The UK in Afghanistan

[JMA]

Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan

While sure to be a painful read I will buy this and read it.

Book available on Kindle.

A Frank Ledwidge article of some value:

Frank Ledwidge on changing fashions of Counterinsurgency

[davidbfpo]

I have read the Ledwidge article, it has valid points, but as is my way the final sentences jar. Nor is citing Martin van Creveld entirely appropriate, as SWC have discussed before.

The last sentences being:

One hopes that the words of the eminent Israeli historian Martin van Crefeld are then recalled: ‘The first, and absolutely indispensable, thing to do is throw overboard 99 percent of the literature on counterinsurgency, counterguerrilla, counterterrorism, and the like. Since most of it was written by the losing side, it is of little value’. I am not sure whether the remaining 1 percent is worth reading either.

Anyone know of a military institution that has dispensed with 99% of the literature it uses? I fear the author will remain at Cambridge University awhile yet.

[JMA]

I have read the Ledwidge article, it has valid points, but as is my way the final sentences jar. Nor is citing Martin van Creveld entirely appropriate, as SWC have discussed before.

I am not sure where you are coming from here? I searched SWC and only found his contribution on Airpower.

I know relatively little about this man but even if he is a heretic in the eyes of some of the honoured and trusted around here we should not be shunning a person espousing a dissenting view, should we?

Anyone know of a military institution that has dispensed with 99% of the literature it uses? I fear the author will remain at Cambridge University awhile yet.

That said I would not support a book burning session (even) of a failed doctrine either. These (counterinsurgency) books need to be retained for the study by future generations of how badly the US and Brit militaries got it all wrong (as a sort of lessons learned).

[davidbfpo]

I am not sure where you are coming from here? I searched SWC and only found his contribution on Airpower.

I know relatively little about this man but even if he is a heretic in the eyes of some of the honoured and trusted around here we should not be shunning a person espousing a dissenting view, should we?

That said I would not support a book burning session (even) of a failed doctrine either. These (counterinsurgency) books need to be retained for the study by future generations of how badly the US and Brit militaries got it all wrong (as a sort of lessons learned).

JMA and others,

My apologies it was a bad post. First I confused Martin van Creveld, who is a well known author with one SWC citation, to Edward Luttwak, who has appeared more often here.

Second, that prejudiced my post.

Back to the citation by Martin van Creveld, with a fresh look:

The first, and absolutely indispensable, thing to do is throw overboard 99 percent of the literature on counterinsurgency, counterguerrilla, counterterrorism, and the like. Since most of it was written by the losing side, it is of little value.

I really do doubt that much of the counter literature is written by the losing side; only if you look hard enough can books by the guerilla or terrorist be found - whether loser or winner in their contest. To throw away 99% of the literature strikes me as a very odd recommendation. So I stick to my comment Frank Ledwidge's viewpoint will remain a jarring voice of dissent.

PS. Wiki on van Creveld:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_van_Creveld and Luttwak appears in thirty-four threads, including one where his is the subject.

[Infanteer]

That was an excellent article, thanks for posting it.

I found myself agreeing with the author taking Nagl to task for ignoring the obvious differences between Malaya and Vietnam in his flawed "Soup with a Knife".

The focus on population control, all but absent from FM 3-24, is crucial as well; nobody wants to talk about its effectiveness to keep modern COIN theory politically correct.

[davidbfpo]

Thanks to accidental open government, a Cabinet member having an official document on display leaving No. 10 Downing Street:

..revealed that the British government was not unduly concerned about President Karzai leaving office in 2014.

However, less coverage was given to another point in the document's final paragraph, which reveals that there is substance to rumours that a second Afghan bank - after Kabul Bank - may be facing financial problems. This probably refers to Azizi Bank, the country's second largest financial institution, which is thought to face a shortfall of funds and for which the IMF has demanded an audit.

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot....-audit-of.html

Personally I wondered reading this:

Afghan perceptions of violence are very important for their confidence in their future and for their readiness to work for the Afghan government. Have we got the strategic communications on levels of violence right?

How long have we been there now? Since 2002 and in a big way since 2006. So in August 2011 that question is being asked is not a confidence-building step.

