USAF Cyber Command (catch all)

[selil]

This is an interesting article. When I started reading it I thought 'Ah a don't forget me I support Cyber!' but I don't think that is what it says. I think what it says besides a really good summation of cyber warfare at the beginning is that the acquisition for the new command all future equipment is going to be "new". That is an understatement. Invoking Moore (a really great guy) doesn't impress but knowing that flexibility beyond pandering to the word will be a key strategy.

Unfortunately I'm seeing a huge monster bureaucracy being created and in this cyber world where asymmetry is key I see large army, large air force, type thinking starting to take hold. I don't think the Air Force is seeing the hypocrisy of trying to solve an "insurgency" type conflict with "carpet bombing" thinking.


From a story posted HERE

The U.S. Air Force Electronic Systems Center issued the following commentary:

By Col. George Kramlinger

AFCYBER (P) OL-A

The Electronic Systems Center here and it's predecessors have always played a key role in defending the nation. With an ominous threat to the nation emerging on the cyberspace frontier, ESC is once again poised to play a key role in defending the Republic.

The United States increasingly depends on cyberspace to maintain our way of life and employ the instruments of national power. Control of essential processes in manufacturing, utilities, banking, health care, public safety, communications and national security now rely on networked computer systems.

This trend toward networked cyber systems continues to expand. Consequently, our economy and national security are fully dependent on the cyberspace infrastructure. Unfortunately, resources for exploiting the vulnerabilities in cyberspace are widely available and inexpensive.

Our adversaries - even those considered unsophisticated - actively seek to exploit this vulnerable center of gravity by developing capabilities to cripple our military forces, critical infrastructure, and commerce. As a result, cyber warfare is emerging as the preferred asymmetrical means to strike the United States.

With the advent of Air Force Cyber Command, the USAF will present cyber warfighting forces and capabilities to U.S. Strategic Command, geographical combatant commanders, and joint task force commanders. AFCYBER will organize, train, and equip to: deter and prevent cyberspace attacks against vital U.S. interests; rapidly respond to attacks and reconstitute networks; integrate cyber power into the full range of global and theater effects; defeat adversaries operating through cyberspace; ensure freedom of action in cyberspace for US and Allied commanders; and maintain persistent cyberspace awareness.

AFCYBER will work through the joint force to rapidly engage, degrade, or destroy an enemy's networks and network attack systems. We will provide the means to render an enemy deaf, mute, and blind in the first hours of a conflict, making it impossible for that enemy to effectively challenge U.S. and allied forces. Dominating the cyberspace domain makes it possible to paralyze an adversary before the first kinetic engagement. Thus, cyber paralysis is a critical element of 21st century warfare.

In 1965 Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel, observed that that the number of transistors per square inch had doubled every year since the inception of the integrated circuit. Over time, his observation morphed into the theory commonly known as "Moore's law". This theory suggests almost every measure of digital electronics improves by an order of magnitude every 18 months.

Unfortunately, "Moore's law" drives a cyber technology refresh rate that seriously challenges the USAF in a fiscally constrained environment. Thus, USAF dominance in the rapidly changing cyberspace domain requires an agile acquisition strategy to rapidly field new systems that easily integrate with existing capability. Avoiding stove piped systems creates synergy and enhances freedom of action in cyberspace. Fortunately, ESC has the requisite expertise to partner with AFCYBER and overcome the challenges of Moore's law.

In December 2006, Air Force Materiel Command gave ESC primary responsibility to acquire and sustain USAF cyberspace systems. In this capacity ESC manages program objectives and executes total life cycle responsibility for assigned cyberspace systems. ESC program managers develop acquisition strategies then manage cost, schedule, and performance. This framework combined with ESC's disciplined Systems Engineering approach creates integrated solutions that can quickly deliver high-quality, affordable, and sustainable capabilities. However, acquisition does not occur in a vacuum.

AFCYBER will lead the requirements management process throughout the entire cyber acquisition and system life cycle in coordination with warfighters, MAJCOMs, ESC, and the Air Staff. In addition, AFCYBER will lead development and submission of the integrated cyberspace program objective memorandum in collaboration with appropriate stake holders to capture life cycle costs, ensure sustainment, and develop a sound investment strategy.

Furthermore, we will lead development of the USAF cyberspace roadmap as part of the USAF Capability Review and Risk Assessment process to identify gaps, shortfalls, and recommended courses of action. With an eye toward the horizon, AFCYBER will lead development of future cyberspace concept of operations to guide science, technology, and experimentation. Finally, we will provide a cyberspace "hot bench" for integration and developmental testing, procedures development, and proof of concept evaluation for emerging technology.

Unfortunately, the urgent genesis of cyberspace capability, dynamic evolution of AFCYBER, and ownership of the cyber "hot bench" may generate fog and friction between AFCYBER and ESC relating to experimentation, testing, and demonstrations.

