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Thread: Article in German journal "Stern"

  1. #41
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    Default Appreciate the assist...

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    It's the other way around.
    "Angriff" (attack/assault) is the new word, they deleted the other one.
    There's no caveat in the sentence.
    Practice makes perfect, thanks for the help.


    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    We're quite off-topic, aren't we?
    I would disagree.

    The Stern article by Christoph Reuter (a fluent Arabic speaker) contrasted the 'American' approach with the 'European' approach in Afghanistan. It was not the most favorable review of the American approach, but be that as it may it is interesting to me to watch the European approach adapt to the realities of the battlefield just as does the American approach.

    The Russian transit assistance is also of interest.

    There are commonalities between our approaches...and while this may distress some in both of our respective cultures the presence of these commonalities will ultimately lead to workable solutions that benefit those involved.

    This change in approach, as I understand it, is a pretty big thing for Germany, how do you see it impacting the intent of the Grundgesetz?
    Last edited by Surferbeetle; 07-04-2009 at 08:57 PM.
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  2. #42
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    The RoE change was necessary because one of both coalition parties will leave the government and need at least one coalition partner in fall.
    Most other parties would have been opposed to the change (and actually the whole mission) as junior partners in the next coalition.

    The constitutional aspect is difficult. The only real provisions for military action are
    * U.N. authorized missions (Not allowed by the constitution in itself, but by the constitutional court about 15 years ago.)
    and
    * Verteidigungsfall (case of defence; 'the Russians are coming').
    The latter would have drastic consequences.

    Nobody really expected that we could become entangled in a war WITH U.N. mandate.
    An official war would also move the command authority from SecDef to chancellor (and she doesn't seem to be eager about that).

    We had 19 deaths so far in Afghanistan. I'm not sure if that's already a war (for us - it is for sure one for the Afghans). It would certainly be a strange and minimalist war if seen in a historical perspective.

    'Violent peacekeeping' does probably apply much better, because we basically do that: We keep the peace as much as possible till the Afghan government takes over. It's not about breaking the enemy or his will by ourselves.

  3. #43
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    The RoE change was necessary because one of both coalition parties will leave the government and need at least one coalition partner in fall.
    Most other parties would have been opposed to the change (and actually the whole mission) as junior partners in the next coalition.
    Thanks for the insight on the timing, I am aware of the upcoming September elections, but had not yet put two and two together with respect to the ROE change.

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    The constitutional aspect is difficult. The only real provisions for military action are
    * U.N. authorized missions (Not allowed by the constitution in itself, but by the constitutional court about 15 years ago.)
    and
    * Verteidigungsfall (case of defence; 'the Russians are coming').
    The latter would have drastic consequences.
    Anticipating changes can be tough. The fall of the Berlin Wall was a shock for me while the implosion of Yugoslavia was less so (local schools were gathering food and blankets to send to Yugoslavia for a while before it all went bust). I was living in Europe at the time and I was not alone in this surprise. In contrast this retrospective on that time was a recent interesting read.

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    Nobody really expected that we could become entangled in a war WITH U.N. mandate.
    An official war would also move the command authority from SecDef to chancellor (and she doesn't seem to be eager about that).

    We had 19 deaths so far in Afghanistan. I'm not sure if that's already a war (for us - it is for sure one for the Afghans). It would certainly be a strange and minimalist war if seen in a historical perspective.
    All deaths are regrettable. The actions of the German military command authority is fairly opaque to me but interesting nonetheless. Die Zeit seems to like to follow it, its a bit highbrow for me, but sometimes its worth the effort.

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    'Violent peacekeeping' does probably apply much better, because we basically do that: We keep the peace as much as possible till the Afghan government takes over. It's not about breaking the enemy or his will by ourselves.
    I have always been pretty impressed with the professionalism and competence of the Polizei, in general they are not somebody to mess with, and as a result the actual results of the Polizei training mission in Afghanistan have been a bit of a mystery to me. I have also had some exposure to the Carabinieri and continue to wonder why an Afghani Gendarmerie is not something we push harder. The saga of the development of the Kosovo police I would guess is the counter argument.
    Last edited by Surferbeetle; 07-04-2009 at 10:04 PM.
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  4. #44
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    The simple reason is that we're able to order soldiers to Afghanistan (there are no conscripts in those units), but we cannot order policemen to go.
    Policemen with adequate experience have usually a family and there were simply just a few dozen volunteers.

