Can I assume then that you agree with Hamas? The only way the Palestinians will ever get their own country is by overcoming the other armed group?Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Can I assume then that you agree with Hamas? The only way the Palestinians will ever get their own country is by overcoming the other armed group?
Huh? Of course I don't agree with Hamas, or any bunch of terrorists. One armed group overcoming another is an observational definition of warfare. Not a moral justification for the political aims for which Hamas or any other bunch of clowns want to apply violence. Hamas is actually a major obstacle to the creation of the Palestinian states.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I'm not following. Based on my read of your reasoning, either you're suggesting that the Palestinians and Israelis are not technically in a state of warfare, or you're saying one of the armed sides will ultimately have to overcome the other in combat for peace to occur.
However, I would say they are at war, and the Palestinians will ultimately gain independence without overcoming the Israelis through armed force.
Brandon, I think you and Rank amateur are misreading what William wrote. His statement was value neutral observation on warfare.
John Wolfsberger, Jr.
An unruffled person with some useful skills.
What I said and am saying is,
That is a commonly accepted definition of warfare with an added context relevant to countering insurgents.Warfare is a struggle between two armed groups. One armed group is required to overcome the other. Killing the right people enables that. Killing the wrong people is almost always counter-productive. Until you reduce the enemy's ability to constrain your freedom of action, you can't do any of the so called hearts and minds stuff, which should be focussed on creating a hostile environment for the enemy! - not just a nice environment for the locals!
What on earth has that got to do with Israel and the Palestinians?
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Tom Ricks posted a an Army report about COL Steele and how he dealt with his battalion commanders. This is the link to the particular page on Ricks' blog
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/?page=1
It is the first entry. The report is from Wikileaks. I don't know what the policy here is on those things are so forgive me if I made an error.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
A response to Mr. Owen's definition
I am new to this forum so if I speak brashly, I apologize for my inexperience. All my experience with irregular warfare or insurgency comes from one tour to Afghanistan as a platoon leader. In that tour, I definitely fought insurgents, but I also conducted humanitarian operations (the soft side or hearts and minds).
When reading the responses to my second comment, it seemed like the responders glossed over Mr. Owen's first thought: that insurgencies or irregular warfare DO NOT REQUIRE THE SUPPORT OF THE POPULATION. Mr. Owen then calls the US Army COIN manual deeply flawed. Many responders on this thread gave kudos to him for his definition of warfare while ignoring this comment. I have to ask the people reading this thread, how many people find the FM 3-24 flawed for its belief that insurgencies are supported by the population?
Second, Mr. Owens definition of warfare is a correct start, but leaves out the most important detail. Rank Amateur and Brandon were hinting at this specific deficiency. Warfare is a struggle between two armed groups using violence to achieve political ends. In warfare, the political motivation is everything; it is what separates warfare from criminality. Without politics, warfare would not exist.
Further, Mr. Owens provides the next point: "Killing the right people enables that." Killing is a method, but so is influencing them irregular forces to give up arms, convincing the leadership to join the government, or destroying their logistical support so that they cannot continue fighting. In Carl's link above, Thomas Ricks describes killing people as the least effective way to combat insurgents. I agree. You can kill insurgents or irregular forces, but that is only one method of overcoming an armed force. Convincing whole groups to quit fighting is much more effective and more beneficial in the long run.
Finally, saying "just kill the right people" is easy. On paper, that briefs really well. The hardest part is determining whom to kill. The answer is intelligence. Intelligence can be coerced, paid for or freely given. The question is, what is the most accurate? Coercion is rarely accurate and paid for intelligence is frequently misleading. Therefore, the best intelligence is that freely given. And, the best way to get that intelligence is to convince locals you care about the best outcome. The way to do that is to try and wins hearts and minds.
Unfortunately, for soldiers in the US Army and Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan, counter-insurgency is never the simple decision between killing the enemy or population-centric counter-insurgency. Soldiers conduct humanitarian operations, build the local government, train local security forces all while conducting counter-force operations (killing the enemy). What the Rakkasans--to bring this back to the article "Kill Company"--really failed to do was conduct full-spectrum counter-insurgency, and that is why they are a cautionary tale to modern soldiers.