However, fog and friction are easily overcome by formalized communication that seeks to deconflict, coordinate, and synchronize overlapping areas of responsibility especially relating to the smooth transition of initiatives into sustainable systems of record.

Regular communication will enhance ESC's ability to rapidly deliver cutting edge, integrated, and open architecture capability to the warfighter without wasting time, effort, or money. The Global Cyberspace Integration Center - formerly the Air Force Command Control, and Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center - now part of AFCYBER (P), has successfully collaborated with ESC on numerous programs and initiatives over the last seven years.

Of particular note is the success our organizations have had working together on the Air Operations Center weapon system, Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment and Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration. These examples in particular highlight the capability to successfully transition emerging, newly created, or existing technology into systems of record that meet warfighter requirements.

The cyber domain follows the exponential change of Moore's law and therefore requires innovative processes to thoroughly identify requirements then rapidly field systems that integrate across the breadth and depth of this new frontier. The success of AFCYBER - and our dominance of cyberspace - is heavily dependant on the AFCYBER relationship with ESC.

AFCYBER will execute a disciplined and responsive requirements process while at the same time providing a cyber "hot bench" to test new initiatives and technologies early in the development cycle.

Given the intellectual and technical prowess that characterize all Airmen, the partnership between ESC and AFCYBER gives the USAF a distinct advantage over any potential adversary in the cyber domain just as it has in air and space.

AFCYBER in partnership with ESC will create a dynamic warfighting enterprise that integrates capabilities, systems, and warfighters to establish the cross domain dominance necessary to fly, fight, and win in cyberspace.

From a story posted HERE

[selil]

This could have been a much better story if it wasn't dropping into the realm of scare tactics. Though the criticism is likely warranted, with all the money that has spent, the paradigm of information assurance and security hasn't changed much.

Though simplistic the analogy is we designed the auto industry, but we've fallen behind everybody else who are now driving George Jetson air scooters.

I hate to say it but some of the under current of this article supports the idea that maybe culturally we will never be able to secure of utilize cyber space it is just to much of a change at this time.

More at the link

Former White House cyber-security and anti-terrorism advisor Richard Clarke isn't known as a fan of the current administration, but political loyalties aside, the expert claims that the president's new initiative aimed at bolstering the nation's electronic infrastructure is fundamentally flawed.

Speaking at the inaugural Source Boston security conference, Clarke expressed his concerns over the national electronic security initiative signed by Bush on Jan. 8.

While the measure has yet to be detailed by the White House publicly, the Washington rumor mill is already circulating many details of the strategy and Clarke said the plan won't have the effect that the president's advisors are hoping for.

The two major thrusts of the Bush mandate, according to Clarke, are aimed at better securing the government's own computing and communications networks, and adopting a more proactive approach to engaging in cyber-warfare.

In both cases, the plan may in fact serve to weaken U.S. security and privacy efforts, he said.

As Clarke sees it, the biggest flaw in the portion of the measure devoted to protecting government computing operations is a lack of recognition that most of those systems run on the same infrastructure, and through the same carriers, as the rest of the nation's Internet traffic.

"There's the idea that somehow these are government networks that we're talking about, but they really aren't, all these government sites are running through the same network of routers and the same fiber channels as everything else, there's no segmentation on these carrier networks," Clarke said. "This means that [the plan's authors] either don't know that and merely think they need to reinforce security on state-owned servers, or data in their own facilities, in which case thy are missing most of the problem, or that they plan to do monitoring of everything going through the carriers' systems."

If it is the latter, than Americans will need to prepare for a world where they have far less privacy in terms of their ability to access the Web without the potential for government observation, he said.

Much more HERE

[selil]

Slashdot does not reflect the "hacker" culture but they most definitely reflect the YUG's (young uppity geeks). The "I can argue about Play Station, X-Box, and Wii, and PWN you", group is unfortunately where Air Force Cyber Command will likely start pulling recruits.

For the rest of us I'd look at the language of this and think about the "close air support" role end the effectiveness of the Air Force in dealing with other services. Then I would suggest to the higher up in each of the other forces to think about the Air Force determining the linkages of all the command and control (as in their words) they are the leader in cyber-space.

Enjoy the interview some of the questions are quite well thought out. Others show the standard audience of Slashdot (which includes me!!!)

For a view into the heck of geekdom follow the link.

Slashdot interview with Air Force General Link

[selil]

Military commanders should consider reports like this and think back to what does it mean if the enemy has access to all of your deepest military secrets. Consider the tightening of public disclosures of information and the rampant use of states secrets to secure data. Then balance that on the wholesale loss of control of massive amounts of data (or minimal dos it matter?).

Don't fall for the fear mongering that most security analysts would drive change or new initiatives with instead consider how simplistic the attacks are (trojan in an email for example). Almost no security service that does not degrade capability and uniformly degrade information technology services is going to work without people not doing stupid things.

