The UK in Afghanistan

[davidbfpo]

Months ago we debated 'Courageous Restraint' and in recent UK documentaries there have been episodes in which restraint, aka PID has featured.

Today there is this headline 'Soldiers told not to shoot Taliban bomb layers' and a sub-title:

British soldiers who spot Taliban fighters planting roadside bombs are told not to shoot them because they do not pose an immediate threat, the Ministry of Defence has admitted.

The information came via an inquest Q&A; although I expect it has been seen before.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news...mb-layers.html

A story like this does little to reassure the UK public of our military mission and the widow's viewpoint is likely to resonate here:

They are not allowed to fire on these terrorists. If they can see people leaving these IEDs, why can’t they take them out? One officer even told him 'I am an army Captain and you will do your job'. We have lost too many men out there, they had seen people planting IEDs yet could not open fire or make contact with them. I believe strongly if people had taken on board what he was saying more he might have been here today.

[JMA]

Months ago we debated 'Courageous Restraint' and in recent UK documentaries there have been episodes in which restraint, aka PID has featured.

Today there is this headline 'Soldiers told not to shoot Taliban bomb layers' and a sub-title:

The information came via an inquest Q&A; although I expect it has been seen before.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news...mb-layers.html

A story like this does little to reassure the UK public of our military mission and the widow's viewpoint is likely to resonate here:

David this almost defies belief. I really do believe that for the clowns who make these policies and the generals who just roll-over and say "yes" there should be (career ending and pension affecting) consequences (for all the incompetence shown over Afghanistan).

Just for the record on this thread an article by William F Owen in the Spring 2011 BAR entitled Killing Your Way to Control provides a refreshing approach.

[Red Rat]

David this almost defies belief. I really do believe that for the clowns who make these policies and the generals who just roll-over and say "yes" there should be (career ending and pension affecting) consequences (for all the incompetence shown over Afghanistan).

It does almost beggar belief and it would be interesting to see the full context of the quote.

UK ROE are based on UK Law and the defining principle is that there must be a clear and immediate threat to life - that has not changed since the start of the AFghan Campaign. The problem with IED emplacement is understanding whether it is an IED being emplaced or not. Generally if suspicious activity is spotted then there are many options available to prevent/disrupt that activity from taking place.

My talks with UK soldiers recently returned from AFG with 2-3 tours of AFG under their belt was that they felt that ROE were robust and sufficient.

The problem with Courageous Restraint when it was introduced was that as it was 'guidance' and not a technical change to the ROE it did what all good guidance is not supposed to do - it cobnfused matters considerably and soldiers were no longer sure as to what they could or could not do. People should be held accountable for that.

[TDB]

In a strange, if predictable official response the first edition's total print run was purchased by the UK MoD and pulped.



Apparently the Estonian government was upset - Stan any comment?

(Added later). The passage Estonia did not like published:http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/to...you-to-read-1/

And as Major (Retd) John Thorneloe, 88, Lt Col Thorneloe’s father, said recently:

And Toby Harnden now says:

Excellent work by the MoD press officers and those who agreed to this approach.

Two links, a newspaper story:http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/to...gn=harnden1503 and a more detailed account:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/al...-the-mod.thtml

In the middle of reading Dead Men Risen at the moment and apart from being quite harrowing it is also rather shocking. The inability of the Army to be self-critical has cause many deaths.

[Red Rat]

In the middle of reading Dead Men Risen at the moment and apart from being quite harrowing it is also rather shocking. The inability of the Army to be self-critical has cause many deaths.

I think that is a failing of many armies, where there is a tension between a formal hierarchy and discipline with the requirement to critizise and innovate (outside the box). It is exacerbated in the British Army by several things:

• Ethos and Culture - the British Army is conservative and British society is largely consensual - we don't like to be blunt with each other (it's rude)
• The army is small and getting smaller - politics matter. You need to get on to get up. This leads to
• Like selecting like - bucking or critizing the system is unlikely to attract reward
• The army is heavily meshed with the Ministry of Defence and its sister services. That means it is hard to keep criticism in-house and anything that hints of criticism of civil servants or other services often gets diluted or written out entirely.

The Army does recognise its failings and some of the Generals that it has now are trying to drag it into a more open and self-critical era, but there is a long way to go yet.

[jcustis]

My talks with UK soldiers recently returned from AFG with 2-3 tours of AFG under their belt was that they felt that ROE were robust and sufficient.

RR, the ROE absolutely are robust and sufficient.

