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Thread: The UK in Afghanistan

  1. #901
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default Two links to pursue

    Ken White has posted an important paper on the UK & COIN elsewhere:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=14285

    Today there was an interesting radio discussion on Afghanistan and SIS (MI6), with Rory Stewart, Frank Ledwidge and Gordon Corera, which is available on a podcast, hopefully without problems of access!

    Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/people/p...s/andrew-marr/
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  2. #902
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    Default Cost and numbers for the UK in Afghanistan

    Thanks to Circling The Lion's Den for pointing at a House of Commons Library report on 'The cost of international military operations':http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN03139

    The outturn cost of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan totalled £21.6bn between 2002/03 and 2010/11. The Government has estimated the costs of maintaining operations in Libya for six months to be £260m.
    From Circling's comment:
    Total costs for the current financial year are likely to be £4.0 billion.

    The report also provides details of the increase in troop numbers since June 2002 when there were only 400 UK troops in Afghanistan. Those seem like faraway days. Since April this year there have been around 9,500 military personnel deployed in Afghanistan, the highest figure ever in the present campaign.
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  3. #903
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default Afg: Impact of mission on UK forces' reputation

    A broad brush article by the BBC Defence Correspondent, which starts with:
    The Armed Forces' reputation has paradoxically both suffered and been enhanced by its decade of experience in Afghanistan.
    Ens with:
    The Armed Forces' reputation has paradoxically both suffered and been enhanced by its decade of experience in Afghanistan.
    Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/15212871
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    Default So what has changed?

    From the BBC we get Upper Gereshk: The Helmand plan meets tough reality - John Cantlie and this quoted from a US Marine:

    "Every time we leave the wire we get shot at or find an IED, either with our engineers or by treading on it. The Taliban have freedom of movement and we can't engage until they've engaged us first. Sometimes it's hard to see what we're supposed to accomplish out here."
    We have had a go at the politicians and the generals yet nothing has changed on the ground. I guess it is now time to start firing battalion level officers. I said some time ago (to much derision) that there should be seats reserved on every flight out of Afghanistan for all officers and men who prove to be incapable and unfit to fight (with the aim of closing with and killing the enemy). Its not too late.

    Can they not see this so-called stalemate is turning into a military defeat?

  5. #905
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default It was always going to in a sense...

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Can they not see this so-called stalemate is turning into a military defeat?
    The only question was the magnitude, small or smaller. It will change little in the world.

    Both nations foolishly rushed into playing in a game they did not understand on turf they did not know and got their a$& handed to them -- easily predictable. It wasn't a foregone conclusion but a number of factors, many political, trended to assure it was the most likely outcome.

    More aggressive tactics would have made little difference and more troops also would've been inconsequential. Both probably would really have done more harm than good. Everyone wants to imitate Malaya. Can't, totally different conditions elsewhere and in other such affrays.

    No third party nation is going to achieve victory in a counterinsurgency in this era, the best that can be obtained is an acceptable outcome and history shows that as time passes -- and the insurgent is constantly stalling for time -- that acceptability is defined down.

    Most Commanders realize that and while it's easy to sit in comfort thousands of miles away and second guess them, all of them want to avoid as many losses as possible in view of the fact they have been told by their political masters there will be no 'win.' Under the circumstances, I submit you would react pretty much the same way, I know I would. Announcement of drawdowns is prima facie 'we're quitting.' The opponents know that, the troops know that and their Commanders know that.

    Out of order:
    We have had a go at the politicians and the generals yet nothing has changed on the ground.
    What do you mean "we've had a go..." If you mean anything written here, that's laughable. If you mean both nations have new senior leaders, that's true but irrelevant -- the Bureaucracies that actually drive what happens on the ground have not changed. The new governments are in thrall to those bureaucracies, like it or not. Those bureaucracies are toting up costs and benefits and have told their govenrments its time to pull the plug.
    I guess it is now time to start firing battalion level officers. I said some time ago (to much derision) that there should be seats reserved on every flight out of Afghanistan for all officers and men who prove to be incapable and unfit to fight (with the aim of closing with and killing the enemy). Its not too late.
    That 'idea' attracted derision because it is patently unworkable in either the UK or US today. While it has military merit, it is politically totally impossible.

