Impacts on Finland/EU/NATO of renewed IW/COIN focus of US military

[charlyjsp]

Hi,

I am working on a project looking at the recent evolution of the U.S. armed forces interest and capabilities in IW/COIN/StabOps and what implications it may carry for Finland, EU and NATO. Open disclosure: the project is mainly funded by the Defence Ministry and any report is meant for public dissemination.

The first portion, what has taken place, the debates, most recent budget request etc. I feel I have under fairly good control (thanks in part to SWJ & SWC). Interviews and thinking (hey, I'm being paid for something, right?) have clarified some of the potential implications but, I would greatly appreciate any insights (personal, links to reports etc.) anyone of the boards has on what the concrete consequences of the increased focus on IW/COIN/Stabops may have on (1) NATO, EU and Finland, and (2) the future of the concepts 'crisis management' (EU) and 'peacebuilding/keeping' (UN).

I don't want to guide any potential replies at this point, but look forward to engaging in a discussion and sharing my insights as they are at the moment.

Thank you in advance.

[davidbfpo]

My first reaction - on a wider European level - is that participation in such activities when a part of a coalition with the USA will have an impact of each defence forces learning / experience / equipment / tactics. Kilcullen cites the Danes as being amongst the best COIN operators in Afghanistan and another here (Ken?) cites the Swedes have the best kit.

Secondly, especially for peacekeeping / stability ops and those under UN command, is the impact on imagery and legitimacy. Scandanavian participation in UN peacekeeping was (still?) a major focus and commitment. Can COIN experiences be left behind, should they be left behind.

Third, UN operations often cite the professionalism of some NATO / Western nations, alongside a willingness to be 'robust' and make comparisons to others weaknesses. Will involvement in US-led COIN ops and the risk of casualities impact being 'robust'?

Finally I am mindful of the frequent comment that the Europeans in NATO / EU have two million in service and can deploy a tiny fraction. Let alone helicopters and specialist troops.

Just a few thoughts from an armchair.

davidbfpo

[charlyjsp]

davidbfpo, thanks for initial comments. I haven’t read Kilcullen’s Accidental Guerilla yet, are his comments about Danes in there?

In trying to push the conversation onwards, some of my thoughts on the issues of legitimacy, robustness you raise.

For UN commanders, access to imagery, especially tactical (and live) is by most accounts far more limited than NATO ops. If US COIN & IW doctrine ‘requires’ access to such ISR assets, and especially NATO adopts similar doctrines, then more investments are needed to be able to ‘play the game’. Conversely, NATO (and EU) troops that are used to receiving larger amounts of ISR info may not want to participate in UN operations if it is not forthcoming (and they don’t have the resources to provide it themselves).

On legitimacy, In Finland UN led operations are still closely identified with peacekeeping of yore, and it’s therefore seen as more legitimate (what Finland should be doing). This hasn’t precluded Finland from reducing its involvement in UN led operations. Nearly 80% of soldiers are in NATO led operations (KFOR & ISAF), less than 5% in UN led operations and the remainder in EU led operations. Local legitimacy is something that I’ve tried to look at, because Finns are not that used to having to worry about supporting the legitimacy of the HN through their actions - in effect taking sides on the strategic level.

I agree that NATO-EU led operations (or UN ones predominantly staffed and led by westerners - UNPROFOR in 1995) are seen to be more robust. Some of this undoubtedly comes from actually capabilities. However, already at the willingness to use the capabilities level, when moving towards actual combat (within COIN-stabops), I think there are many unanswered questions among both NATO and EU members. If robustness also includes a willingness to take casualties and keep going, I don’t know that those countries that are significant contributors to UN ops in Congo (for example) can be seen as less robust.

I haven’t hear anyone say Finns are participating in COIN, though operationally they are - it’s all to be subsumed under the ‘crisis management’ moniker. Speaking with a Finnish officer who has a good amount of international experience, he commented on Gen. Petraeus’s ‘commandments’ listed in Ricks’ The Gamble. In short, he felt that what was prescribed by Petraeus would have been very familiar to almost any Finnish peacekeeper that was stationed in Lebanon in the 1980s. From what I hear, I agree partially. However, for about 65 years Finnish soldiers have not been in a position where anyone is actively trying to kill them (with the increasing exception of Afghanistan). Considering what I understand of IW and COIN, I would say this is a significant difference. Though I don’t think Finnish soldiers are alone in this (among EU and NATO members).

[jmm99]

On this one ....

from Charly
For UN commanders, access to imagery, especially tactical (and live) is by most accounts far more limited than NATO ops. If US COIN & IW doctrine ‘requires’ access to such ISR assets, and especially NATO adopts similar doctrines, then more investments are needed to be able to ‘play the game’.

you probably should get in touch with Wilf (he is a bit straight-forward, but that should not be a problem for a Finn ) as to what age-old and modern tactical capabilities are really necessary - on the ground and looking at it from the air - particularly for a smaller nation.

