The UK in Afghanistan

[JMA]

The UK TV programme - Panorama - The Battle for Bomb Alley aired recently in the UK. (and can be viewed here)

It is essentially about Marine efforts in Sangin where in this piece the marines clear a route to an old Brit base (which they abandoned when they arrived) to reoccupy it (and in so doing bulldoze a bunch of houses to widen the route).

It indicates a brute strength and ignorance approach which can hardly be to seen to be pop-centric - so one must wonder what has changed?

We hear the Marine company commander explaining in a very Vietnam-esque way:

I know that most people in the world probably wouldn't understand the way we are trying to build the country up by destroying it and it seems like its a paradox but those are people who have not been to Afghanistan and don't understand that the nature of conflict inevitably includes disruption until you can build it the way it should be.

So in this area of Sangin (at least) the pop-centric stuff flies out the window... and why (it is legitimate to ask) are the Marines reoccupying abandoned Brit bases that they mocked the Brits for establishing in the first place?

[Bob's World]

Sangin. There is little support for GiROA there; and little reason that there should be. The people of that District are not represented by GiROA; but are largely self-governing, independent, pro-Taliban, and not particularly fond of having foreign military forces (Brit, U.S. or Tajik) in their area.

There is no way to "live among the populace" there, but there are a hundred ways to be killed among the populace. It is probably relatively quiet now, but soon it will start to green up along the Helmand and the fight will be on. We squeezed the balloon below Sangin at Marjah and Lash; but this only serves to compress the fighters northward, closer to their sanctuaries above the Kajaki dam, and deeper into their base of popular support.

If the Marines seek to "Clear" Sangin this summer, it will be a hot summer indeed.

[Infanteer]

Sangin. There is little support for GiROA there; and little reason that there should be. The people of that District are not represented by GiROA; but are largely self-governing, independent, pro-Taliban, and not particularly fond of having foreign military forces (Brit, U.S. or Tajik) in their area.

There is no way to "live among the populace" there, but there are a hundred ways to be killed among the populace.

Yes! And there are other places like this - and pop-centric COIN and "protect the populace" fail in these types of places; how do you protect a populace from itself?

[JMA]

Sangin. There is little support for GiROA there; and little reason that there should be. The people of that District are not represented by GiROA; but are largely self-governing, independent, pro-Taliban, and not particularly fond of having foreign military forces (Brit, U.S. or Tajik) in their area.

There is no way to "live among the populace" there, but there are a hundred ways to be killed among the populace. It is probably relatively quiet now, but soon it will start to green up along the Helmand and the fight will be on. We squeezed the balloon below Sangin at Marjah and Lash; but this only serves to compress the fighters northward, closer to their sanctuaries above the Kajaki dam, and deeper into their base of popular support.

If the Marines seek to "Clear" Sangin this summer, it will be a hot summer indeed.

I'm fascinated by this comment.

While I am a vocal critic of the way successive British brigade commanders operated in Sangin and indeed in Helmand I remember too well the criticism from various US military (and odd political) sources (thank you Wikileaks) that the Limeys weren't getting their act together in Sangin and in Helmand.

Amazing the changes in attitude a few months bring.

[davidbfpo]

Having watched - thanks to JMA's post - the UK TV programme - Panorama - The Battle for Bomb Alley and the linked on You Tube earlier programme on Olaf Schmid, an EOD NCO killed last year I was pessimistic on what was reported.

'The Battle for Bomb Alley' reported that in Sangin the USMC took three days to move 900m due to IEDs along a road to a former UK base.

As if my magic today the BBC has an upbeat report, citing the current UK brigade CO:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12445041

Nearly a month ago there was a radio interview with Robert Fox, ex-BBC, which offers a more balanced view:http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today...00/9370378.stm

[davidbfpo]

An article reflected a new book by the author, which opens with:

The first battalion commander to be killed in action since 1982 was critical of the equipment and strategy in Afghanistan, but was determined to lead his men by example. Toby Harnden reveals the truth behind Lt Col Rupert Thorneloe’s death and the system that failed him.

Ends with the widow's comment:

If you are going to send an army to war, the government of the day should ensure that they are properly equipped...You can’t, and you shouldn’t, cut corners. It doesn’t work and we’ve seen the results.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/b...spoke-out.html

The author has written an excellent book on 'The Troubles' and this book should be good.