    Plus, while there is no doubt that's merited for a few, you would in far too many cases penalize folks who did their best with a really bad hand dealt by echelons above reality -- those bureaucracies again. Your ire is merited, it is wrongly focused.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 10-09-2011 at 09:00 AM. Reason: Fix quote

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    The only question was the magnitude, small or smaller. It will change little in the world.
    It's bad for the US and other NATO countries to lose even the smallest wars. Look at the Lebanon and Somalia for example. When the US likes it or not both or seen as victories against the US. In changes little in real terms but it changes a lot in terms of the perception of the US and its power.

    Both nations foolishly rushed into playing in a game they did not understand on turf they did not know and got their a$& handed to them -- easily predictable. It wasn't a foregone conclusion but a number of factors, many political, trended to assure it was the most likely outcome.
    I guess the politicians called the generals in and said this is what we want to do. The generals must must have agreed. The failures must be laid as much at the door of the generals and the rest of the army as at the door of the politicians. The obvious failure to study the enemy and the terrain ( both human and geographical) is clearly a military failure and add to that the lack of continuity through short tours and you get a class one cock-up of the military's making.

    Of course the politicians should never have got into a shooting war in Afghanistan ( for the reasons I have mentioned above) but they did and in the best traditions of the military they needed to make the best of it. I don't see any evidence that they have in fact quite the opposite which is very very sad. This cock-up has been going on for years now and as such the military has become complicit.

    More aggressive tactics would have made little difference and more troops also would've been inconsequential. Both probably would really have done more harm than good. Everyone wants to imitate Malaya. Can't, totally different conditions elsewhere and in other such affrays.
    In Helmand more troops seem to have made a difference. The question is what tasks were required to be carried out? Certainly in Helmand all the Brits had were army units of the fighting type. The local police and army were conspicuous by their absence and there were no Brit or NATO Civil Action troops to step in once the Taliban had been cleared from an area. You found the bizarre situation where the best but troops after a short sharp clearing operation were left to defend ground like a militia. It made no military sense.

    What you could certainly take from Malaya is the appointment of a 'supremo' who is in total command. How the command structure works in Afghanistan is likely to be hilarious... Which is why it probably doesn't work.

    No third party nation is going to achieve victory in a counterinsurgency in this era, the best that can be obtained is an acceptable outcome and history shows that as time passes -- and the insurgent is constantly stalling for time -- that acceptability is defined down.
    You are correct only if you mean the way the US prosecutes counterinsurgencies. Sri Lanka has just put an insurgency to bed (admittedly) using means not acceptable to any of the NATO powers. Brutality will work but is not on the list of options for NATO. There are other such examples and one needs to keep an eye on what the Russians and the Chinese are doing in their own backyards.

    Most Commanders realize that and while it's easy to sit in comfort thousands of miles away and second guess them, all of them want to avoid as many losses as possible in view of the fact they have been told by their political masters there will be no 'win.' Under the circumstances, I submit you would react pretty much the same way, I know I would. Announcement of drawdowns is prima facie 'we're quitting.' The opponents know that, the troops know that and their Commanders know that.
    Ah... We are back to the armchair general defence. Commanders must be made aware that they are accountable for their actions and sadly simply viewing much of the video material available it is an indictment. Blind loyalty to poor soldering (or worse) does not help in any way whatsoever. We are five years down the line (since 2006) since the proper war began and it seems that the command and control issues are still unresolved. So who is to blame for this? Yes it was insane to lead the world (and the Taliban) know that they just have to wait another 18 months then all they will have to deal with is the pathetic ANA.

    Out of order:What do you mean "we've had a go..." If you mean anything written here, that's laughable.
    Sorry, bad choice of words. By 'we' I mean those who years ago saw the futility of the intervention and it's ineffective implementation (or worse) and said so. You were not one so sorry to drag you in where you don't belong.