You should be coming up on the beginning of your rotation to AFG soon, eh?

[Red Rat]

The boys are out there just now! Our HQ never deployed and I am now 'somewhere in the UK'...

It is feast or famine here, I will either be made redundant next year as part of the army cutbacks or deployed to Afghanistan; it's a soldier's life!

[jcustis]

The boys are out there just now! Our HQ never deployed and I am now 'somewhere in the UK'...

It is feast or famine here, I will either be made redundant next year as part of the army cutbacks or deployed to Afghanistan; it's a soldier's life!

I am genuinely sorry to hear that. You had been putting a good bit of effort into the workup.

[JMA]

The Army does recognise its failings and some of the Generals that it has now are trying to drag it into a more open and self-critical era, but there is a long way to go yet.

This problem seems to repeat itself over time, not so?

If you look at the build-up to the Boer Wars you see the Brits ran through a list of the following:

* 1857 - The Indian Mutiny
* 1878 - Second Anglo-Afghan War
* 1879 - The Anglo-Zulu War
* 1880 - more Afghanistan

Then the First Boer War - 1880-1881 - where the Brits were given a good hiding in the battles of Laing's Nek, Schuinshoogte and Majuba Hill.

(Note 1: This war was as a result of the Boer Republic of the Transvaal being annexed by the Brits. To avoid being sucked into a full scale war the Brits concluded a peace treaty. The republic was reinstated and the Brits withdrew their troops.
Note 2: Of military significance the boers employed (one of the first recorded occurrences of) tactical fire and movement during the final assault on Majuba Hill.)

* 1881-1889 - Sudan Campaign continues (and Brit forget lessons of first Boer War)

Then the Brits wrap up the Sudan campaign just in time for a second war with the Boers (hint gold had been found in the Transvaal in 1886).

The Brits finally won in 1902 having had to resort to actions against the boer civilian population to bring the Boer nation to its knees (the methods which the Brits would rather not talk about).

(Note: The Boer nation (now called Afrikaners) resulted from a mix of Dutch and (a few ship loads of) French Huguenots (also Calvinists), a portion of Germans and a pinch of Scandinavians. To state that these people were/are "difficult" is an understatement and in the main they (in the two Boer republics at least) refused to submit to British rule. The weakness (which remains today and probably due to the predominant Dutch genetic influence) is that they can seldom agree with each other. Unity was possible when faced with a war against Britain and when fighting some of the native tribes.)

Now this all brings us to Rudyard Kipling and his poem - The Lesson 1899-1902 (Boer War) - motivated by his being "scandalised by what he had seen of British military planning and preparedness" for the war:

The Lesson 1899-1902 (Boer War) - Rudyard Kipling

LET us admit it fairly, as a business people should,
We have had no end of a lesson: it will do us no end of good.

Not on a single issue, or in one direction or twain,
But conclusively, comprehensively, and several times and again,
Were all our most holy illusions knocked higher than Gilderoy’s kite.
We have had a jolly good lesson, and it serves us jolly well right!

This was not bestowed us under the trees, nor yet in the shade of a tent,
But swingingly, over eleven degrees of a bare brown continent.
From Lamberts to Delagoa Bay, and from Pietersburg to Sutherland,
Fell the phenomenal lesson we learned—with a fulness accorded no other land.

It was our fault, and our very great fault, and not the judgment of Heaven.
We made an Army in our own image, on an island nine by seven,
Which faithfully mirrored its makers’ ideals, equipment, and mental attitude—
And so we got our lesson: and we ought to accept it with gratitude.

We have spent two hundred million pounds to prove the fact once more,
That horses are quicker than men afoot, since two and two make four;
And horses have four legs, and men have two legs, and two into four goes twice,
And nothing over except our lesson-and very cheap at the price.

For remember (this our children shall know: we are too near for that knowledge)
Not our mere astonied camps, but Council and Creed and College—
All the obese, unchallenged old things that stifle and overlie us—
Have felt the effects of the lesson we got—an advantage no money could buy us!

Then let us develop this marvellous asset which we alone command,
And which, it may subsequently transpire, will be worth as much as the Rand.
Let us approach this pivotal fact in a humble yet hopeful mood—
We have had no end of a lesson, it will do us no end of good!

It was our fault, and our very great fault—and now we must turn it to use.
We have forty million reasons for failure, but not a single excuse.
So the more we work and the less we talk the better results we shall get—
We have had an Imperial lesson; it may make us an Empire yet!