Michael C. at www.onviolence.com
Removing violence...
The statement that they do not require the support of the population is correct. Having the support of the population makes the insurgents job easier but such support is NOT required. I have read FM 3-24 (and 3-24.2 which is a slightly better document) and it is an overwordy academic tome that is better than nothing but is flawed, IMO, on several levlels.
Writing a 'counterinsurgency' manual and relying on a number of 'experts' whose experience was in insurgencies during which they were part of the government forces and who wrote in a time of ideological turmoil resulted in a skewed effort that place excessive emphasis on population control -- governments can do that; intervenors like the US in other nations (Viet Nam, Afghanistan and Iraq to name three) cannot exercise such control -- and most 'host' governments are not likely to do so. The Roman, Mongol and even the British solutions are no longer practical. So you are NOT going to control the population.
If you aren't going to control it, the best you can hope for is to guide the population into not offering active support for the insurgency. You cannot prevent them from offering tacit support unless you're prepared to use the same techniques the opponent uses and scare them into it. If you aren't going to do that, your alternative is to make the opponent cease terrorizing the population to get tacit support. To do that, the best solution is to kill the opponents -- being very careful not to kill relatively innocent members of the population.
That requires telling the good guys from the bad guys. How do Americans do that in a culture the like of which most of them even after a couple of tours can barely comprehend? The answer is that with rare exceptions, who can and do 'go native,' you cannot. That means you have to have locals to tell who's on what side.
This in an area where Achmat, Elder in Sturm Walla will gleefully shop Abbas in the next valley because Abbas was toying with Achmat's cousin's third wife in 1976. So you need reliable locals, say a Political adviser and an Interpreter Walla (think a British RSM type) to keep all a Battalion's interpreters in line while the PolAd insure that he and the 'terps give the straight scoop. That can take three to five years to vet, build and staff. We're just getting around to something on that line and it'll work.Like the manual, better late than never.
Realize also that Afghanistan is not a COIN fight -- the Afghans may have some elements of one but we do not -- and that's not a semantic quibble, that's a critical difference. There are FID and SFA elements but for most troops, it's a war, pure but durn sure not simple...Do the Religious fanatics of the world, past and present know that? Loaded question, I know -- religion is political in many senses. However, while your statement is basically correct it has little to do with the reality on the ground. Side trips into Hamas et.al. do not change the fact that Wilf's comment was, as J Wolfsberger noted, a value neutral statement on warfare. It did not address the political aspects, nor is that an Army's job....Without politics, warfare would not exist.Absolutely correct for openers, agree with you wholeheartedly until the last clause -- you are not ever going to win anyone's heart or mind. What you can do is convince most people that you do consider their interests and that you can clobber the bad guys anytime you can locate them and that you are trying to do this without being counter productive by killing the wrong people.Finally, saying "just kill the right people" is easy. On paper, that briefs really well. The hardest part is determining whom to kill. The answer is intelligence. Intelligence can be coerced, paid for or freely given. The question is, what is the most accurate? Coercion is rarely accurate and paid for intelligence is frequently misleading. Therefore, the best intelligence is that freely given. And, the best way to get that intelligence is to convince locals you care about the best outcome. The way to do that is to try and wins hearts and minds.
Realize that all most of the population in such a situation wants is for everyone to go away and leave them alone. If you or the bad guys offer any benefits, they'll take 'em. If you pose a threat, they'll do what you want them to -- as long as you're watching. If the bad guys do a better and more constant job of watching than you do (and they almost always will), then you need to destroy their ability to do that or negate it in some other way.
Since they really do not like being visited in the night by Afghan Talibs, Pakistani Talibs, AQ and allies, Smugglers, Opium Traders and other tribes with a grudge and the odd batch of just plain old border Banditti or Crooks (all called 'insurgents' for simplicity's sake...) in various combinations and with unpleasant ramifications; if you can look like you're going to remove that unpleasantness, you will not win a single heart or mind but they will cease active if coerced support to the bad guys and as you reduce the number of said miscreants and the night visits decline in number and intensity, they will cease fear driven tacit support to them and give it to you -- not out of fear (or gratitude -- all our projects are seen as partial compensation for our presences, no more) but simply because you can reduce the fear quotient. You can remove the violence.