    If you mean both nations have new senior leaders, that's true but irrelevant -- the Bureaucracies that actually drive what happens on the ground have not changed. The new governments are in thrall to those bureaucracies, like it or not. Those bureaucracies are toting up costs and benefits and have told their govenrments its time to pull the plug. That 'idea' attracted derision because it is patently unworkable in either the UK or US today. While it has military merit, it is politically totally impossible.
    As far as disagreement is concerned we can revisit the 'UK in Afghanistan' thread and see who's right about what. Sadly (and I mean it) I was 99% correct. I'm told things have changed on the ground since the Marines went into Helmand but I'm yet to find out how. Yes, where they were once 9,500 Brits in Helmand and then 20,000 US Marines were added to the mix. How much has it improved? I don't know do you?

    Plus, while there is no doubt that's merited for a few, you would in far too many cases penalize folks who did their best with a really bad hand dealt by echelons above reality -- those bureaucracies again. Your ire is merited, it is wrongly focused.
    Well when I talk about firing I mean the right people in other words those who screw up, be they officers, NCOs or troopies. There has to be some process to ensure that only the failures get sent home and not some fall-guy. I'm just a little worried that with the focus on the politicians and generals people who screw up at the lower levels will get away with it. My experience was that we tended to wait too long to act in this regard. Better to move them on and if the Army wants to give them a second chance somewhere else then it's good and well but to keep them on in the unit is asking for trouble.

    It's interesting when you speak to the Brits and ask them how they dealt with IEDs in Northern Ireland and they will tell you that they used helicopters extensively. Then and when you ask them what about Helmand the long stories start to come out. Sad really sad.
    Last edited by JMA; 10-09-2011 at 02:24 PM.

  7. #907
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    Talking Which Spots will the Leopard wear tomorrow...

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    What you could certainly take from Malaya is the appointment of a 'supremo' who is in total command. How the command structure works in Afghanistan is likely to be hilarious... Which is why it probably doesn't work.
    Hard to do when you are not THE government as the British were in Malaya; even harder if a coalition of other nations is involved.
    You are correct only if you mean the way the US prosecutes counterinsurgencies. Sri Lanka has just put an insurgency to bed (admittedly) using means not acceptable to any of the NATO powers. Brutality will work but is not on the list of options for NATO. There are other such examples and one needs to keep an eye on what the Russians and the Chinese are doing in their own backyards.
    You just answered your own complaint; what is easily militarily possible is precluded politically.
    Ah... We are back to the armchair general defence. Commanders must be made aware that they are accountable for their actions and sadly simply viewing much of the video material available it is an indictment. Blind loyalty to poor soldering (or worse)...
    Don't be snide, it aids nothing. You are as aware of political realities as am I or anyone else -- wishing them away doesn't change facts and you know it.
    As far as disagreement is concerned we can revisit the 'UK in Afghanistan' thread and see who's right about what. Sadly (and I mean it) I was 99% correct. I'm told things have changed on the ground since the Marines went into Helmand but I'm yet to find out how. Yes, where they were once 9,500 Brits in Helmand and then 20,000 US Marines were added to the mix. How much has it improved? I don't know do you?
    Nope, not a clue -- but I can't help comparing your tone in this post to the far more realistic effort here (LINK).
    ...Better to move them on and if the Army wants to give them a second chance somewhere else then it's good and well but to keep them on in the unit is asking for trouble.
    I agree, most politician in democratic nations will not -- they're into 'fairness' and 'sunk costs.' War isn't fair or cheap but there we are...

  8. #908
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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    In Helmand more troops seem to have made a difference. The question is what tasks were required to be carried out? Certainly in Helmand all the Brits had were army units of the fighting type. The local police and army were conspicuous by their absence and there were no Brit or NATO Civil Action troops to step in once the Taliban had been cleared from an area. You found the bizarre situation where the best but troops after a short sharp clearing operation were left to defend ground like a militia. It made no military sense.
    You have to provide a basic element of security before you can start to deal with civil issues. At the beginning of the AFG campaign the issue was more that we could not provide that basic level of security; not the lack of specialist troops. The early years of the AFG campaign saw pretty stiff levels of close combat fighting so I see no problem with using fighting troops then. Now fighting has dropped off considerably and we are using more militia forces for garrison work.