I still do not think the government today, let alone the previous Labour government, realise how deep an impact the Afghan War has made on the UK public and in particular their trust & confidence in the policy decisions made. Public opinion is overwhelmingly opposed to the UK's military role in Afghanistan.

Way back was this post:Following the death of Lt.Col. Thorneloe, once a student of his Professor Richard Holmes (once a TA / Reserve Army brigadier) has written this savage IMHO attack on the UK lack of a strategy: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/com...cle6652496.ece

[JMA]

An article reflected a new book by the author, which opens with:

Ends with the widow's comment:

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/b...spoke-out.html

The author has written an excellent book on 'The Troubles' and this book should be good.

I still do not think the government today, let alone the previous Labour government, realise how deep an impact the Afghan War has made on the UK public and in particular their trust & confidence in the policy decisions made. Public opinion is overwhelmingly opposed to the UK's military role in Afghanistan.

Can't wait for this book to be released.

From the screed in the Telegraph the following two paragraphs need to be highlighted IMO:

“I fear this is becoming the typical Herrick thing where every tour there’s a big operation, you lose several people doing it and it does a certain amount of good but not really anything long-lasting.” He added that “sadly people are going to die and I’m not sure it’s going to be that beneficial”.

and

Once the euphoria of life-saving heroics had subsided, however, many of the guardsmen were left almost paralysed with fear. The Vikings, they said, were coffins on tracks. Soldiers were threatening to refuse to get back into one. Young men were vomiting before patrols and some had been evacuated because of battle shock.

All terribly sad its got to that.

[davidbfpo]

Part 2 of 3 and Mark Evison's mother IIRC published his letters after his death, so maybe here already. Sub-title reads:

With supreme bravery, Welsh Guardsmen fought to get their grievously wounded commander back to their remote Helmand base. Then they faced an agonising wait for a helicopter as his life slipped away.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/b...rk-Evison.html

Part 2 of 3 is different:

Operating from a remote patrol base in Helmand, two British snipers were responsible for killing 75 Taliban fighters in just 40 days. In one remarkable feat of marksmanship, two insurgents were dispatched with a single bullet.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/b...ers-story.html

Old thread re Evison's letters:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=8062 and a link to his letters: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/5...ghanistan.html

[JMA]

Part 2 of 3 and Mark Evison's mother IIRC published his letters after his death, so maybe here already. Sub-title reads:

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/b...rk-Evison.html

Part 2 of 3 is different:

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/b...ers-story.html

Old thread re Evison's letters:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=8062 and a link to his letters: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/5...ghanistan.html

David,

The video of the contact where Mark Evison was wounded can be found here:

Afghanistan-war-video: see-how-my-son-died

I will not comment on either the video or the diary at this time. Clearly there are a number of lessons to be learned.

[davidbfpo]

In a strange, if predictable official response the first edition's total print run was purchased by the UK MoD and pulped.

According to the MoD, “at a late stage the text of the book was found to contain information that could damage national security and put at risk the lives of members of the Armed Forces”.

Let’s set aside for the moment the fact that the “late stage” was when the book had been printed, after being OKed by the MoD following a four-month review, and deconstruct this statement.

Apparently the Estonian government was upset - Stan any comment?

..it wanted to avoid a certain Nato ally pulling out of Helmand.

(Added later). The passage Estonia did not like published:http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/to...you-to-read-1/

And as Major (Retd) John Thorneloe, 88, Lt Col Thorneloe’s father, said recently:

Too bad if it makes uncomfortable reading for the Ministry of Defence and Her Majesty’s Government.

And Toby Harnden now says:

In the spirit of Maj Thorneloe’s words, from tomorrow I’ll post an example each day of a specific thing that the MoD did not want you to read but does in fact appear in the book.

Excellent work by the MoD press officers and those who agreed to this approach.

Two links, a newspaper story:http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/to...gn=harnden1503 and a more detailed account:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/al...-the-mod.thtml

[davidbfpo]

A BBC Newsnight report I missed tonight, which starts with:

In the Nad-e Ali district of Helmand province in Afghanistan, coalition forces are not declaring victory - but they are saying they have defeated the insurgents.

