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  1. #1
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    Post The Kill Company

    Excellent piece on platoon level dynamics in this week's New Yorker magazine. Registration required to read the full text.

    The Kill Company
    Did a colonel's fiery rhetoric set the conditions for a massacre?

    ABSTRACT: A REPORTER AT LARGE about the fatal shooting of eight Iraqi men during a U.S. Army-led mission called Operation Iron Triangle in May of 2006. Writer tells about Army Colonel Michael Dane Steele, a veteran of actions in Somalia and Bosnia and the commanding officer of Operation Iron Triangle. When Steele landed in Iraq, he was the only brigade commander there to have experienced sustained urban warfare before 9/11. He arrived with a clear sense of purpose: to subdue violence with violence, to hunt down and kill insurgents. A number of soldiers, among them General Peter Chiarelli, the Army’s Vice-Chief of Staff, believe that Steele set the conditions for a massacre by cultivating aggressiveness in his soldiers, and by interpreting the rules of engagement in a way that made the killing of noncombatants more likely. Steele has since entered Army folklore as a cautionary figure. The debate over Steele’s leadership touches on larger questions about modern warfare: about the distinction between killing and murder on the battlefield. As Major General Michael Oates told the writer, “The story of Colonel Steele and Operation Iron Triangle is about a fundamental difference of opinion about how to prosecute the war in Iraq.” Tells about the third brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, which Steele commanded. Its members are known as Rakkasans, and have a reputation for aggressiveness and individual initiative. Describes how Steele prepared his men for combat in Iraq. Steele believed that since the end of the Cold War the Army had placed too many nonmilitary burdens on soldiers. He wanted to make his men skilled at killing but also capable of restraint. He told his men to think of themselves as apex predators (“If you mess with me, I will eat you.”), but also called them “sheepdogs”—creatures bred to protect the defenseless. Discusses how Steele’s ideas ran contrary to those of Chiarelli, who placed an emphasis on civil outreach and reconstruction in Iraq. Describes the difficulties faced by U.S. soldiers in the Salah ad Din province where Steele and his men were deployed. Tells about Steele’s most daring unit, Charlie Company, its commanding officer, Captain Daniel Hart, and its ranking non-commissioned officer, First Sergeant Eric Geressy. After a few months in Samarra, Charlie Company became known to some soldiers as the Kill Company. Some of the company’s own soldiers were disturbed by the emphasis on killing. Discusses the Army’s rules of engagement in Iraq and the use of status-based targeting by Steele’s men. Tells about Steele’s obsession with the idea of killing Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his preparations for Operation Iron Triangle, an assault on an area near the Al Muthanna chemical-weapons complex where, intelligence suggested, insurgents were operating. Describes the assault in detail and relates the conflicting accounts of how the eight Iraqis came to be killed. Tells about the findings of Brigadier General Thomas Maffey’s investigation into the operation and the hearings convened for the soldiers involved in some of the killings. Steele was formally reprimanded by General Chiarelli. Describes Steele’s devotion to his men and his focus on their safety in combat. Quotes from a speech about the Army given by Steele earlier this year at the Georgia Farm Bureau.
    Drew Conway
    Ph.D. Student
    Department of Politics, New York University
    agc282@nyu.edu
    http://www.drewconway.com/zia

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    I don't have a subscription and it doesn't appear to be up on Lexis-Nexis or any similar tool yet. But, I have some knowledge of that particular unit. An earlier comment that I made speaks briefly to this.

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    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Schmedlap View Post
    I don't have a subscription and it doesn't appear to be up on Lexis-Nexis or any similar tool yet. But, I have some knowledge of that particular unit. An earlier comment that I made speaks briefly to this.
    I have a PDF of the article received via email, too big to post here (not even accounting for copyright), PM if you want it.

    It is honest, balanced, and thoroughly disturbing. I found myself saying "I can't believe a unit would do this" multiple times. I'm surprised it was allowed to go that far. In a way, it is reflective of the massive problem of 2003-2006 COL Gentile wishes away - each BCT was a kingdom unto itself, and followed it's BCT commander's version of how COIN should go. GEN Petraeus/Odierno's biggest achievement in my view was simply getting all the BCT commanders on the same page.

    As I said on the Stern article thread, incidents like this have made me cease denying allegations of murder/torture out of hand.
    "A Sherman can give you a very nice... edge."- Oddball, Kelly's Heroes
    Who is Cavguy?