From my armchair, I could see where the Finnish forces (being something of a proportionately large National Guard-type outfit) could easily fit into the broader aspects of "stability operations" (e.g., James Dobbins, "Nation Building for Dummies", actually for "Beginners") since most all of the reserves would be well-qualified in various skills needed for reconstruction, etc.

But, why would Finland (as a national policy issue) want to go beyond multi-national peace enforcement (as the kinetic limit), and get into COIN and IW (irregular warfare ?), or even get into such as FID and SFA ?

[Ken White]

a Private Message (P.M.) on this board and get him to send some of his articles.

Based on your initial request,

"...recent evolution of the U.S. armed forces interest and capabilities in IW/COIN/StabOps and what implications it may carry...

I'd say one big implication is that we have not learned anything new, we have merely had to relearn what we earlier had to relearn -- the basic principles and practices of aiding foreign development, security force assistance and even COIN ops were all practiced by us -- but we purged the doctrine and neglected the training in an effort to save money and time after WWI and after WW II and after Korea and after Viet Nam. Big mistake each time. Hopefully we won't repeat it.

This

"If US COIN & IW doctrine ‘requires’ access to such ISR assets, and especially NATO adopts similar doctrines, then more investments are needed to be able to ‘play the game’. Conversely, NATO (and EU) troops that are used to receiving larger amounts of ISR info may not want to participate in UN operations if it is not forthcoming (and they don’t have the resources to provide it themselves)."

is a very valid and important issue for the reasons you cite and for the FACT that such immediate and good imagery will not always be available -- even to the US -- technical goodies do fail and they are expensive, so much so that the sheer number of means now available may decline. Better to train and plan to do without; thus acquiring such benefits will serve to increase capability whereas training or planning only to operate where or if it is available will be quite damaging if it becomes unavailable.

Obviously on the issue of casualties taken, every nation will differ. Attitudes toward a particular operation will cause some internal differences. Can't speak for Finland but here in the US over the years, we've pretty consistently had about a third who opposed a given war or operation generally from (or supporters of the party not in power at the time plus the few truly pacifistic and anti war persons). Another third generally was supportive (political opposites and a few really crazy people) while a third or so varied from support to non support dependent on how well the operation or war seemed to be going -- if well, they were supportive, if not they seemed to believe the potential benefits were not adequate for the number of casualties sustained. The combination of perceived legitimacy of the operation or war and the number of casualties thus affect the public tolerance. That's US centric but I suspect it has broader applicability. People the world over don't differ that much

[charlyjsp]

Thanks Ken,

Further clarification on:

I'd say one big implication is that we have not learned anything new, we have merely had to relearn what we earlier had to relearn -- the basic principles and practices of aiding foreign development, security force assistance and even COIN ops were all practiced by us -

My impression is that the U.S. has to a large extent relearnt the old, but failed to integrate the actually new (the 'classicist' COIN - '21st C. insurgencies balance). For some European countries (UK, France, Spain?) various amounts of relearning and adaptation have started. Disagreements?

Then, for euro countries w/out any colonial power history I'd argue that COIN actually is new; and, there is some need to at least understand what its implications are within a broader "comprehensive approach" context. The question then becomes: Whose Coin becomes the legitimate currency (sorry, couldn't resist).

jmm99's comment/question is pertinent here: "But, why would Finland (as a national policy issue) want to go beyond multi-national peace enforcement (as the kinetic limit), and get into COIN and IW (irregular warfare ?), or even get into such as FID and SFA ?" Finland needs to think long and hard about this, particularly the why. The answer to why and in what capacity is to my mind different depending on how Finland understands COIN, FID etc.

[davidbfpo]

[QUOTE=charlyjsp;75659]davidbfpo, thanks for initial comments. I haven’t read Kilcullen’s Accidental Guerilla yet, are his comments about Danes in there?[QUOTE]

Yes, in one of the videos certainly, two are linked here - from Chicago and at Google. The thread is: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ight=kilcullen

davidbfpo

[slapout9]

Kilcullen cites the Danes as being amongst the best COIN operators in Afghanistan and another here (Ken?) cites the Swedes have the best kit.

davidbfpo

Does anybody have any pictures of Swedish Infantry Kit?

[Ken White]

LINK

[charlyjsp]

See Post 11; previously cited wrong webpage.

[davidbfpo]

Changed, see poist 11.
davidbfpo

[charlyjsp]

My bad, follow this link:
http://www.mil.se/sv/Press/Pressbilder/

on the right hand side, click on the sigth >> link (it reads "Gästkonto (Gå in som gäst)

You'll come to a screen with a file tree on the left, go down to "Internationellt", click and then pick Afghanistan. You can only view one picture in detail per page (without reloading), a little cumbersome, but should give some pictures. What there are no pictures of are the electronics...