And the bad news is... the Brits did not learn the lessons... and continue to this day to be slow to adapt and evolve believing it seems (in what stood them in good stead in bygone times) that in a war (any war) the only battle you really must win is the last one.

[JMA]

From the Telegraph, Armed Forces too weak to defeat the Taliban

A devastating report into the Afghanistan war has concluded that the British task force sent into Helmand in 2006 was ill-equipped, under-resourced and too weak to defeat the Taliban.

In Operations in Afghanistan – which is deeply critical of both senior commanders and government ministers – the Defence Select Committee states that the Helmand mission was undermined by bad planning and poor intelligence, and the task force was capped at 3,150 troops for financial rather than operational reasons.

Much of the blame for the failings is levelled at senior officers for claiming that field commanders were content with the support they were receiving, when the reverse was true.

Add to all this the initial (certainly) tactical ineptitude of the brigade/battalion/company/platoon operations and one (certainly me) is left deeply saddened at the depths to which the Brit military was sunk. The fine soldiers found in the ranks of the Brit military deserve better.

[JMA]

The boys are out there just now! Our HQ never deployed and I am now 'somewhere in the UK'...

It is feast or famine here, I will either be made redundant next year as part of the army cutbacks or deployed to Afghanistan; it's a soldier's life!

Sky News tells me that the big announcement re the reorganisation of the military will be made in the House tomorrow. Regular army down to 84,000, I believe, the lowest since the Boer War.

[davidbfpo]

JMA,

I too have read the story and am slightly puzzled at the timing of the media reports. The report (link below) was ordered to be printed on the 6th July 2011 and a Press Statement is on Parliament's website today - which is not a working day. Methinks a Sunday "filler" item after the media focus elsewhere.

Parliamentary Press release:http://www.parliament.uk/business/co...n-afghanistan/
Full Report:http://www.publications.parliament.u...4/55405.htm#a7

On a quick read of a few sections there are some "howlers" and whilst not unexpected why were those responsible for decision-making not identified?

There is a section about the 2006 deployment to Helmand and the follow-on decision to man section bases in northern settlements, e.g. Sangin,

General Fry said that the key question about the events of 2006 was how did UK Forces get from the original plan to provide security in a small area to "fighting for their lives no less than two months later in a series of Alamos in the north of the province....

...to win what the MoD described as the totemic battle of the flagpoles—preventing Government flags from being replaced by those of the Taliban.

John Reid, Defence Secretary, at the time of the initial deployment and five weeks later elsewhere:

I understand from inquiries that I made then and subsequently that the matter was not referred to the Secretary of State for Defence who succeeded me. It was never brought to his attention, except in retrospect. Undoubtedly, in my view, it was an operational decision which may or may not have been right. Let us assume that the commanders on the spot got it right; but it was an operational decision that changed the strategic nature of the mission..

Two generals:

General Richards said that the move to the north of Helmand was not a change of mission but a change of tactics.[58] But General Wall said that UK Forces had ended up in a situation that turned out to be strategically very different from the one that was anticipated.

The in place Defence Secretary at the time, Lord Browne:

..a tactical decision was made to deploy forces beyond the lozenge. He told us that he was briefed about this retrospectively and informed by those in command that, in military terms, this was an operational decision.

We are often told we are in the era of the 'Strategic Corporal', well this is evidence of something very different. The Committee's Press Release says:

The Committee considers it unlikely that this fundamental change was put to Ministers.

[davidbfpo]

The BBC News report takes a wider view, hence the title 'Warning over early Afghan pull-out by British forces', which I will leave you to read.

It ends with a comment by an ex-BBC reporter:

.. the greatest focus should be on the political mistakes rather than the actions of soldiers.

The responsibility in the end is political. What worries me about this report and it's not generated by it at all - it's doing its job - is that now there's a feeding frenzy: let's blame the soldiers, let's push off, it's all over, it's their fault, they got it wrong. This is too simplistic and it's very dangerous.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14175600

[JMA]

JMA,

I too have read the story and am slightly puzzled at the timing of the media reports. The report (link below) was ordered to be printed on the 6th July 2011 and a Press Statement is on Parliament's website today - which is not a working day. Methinks a Sunday "filler" item after the media focus elsewhere.

Parliamentary Press release:http://www.parliament.uk/business/co...n-afghanistan/
Full Report:http://www.publications.parliament.u...4/55405.htm#a7

On a quick read of a few sections there are some "howlers" and whilst not unexpected why were those responsible for decision-making not identified?

