The UK in Afghanistan

[JMA]

The BBC's Panorama reporter, John Ware, weighed last night with an hour long documentary on the UK in Afghanistan from 2001 to today, notably over why we deployed in 2006 to Helmand Province. Amongst the "talking heads" were two civil planners who advised against deployment and were over-ruled; the programme is worth watching for just them alone IMHO.

What is puzzling is the decision to deploy beyond the original focus, Lashkar Gar, to the four centres in the north and the political recollection it was not their decision. Now a matter before the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence's current hearings on Afghanistan.

Link to summary:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13855804

Since being informed that the video "is not available in your area" I had to go looking and found it here

Found it outstanding and informative and look forward to next weeks part on the war in Helmand by Mark Urban. (Don't know what part three is about)

Its all there:

* Can't win an insurgency then the government is illegitimate and corrupt.

* Failure to take decisive action against poppy cultivation is a major strategic error.

* Failure to consider the adverse effect of Afghan police and military being deployed to an area occupied by another ethnic group.

* Failure to build an army (current shower has a 20% desertion rate) on a sustainable basis will lead to disintegration when US funding dries up.

* etc etc

Probably the only good thing is the special forces actions against Taliban leadership targets which have been (by most accounts) spectacularly successful. (Sadly this has been more than offset by the failure to take out the Taliban leadership in Pakistan)

[davidbfpo]

Once again The Scotsman "hits the nail" with this short, obvious report that there is a navigation problem ahead:http://www.scotsman.com/news/US-withdrawal-set-to-leave.6790326.jp?articlepage=1

From faraway I've never understood the strategic value of Helmand Province and devoting such a level of resources. Unless the key effect was reducing heroin production, which it is not.

IIRC in 2006 the USA deployed a small force, in one source given as three hundred and their role was as a support unit for SOF / CIA.

[JMA]

Once again The Scotsman "hits the nail" with this short, obvious report that there is a navigation problem ahead:http://www.scotsman.com/news/US-withdrawal-set-to-leave.6790326.jp?articlepage=1

From faraway I've never understood the strategic value of Helmand Province and devoting such a level of resources. Unless the key effect was reducing heroin production, which it is not.

IIRC in 2006 the USA deployed a small force, in one source given as three hundred and their role was as a support unit for SOF / CIA.

Where the troops levels will be reduced is (surely) to be in areas which are handed over to the ANA and not wholesale out of Helmand. The Brits must now insist that they operate in an AO which they can handle with the 9,000 troops they have and is reduced in line with the troop draw down in the future.

[Red Rat]

The UK does now have an AO appropriate to it's troop levels. The trick from now on will be twofold:

1) to conform to the overall campaign plan in terms of main effort. President Obama's announced troop withdrawals will create gaps, there will be pressure to fill those gaps, especially if Helmand looks increasingly secure (big if! Not sure if Helmand is the Afghan equivalent if South Armargh, but it sounds like it!)

2) as the campaign looks towards handing over to the Afghans the issue will be how does the Afghan government see itself postured after most Coalition forces have left? What may be important to us may not be important to them, and there seems little value to fight and hold real estate that they will not.

[Red Rat]

Does that infer that there is the belief that operational efficiency after 2010 has improved?

Extended tours, trickling in of HQ elements, better information flows, better TTPs in theatre, a realisticaly sized AO, comprehensive (and working) cross government approach (civil and military), a coherent C2 structure; yes it is better. Could it be better yet? Undoubtedly, but it is a great deal better then it was.

[JMA]

Extended tours, trickling in of HQ elements, better information flows, better TTPs in theatre, a realisticaly sized AO, comprehensive (and working) cross government approach (civil and military), a coherent C2 structure; yes it is better. Could it be better yet? Undoubtedly, but it is a great deal better then it was.

Extended tours?

[Pete]

Depending on how you look at it the glass is either half-full or half-empty. During 2006-07 Helmand was said to be like the Wild West. Even successful military operations have flaws in planning and execution. Should we take away some guy's Silver Star because he should have put a machine gun in on his right flank before he rushed the enemy position? These things can only be fined-tuned but so much.