    Even a career progression bonus for volunteers would not motivate much because of how the careers are organized. There are only 3x4 police ranks. The top four (gold) are restricted to high brass with law degrees. The bottom four (green) are usually not qualified as trainers. The typical experienced potential trainer would be 2nd to 4th in the middle (silver) group and even maximum promotion (to 4th silver rank) would only mean a tiny increase in pay and likely no improvement in everyday work.


    The ministers of the interior didn't seem to be much interested in the project anyway. It was the pet project of foreign affairs & defence ministers.

    The past two ministers of the interior liked to focus on police and intelligence service CT work (all to often scrapping rights and pushing for population surveillance and data bases on their path).
    There was no public pressure on the police training program to speak of. Even ISAF is a marginal topic in our news, to be heard of maybe five to ten times a year in TV news (just my memory).

    Last but not least: police is a state job in Germany. The federal minister of the interior has only control over the federal police - what happened to be the border police (= your link). The state ministers of interior are even less occupied with AFG, of course.



    I have yet to understand why we didn't simply set up police training facilities in Kyrgyzstan or similar areas. Less risk and high bonuses would have meant more volunteers.

    Disclaimer:
    I wasn't very interested in the whole AFG police training affair and have no real details on it.

  5. #45
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    Default Part of a larger picture ?

    The 2007-2008 UNAMA Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict had an impact on the current changes in US Astan ROE/RUF (discussed extensively in another thread). My citation to that report here is re: the UN view of the armed conflict in Astan:

    (p.9, 9-10)
    ISAF: International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. ISAF has a peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, it is not a UN force but a “coalition of the willing” deployed under the authority of the UN Security Council. In August 2003, upon the request of the UN and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, NATO took command of ISAF. The NATO force currently comprises some 55,000 troops (including National Support Elements) from 41 countries as well as 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Since November 2008, the Commander of ISAF serves also as the Commander of US Forces Afghanistan, although the chains of command remain separate.
    .....
    OEF: “Operation Enduring Freedom” is the official name used by the US Government for its contribution to the War in Afghanistan under the umbrella of its Global War on Terror (GWOT). It should be noted that Operation Enduring Freedom - Afghanistan, which is a joint US and Afghan operation, is separate from ISAF, which is an operation of NATO nations including the USA and other troop contributing nations. Most US forces operating under OEF since October 2008 have been incorporated into “US Forces Afghanistan” (see below) under the command of General McKiernan, who is also ISAF Commander - although some special forces remain under separate command.
    ....
    US Forces Afghanistan: or “USFOR-A” is the functioning command and control headquarters for US forces operating in Afghanistan. USFOR-A is commanded by General McKiernan, who also serves as the NATO/ISAF commander. Under this new arrangement, activated in October 2008, the approximately 20,000 US forces, operating as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, were placed under the operational control of USFOR-A. The ISAF and OEF chains of command remain separate and distinct, and US Central Command continues to oversee US counterterrorism and detainee operations.
    The legal stance of the US is roughly reflected in the reference to "the War in Afghanistan" and GWOT (now a dated terminology). In short, to the US (under the refined definition adopted by the Obama administration), Astan is an "armed conflict" subject to the 2001 AUMF. That topic has been completely discussed in the War Crimes thread and needs no repetition here.

    Note that ISAF operates under a "peace enforcement" mandate, not a "peacekeeping" mandate. The distinction between those two types of peace operations is doctrinally defined in JP 3-07.3: Joint TTP for Peace Operations:

    p.I-10

    6. Distinction Between Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Operations

    a. A clear distinction between PKO and PEO is important. Although both are PO, they are not part of a continuum. A distinct demarcation separates these operations.