There is a section about the 2006 deployment to Helmand and the follow-on decision to man section bases in northern settlements, e.g. Sangin,

John Reid, Defence Secretary, at the time of the initial deployment and five weeks later elsewhere:

Two generals:

The in place Defence Secretary at the time, Lord Browne:

We are often told we are in the era of the 'Strategic Corporal', well this is evidence of something very different. The Committee's Press Release says:

Thanks for that link. The full text version is interesting. I had asked some time ago what the number of wounded were who would be unlikely to be able to return to duty and got the OPSEC reply. Now we have this:

Armed Forces casualties in Afghanistan

10. The worst aspect of operations has been the loss of lives and the number of people receiving very severe injuries. From the start of operations in Afghanistan in 2001 to 15 June 2012, 371 British military personnel were killed with a further 586 very seriously or seriously wounded. Over 5,000 troops were admitted to the field hospital of whom 1,712 were wounded in action and the remainder had a non battle injury or disease. Some 4,700 personnel were evacuated back to the UK by air.

Not sure how they classify the wounded. This IED thing is a bitch so I assume the wounds are horrific and can't be compared to other wars statistically.

On the field hospital stats clearly 300 odd were discharged locally but 3288 odd sick soldiers (not WIA) were medevac'd back to the UK. Twice the number as the WIA admitted to the field hospitals and later CASEVAC'd. This is disease and illness. Any idea what?

[JMA]

The BBC News report takes a wider view, hence the title 'Warning over early Afghan pull-out by British forces', which I will leave you to read.

It ends with a comment by an ex-BBC reporter:

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14175600

The draw down must surely be as a result of handing over to the ANA with the remaining area shrinking accordingly?

[TDB]

I think the biggest failing of British forces in Helmand and ISAF troops across the country, was to stumble blindly into the country with only the courage of their convictions to comfort them. As we all know now the US back Karzai to lead and he set up a system of patrionage which alienated the majority of the people, making the Taliban seem like a pretty attractive alternative. Further more when we set off for Helmand, we were, were we not? On a counter-narcotics mission, so fueled by out sense that drugs are bad and so people who, grow, deal and use them are evil then we should destroy opium crops. Again it seems that all to late was it realise that people were growing opium because it made them more money than wheat but still lived hand to mouth. In short decisions were made that created more enemies before we'd even got there.

[davidbfpo]

TDB,

Partial citation:

..Further more when we set off for Helmand, we were, were we not? On a counter-narcotics mission..

What is remarkable is that the counter-narcotics (heroin) segment of the renewed 'Great Game' in Helmand played an understandably small a role. The UK was not on a counter-narcotics mission in 2006 and IMHO to this day is not. There is another thread on Afghan counter-narcotics, where we have debated the issues, greatly aided by 120mm who has been there:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=1234

The Defence Select Committee hearings include:

General Peter Wall told us that the UK taking on Helmand was consistent with the UK's role in counter-narcotics (held since July 2005).[25]

Earlier in the why did NATO expand it's role in Afghanistan:

General Houghton told us....(southern Afghanistan) being an unsafe place that was host to international terrorism and for which the delivery of good government and governance was essential.[22]

Plus some strategic arguments for UK / NATO and the USA.

The initial objective in 2006 was to establish a central "lozenge of security" around Lashkar Gah, Gereshk and Camp Bastion and then move out from there as conditions permitted. The intent was that UK Forces would gain intelligence and a cultural understanding of the environment and, by developing a local envelope of security, would be able to help create the right environment for governance, build Afghan capacity and create a capacity for economic growth.[31]

Note counter-narcotics does not appear. There are anecdotes that the UK Army took no action when opiates were found and on some of the film footage recently poppy fields formed the backdrop to patrolling.

Nor has the pre-2006 US presence been let's say robust:

..the US Forces acted in what General Fry described as "a profoundly live and let live" way.[34] Intelligence from such an operation was limited...There were something like 100 members of the US special forces, for example.

Brigadier Butler, the first UK commander in Helmand:

As soon as we arrived in those conditions—and as I have said the Province was already in some form of crisis; they were certainly ready and waiting—of course they wanted to engage us. We used to say that there would be a reaction to our size 12 Boots going into Helmand Province, whether from the Taliban, from the opiate dealers or from the warlords, because we were threatening their very existence. We were trying to turn a failed state into a steady and successful one, which was contrary to all their aims and objectives. We knew full well, as reasonably experienced military men, that we were going to have a reaction.[38]

What undermines the official explanation IMHO is that pre-2006 Helmand Province was a functioning, working and presumably peaceful province where power was split between the Taliban, warlords and opiate dealers. A province where the provincial government was only a token presence. Maybe with rare national i.e. US-funded counter-narcotic visits (another SWC may know if that happened).

