[JMA]

Yup, but I was only raising the issues which had a political dimension, not advantages and disadvantages. I did say that I recognised there were operational advantages!

Two of the four points related to the Gurkhas which may not work politically but the Gurkha issue was inserted by David. So lets drop it then.

That leaves two.

The apparent commitment issue. Well I could think of a way to apply some spin to this and that would be simply that hitherto the Brit involvement in Afghanistan has been half-assed and the new government is committed to see the Brit commitment through to the bitter end. There the plan will be to commit troops to Afghanistan on a decreasing scale in support of the ISAF effort to get the job done. This approach would also release the other specialised troops to return to their core military role and make sure that they can return to their core training without further distraction.

And on point four. Ah... so Afghanistan tours are deemed essential to the very existence of certain regiments? I must admit I was surprised to read elsewhere of the thought to disband the paras and maintain the marines (the claim being that there are more or as many marines are para trained?). You see these generals have been bleating that the Afghan tours have been interfering with other aspects so let them spell out what these important other aspects were and are that they wish to keep the non Afghanistan involved troops occupied with. We need to remember what the new CDS said in June this year:

Gen Richards rejected suggestions that the Army was ''over-focused'' on Afghanistan and insisted that its heavy involvement in the conflict had made it stronger.

You have a comment on this statement?

It is not a Commonwealth problem per se, so I doubt the Commonwealth would wish to get involved. As for Indian troops in Afghanistan - Pakistan would never countenance that. The ISI appears convinced that India lies behind most of its Baluchistan problems, let alone their FATA problems.

Won't be the first time the commonwealth has come to the assistance of the mother country. I wouldn't have thought that Pakistan would be in any position to dictate anything would you? Part of the crisis at the moment is through the unintended consequence of funneling all the aid for the mujahideen through Pakistan. Pakistan did very nicely out of that and took the US and Brits and other donors to the cleaners. Aside: Personally I would ask India to provide troops to secure the non-Pashtun areas. The Pashtun connection is the rotten thread running through the region.

Most of the stuff between tours is training, and yes we can be more efficient at it, much more. But the more efficient we are the smaller we will be. Currently we have circa 10,000 troops in Afghanistan. If we did year on, year off with 10,000 then we need 20,000 to meet the overall operational commitment and a little more to meet the training and home defence requirements. Lets be generous and say another 20,000. So we need an overall army size of 40,000 to meet the commitment instead of the current 100,000. Immediately the pressure is on to cut 60,000 troops

I believe the ceremonial stuff is about to go (remember the response my comment about guarding palaces brought on?).

But seriously, what is filling the 18 months between Afghanistan tours which preclude the various formations/units from being ready for the next big war?

Lets look at where we can free up some soldiers shall we?

1. the Gurkha battalion out in Brunei.
2. the two battalions out in Cyrus.
3. the Armoured Div out in Germany.
4. the reported 3,700 troops out in the Middle East

What if any future there may be for the Armoured Div should be decided based upon the motivation put forward by the military/army.

For the rest a further 5,000 odd troops could be freed up to bolster the forces in Afghanistan or...

The idea is to have forces large enough to protect the island and to take part in foreign interventions as per the foreign policy of the time. The military needs to motivate why its needs its current strength and if it can't ...

The problem is that is should not be the Army going to the Treasury. It should be the Government telling Defence what tasks it needs to do in order to help enable the Government's strategy to maintain our National Interests. Defence (tri-Service plus) then goes off to resource this and comes back to the Treasury with the bill; at which point the haggling starts. Currently however we do not know what our National Interests are, let alone what strategy we should adopt!

Well if the Army sits on its hands expecting others to do the work for them they are likely to be disappointed, yes?

I watched Gen Jackson and Lt Col Tootal on Sky-TV last night and noted that they admitted that the military had absolutely no idea what the military should be preparing for. Am I to understand that unless there is an official politically ordered Defence Review the Brit military will just sit on its hands and do nothing off its own bat? Sounds like it. Maybe that's part of the problem?

Trident seems to be the budget killer.

Now I see this Liam Fox is fueling the crisis with the innuendo that defence cut backs will adversely affect the troops in Afghanistan? How so? I would have thought that by slimming down the military, getting rid of the deadwood and freeing up resources for use in Afghanistan it would be an overall improvement (not to mention the improved focus), yes?

I have maintained that the principle Brit problem with Afghanistan has been that they have treated this as a pain in the butt requirement that has to be fitted into an otherwise enjoyable peacetime schedule. Instead of spreading the load they should focus the load more narrowly on troops best suited for the operational requirements in theatre. There are many operational benefits from such a system and the only counter has been the guess that it would lead to a higher incidence of PTSD.