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    As far as disagreement is concerned we can revisit the 'UK in Afghanistan' thread and see who's right about what. Sadly (and I mean it) I was 99% correct. I'm told things have changed on the ground since the Marines went into Helmand but I'm yet to find out how. Yes, where they were once 9,500 Brits in Helmand and then 20,000 US Marines were added to the mix. How much has it improved? I don't know do you?
    Casualty levels are down both proportionately and overall (despite the increase in the number of troops). Like for like statistics, this year from last, show that the tempo of fighting has dropped in Helmand. this summer's fighting season in Helmand was considerably calmer then last year's.

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    It's interesting when you speak to the Brits and ask them how they dealt with IEDs in Northern Ireland and they will tell you that they used helicopters extensively. Then and when you ask them what about Helmand the long stories start to come out. Sad really sad.
    But we never had enough helicopters in NI to do everything that we wanted, we sufficed. And we also used armoured vehicles extensively (the Humber 'Pig', Snatch and APV). There were other techniques in common use that are not necessarily applicable to Afghanistan in use, ie: extensive use of covert vehicles by all troops was the norm (except in South Armagh). Helicopters in NI were focused on the rural areas of Armagh and Fermanagh for troop lift and hotspots province wide for surveillance.

    Our most effective means of dealing with IEDs was however intelligence collation and our ability to identify pattern setting and stop it. I would say that a clearer example of the British Army's rupture from the past and best practice was not the lack of helicopters (which were split among three operational theatres until 2008 and two until 2009), but the lack of G2 and G3 intelligence/information collation, interrogation and diffusion systems, procedures and capabilities. What had been ingrained in the army when dealing with an IED threat in NI was lost in the space of 10 years from 1995 - 2005.
    Last edited by Red Rat; 10-10-2011 at 10:30 AM.
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    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default California not Kenya for some Afg training

    JMA for one will welcome this, maybe?

    A BBC report on a Royal Marine Commando using the Three Palms training ground for training, as it matches Afg:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-15327943

    The RM will deploy to Afg in a year's time and half are just out of training.
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    Quote Originally Posted by davidbfpo View Post
    JMA for one will welcome this, maybe?

    A BBC report on a Royal Marine Commando using the Three Palms training ground for training, as it matches Afg:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-15327943

    The RM will deploy to Afg in a year's time and half are just out of training.
    Certainly an improvement on Kenya if out of the clutches of the Health and Safety nazis. But still I fail to understand why no such facility has been erected in Afghanistan itself which ISAF and ANA can use. If a battalion can be flown to the US for training then surely they can do it in Afghanistan? Any legislative technicality should be dealt with. Oh yes and it reduces the amount of training kit required.

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    Default From the blog entry...

    Flighted in the blog the article in The Economist, The future of the British army - On the defensive contains an action by the Brit military that needs to be noted.

    It should be noted that the Dr Fox, the Defence Secretary, (no friend of the MoD) had:

    ... appointed one of the ministry’s harshest critics, Bernard Gray, to bring some realism and order to procurement.
    In the wake of Dr Fox's resignation (one wonders who or what had a hand in the leaking of evidence to the press) as Defence Secretary he:

    General Sir Peter Wall, the head of the army, asked Major-General Nick Carter, a former commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan and the director-general of land warfare, to carry out a review that would shape the army of the future.
    This is no doubt Carter's opportunity for redemption (as he must surely carry much of the responsibility for the abysmal British performance in Afghanistan during his tenure).

    The report is a concern because he seems to ignore that in military planning one always works backwards from the desired end point (or outcome) so as to chart your course of action (that is everything being related to D-Day and H-Hour... remember?).

    His first reported issue is:
    “getting off the Afghan hamster wheel”—extracting men and equipment from Afghanistan in good order
    Not sure what the problem is afterall with mass change-overs every six months the one aspect the Brits are masters at is how to get 10,000 soldiers out of Afghanistan in quick time.

    Next:
    Where deep cuts are made, the emphasis will be on preserving institutional readiness by retaining just enough skills, expertise and equipment to regenerate capabilities quickly.
    Interesting. I wonder what the plan is. The key to this will be 'how quick is quickly'.