When you think about all of the intersections between information technology services and the command and control infrastructure (technical or not) the issue rapidly becomes not when it will be attacked (peace or war), but how and how much it will be attacked. The same way telegraph wires were cut in WW1 (denial of service), the same way encryption was broken (confidentiality), and the same way that information operations injected errors in the enemy command and control (integrity).

I wonder where you can find people who know how to fight asymmetric attacks against large infrastructures and political organizations?



Original Article Here

On June 22, 2007, Defense Secretary Robert Gates acknowledged that the Pentagon's network had been successfully attacked the previous Wednesday, and that this attack was responsible for a disruption in email service to some 1,500 Pentagon employees. At the time, Gates downplayed the attack, saying that it affected only the OSD's (Office of the Secretary of Defense) non-classified e-mail service and that there was "no anticipated adverse impact on ongoing operations." It seems that the adverse impact of the June attack may have been much greater than Gates' early guidance implied. According to a top DoD technology official quoted at GovernmentExecutive.com, the thieves behind that attack seized an "amazing amount" of data.

New details on the attack itself have become available in the months since it occurred. According to Dennis Clem, CIO of the Pentagon and the OSD, the intrusion was first detected during an IT restructuring that was underway at the time. By the time it was detected, malicious code had been in the system for at least two months, and was propagating via a known Windows exploit. The bug spread itself by e-mailing malicious payloads from one system on the network to another. The messages themselves were spoofed and appeared to be legitimate missives from other employees. Once the recipient opened an infected e-mail, the worm sent that person's password and other login credentials back to home base.

The government isn't saying what, exactly, got stolen. There's no evidence to contradict Secretary Gates' claim that the classified e-mail system remained unaffected, but data that Clem describes as "sensitive" was accessed and encrypted before being transmitted to the hackers' location. As for where that location might be, unconfirmed reports point towards China's People's Liberation Army. China, of course, has vehemently denied any knowledge or responsibility. The Pentagon has stepped up its network protection since the intrusion, and added additional protection in the form of smart cards and digital signatures. Such security measures are the ultimate example of closing the barn door after the horse is gone, but should at least make further intrusions more difficult.

[Boot]

The PLA have a BN sized element (it may be more) dedicated to hacking other countries systems. One area at least in the Corps we seem to pay lots of lip service to but not actual action is cyber security. I can't count how many CO's on various operations "had" to have access to the internet for convience. Their day to day is only done on NIPR. Classified systems are secure because its a closed system, that is it connects to itself. In most cases any intrusion would have to physically come from the system itself, that is the hacker would phyically have to have access to it.
Back to unclass systems. Its attitudes and lack of training that usually allows these intrusions. One of my biggest rubs as a Comm type has always been the way the my fellow non-Comm. types viewed my specialty. In the Marine Corps at TBS its beat in your head that if your not combat arms your nothing. Many officers come up with that sort of mentality, and what I have seen is a perception that you are weak because your not a "meat eater". As far as the Pentagon goes I can't speak for them. Like I sai I'm willing to bet its a lack of enforcement and attitude (those computer guys are a pain in the butt) that probably led to this.
My last word on perceptions and attitudes; I knew a LtCol now Col, who was told by his base CG that he was the one of best officers he ever had, and even presented him with a pretty high medal. When that CG ranked him, he ranked him last. When the officer confronted his boss on this, his boss told him he doesn't have to talk to him, he's just a Commo...and those in manpower and leadership positions wonder why things like this happen and their best leave to go work for GD or NG.

[Stan]

The Capital Interview -
Greg Bruno, Staff Writer, April 1, 2008

...If you could, start out by talking about the Air Force’s Cyber Command structure, the mission of cyber command, and where we are today in terms of its capabilities.

Right now we’re in the nascent phase. We have a hundred and sixty folks who are assigned across about four different bases who are doing this work for me. As a provisional command, I have no forces. I’m not authorized to have any forces. So until this capability goes initial operational capability on the first of October, this really is a virtual command.

Have we been attacked?

Depends on what you call an attack. We certainly have had penetrations and we’ve been attacked by ourselves, if you will. If you define an attack as something that degrades your ability, yes we’ve been attacked. Sometimes we’re attacked by ourselves from our own acts of omission versus commission.

...How good are we? What can we do, what can’t we do, and are we the best out there?

Well, in this business, there are lots of peers because the price of admission is relatively low. With some technologically smart kids you can do a lot of damage. And the difference is this technology only requires you to have a connection and a laptop computer. So as the nature of warfare changes and the price of admission to the fight goes way down, you can have lots more players.

Much more at the link...

[selil]

The Air Force is pushing this hard. I support our new cyber-over-lords but I'm concerned about several implementations and failures at basic understanding of capability and reasonign I see occuring. When I met for a few minutes with Maj. Gen Elders of AF Cyber Command he was pretty impressive on his depth of understanding. Still having talked to the former project officer for related DARPA projects most everybody is worried about nuts and bolts and few know how to build a car.