[davidbfpo]

Brigadier James Chiswell MC Commander 16 Air Assault Brigade briefed IISS London on British Operations in Helmand Province, Afghanistan 2010-11”.

He explained the background to the Brigade’s fourth deployment to Afghanistan since 2001, showing how the brigade prepared for the tour. This included formulating a Brigade concept of operations that embraced the complexity of the environment in Afghanistan, the number of actors and the need to build support amongst the Afghan people.

About to listen to the eighty minute long podcast, there should not be any copyright issues:http://www.iiss.org/events-calendar/...istan-2010-11/

[Infanteer]

a realisticaly sized AO

Probably one of the most important aspects - we noticed this when our AO went from Kandahar Province to a District within said province.

Shortens LoC, prevents one from having to run around willy-nilly, improves inter-unit support, etc, etc. All that common dog military stuff.

[JMA]

About to listen to the eighty minute long podcast, there should not be any copyright issues:http://www.iiss.org/events-calendar/...istan-2010-11/

The Youtube download is actually the 40 odd minutes address with strangely a repeat to make up the 80 minutes... strange.

The public part of the speech is worth deconstruction at some point. (The question and answer session was off the record)

I note in the early stages that he ascribes the "improvement" in Helmand to the introduction of 20,000 US Marines. He said the increase in troop level went from 7,000 to 30,000 and that the Brits had their borders consolidated into central Helmand. Must have been an improvement.

Interesting to hear his comment on the nuanced change from "courageous restraint" to where soldiers are rather to exercise "patience and precision". I would be interested to hear how he explained that the Brit "Toms" and squaddies (and what their comprehension level was).

I note with sadness that they appear to have no choice but to use the same troops who "cleared" an area for the "hold" and "build" phases. The Brit paras and marines are up there with the best fighting men in the world and to utilise them to effectively protect a road or a construction project or a government or civil authority compound for most of their tour seems to be a massive waste to me.

[JMA]

Probably one of the most important aspects - we noticed this when our AO went from Kandahar Province to a District within said province.

Shortens LoC, prevents one from having to run around willy-nilly, improves inter-unit support, etc, etc. All that common dog military stuff.

Isn't it all about the density and activity of the enemy? I see it as very much a "troops to task" issue. The commander allocates the troops needed to achieve the mission in each area under his command.

In certain provinces and districts of Afghanistan there must surely be a low requirement for troops and in some cases they (by all accounts) hardly leave their bases and seldom if ever seek to (or need to) make contact. There would be a real difference in how troops in high activity/density areas operate as opposed to those in "quieter" areas.

[Red Rat]

Interesting to hear his comment on the nuanced change from "courageous restraint" to where soldiers are rather to exercise "patience and precision". I would be interested to hear how he explained that the Brit "Toms" and squaddies (and what their comprehension level was).

They explained it simply enough. I attended one of his briefs and I seem to recollect the phrase he used was along the lines of 'Make sure you only kill the people you need to kill'. I took a quote at the time, I will check my notes later and see if I can find it. I was struck at the time by how simple he phrased it, when 'courageous restraint' came out it caused a degree of confusion amongst the 'jockery', whereas his explanation was clear, concise and soldier friendly.

The soldiers I have spoken to from 16 Bde were very clear and happy with both their ROE and the underpinning ethos on use of force.

[Red Rat]

In certain provinces and districts of Afghanistan there must surely be a low requirement for troops and in some cases they (by all accounts) hardly leave their bases and seldom if ever seek to (or need to) make contact. There would be a real difference in how troops in high activity/density areas operate as opposed to those in "quieter" areas.

That might be true across Afghanistan as a whole, and may in part be due to national caveats (some nations only want to stay in the less hostile or active areas).

In Helmand if an area is quiet then densities are adjusted to reflect.

As Transition progresses quiet areas are also handed over to ANSF elements, allowing ISAF elements to focus elsewhere.