    And finally:
    ... putting a lot of emphasis on “upstream” conflict prevention and capacity-building. The army already carries out training missions in bits of the Middle East and Africa, but the idea is to go much further, with around 3,000 of its people actively engaged around the world.
    The idea is that somehow that such a group of 'bright and culturally sensitive people' will somehow prevent wars breaking out. WHHBS? (what has he been smoking)

    Perhaps this is the time for the Brits to put together civic action units for this dubious purpose rather than attempt to expect this from line infantry units as a matter of course. Here they need to go to McCuen to see that a leaf must be taken out of the French Algeria experience with teams of S.A.U.'s and S.A.S.'s (not to be confused with the British term) on how to counter-organise the population against the insurgents. Again though there is that underlying thread of staggering arrogance to think that the Brits or any military can have units/teams waiting to deploy to just about any potential conflict area and achieve what the local government has themselves failed to achieve.

    At least the Brit general staff have started thinking and that for many will be a novel experience and should be welcomed by all.

  12. #912
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    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Flighted in the blog the article in The Economist, The future of the British army - On the defensive contains an action by the Brit military that needs to be noted.
    It is a very good article, and a very well informed one to boot. The passing of Dr Fox is widely lamented within the defence establishment; even if I suspect that some will be breathing sighs of relief.


    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    This is no doubt Carter's opportunity for redemption (as he must surely carry much of the responsibility for the abysmal British performance in Afghanistan during his tenure).
    Well, he was only there for one year and that was 2010-2011.


    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    The report is a concern because he seems to ignore that in military planning one always works backwards from the desired end point (or outcome) so as to chart your course of action (that is everything being related to D-Day and H-Hour... remember?).
    In theory we have an endstate which is the UK's Future Character of Conflict Paper and the UK's National Security Strategy (NSS) together with various statements from the current government on UK defence spending. Unfortunately the NSS is a series of rather bland statements that can be viewed as strategic goals but certainly do not form a coherent strategy.

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    His first reported issue is: Not sure what the problem is afterall with mass change-overs every six months the one aspect the Brits are masters at is how to get 10,000 soldiers out of Afghanistan in quick time.
    Well it took us years to get the equipment in to Afghanistan (we do not change the equipment over every time we rotate troops) and so it will take years to get the equipment out. But as the Ministry of Defence does not own the majority of the equipment per se it also has to decide which equipment is Afghanistan specific and which is likely to form core equipment for future conflicts and then figure out where to get the money to pay for it all from. Money is a big issue; the UK Government has stated that the UK's deficit is the single largest strategic threat to the UK's prosperity and way of life that currently exists; it is tightening the purse strings accordingly.


    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    The idea is that somehow that such a group of 'bright and culturally sensitive people' will somehow prevent wars breaking out. WHHBS? (what has he been smoking)
    The idea is that by strengthening the institutions of government we can help prevent failing states from becoming failed states. If conflict does break out then we have people who are culturally attuned to the conflict area. It is much more like the US Army's FAO programme.


    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Perhaps this is the time for the Brits to put together civic action units for this dubious purpose rather than attempt to expect this from line infantry units as a matter of course. Here they need to go to McCuen to see that a leaf must be taken out of the French Algeria experience with teams of S.A.U.'s and S.A.S.'s (not to be confused with the British term) on how to counter-organise the population against the insurgents.
    But this approach can only be done by the indigenous government or by others acting on behalf of the indigenous government. The latter presents clear problems of implementation as seen only too clearly in Iraq and Afghanistan.


    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Again though there is that underlying thread of staggering arrogance to think that the Brits or any military can have units/teams waiting to deploy to just about any potential conflict area and achieve what the local government has themselves failed to achieve.
    Again think prevention and not cure. These teams will be permanently deployed like the US Army FAOs or like the loan service personnel we have in many Middle Eastern countries. Again they are envisaged as strengthening the institutions of government; they will not be able to directly influence indigenous government policies or politics. The issue of them achieving what the local government has failed to achieve is just not on the cards; that is not their role and I doubt an indigenous government would allow them that much leeway.