To save itself from arbitrary cuts the military should present its case without delay. If they haven't thought out a case then they deserve whatever comes their way.

[Red Rat]

That leaves two.

The apparent commitment issue. Well I could think of a way to apply some spin to this and that would be simply that hitherto the Brit involvement in Afghanistan has been half-assed and the new government is committed to see the Brit commitment through to the bitter end. There the plan will be to commit troops to Afghanistan on a decreasing scale in support of the ISAF effort to get the job done. This approach would also release the other specialised troops to return to their core military role and make sure that they can return to their core training without further distraction.

No, the new government commitment is to draw down as soon as possible while not being seen to cut and run. It is in line with the US government's aims. The war is seen as both politically unwinnable and hugely expensive.

And on point four. Ah... so Afghanistan tours are deemed essential to the very existence of certain regiments? I must admit I was surprised to read elsewhere of the thought to disband the paras and maintain the marines (the claim being that there are more or as many marines are para trained?). You see these generals have been bleating that the Afghan tours have been interfering with other aspects so let them spell out what these important other aspects were and are that they wish to keep the non Afghanistan involved troops occupied with. We need to remember what the new CDS said in June this year:

What is at stake is not the existence of certain regiments, but the size and shape of the army and the wider military. Lots of regiments are going to go, no-one I know in the army is overly sentimental about that, but joe public (and therefore politicians) are. As the character of warfare changes so do armies.

As for the then CGS's comments, we may be stronger for Afghanistan, but we are now entirely focused on Afghanistan . That is fine if you anticipate that all future conflicts will be like Afghanistan, but of concern if you think we need to maintain a balanced skillset. Currently the government has told us that their analysis of future conflict requires us to maintain a balanced skillset.

Won't be the first time the commonwealth has come to the assistance of the mother country. I wouldn't have thought that Pakistan would be in any position to dictate anything would you?

Pakistan is the strategic concern, not Afghanistan. Putting Indian troops into Afganistan would put the Pakistan government into an untenable position and unit Pakistan against Coalition efforts in Afghanistan. It would likely result in even less (if any) cooperation in efforts in Afghanistan and the border regions and lead to a significant deterioration in the strategic situation.

I believe the ceremonial stuff is about to go (remember the response my comment about guarding palaces brought on?).

We don't want to do the ceremonial stuff, but it is a mandated task given to us by the government. Everytime we have tried to call quits on it we have been told to soldier on. Happy to do so so long as someone else pays for it!

My comments in blue.

Lets look at where we can free up some soldiers shall we?

1. the Gurkha battalion out in Brunei. Committed to Afghanistan but is paid for by the Sultan of Brunei, so essentially is a free bn while in Brunei.
2. the two battalions out in Cyrus. commited to Sovereign Base Protection Duties (1 bn) and Theatre Reserve Battalion (Afganistan) (1 bn)
3. the Armoured Div out in Germany. committed to Afghanistan (7 bde deploys in Summer 11, 20bde in Winter 11)
4. the reported 3,700 troops out in the Middle East No units or formations permanently committed to the Middle East and I am not aware of any exercises going on, so I am not sure where this number has come from.

What if any future there may be for the Armoured Div should be decided based upon the motivation put forward by the military/army.

The future of the armoured capability depends on the military anaysis of the types of conflict that are likely to occur in the future and the political analysis of the types of conflict the UK is likely to get involved with in the future. The UK analysis is that future conflicts will see a requirement for an armoured capability of some sort. We are still waiting for the governments analysis of the type of conflicts we are likely to get involved in.

The idea is to have forces large enough to protect the island and to take part in foreign interventions as per the foreign policy of the time. The military needs to motivate why its needs its current strength and if it can't ...

You have hit the nail on the head! And the government has yet to articulate what the foreign policy and security strategy will be! So we have been asked to reconfigure our forces without understanding what we are going to be used for...

I watched Gen Jackson and Lt Col Tootal on Sky-TV last night and noted that they admitted that the military had absolutely no idea what the military should be preparing for. Am I to understand that unless there is an official politically ordered Defence Review the Brit military will just sit on its hands and do nothing off its own bat? Sounds like it. Maybe that's part of the problem?

No, the point is the military cannot make up its own jobs, it gets on with what it has been told to do. We implement strategic policy, we do not formulate strategic policy. Currently the government has told it to do certain military tasks, but has not funded it to do them. It is currently reviewing these military tasks but has not told the military what military tasks it expects us to do; but has asked us to rebalance in order to do them...

Trident seems to be the budget killer.