Thanks for the job you do and keep on keepin' on...
It is historical fact that many insurgencies have not enjoyed total or even widespread support from the populations they are fighting amongst. Nor have many regimes. If 5% support them, does that count as "support of the population." What if it is 1%? What if they 90% in one village and then 1% in the next? To fixate on the popular support is simplistic. Insurgent use violence against the population to gain supportMr. Owen's first thought: that insurgencies or irregular warfare DO NOT REQUIRE THE SUPPORT OF THE POPULATION. Mr. Owen then calls the US Army COIN manual deeply flawed.
Precisely my point. I am a Clausewitian. Reading some of my other posts would show this.Warfare is a struggle between two armed groups using violence to achieve political ends. In warfare, the political motivation is everything; it is what separates warfare from criminality. Without politics, warfare would not exist.
That is why I said "enables." As in any form of warfare, all the instruments of the state can be applied. Seeking to influence, killing the leadership and interdicting logistics are done in most forms warfare. You cannot do any of those things without demonstrating an ability to apply lethal force, better than they can."Killing the right people enables that." Killing is a method, but so is influencing them irregular forces to give up arms, convincing the leadership to join the government, or destroying their logistical support so that they cannot continue fighting.
Allowing the enemy leadership a place in government is usually surrendering to the insurgents, as that is what they want.
The Insurgents are using killing and violence to break your will. They are also employing all their instruments of power against you, just like any form or warfare. How do you get them to quit fighting without killing a few first? The basis of warfare is to kill enough to convince the majority to quit. Clausewitz and his student Mao-Tse-Tung wrote at some length on thisYou can kill insurgents or irregular forces, but that is only one method of overcoming an armed force. Convincing whole groups to quit fighting is much more effective and more beneficial in the long run.
Well that's simplistic, and not always true. Gaining intelligence against an irregular force is done by developing and exploiting and all sources approach that allows civil and military agencies to basically work as one, and at a level of detail, most military intelligence cannot work at. Again, military history is quite clear on this. Some irregular warfare intelligence work is conducted in extremely hostile environments and with no aid from the local population, other than covertly developed sources. - sorry to bang on, but this is something I was involved in, in a past life.And, the best way to get that intelligence is to convince locals you care about the best outcome. The way to do that is to try and wins hearts and minds.
A'Stan and Iraq and not the only insurgencies that ever occurred. Do not snap shot these and go "oh look! This is COIN!"
We've had irregular forms of warfare for 3,000 years. War isn't changing and all wars get won the same basic way.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
What baffles me is that Steele's antics were well known for years. The guy was notorious throughout the Army for being a loud-mouthed, arrogant, arguably incompetent, and reckless leader. My NCOs had the displeasure of working with him in 3/75. Their assessment bore true in real life when I was deployed at the same time in Bosnia when he was there as a Bn Cdr - thankfully I did not have much interaction with him, but even then his antics got ample attention throughout the MND. And as noted earlier on this thread, I had the misfortune of doing RIP/TOA with his BDE when they arrived in theater. Within one week, tales of his antics were circulating and BDE policies that he put into effect left us all scratching our heads. The guy was a clown.
Steele has been a known quantity for years. Why was he put in command of a Brigade (let alone a BN before that)? I'm glad that some ADC finally took the initiative to look into this and officially record it, but it seems like too little, far too late. The damage has been done - to the mission, to innocent Iraqis, to the reputation of the Army and 187, to any decent subordinate who chose to ETS (to the detriment of the Army) after enduring his crap, and to any Soldiers who may have been misled by his disgraceful example and thought it right to emulate him.
The sad thing is that some of this is very reminiscent of the conduct encouraged by the CG of the 9th ID in Vietnam during 1968-1969. Seems we never DO learn.....
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
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