    Of course if Scotland votes for independence in 2015 then this is all a moot point
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    Quote Originally Posted by Red Rat View Post
    It is a very good article, ...snipped for brevity
    I will drop the t for t response at this point as we have all but exhausted the aspects IMHO.

    COIN will never work in an instance where there is no legitimate indigenous government on whose behalf the 'assistance' is being given.

    It worked for the Brits in Malaya, was problematic for the yanks in Vietnam and the French government walked out of Algeria on the cusp of victory.

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    The Times (London) is reporting that British troops are to hand over Nad-e Ali (www.thetimes.co.uk). Can watch the video on the main page without having to subscribe.

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    Quote Originally Posted by TDB View Post
    The Times (London) is reporting that British troops are to hand over Nad-e Ali (www.thetimes.co.uk). Can watch the video on the main page without having to subscribe.
    I guess Nad-e Ali will from now on be as safe as Kabul.

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    Default US slims down in Helmand: good or bad sign?

    A curious report in the Daily Telegraph, which appears to be based on interviews granted by a USMC general and a somewhat awkward UK MoD response in London.

    The article is headlined 'Helmand killing fields to be handed back to Britain' and sub-titled:
    The number of American troops in Helmand is to be cut in half leaving Britain to take the lead in the Afghan province, a US general has told The Daily Telegraph.
    Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...o-Britain.html

    Opens with:
    The substantial reduction in US forces could mean that British forces will resume control of former bases such as Sangin, Musa Qala and Now Zad. It is understood that the force of 20,000 US marines in Helmand, which has done much to restore stability, could even be cut to almost a quarter of its strength by September next year.
    No doubt General Toolan has his national orders, the reduction in US troops and if current, official statements are credible Taliban overt activity has dropped - so US Marines can be redeployed. All sound militarily, then you notice some of his words of caution:
    Afghan security forces are in a good place but very few if any are in a position where they can operate totally independently. More time is needed to address the insurgency.
    I am sure the USA has coordinated with ISAF, in particular with those nations present in Helmand (UK, Denmark, Australia & the Baltic States).

    That does leave a political dilemma for the UK, does it redeploy back to the "hot spots" like Sangin? Or encourage the ANSF to do so, with adviser teams and with ISAF only in a support role?

    I am aware that the US Army has made some significant withdrawals in other parts of Afghanistan, notably in the East.

    Clearly this post could sit comfortably in 'The Uk in Afg' thread, but it is a significant decision and worthy of standing alone for the moment.
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    Default I shook hands with Sinn Fein, we must talk to the Taliban too

    A nice catchy title for the first media interview of the new UK Defence Secretary, which has a number of topics and a good measure of "spin":http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...liban-too.html

    He has just been to Afghanistan and been briefed accordingly.

    Talking to the Taliban is a process the Afghans have to manage. It is their country.

    The goal from their point of view is peace, from our point of view it's stability. That can only happen by an inclusive political settlement that will involve bringing elements of the Taliban into that process.

    But negotiating with the Taliban must be done from a position of strength. Negotiating from a position of weakness would be a disaster. Nobody must every think of this as being a measure of failure or abandoning the sacrifices which have been made.
    This is a classic:
    Some of the so-called spectaculars that we have seen rather suggest desperation. They're designed to grab headlines rather than to achieve military objectives.
    Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...liban-too.html

    Someone needs to widen his briefing material and include as an example the Tet Offensive, with the attack on South Vietnamese cities, including the US Embassy. The Taliban are Afghans (mainly), with a strategy aimed primarily at other Afghans and impacting their calculation of future loyalties.
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    Default From SO2 Spin...

    The Brits finally get the idea

    MOD/1/109/666

    STAFF GUIDANCE ON DEFENCE RESTRUCTURING

    1. This guidance is being issued to remedy a perceived difficulty experienced by Staff at all levels in understanding the rationale behind recent Defence re-structuring. In particular many Staff Officers seem not to understand how reducing the numbers of aircraft, ships, tanks, artillery and soldiers results in a more flexible, robust and effective fighting force.

    2. In particular it seems that much of the confusion stems from a systemic misunderstanding of the correct use of military terminology. A list of common terms and actual meanings follows.