Plus the fact that in order to meet the defence budget as planned we already have to make cuts of 5% and that is before we start to implement any cuts as part of the comprehensive spending review. Trident is a de facto additional cut as it never used to come from the defence budget.

Now I see this Liam Fox is fueling the crisis with the innuendo that defence cut backs will adversely affect the troops in Afghanistan? How so? I would have thought that by slimming down the military, getting rid of the deadwood and freeing up resources for use in Afghanistan it would be an overall improvement (not to mention the improved focus), yes?

I think Dr Fox is throwing a red herring in terms of troops in Afghanistan. We can cut back extensively and still support troops in Afghanistan, it just makes us a one trick pony. The defence review and comprehensive spending review is not going to affect troops in Afghanistan.

I have maintained that the principle Brit problem with Afghanistan has been that they have treated this as a pain in the butt requirement that has to be fitted into an otherwise enjoyable peacetime schedule. Instead of spreading the load they should focus the load more narrowly on troops best suited for the operational requirements in theatre. There are many operational benefits from such a system and the only counter has been the guess that it would lead to a higher incidence of PTSD.

I quite agree that the UK military has treated Afghanistan as being on operations and not being in a fight to win it. That is partly reflective of failings in our military command, and partly the result of strategic direction. In Iraq for instance we accomplished what we were told to do - but it still left a sour taste in the mouth.

But in-theatre operational benefits have to be balanced against strategic implications. Afghanistan is not 'Britain's war', it is NATO's war. It is not a war for national survival, it is an (optional) war of perceived national interest.

To save itself from arbitrary cuts the military should present its case without delay. If they haven't thought out a case then they deserve whatever comes their way.

The military has presented its case which is that we cannot do what we have been told to do with the resources that are currently allocated to us. We can (and we accept this) become more efficient, but the issue will still remain overly committed and under-resourced. That situation can only be corrected by either increasing reources (highly unlikely) or cutting commitments. The government has refused to cut commitments to date. This is not really an Army issue, the main concern is with the RAF and the RN. Already the RN is failing to meet its mandated military tasks because it is too small.

As an army officer I am on record as saying that I think we need to draw down the Army, reconfigure the RAF and maintain or increase the size of the Navy.

[JMA]

No, the new government commitment is to draw down as soon as possible while not being seen to cut and run. It is in line with the US government's aims. The war is seen as both politically unwinnable and hugely expensive.

Well you see what the politicians have done with barley a peep out of the senior ranks of the military. The first five years are approached on a half ass'd basis while the last five years are not deemed important enough to take it seriously even at the end. Its a disgrace.

Iraq will be defined as a failure of British intervention. As far as Afghanistan is concerned it was treated as a sideshow from beginning to end with predictable results. Is this so when the military failure in Afghanistan is raised the stock excusing response can be "oh but it was just a sideshow".

What is at stake is not the existence of certain regiments, but the size and shape of the army and the wider military. Lots of regiments are going to go, no-one I know in the army is overly sentimental about that, but joe public (and therefore politicians) are. As the character of warfare changes so do armies.

Oh? When my regiment was disbanded I was gutted. Can't believe tha Brit army cares not about such matters. A case of maintaining a stiff upper lip?

As for the then CGS's comments, we may be stronger for Afghanistan, but we are now entirely focused on Afghanistan . That is fine if you anticipate that all future conflicts will be like Afghanistan, but of concern if you think we need to maintain a balanced skillset. Currently the government has told us that their analysis of future conflict requires us to maintain a balanced skillset.

Maybe you can explain to me how the Brit army can be entirely focused on Afghanistan when they only have 10% of their force level committed there at any one time?

Representing 25% of participating units time the balance of 75% is surely enough to allow adequate time for a professional army to balance their skillset? Methinks that Afghanistan is becoming the scapegoat for bigger problems elsewhere perhaps?

Pakistan is the strategic concern, not Afghanistan. Putting Indian troops into Afganistan would put the Pakistan government into an untenable position and unit Pakistan against Coalition efforts in Afghanistan. It would likely result in even less (if any) cooperation in efforts in Afghanistan and the border regions and lead to a significant deterioration in the strategic situation.

Pakistan is only a strategic concern because they were allowed to develop nuclear weapons. They have been allowed to assume greater importance vis-à-vis Afghanistan because they convinced the CIA/State Department to channel of the funds through them for the mujahideen. Who let this otherwise Mickey Mouse country rise up to sit at the top table?

We don't want to do the ceremonial stuff, but it is a mandated task given to us by the government. Everytime we have tried to call quits on it we have been told to soldier on. Happy to do so so long as someone else pays for it!