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    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    I have a PDF of the article received via email, too big to post here (not even accounting for copyright), PM if you want it.

    It is honest, balanced, and thoroughly disturbing. I found myself saying "I can't believe a unit would do this" multiple times. I'm surprised it was allowed to go that far. In a way, it is reflective of the massive problem of 2003-2006 COL Gentile wishes away - each BCT was a kingdom unto itself, and followed it's BCT commander's version of how COIN should go. GEN Petraeus/Odierno's biggest achievement in my view was simply getting all the BCT commanders on the same page.

    As I said on the Stern article thread, incidents like this have made me cease denying allegations of murder/torture out of hand.
    Agreed and the only thing I would add is that units with issues in training have issues downrange.

    Tom

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Thank you!

    Agreed and the only thing I would add is that units with issues in training have issues downrange.
    I needed that...

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    Council Member Greyhawk's Avatar
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    Default "Each BCT was a kingdom unto itself"

    On the other hand, some - given orders no more clear than "keep a lid on it" - managed to create our current model for COIN ops.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    GEN Petraeus/Odierno's biggest achievement in my view was simply getting all the BCT commanders on the same page.
    That's worth a thread by itself. It clears the field in a useful way.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    In a way, it is reflective of the massive problem of 2003-2006 COL Gentile wishes away - each BCT was a kingdom unto itself, and followed it's BCT commander's version of how COIN should go.
    And the second order effect is zero continuity from BCT to BCT (or even company to company). My company RIP/TOA'd with companies from two different battalions of 187. Neither company inherited our AOR. Our AOR was handed off to an IA force that we had only stood up a few months prior and lacked the training, experience, rapport with the community, and logistics support to do anything more than accompany us on low-risk missions. The companies that we RIP/TOA'd with took AORs to our north and to our battalion's north (my company was in the southern part of the AOR - none of this made any sense, but my BN CDR did the right thing and forced us to accommodate the incoming unit in order to make their transition simpler). So what did RIP/TOA consist of? Basically signing over property. I could have told my counterpart all about operations in our AOR, but it wasn't the one that he was inheriting. I was sure to pass along the info anyway, because it seemed obvious to me that they would be bailing out IA patrols that got in over their heads or simply assuming the IA mission since it was, as noted earlier, not even close to being prepared for the mission.

    Two months prior to RIP/TOA I escorted two BN XO's from 187 around our patrol base and AOR and we discussed manpower requirements. I still recall one of them asking me if a company half the size of mine was sufficient for an AOR twice the size of what we were responsible for. I told him that what we had was pretty much stretching us to our breaking point and would not have been sustainable had we not reached the end of our block leave period and regained all available Soldiers. We were only able to maintain security by dispersing the company throughout the AOR in 3-man teams, which carried with it significant risk (see here for an example of the risks). During the 2005 voting we had to be augmented with Soldiers from two other battalions. The expression on his face told me quickly that he knew neither my advice, nor the obvious situation on the ground, was going to change decisions made at the BCT regarding how units were arrayed and who took what AOR.

    As a side note, many Soldiers communicated with local civilians via email. They continued intermittent communication after redeployment. Most of the Soldiers said that the residents were freaking out after we left, stating that there were masked gunmen on every street corner and not a US Soldier in sight. After all of the progress that was made in that area (1st ID and 3ID slugging it out with insurgents during 2004 and the first half of 2005, resulting in relative calm in the second half of 2005) the locals were flabbergasted and asking, "why did you leave?" Sorry bro, but it wasn't our call. Ask the new chain of command.

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    Council Member Brandon Friedman's Avatar
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    This is also indicative of how much a single person can influence and affect a unit. Steele's "leadership" was not reflective of how the Rakkasans operated during the previous two combat deployments--OEF I and OIF I. I can provide examples if anyone is interested.

    I left right before Steele took command, but I know he was never a good fit at 187 and that he managed to horrify many of his subordinates with a manner that hadn't changed all that much from the way he was portrayed by Mark Bowden in Blackhawk Down.

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    Default Brutality

    The conversation concerning COL Steele and the Rakkasan's reminded me of a recent post on Kings of War (http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2009...rutality-work/) about brutality and warfare. I have noticed this trend occurring more frequently in recent months as Soldiers question whether the soft side of counterinsurgency is worth it. The argument being that if force alone seemed to work in dealing with the Tamil Tigers, why do we need counter-insurgency?