[JMA]

A review by Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles who was Britain's ambassador to Afghanistan from 2007 to 2009. His memoir "Cables from Kabul" is published by HarperPress.

A decade of misadventure in Afghanistan. - Blood and treasure

It starts with:

Lieutenant Commander Frank Ledwidge, RNR (retired), has written one of the most upsetting books I have read about Britain's part in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Anyone who wants to understand what happened should read it. Yet this extended, occasionally emotional indictment of the British army should be approached with steady nerves - and taken with the occasional pinch of salt.

And ends with:

Afghanistan is great blood and treasure - getting on for £6bn a year for Britain alone. Sooner or later the account must be settled. Ledwidge's well-aimed missiles hit the secondary targets - the foot soldiers in this Afghan march of folly - but not the political high command. It is to the latter that the invoice for a decade of expeditionary excess should properly be addressed.

[jmm99]

The last three paragraphs apply to both sides of the Atlantic - tenfold in the case of US politicians and policymakers, especially those who believe that "Little Americas" are possible:

On both sides of the Atlantic, every politician of any calibre now knows - as the press and the public know - that the military campaign in Afghanistan is going nowhere, and can go nowhere unless it is integrated into a clear political strategy. Unfortunately, that strategy is still missing in inaction, yet that doesn't stop western politicians from popping up in Kabul or Kandahar to mouth the same old platitudes about progress being made, though the challenges remain. They still subscribe to the big lie that the Afghans will be ready to secure and govern their country to a timetable dictated neither by conditions on the ground nor by progress towards a Afghan settlement, but by the unforgiving calendar of western elections.

That is why I conclude that Ledwidge's book may be telling the truth, but not the whole truth, about why we are losing these wars. It is unfair to blame soldiers for being soldiers. In a democracy, those responsible for such mistakes are the political leaders and their advisers, who decide to do not what they know to be right in Afghanistan, but what they believe to be expedient; leaders who have too often chosen to go along with military advice that they know to be overoptimistic and self-serving.

Afghanistan is great blood and treasure - getting on for £6bn a year for Britain alone. Sooner or later the account must be settled. Ledwidge's well-aimed missiles hit the secondary targets - the foot soldiers in this Afghan march of folly - but not the political high command. It is to the latter that the invoice for a decade of expeditionary excess should properly be addressed.

I will not hold my breath waiting for that butcher's bill to be sent.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

The last three paragraphs apply to both sides of the Atlantic - tenfold in the case of US politicians and policymakers, especially those who believe that "Little Americas" are possible:

I will not hold my breath waiting for that butcher's bill to be sent.

Regards

Mike

Yes the politicians on both sides have a lot to answer for... but then so have the generals.

The Brit Chilcot Inquiry seems to have exposed 'problems' in the upper echelons of the military as well. We await the release of the findings.

Having spent a delightful day yesterday (Sunday) with an friend (ex-Rhodesian Lt Col, now retired and Boer War enthusiast) and a visiting serving US officer at the site of the Battle of Spionkop I was shocked at the ineptitude of the British generals of that battle (Buller and Warren). The defeat of the British was severe when after losses of 322 killed or died of wounds, 563 wounded (almost as bad as the 5-year losses in Afghanistan as of a year ago but here over two days) and 300 missing/captured and ended with a general British withdrawal back across the Tugela river.

Also stopped at the site where the young Winston Churchill was captured when the armed train on which he was travelling was ambused by the Boers.

As always there was a spark of life in the officers at battalion level (in this case the Earl of Dundonald and his mounted troops amongst others) but where the strategy is a cock-up no amount of bravery and bold action can save the day (and as usual there were a number of young officers who 'died well' leading their troops in a futile battle).

This is so like the Afghanistan one reads about in books like 'Dead Men Risen' and is so terribly sad for the Brit soldier who has proven time and again that given the right leadership in battle they are a formidable fighting force.

But how to save them from their politicians and their general staff?

[excadet]

We were pretty crap that day. However that defeat and the whole campaign did eventually lead to the vital Haldane reforms. Our only hope is we can have a 21st Century version. Maybe Williams and Lamb ? Certainly not Wall and Houghton -who should be sacked asap in my view.

