The Kill Company

[William F. Owen]

I have noticed this trend occurring more frequently in recent months as Soldiers question whether the soft side of counterinsurgency is worth it. The argument being that if force alone seemed to work in dealing with the Tamil Tigers, why do we need counter-insurgency?

Sorry to say this, but that argument can only be symptomatic of a profound misunderstanding as to the nature of the issue.

Sri Lanka was not so-called "COIN." It was combat operations conducted to inflict militarily defeat on an irregular force. The fact that this is not blinding obvious and clear high lights the problem that comes out of the very odd perception the US now has of what they think "counter-insurgency" is.

What is the "soft side of COIN." The political viability of inflicting military defeat on an irregular enemy resides in the precise, proportionate and discriminating use of force. There is no soft side.

In 3,000 years of recorded history, the vast majority (99%) of defeats inflicted upon of irregular forces have been as a direct result of killing and capturing them.
Inherent to this killing and capturing, is killing the right people, and that applies to all forms of warfare.

D-Day wouldn't have turned out too well if the Canadians had opted to kill and capture Americans, as well as the Germans. ....maybe....

[Fuchs]

In 3,000 years of recorded history, the vast majority (99%) of defeats inflicted upon of irregular forces have been as a direct result of killing and capturing them.

Tztztztz, a daring statement.

For one, I doubt that anyone has done a reliable empirical study to back this up.

Second, I'm sure that lots of compromise peace agreements have been made. I recall many such agreements from history books.

Third, those agreements were most likely nothing the rulers were bragging about (and thus didn't enter official history).

Fourth, some insurgencies defeat themselves because they cannot sustain their effort logistically (the relief force at Alesia and Sitting Bull's army, for example).

Fifth, some insurgencies failed when their leader dies of natural causes.

Finally, even the proven tactic of taking hostages most likely made up more than a per cent. I've read quite often about that in history books as well.

[William F. Owen]

Tztztztz, a daring statement.

For one, I doubt that anyone has done a reliable empirical study to back this up.

Maybe, let's take it as a starting point, for further discussion.

Second, I'm sure that lots of compromise peace agreements have been made. I recall many such agreements from history books.

Sure. That is why I explicitly said "military defeats", not peace treaties

Fourth, some insurgencies defeat themselves because they cannot sustain their effort logistically (the relief force at Alesia and Sitting Bull's army, for example).

That is military defeat. Given no enemy action, they probably could have sustained themselves.

Fifth, some insurgencies failed when their leader dies of natural causes.

Again, military defeat as in a failure to sustain command. Given no enemy action, they should have endured.

Finally, even the proven tactic of taking hostages most likely made up more than a per cent. I've read quite often about that in history books as well.

How is taking hostages not inherent to "killing and capturing". You detain (capture) someone and then threaten them harm (Killing) if your wishes are not met.

[Rex Brynen]

Sri Lanka was not so-called "COIN." It was combat operations conducted to inflict militarily defeat on an irregular force. The fact that this is not blinding obvious and clear high lights the problem that comes out of the very odd perception the US now has of what they think "counter-insurgency" is.

What is the "soft side of COIN." The political viability of inflicting military defeat on an irregular enemy resides in the precise, proportionate and discriminating use of force. There is no soft side.

In 3,000 years of recorded history, the vast majority (99%) of defeats inflicted upon of irregular forces have been as a direct result of killing and capturing them.

Tztztztz, a daring statement.

For one, I doubt that anyone has done a reliable empirical study to back this up.

Without a clearer definition of terms, I'm not sure this is going to be a very productive debate. One can equally say that 99% of all military defeats inflicted on irregular forces have been the direct result of politics (that is, sustaining a state capable of extracting resources and projecting military power; developing ideologies and recruitment systems that place motivated soldiers on the battlefield; shaping a domestic political environment in which killing insurgents enjoys a degree of popular acceptance or support among vital constituencies, and doesn't destabilize the regime; etc.)

I do think Wilf is absolutely correct in suggesting, however, that Sri Lanka's ultimate success was not achieved through population-centric COIN. Partly this reflected a political context in which Tamils represented under 10% of the population, and their support is not necessary for either regime survival or military resources. In a more divided society, or a case where a relatively small number of external forces are undertaking a stability operation, things could be rather different. At the risk of channeling Ken, METT-TC (with an emphasis here on the C).

The Sri Lankans might also find that the Tamil insurgency returns again in the future if the Sinhalese majority doesn't address some Tamil grievances.

D-Day wouldn't have turned out too well if the Canadians had opted to kill and capture Americans, as well as the Germans. ....maybe....

Actually Wilf, as I'm sure you know, we didn't do a lot of "capturing" against the 12th SS in June 1944, once dead Canadian PoWs started showing up.

[William F. Owen]

One can equally say that 99% of all military defeats inflicted on irregular forces have been the direct result of politics (that is, sustaining a state capable of extracting resources and projecting military power; developing ideologies and recruitment systems that place motivated soldiers on the battlefield; shaping a domestic political environment in which killing insurgents enjoys a degree of popular acceptance or support among vital constituencies, and doesn't destabilize the regime; etc.).

Well as all war is political, I hope that is true! .. but my wider point being very few insurgencies, that have ever developed into insurgencies have ever gone away because they realised they lacked popular support. It is an absolute myth the irregular forces, be they insurgents or not, require the support of the population to succeed militarily.
Virtually no one in Sierra Leon supported the RUF, yet they controlled 75% of the country at one time, and thrived whilst doing so.

Actually Wilf, as I'm sure you know, we didn't do a lot of "capturing" against the 12th SS in June 1944, once dead Canadian PoWs started showing up.

Yep. Barb wiring prisoners to the glacis plate of your Sherman's can be be mis-understood!