[JMA]

They explained it simply enough. I attended one of his briefs and I seem to recollect the phrase he used was along the lines of 'Make sure you only kill the people you need to kill'.

As simple as that. I do however think the average troopie needs some guidance on who actually needs to be killed.

I took a quote at the time, I will check my notes later and see if I can find it. I was struck at the time by how simple he phrased it, when 'courageous restraint' came out it caused a degree of confusion amongst the 'jockery', whereas his explanation was clear, concise and soldier friendly.

The soldiers I have spoken to from 16 Bde were very clear and happy with both their ROE and the underpinning ethos on use of force.

Please do. Also, please, what the Brit troops found difficult to understand/comprehend about the courageous restraint idea.

Well one hopes that the people who need to be killed are being killed in greater numbers as that tends to send a clear message to the Taliban that if they want to survive then they should avoid contact until (at least) after 2014.

[JMA]

That might be true across Afghanistan as a whole, and may in part be due to national caveats (some nations only want to stay in the less hostile or active areas).

In Helmand if an area is quiet then densities are adjusted to reflect.

As Transition progresses quiet areas are also handed over to ANSF elements, allowing ISAF elements to focus elsewhere.

Yes, thanks, that just about confirms what I was suggesting.

[JMA]

Lifted from another thread to here where it is applicable:

Yesterday's part (2 of 3) Afghanistan: The Battle for Helmand by Mark Urban was aired on BBC2.
Can be found here in three segments:

1 of 3

2 of 3

3 of 3

enjoy

[TDB]

Lifted from another thread to here where it is applicable:

Yesterday's part (2 of 3) Afghanistan: The Battle for Helmand by Mark Urban was aired on BBC2.
Can be found here in three segments:

1 of 3

2 of 3

3 of 3

enjoy

This series has been very good so far, it hasn't dumbed down for the most part. Shame it's relegated to bbc 2 where the unwashed masses won't see it.

[JMA]

They explained it simply enough. I attended one of his briefs and I seem to recollect the phrase he used was along the lines of 'Make sure you only kill the people you need to kill'. I took a quote at the time, I will check my notes later and see if I can find it. I was struck at the time by how simple he phrased it, when 'courageous restraint' came out it caused a degree of confusion amongst the 'jockery', whereas his explanation was clear, concise and soldier friendly.

The soldiers I have spoken to from 16 Bde were very clear and happy with both their ROE and the underpinning ethos on use of force.

Talking of Chiswell and a somewhat off topic...

Am doing some research into Op Barras (Sierra Leone - 10 Sept 2000)

Chiswell got his MC there as did a number of others get awards. Have tracked down the awards to the relevant London Gazettes but no luck in getting sight of the citations. Are they available in the public domain?

Thanks

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to the newly reactivated Defence of the Realm blogsite for pointing at Mark Urban's BBC Newsnight's report on the Kajaki dam project:

Ever since Western forces plunged into Afghanistan a decade ago, they have realised the importance of winning hearts and minds, particularly in the restive south.

The idea that they could bring electricity to millions of people by upgrading the Kajaki dam in Helmand Province has proven to be a counter of counter-insurgency El Dorado - a quest into which lives and money have been poured, but so far without effect.

General David Petraeus, the commander of Nato forces in Afghanistan, told me during a recent interview that the Kajaki project had proven to be an object lesson in, "overpromising but under-delivery".

The UK and partners moved the parts for a Chinese turbine in August 2008, amidst a PR campaign and they still lie there.

I don't recall this being reported in 2008:

It was only at Kajaki Sofla, a village just a few miles south of the dam, that they met serious opposition.

In Kajaki Sofla, British attempts to buy off the local tribe had been scotched by the Taliban leadership in Pakistan, who ordered them to fight. The result was a battle in which, the British estimated at the time, 200 had been killed.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/13925886

DoRealm link, with photos and commentary:http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.co...est-thing.html

[excadet]

It was covered in some detail by Patrick Bishop in "Ground Truth" 2009.