[JMA]

We were pretty crap that day. However that defeat and the whole campaign did eventually lead to the vital Haldane reforms. Our only hope is we can have a 21st Century version. Maybe Williams and Lamb ? Certainly not Wall and Houghton -who should be sacked asap in my view.

I hope you have been able to steel yourself and read: Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan - Frank Ledwidge.

The question is where the problem lies. Currently we will wait to see what Chilcott finds but can be reasonably sure that it all starts to unravel above half-colonel (as at Spionkop and the Boer war in general).

Some time ago I put my finger on what I believe to be a contributing factor in this problem and that being non military postings of officers to the MoD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Military Attachés) and such - where they forget that their role is to close with and destroy the enemy (or at least those under their command should) and become seduced by the 'soft' world of politics and diplomacy (where everything is negotiable). Of course at the time I was told I was talking nonsense but with the passing of time we shall see...

Yes I understand the first response is to want to string up those generals who have failed the British people (and of course they should be) but really one needs to go to the causes and not the symptoms.

I guess the question is how and by whom this can be done.

[TDB]

Slight off sub-topic here. Last night BBC1 showed a nice little docu entitled "Bomb Squad", title says it all. It gave an interesting insight to this side of the Afghan conflict. Showing what they could of CIED methods. Well worth a watch, not much point in my passing on a link as those of you outside the UK won't be able to watch it. It will no doubt turn up in a torrent or on LiveLeaks.

[TDB]

Well I think the most interesthing thing about small wars or insurgencies in the last decade is that there had been a great deal of soul searching. People, academics, militaries have set out to find a catch all way of winning them. Now while it isn't this simple, they have tried to find a strategy that is broad enough that given any situation those on the ground can fill in the blanks. The problem is though that militaries don't seem to follow their own manuals. We could get bogged down in picking apart how COIN in Afghanistan compares to FM 3.24. My point is either the situation on the ground doesn't fit or that those on the ground seem to think that they can do better. COIN is supposed to be 80-90% civilian in nature after all, yet looking at Afghanistan it seems the reverse of this. Now for one we know that development without security is difficult at best, working in tandem and where possible seems to make the most sence. Robuts SSR is much needed, looking more the judiciary though keeping a keen eye on the ANSF. So after a great wall of text we can some up the last 10 years in three words, one of those an expletive...

[JMA]

We were pretty crap that day. However that defeat and the whole campaign did eventually lead to the vital Haldane reforms. Our only hope is we can have a 21st Century version. Maybe Williams and Lamb ? Certainly not Wall and Houghton -who should be sacked asap in my view.

Spion Kop followed about a month after Black Week

In one disastrous week, dubbed Black Week, from 10-17 December 1899, the British Army suffered three devastating defeats by the Boer Republics at the battles of Stormberg (690), Magersfontein (948) and Colenso (1,138), with 2,776 men killed, wounded and captured. The events were an eye opener for the government and troops, who had thought that the war could be won very easily.

These events really focused the minds of the Brits and Lord Roberts was brought in to replace Buller.

Note: Roberts' son Freddy was killed in the Battle of Colenso and posthumously awarded the VC, making it a rare occurrence where both father and son were awarded the VC.

But once again (virtually) no lessons were learned from the First Boer War 1880-81. Again in this war it was generalship which let the Brits down, in this case Major-General Sir George Pomeroy Colley.

Afghanistan indicates that the problem lies in the same area.

This is where (I humbly submit) it continues to be the problem with the Brit military to this day. Somewhere the selection process of those officers advancing beyond Lt Col seems to be a major problem.

[JMA]

Well I think the most interesthing thing about small wars or insurgencies in the last decade is that there had been a great deal of soul searching. People, academics, militaries have set out to find a catch all way of winning them. Now while it isn't this simple, they have tried to find a strategy that is broad enough that given any situation those on the ground can fill in the blanks. The problem is though that militaries don't seem to follow their own manuals. We could get bogged down in picking apart how COIN in Afghanistan compares to FM 3.24. My point is either the situation on the ground doesn't fit or that those on the ground seem to think that they can do better. COIN is supposed to be 80-90% civilian in nature after all, yet looking at Afghanistan it seems the reverse of this. Now for one we know that development without security is difficult at best, working in tandem and where possible seems to make the most sence. Robuts SSR is much needed, looking more the judiciary though keeping a keen eye on the ANSF. So after a great wall of text we can some up the last 10 years in three words, one of those an expletive...