Timing is another factor:

43. General Houghton pointed out that a number of factors came together to make the situation particularly difficult in the early months:

Poppy eradication—the fear of locals that their livelihoods would be taken away, which was fuelled by Taliban propaganda;
Some of the (my emphasis as never seen before) 200,000 casual labourers who migrated from Pakistan for the poppy harvest had stayed behind as guns for hire;
In preparation for the arrival of UK Forces, the Americans had conducted a number of kinetic operations culminating in Operation Mountain Thrust which had stirred up the local population; and
The removal of Sher Mohammed Akhundzada as Governor and his replacement by Governor Daoud had destabilised the tribal balance and the balance of power within northern Helmand.[49]

There was 'no balance of power within Northern Helmand', the new Governor appointed by Karzai wanted to win the 'battle of the flags'.

Governance is not flag waving and the UK is not in Helmand for counter-narcotics. I have argued before that such a role is in our national interest, a role that would resonate back home, especially in the cities where heroin is freely available (including Muslim areas) and as for the methods look at the linked thread.

[JMA]

I think the biggest failing of British forces in Helmand and ISAF troops across the country, was to stumble blindly into the country with only the courage of their convictions to comfort them.

But the Brits have always done that haven't they?

Given the empire and the military needs spread far and wide the army would be sent all over and arrive under-prepared and wrongly/unsuitably equipped for the required task at hand. Lost a few battles to start with but tended to win the last one (which counted most in those times).

The theory (out here in the colonies at least ) is that this led to the confident air (or arrogant demeanour whichever you prefer) of the British Officer becoming standard. As in when the troops arrive in (say) the Sudan and are faced by the spears and blades of the Mahdi's army and the troopies say "for fook sake!" it is up to the officers to strut their stuff with that air of cool/calm/collected/in-control/relaxed/outward-confidence designed to fool the troopies that they were in control of themselves and therefore the situation.

I would describe this to being like a duck. The key being the difference between the (serene) above water demeanour of a swimming duck as opposed to the (frantic) under water activity of the duck's legs.

So the Brits developed the culture of arriving unprepared, taking a few bloody noses and then muddling through to the point when they finally got their act together and gave the enemy a good hiding. It is this (normal) sequence events that led to bravery and being willing to "die well" being placed above competence in the Brit Army (IMHO).

The sacrifice of subalterns (and many thousands of soldiers) during the 1st World War (where they had a life expectancy of 6 weeks) expresses this priority need to be brave and die well due to a lack of competence of the strategic and tactical abilities of the general staff at the time. (Sounds too close to the Afghanistan situation for comfort?)

(Note: At the start of the 2nd Boer War (1899) my information is that there were two officers based in London who were charged with military intelligence for the empire.)

Sadly going through the motions and muddling through is no longer an option (one would have thought) as the inevitable body counts related to such an approach are no longer acceptable to the British public.

The mind boggles that given this and the demonstrable historical record that in 2006 the Brits once again blundered in and seem happy to muddle through.

[TDB]

Britain had ended up being involved in a role it had not set out to do. Planning for not firing a shot in two years, resulted in something like one million bullets being fired in anger in a year. The lag between the realisation of the situation on the ground and the setting in motion of resources needed for are the biggest issue. The bloody nose situation along with the notion of a stuff upper lip does have its part to play. But also in what is a professional army the fear of speaking out and wrecking your career.

RE: counter narcotics, the UK had agreed to take the lead on counter narcotics even if 16 Air Assault did take part in any CN missions.

While the presence of heroin on British streets is an issue, it could be argued it is mere a symptom of wider issues. Not just that but destorying the poppy fields of Helmand would just see it grown and produced elsewhere within Afghanistan and the wider world. As this report shows http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-...09_summary.pdf

and experience shows from the production of Coca in South America which moves throughout Colombia, Bolivia and Peru as it responds to various counter narcotic efforts.

We would be better off creating a viable alternative to poppy cultivation for Afghanistan if only so Afghan farmers can get a better standard of living not simply to hope it effects the global heroin market.

[davidbfpo]

TDB,

I have long advocated buying the heroin product direct from the farmers, then destroying it and perhaps over time the farmers will grow something else; hich is on the Afg drugs thread. Given the insurgency in Helmand I see little value in crop eradication by more coercive options.