a Private Message (P.M.) on this board and get him to send some of his articles.

Based on your initial request,
"...recent evolution of the U.S. armed forces interest and capabilities in IW/COIN/StabOps and what implications it may carry...
I'd say one big implication is that we have not learned anything new, we have merely had to relearn what we earlier had to relearn -- the basic principles and practices of aiding foreign development, security force assistance and even COIN ops were all practiced by us -- but we purged the doctrine and neglected the training in an effort to save money and time after WWI and after WW II and after Korea and after Viet Nam. Big mistake each time. Hopefully we won't repeat it.

This
"If US COIN & IW doctrine ‘requires’ access to such ISR assets, and especially NATO adopts similar doctrines, then more investments are needed to be able to ‘play the game’. Conversely, NATO (and EU) troops that are used to receiving larger amounts of ISR info may not want to participate in UN operations if it is not forthcoming (and they don’t have the resources to provide it themselves)."
is a very valid and important issue for the reasons you cite and for the FACT that such immediate and good imagery will not always be available -- even to the US -- technical goodies do fail and they are expensive, so much so that the sheer number of means now available may decline. Better to train and plan to do without; thus acquiring such benefits will serve to increase capability whereas training or planning only to operate where or if it is available will be quite damaging if it becomes unavailable.

Obviously on the issue of casualties taken, every nation will differ. Attitudes toward a particular operation will cause some internal differences. Can't speak for Finland but here in the US over the years, we've pretty consistently had about a third who opposed a given war or operation generally from (or supporters of the party not in power at the time plus the few truly pacifistic and anti war persons). Another third generally was supportive (political opposites and a few really crazy people) while a third or so varied from support to non support dependent on how well the operation or war seemed to be going -- if well, they were supportive, if not they seemed to believe the potential benefits were not adequate for the number of casualties sustained. The combination of perceived legitimacy of the operation or war and the number of casualties thus affect the public tolerance. That's US centric but I suspect it has broader applicability. People the world over don't differ that much