Remarks by the outgoing battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Colin Weir, of the 1st Battalion Royal Irish Regiment, are simply the most upbeat of a raft of recent statements emerging from the troubled Afghan province that suggest a corner has been turned.

Ends with:

The resumption of the fighting season will, almost certainly, see some kind of increase in attacks on British troops in Nad-e Ali. It is a question of how much of a rise it is though.

As for the longer term, many harbour serious doubts about the ability of the Afghan government and police to build on security there.

The district police have a woeful history of feuding with locals, drug use, and robbery. They are also 40% under strength.

So while operations may have become less risky for British soldiers, they are certainly not going to be easy.

Link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programme...ht/9447752.stm and the film report (12 mins):http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12981618

The reporter, Mark Urban, is usually good and was a soldier himself. Yet again outside forces have created a window of opportunity for the Afghan state, which has failed to respond. I am assuming the state has an element of capability and will.

The danger in such reporting is that when the often cited "fighting season" starts and casualties mount - for a new UK brigade - claims of 'defeat' are rarely mentioned, let alone by the government. IMHO the public can remember, as can newspaper editors and ask why?

[davidbfpo]

A short report by the Henry Jackson Society popped up today: Revaluing Our COIN: Moving British counterinsurgency forward in the 21st century by Dane Vallejo:http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/c...c+Briefing.pdf

Nowt startling and officially the conclusions are already being addressed, but all in one easy place to read and retain.

[Red Rat]

The reporter, Mark Urban, is usually good and was a soldier himself. Yet again outside forces have created a window of opportunity for the Afghan state, which has failed to respond. I am assuming the state has an element of capability and will.

I was struck by the last sentence "I am assuming that the state has an element of capability and will." I was reading something earlier (reference to follow) about the necessity when trying to re-establish governance capability of building stuctures from the bottom up or transforming from the top down. In Afghanistan we appear to be building from the bottom up but not transforming from the top down. So the Afghan State has an element of capability but I am not sure how far the 'will' goes.

[JMA]

I was struck by the last sentence "I am assuming that the state has an element of capability and will." I was reading something earlier (reference to follow) about the necessity when trying to re-establish governance capability of building stuctures from the bottom up or transforming from the top down. In Afghanistan we appear to be building from the bottom up but not transforming from the top down. So the Afghan State has an element of capability but I am not sure how far the 'will' goes.

Welcome back stranger. Trust you survived the Brit winter and are now coming out of hibernation. Down here in the colonies we are marching towards winter with temperatures at night down to 16C (60F) at night - if it carries on like this I will need to look for a warmer place to spend the winters.

To the point. I believe we have discussed this before around here and that is that the Afghan government is corrupt and probably a criminal state. So what are the chances that this government can ever win the hearts and minds of the people?

This is why Petraeus's pop-centric plan was always going to fail and certainly his smarts must be questioned as to why he has not changed course once he knew what he was dealing with in terms of the Afghan government.

I suggest too that this blind loyalty of the Brits has now gone too far (especially as it is not reciprocated) and its time to bring the troops home by Christmas and let the US sleep in the bed they made there.

Is there any current writing out of the UK about Helmand - like a before and after the Marines moved in? Open source of course - as I am only security cleared up to and including lies and rumours - and wikileaks

[davidbfpo]

JMA,

Operation amnesia, subtitled: Britain’s failings in Afghanistan have as much to do with short memories as shortages of troops.

This week The Spectator (a conservative weekly magazine) has a short editorial on the UK in Afghanistan:

It's easy to forget that Britain has 9,000 troops fighting a war in Afghanistan, as we seldom hear about the campaign unless someone dies. So we lead the magazine this week with a striking analysis from the academic who advised the government on its Afghan conflict in the Treasury, Foreign Office and MoD. Matt Cavanagh says that short-termism is the problem: our six month troop rotation means the military never learns and fights the same battle, taking and retaking the same territory. The heroism of our soldiers shouldn't blind us to the fact that the fact that the military is a vast bureaucracy, structurally incapable of learning. We haven't fought a five-year war. We've fought a six-month campaign, ten times.