    3. In addition there follows an explanation of the key assumptions embedded within the Defence Review. All Staff Officers are encouraged to seek clarification through their Chain of Command if they still have any questions.

    4. Staff Terminology used in the new Defence Plan;

    Term MOD meaning

    Flexible- a. Smaller
    b. Unable to operate unless under US protection

    Robust- a. Smaller
    b. Lacking reserves or regeneration capability

    Networked- Smaller, but still unable to talk to each other

    Capable- Smaller

    Agile- Really, really small

    Deployability- Method of making the Forces, primarily the Army, able to send higher percentages of their manpower to a distant location. This is achieved by reducing the overall numbers involved, i.e. “In future the Army will be able to send 50% of it’s manpower to Africa in the back of a Cessna, thus achieving greater deployability”.

    Reach- The distance the Americans are willing to fly us

    Efficient- Much, much smaller

    Streamlined- Just unbelievably small

    Just in time- For the funeral.

    Integrated- Process by which all three services get to brief against each other in public leaks, attempting to justify and defend their own budget against cuts, thereby doing the Treasury’s work for them. Taken to extremes by the Army in which Corps and Regiments fight each other, and perfected within the Infantry.

    Technically ambitious- a. Slang, as in “He was being a bit technically ambitious when he tried to drive that car through the wall” (cf, “To propose a Bowman”)
    b. Description of the far future

    Reserves- Integral part of current Operational Manning.

    Rationalisation- a. Cuts
    b. Psychological term, meaning to use complicated arguments to avoid facing unpalatable truths, i.e. , “we don’t need to pay for both expensive servicemen and equipment, because we will be networked, agile, and technically ambitious” .

    Rapid- Used in a comparative sense, as in “The rapid erosion of the Himalayan Mountains…”

    Modernisation- Cuts

    Radical- Deep Cuts

    Transformation- Really Deep Cuts

    Sustainable- Assuming zero casualties, no leave and no emergencies.

    Sentences such as “these proposals capture our aim for a speedy deployable, agile, joint and integrated, technically ambitious defence capability” will make more logical sense to the experienced Staff Officer once the above definitions are applied.

    5. It will also help if Staff Officers bear in mind the following Planning Principles. Point C will be of particular relevance in explaining the rationale behind restructuring to Junior Staff.

    a. Use of Special Forces. No one in the general Public has a clue how many there are, so they can be announced as deploying to every country in the world.

    b. Aggressive use of terminology can compensate for lack of actual forces. For example in the past, effective deterrence of a reasonably capable Maritime threat would require the despatch of a task force, consisting of destroyers, frigates, submarines and possibly even a carrier. In the future this task will still be achieved by a task force; but task-force will be the new description for a mine-sweeper.

    c. The new Defence Plan was not resource driven. A comprehensive strategic estimate was conducted, from first principles, identifying the current and potential threats to the UK and its interests, allowing a reserve for the unexpected, and also allowing for recurrent non-warfighting tasks such as Fire Strike cover and Foot and Mouth disease. Against the tasks identified an ideal manpower establishment and Task Org was then identified. By an amazing coincidence it happened to fit almost exactly within current Treasury MOD expenditure plans, and even allow the MOD to carry half the costs of Iraq and Afghanistan.

    d. Much of the current crisis in Defence Spending can be directly traced to the high costs of legacy equipments. These were ordered at a time of ignorance in the past when Planners naively seemed to believe that the threat they identified as imminent would remain the same for the 20-30 year service life of the equipment they were ordering. The assumption in the 1980’s and 90’s that tanks, artillery, and aircraft would be needed in the future was ridiculous, as none of these equipments have been used by the British Armed forces to any degree since the Falklands war.
    However, current planners possess better foresight and are able to predict future threats for at least the next 40 years. We are therefore able to be certain that Britain is unlikely to need any tanks, aircraft, submarines etc. past about 2015.