There will a number of serving officers and soldiers who would be gutted if all the ceremonial stuff was to fall away. Hopefully they will go at the same time.

The future of the armoured capability depends on the military anaysis of the types of conflict that are likely to occur in the future and the political analysis of the types of conflict the UK is likely to get involved with in the future. The UK analysis is that future conflicts will see a requirement for an armoured capability of some sort. We are still waiting for the governments analysis of the type of conflicts we are likely to get involved in.

As I said I would have thought that the Brit military would have updated the threat scenario annually so would/should have a good idea of where this is all leading.

If the armoured units are withdrawn from the Afghanistan rotation and told to focus on their core role then they would be of value to the country. Surely the Brits can' go less than an armoured brigade?

You have hit the nail on the head! And the government has yet to articulate what the foreign policy and security strategy will be! So we have been asked to reconfigure our forces without understanding what we are going to be used for...

The military should have done their homework and be in a position to explain current capability to the politicians? If there is a change then there should by now be a process by which changes would be addressed, yes?

No, the point is the military cannot make up its own jobs, it gets on with what it has been told to do. We implement strategic policy, we do not formulate strategic policy. Currently the government has told it to do certain military tasks, but has not funded it to do them. It is currently reviewing these military tasks but has not told the military what military tasks it expects us to do; but has asked us to rebalance in order to do them...

The bureaucrats in the MoD are the go between the military and the politicians. And the MoD at any time has a bunch of senior officers on secondment. So quite frankly it should be a standard process that if the politicians task the military they should get a costing by return post with the cost implications.

I am sure that most people are aware that the idea is to costs not rebalance the military against any current of future anticipated threat. I suggest therefore that it would be better to be honest about that. The cuts therefore would be made out of financial necessity. Approach it on that basis.

Plus the fact that in order to meet the defence budget as planned we already have to make cuts of 5% and that is before we start to implement any cuts as part of the comprehensive spending review. Trident is a de facto additional cut as it never used to come from the defence budget.

5% plus a further 10-15% would be pretty brutal. Then if the cost of Trident is to be included in such a reduced defence budget it would be devastating.

I think Dr Fox is throwing a red herring in terms of troops in Afghanistan. We can cut back extensively and still support troops in Afghanistan, it just makes us a one trick pony. The defence review and comprehensive spending review is not going to affect troops in Afghanistan.

What game is Fox playing? But I say again the danger of making the Brit army a one trick (Afghanistan) pony is in the main because the way in which deployments are organised. It is an own goal.

I quite agree that the UK military has treated Afghanistan as being on operations and not being in a fight to win it. That is partly reflective of failings in our military command, and partly the result of strategic direction. In Iraq for instance we accomplished what we were told to do - but it still left a sour taste in the mouth.

Yes Basra has tarnished the reputation of the Brit army... irreparably some would say. Afghanistan is not helping either.

But in-theatre operational benefits have to be balanced against strategic implications. Afghanistan is not 'Britain's war', it is NATO's war. It is not a war for national survival, it is an (optional) war of perceived national interest.

And Britain is part of NATO. Regardless of the way in which the politicians approach Afghanistan when it gets down to the soldier level they should surely try to do their best as soldiers coming from a great tradition, yes? Sadly it seems that the military is more keen than the politicians to get out of Afghanistan. That doesn't send the right message.

The military has presented its case which is that we cannot do what we have been told to do with the resources that are currently allocated to us. We can (and we accept this) become more efficient, but the issue will still remain overly committed and under-resourced. That situation can only be corrected by either increasing reources (highly unlikely) or cutting commitments. The government has refused to cut commitments to date. This is not really an Army issue, the main concern is with the RAF and the RN. Already the RN is failing to meet its mandated military tasks because it is too small.

So my question is... is the army just going to sit on its hands and wait for the amateurs in government to figure out some dumb plan? Maybe young David should hire Dannatt as an advisor after all.

As an army officer I am on record as saying that I think we need to draw down the Army, reconfigure the RAF and maintain or increase the size of the Navy.

You considering a career move to the marines?

[Pete]

And the government has yet to articulate what the foreign policy and security strategy will be! So we have been asked to reconfigure our forces without understanding what we are going to be used for...

I have a lot of sympathy for the dilemma Britain finds herself in regarding her role in the world -- it wasn't too long ago that she was one of the world's great powers, but the idea of being merely one of the smaller European nations isn't very appealing either. It would be the same way Americans would feel if our status in the world slipped considerably downward and we remembered our old glory days. On the Great War Forum there are a surprising number of British people who revert back to British 1914-18 attitudes about the U.S., that we're a bunch of unsophisticated country bumpkins.