The fuller cited article by a former "special adviser" to the previous government is on:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/al...-amnesia.thtml

On a quick glance the author is following some of the points JMA and others have expressed here.

[JMA]

JMA,

Operation amnesia, subtitled: Britain’s failings in Afghanistan have as much to do with short memories as shortages of troops.

This week The Spectator (a conservative weekly magazine) has a short editorial on the UK in Afghanistan:

The fuller cited article by a former "special adviser" to the previous government is on:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/al...-amnesia.thtml

On a quick glance the author is following some of the points JMA and others have expressed here.

David, it all comes out in the fullness of time. I note this with interest.

Four years ago, when I was working for the then defence secretary, Des Browne, we pressed senior military officers to look for ways of mitigating this short-termism: longer tours, or a staggered rotation of units, or greater continuity in the command structure. The army, then led by General Dannatt, flatly rejected the first two options. They dismissed longer tours on the basis of the strain on soldiers and their families, and rejected staggered rotation due to the importance of ‘a brigade training and deploying as a brigade’.

So the politicians though about it and the military kicked it into touch. Now that is bad news.

I wonder what the number of married soldiers is in the average infantry company these days. I count 7 in my sub-unit circa 1979. Maybe a different era but on those sort of numbers that would place any such argument purely on the basis of a few married officers and senior NCOs.

As to the second point. Training together as a brigade is only important if the brigade fights as a formation on the ground and not in section or platoon or even company strength. A truly bogus argument. Important for whom? The brigadier?

Good article David, thanks. Probably 90% of my stated position on the issues.

[SWJ Blog]

The Battle for Helmand: Interviews with Professor Theo Farrell and MG Nick Carter

Entry Excerpt:

The Battle for Helmand: Interviews with Professor Theo Farrell and MG Nick Carter
by Octavian Manea

Octavian Manea, Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy, continues his SWJ interview series. In this exclusive, Octavian asks Professor Theo Farrell and MG Nick Carter to describe their thoughts on the Battle for Helmand Province in Southern Afghanistan.

Download The Full Article: The Battle for Helmand



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Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

A short article following the Scots Guards in Helmand, which ends with a rather surprising paragraph nd my emphasis:

Major combat operations are slated to come to a close in 2014, after full transition to Afghan control - though timelines in wars don't work. In terms of resources, however, the 10,000 or so British troops stationed in Afghanistan today and the billions of pounds spent annually on the mission must represent the high-water mark of this country's involvement. In the summer of 2010 that involvement was working - at least where I witnessed it - admittedly at significant cost.

I use surprising as the article was in the New Statesman, not known for such reporting, let alone such a comment on my occasional reading.

Link:http://www.newstatesman.com/asia/201...hanistan-flank

Yes the author is writing a book and this needs to be said:

What I saw was the best of this generation going through an experience that was unique to them, though redolent of what their forefathers had done.

[JMA]

A short article following the Scots Guards in Helmand, which ends with a rather surprising paragraph nd my emphasis:

I use surprising as the article was in the New Statesman, not known for such reporting, let alone such a comment on my occasional reading.

Link:http://www.newstatesman.com/asia/201...hanistan-flank

Yes the author is writing a book and this needs to be said:

David, thank you for posting that.

There was something so very sad that came through with that article that I had to will myself to finish it.

Its all there. The short tour syndrome. The absolute futility of using fine soldiers for Taleban target practice guarding seven kilometers of road in Helmand for six months. The wasted lives and the hidden damage these young men suffer for no honourable purpose. It just too terrible...

[JMA]

David in another thread you posted:

Check out a British Army Review (BAR) article by a Welsh Guards officer, a summary of which appeared in the press:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ghanistan.html

I have read the BAR article, which was accompanied by a very senior officer's response, IIRC General Sir David Richards, the UK's top soldier.

Would like to hear what David Richards had to say.

Again this 2009 piece supports my arguments of a year or so ago. I seem to remember I was very alone in my opinions here at the time. Would it be silly of me to expect that at some point some (at least) of those who so aggressively defended the indefensible policy and practice of the time and still currently to change their stance and amend their position?

This comment of his is worth restating:

"It was thanks to the tenacity of the common soldier and the paratrooper that British embarrassment was saved."