There is no catch-all way of fighting and winning insurgencies (small wars which are not insurgencies are generally straight forward unless the politicians get involved and screw it all up).

The search for a COIN 'prophet' is futile.

Read widely and learn from as many sources as can be assimilated and use intellect to apply the right lesson of history to the current situation that manifests itself.

This is what the conventional types can't stand about TE Lawrence and that is that all he had was a classical education and a sharp intellect but no formal military indoctrination... I mean training.

There is no little book (like Mao's little red one) containing the' truth' that can be clutched to ones breast like the holy-grail of COIN. This why FM 3.24 has been so counterproductive in real terms.

Study, commitment and hard work is what is required... and not short in-and-out tours with ever changing command.

The other problem area is the confusion with regards to the political/military mix. There is a real problem that because someone came up with the 80:20 ratio that some have come to believe that this works also for all military interventions as well. Political action by politicians (on both sides) are of course the aspects which start insurgencies, make sure they continue and ultimately end the wars. But that does have little effect upon the soldiering requirements down at section/platoon/company level where military action is required to prevent a military solution being imposed by the insurgents.

A must read for the confused is: Killing Your Way to Control - William F. Owen.

[davidbfpo]

Based on a NATO post-incident report and headlined:

Commanders ignored warnings that British troops were at risk from attack by Afghan allies
British troops face such danger from their allies in the Afghan army and police force that they should carry a loaded pistol whenever they are working alongside them, a secret Nato report has warned.

The report, ordered after a rogue Afghan policeman shot dead five British servicemen, recommended that British troops should be armed with 9mm pistols at all times - even when sleeping - because of the high risk of being attacked.

It also called for British soldiers to have separate sleeping and living quarters from Afghan troops, and for all British "administrative areas" to be covered by armed sentries, such were the fears of further incidents.

(My emphasis)But the rulings were never implemented amid fears they would lead to a breakdown in trust between members of the Afghan security forces and the British troops who train them and fight alongside them.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...an-allies.html

Sad, well at least a few commanders issued different orders.

[Red Rat]

This is where (I humbly submit) it continues to be the problem with the Brit military to this day. Somewhere the selection process of those officers advancing beyond Lt Col seems to be a major problem.

That is not just a British problem, every army suffers from the same problem to a greater or lesser degree.

To be a general means that you are a successful soldier, it does not necessarily mean that you are a good soldier. Plus you may be a successful and good soldier in previous conflicts - but not this one. So every conflict should see a winnowing of General Officer ranks as those who are no good are extracted and suitable talent brought in.

The current problem with the British General Officer Class is that not only does The Peter Principle apply, but the confused chain of command and short tours means that we cannot even readily identify (and thereby sack) those who have reached their level of incompetence.

[Ken White]

That is not just a British problem, every army suffers from the same problem to a greater or lesser degree.

One could say that larger insures greater.

Ve haf effidence...

[Red Rat]

I can see why most coups are initiated by junior officers up to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel...

[JMA]

That is not just a British problem, every army suffers from the same problem to a greater or lesser degree.

Yes... but that does not depreciate the very real problem the Brit army continues to face.

To be a general means that you are a successful soldier, it does not necessarily mean that you are a good soldier. Plus you may be a successful and good soldier in previous conflicts - but not this one. So every conflict should see a winnowing of General Officer ranks as those who are no good are extracted and suitable talent brought in.

The other thing of course is that in peacetime a different type of officer seems to advance faster up the promotion ladder. This of course becomes a problem when war breaks out.

The current problem with the British General Officer Class is that not only does The Peter Principle apply, but the confused chain of command and short tours means that we cannot even readily identify (and thereby sack) those who have reached their level of incompetence.

The trick is then to identify the when an individual reaches his highest level of competence rather than let The Peter Principle kick in. Any ideas on how to achieve this?