    e. Britain no longer needs a significant anti-submarine capability. No other nation possesses submarines in any numbers, submarine technology is unlikely to advance at all over the next few 30 years, and should anti-submarine technology or skills be required at any point in the future they can be reconstituted overnight from the reserves. (Once the reserves have been reconstituted). In any case by 2020 the UK will be fully integrated into mainland Europe, and will therefore no longer have a coastline to defend or be reliant upon sea-supply.

    f. Similar arguments apply to air defence.

    g. The Regimental System. In the past the Regimental System has been seen as the corner-stone of British Military success, creating a system in which the individual is made to feel part of a greater family, often stretching back hundreds of years, in which he is nurtured and developed, and to which he feels such great loyalty that he is inspired to sacrifice himself if need be for his Regimental comrades. However, the British youth of today are so naturally self-sacrificing and community spirited that additional incentives are now unnecessary, and in any case the threat to soldiers on the ground has been assumed away. There is therefore no further need for a system whose main purpose is to generate fighting spirit, and it can be safely emasculated to achieve administrative efficiency (see “Efficient” above).

    h. High divorce rates within the Services will solve manpower crises, by ensuring all service personnel will be happy to conduct back-to-back tours forever, as no one will have any families or friends to miss.

    i. Savings will be ploughed into the purchase of large numbers of hats. This will be essential as in future everyone will be at least treble or quadruple hatted. Wars will be fought in rotation on a strict “first come, first served” basis.

    k. Future savings will be made by abolishing all training for the Chiefs of Staff. After all they haven’t proven remotely as effective at manoeuvre warfare, disruption, dislocation or divide-and-rule as the Treasury.

    l. Successive efficiency measures can be made to reinforce each other. For example, each time troop numbers are cut, a unit can then be tasked to conduct the same jobs as before. Provided there are no actual massacres of Friendly Forces, the new troop numbers can be seen to have been fully as effective as the previous numbers, and so can form a baseline for achieving efficiency cuts to new troop numbers. Savings can then be invested in new equipment, in the same way that British Airways fires half its pilots every time it needs to buy a new plane. The ultimate aim is to have one man, but equipped like Dr Octopus. He will sleep with one eye open at all times to replicate full manning.

    m. Key Assumptions: Current levels of operations are an aberration, will never be repeated, and should form no guide to current manning requirements, let alone future ones. Gerry Adams has embraced peace, there is no more requirement for crowd control in Northern Ireland, the FBU have forsworn strikes along with all other key public workers, Osama Bin Laden is history and the Easter Bunny will be providing Area Air Defence for London.

    6. More detailed guidance can be found in JSP 4708- “Magic Mushrooms, their consumption, effects and results in the MOD” and the Defence Secretary’s Autobiography “What Colour is the Sky in My World?”


    {CHOtS SIGNED}

    I M Promoted
    SO2 Spin
    Ministry of Truth
    Orwell Bldg
    MOD 1984
    Added by Moderator: this comes from:http://www.arrse.co.uk/armed-forces-...ructuring.html
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 11-16-2011 at 01:22 PM. Reason: Add note & link

  19. #919
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    Default From the Armed Forces Journal

    Slow learners : How Iraq and Afghanistan forced Britain to rethink COIN
    BY CAPT. ANDREW P. BETSON

    The last paragraph:

    The British military’s experience in contemporary COIN operations elicited an unfortunate smugness and complacency in an organization that thought that it “got it.” Successful experiences in the past gave it a false sense of security in its approaches to Iraq and Afghanistan, and it suffered the consequences. Officers within the organization identified these shortcomings, but also began to point out failures in adaptation, while the U.S. seemed to embrace change. Though the early misperceptions may have delayed the response, the British military — especially the Army — eventually experienced very similar dynamics as its U.S. counterpart in its approaches to counterinsurgency.
    Takes me back to those 'heady' days of the 'Wilf Wars' some time back in this thread.

  20. #920
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    Default

    PRIO, 15 Nov 11: Faithful Ally: The UK Engagement in Afghanistan
    This case study first contextualizes the UK Afghanistan engagement in light of the broader foreign policy concerns, and then focuses on the development and adjustment of military strategy in relation to other components of the engagement. In this respect, special attention is given to the importance of realities on the ground in Afghanistan, organizational (NATO) interests, and domestic factors.

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