    PKO and PEO take place under different circumstances, characterized by three critical factors — consent, impartiality, and the use of force. Commanders who are aware of the importance of these factors and how military actions affect them are apt to be more successful in controlling the operational setting and the ultimate success of the operation. Consent is evident where parties to the conflict, those that share responsibility for the strife, exhibit willingness to accomplish the goals of the operation. These goals are normally expressed in the mandate. Consent may vary from grudging acquiescence to enthusiastic acceptance and may shift during the course of an operation. Impartiality means that the PO force will treat all sides in a fair and even-handed manner, recognizing neither aggressor nor victim. This implies that the force will carry out its tasks in a way that fosters the goals of the mandate rather than the goals of the parties.

    During PE, the force maintains impartiality by focusing on the current behavior of the involved parties — employing force because of what is being done, not because of who is doing it. The French Army has called this notion "active impartiality". Parties may believe they are being treated unfairly and will accuse the PO force of favoring the opposition. They will often set an impossible standard, demanding that the PO force affect all parties equally. But impartiality does not imply that a PO will affect all sides equally; even the least intrusive PO is unlikely to do so. However, the standard remains for the PO force to be impartial and even-handed in its dealings with all sides to a conflict.

    This standard does not preclude the use of force in either PKO or PEO. In the former, the use of force is for self-defense. In the latter, force is used to compel or coerce compliance with established rules. Moreover the central “goal” of PEO is achievement of the mandate, not maintenance of impartiality. While impartiality is desirable, it may be extremely difficult to attain and maintain in an actual PEO, no matter how the PE force executes its mission.
    The decision to change US ROE/RUF was made before GEN McChrystal left DC; and was a presidential decision (apparently as part of a larger strategic plan) after everyone had their say. Reference in this post.

    The shift in US policy may be from an armed conflict standard toward more of a peace enforcement standard in some areas or facets of the Astan conflict. The shift in German policy (if implemented) may suggest a shift toward the peace enforcement standard defined in JP 3-07.3.

    I'm making no predictions here. We have to see what develops. But, the two US generals are too smart (IMO) to go off half-cocked.

  6. #46
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    Today I'll cheat my body (my drill sgt would be po'd) and post a German article written in English...

    From Der Spiegel: Afghanistan Offensive 'Dispels German Illusions'

    In a step that marks a major psychological milestone in postwar Germany, Bundeswehr soldiers are now on the offensive in Afghanistan. Some German commentators are angry; others saw it coming. But they all agree that Germany can not preserve its "special status" within NATO forever.

    The days of German troops only conducting defensive operations are quickly becoming a thing of the past. In a press conference in Berlin on Wednesday, German Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung announced that 300 German soldiers were backing 1,200 Afghan army troops in a major offensive against the Taliban in northern Afghanistan. But what was important about the announcement was not just the fact that the Bundeswehr, Germany's armed forces, was participating but also that it was putting some serious offensive firepower behind its actions. Since coming to Afghanistan in 2002 as part of the NATO-led ISAF peacekeeping force, around 3,700 German soldiers have been in charge of the more peaceful northern part of the country, where they were mostly involved in civil reconstruction and training efforts.

    But since late last year, the Germans have had to face increased attacks from a resurgent Taliban. In the run-up to the country's Aug. 20 presidential election, NATO has decided to take the fight to the Taliban. At the beginning of July, US marines launched a surprise offensive in southern Afghanistan. And, as of Sunday, the Germans -- alongside the Afghan soldiers they trained -- are on the offensive in the north. In Wednesday's press conference, Wolfgang Schneiderhan, Germany's highest-ranking officer, stressed the precedent-setting importance of the actions, describing it as "probably the biggest" deployment by German forces in Afghanistan. And he underlined how the soldiers are now using heavy weapons, such as mortars and Marder armored infantry vehicles, in a fight that involves "house-by-house searches and looking for the enemy." SPIEGEL ONLINE has also reported that German fighter jets are firing missiles at suspected insurgents for the first time.

    For Germans, having their military on the offensive for the first time since World War II involves passing over a major psychological threshold. And it takes place in the context of a war that has grown more unpopular over the years, after having initially received widespread support. It's also a war that Jung -- to the consternation of many -- has refused to call a war.
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