    I haven't read the New Yorker piece yet, (New Yorkers arrive a week late to Europe APO boxes) but my platoon mentor in IOBC was from the Rakkasans and he told plenty of stories. He summed up the attitude clearly, saying that the Rakkasans' goal was to be the biggest bad asses in Iraq. If they were, then the insurgents would go elsewhere to fight. He said it worked well for his battalion, but I don't think the gains were permanent.

    Michael C at www.onviolence.com

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    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    GEN Petraeus/Odierno's biggest achievement in my view was simply getting all the BCT commanders on the same page.
    Does the term "Herding Cats" ring a bell?

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    Default Defining the Terms

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    It is an absolute myth the irregular forces, be they insurgents or not, require the support of the population to succeed militarily.
    The belief that insurgencies or irregular forces require the support of the population is the foundation of the FM 3-24, Maoist doctrine and most counter-insurgency theory. Even if not the support of the whole population, at least some level of support from the population is required to hide the logistical and leadership support of irregular forces.

    Quote Originally Posted by Rex Brynen View Post
    Without a clearer definition of terms, I'm not sure this is going to be a very productive debate.

    The Sri Lankans might also find that the Tamil insurgency returns again in the future if the Sinhalese majority doesn't address some Tamil grievances.
    I agree that we should define terms more appropriately. It seems like there is a dichotomy between what I initially described as "soft" counter-insurgency and its opposite, lethal counter-insurgency. Mr. Brynen hit the nail precisely on the head when he replaced soft with population-centric COIN. So you can call population-centric COIN either soft, non-lethal, or non-kinetic but it means the operations not considered conventional.

    Mr. Owen describes targer-centric COIN. I call that the lethal, kinetic or traditional approach. In the article "Kill Company," COL Steele absolutely argues for this approach to COIN. He says clearly that his BDE will win if "they get violent the fastest."

    Rethinking my original comment, I think I set up a false dichotomy. In an article for the Naval Postgraduate School, "The Tao of Special Forces" The Tao of Special Forces The authors present an excellent schema for analyzing COIN. The break up the operations a counter-insurgent force can conduct into four types: counter-force, counter-logistics, counter-leadership/ideology and counter-infrastructure.

    This schema allows us to see that the soft-side of warfare incorporates both counter-infrastructure and counter-leadership operations. When Fuchs gave his examples of irregular defeats by means other than military he described counter-leadership and counter-logistics operations.

    We can also see that the Rakkasan's problem in Iraq was a total focus on counter-force operations to the exclusion of any other type of operation. The example of the Tamil Tigers seems like a successful counter-force example; but so too did the French after the initial Battle for Algiers, and they ended up losing.

    Population-centric COIN really just includes all the types of operations to defeat an enemy, the so-called soft skills.

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    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Michael C View Post
    The belief that insurgencies or irregular forces require the support of the population is the foundation of the FM 3-24, Maoist doctrine and most counter-insurgency theory. Even if not the support of the whole population, at least some level of support from the population is required to hide the logistical and leadership support of irregular forces.
    The question is whether that support needs to be voluntary.

    Furthermore, the requirements for any violent endeavour depend strongly on the extent of opposition.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Michael C View Post
    The belief that insurgencies or irregular forces require the support of the population is the foundation of the FM 3-24, Maoist doctrine and most counter-insurgency theory. Even if not the support of the whole population, at least some level of support from the population is required to hide the logistical and leadership support of irregular forces.
    So what percentage of support are we talking about, and is that willing consent or coerced consent? If the premise of FM3-24 is as you describe then it is deeply flawed and has not read deeply into the history of irregular warfare. The very fact they call it "COIN" should act as a warning

    Mr. Owen describes targer-centric COIN. I call that the lethal, kinetic or traditional approach. In the article "Kill Company," COL Steele absolutely argues for this approach to COIN. He says clearly that his BDE will win if "they get violent the fastest."
    If you want to state what I am describing, then please describe it correctly. I in no way condone the idiotic approach exemplified by the article. Being British and not American, I've dealt with COIN since basic training, so please don't tarnsih me with the same brush as those who stumbled across COIN just a couple of years ago.

    Warfare is a struggle between two armed groups. One armed group is required to overcome the other. Killing the right people enables that. Killing the wrong people is almost always counter-productive. Until you reduce the enemy's ability to constrain your freedom of action, you can't do any of the so called hearts and minds stuff, which should be focussed on creating a hostile environment for the enemy! - not just a nice environment for the locals!

    Hope that helps.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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