UK Counter-Terrorism (merged thread)

[davidbfpo]

AdamG,

Some of the 'Plan' & 'Prepare' aspects of the UK's CT strategy are very good, but for obvious reasons are very London-centric or the big cities.

'Run/Hide/Report' advice is somewhat marred by the public practice of taking out their cell / mobile hones and filming the scene in front of them. At one recent incident the first emergency call was twelve minutes after the incident and the first film footage was uploaded in two minutes. Leaving aside the capacity to accept calls from the public (a common issue internationally).

[davidbfpo]

Prompted by the retirement soon of David Anderson, a commercial barrister (lawyer), who was appointed as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation in 2011, Peter Oborne has written a comprehensive review of terrorism as if effects the UK primarily.

He ends with:

Nevertheless, for six years, David Anderson has been a voice of sanity and a force for good. He has brought intellectual clarity, moral courage, a sense of perspective and, perhaps above all, earned the trust of all sides.

Link:http://www.middleeasteye.net/essays/...rism-608161931

[davidbfpo]

A short parting speech (32 mins), which is worth listening to - in part as the historical setting is given:

Counter-terrorism as a field continues to present fundamental challenges not only to the rule of law and human rights, but also to systems of political accountability. In his lecture, David Anderson reflected on the development of UK counter-terrorism legislation from 2011 to 2017. He discussed the meaning of national security and consider the best structures for countering terrorism threats in a changing world.

Link:https://rusi.org/event/terrorism-and...nal-security-0

Then we have a retired senior CT police officer:

A former counter-terrorism chief has revealed that he lies awake worrying about a mass casualty attack in London, as he issued a new warning about the threat posed by radicalisation in prisons.Richard Walton, who led the Met’s anti-terror command until his retirement last year, said the danger of a marauding firearms attack in the capital was a “constant anxiety”’ to police and the intelligence services.
He also expressed concern about the potential ability of the large number of extremists in prison to radicalise vulnerable inmates and use their new criminal contacts to obtain guns.....are made in a BBC “drama-documentary” to be broadcast tomorrow. It depicts a fictional Islamic State-inspired plot, involving a drugs offender radicalised in prison by extremists, to carry out a firearms attack in the capital and shows the police attempts to foil the outrage.

Such an attack has been raised as a possibility since at least Mumbai in 2008, often by those who had just retired. For reasons yet to be fully explained radicalization activity in prisons is not a success story.
Link:http://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime...-a3478831.html

[davidbfpo]

Professor Paul Rogers has a commentary on UK CT; the summary states:

The recent statement from the UK’s new Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation that the terrorist threat to the country is at its highest level since the 1970s raises at least three crucial questions that this briefing seeks to answer. Why is the apparent threat so high, and apparently rising, after 15 years of high-intensity ‘war’ against international terrorist groups? Why is the specific threat from Islamic State (IS) so substantial at present? Finally, and most overlooked, why is there such a disconnect between the intense war in Iraq and Syria and the perception of threat in the UK? As the Trump administration prepares a new, escalated strategy against IS, these questions matter more than ever for Trump’s closest allies.

Link:http://oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/pu..._terror_threat

Personally I suspect the public here will accept the approach taken at home and overseas - provided there is very limited "blow back". Killings on the scale seen in Belgium and France could easily end that acceptance, especially if those involved are returned "foreign fighters".

[davidbfpo]

This weighty volume (1k pgs) and at a hefty price by the Henry Jackson Society, a London-based "think tank" with a "neo-con" character, was published last week.

There are links to a four page infographic and summary:http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-co...nfographic.pdf

A 22 pg summary:http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-co...d-analysis.pdf

[davidbfpo]

Ten days ago UK CT's most senior police officer started a new campaign to explain and obtain greater public support. In doing so he revealed some new figures:

....there were 500 live counter-terror investigations at any time. Information from the public has helped police in a third of the most high-risk investigations, figures show.It has also contributed to stopping some of the 13 attacks - a figure one higher than the last update, given in October.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-39176110

BBC News database 'Who are Britain’s jihadists?'. Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-32026985

A commentary:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-39183003

There are two podcasts: Hostile Reconnaissance (23 mins) and Multiple Bombings (18 mins):

They tell previously untold stories of how terrorist attacks on UK soil were prevented thanks to information from the public.

Link to the campaign:https://act.campaign.gov.uk/

There is a fuller post on the public contribution in another thread:What & Who discovers terrorist plots?

[davidbfpo]

After the Westminster attack the new Home Secretary called for access to encrypted applications, notably What's App, as the suspect had sent a message or more immediately before the attack. A quite odd call given the legal powers the agencies now have and that the attacker's intention had not bene known, so how would access help?

David Wells, a SME on CT & Sigint, has a commentary and I cite on passage:

What this all means is that while the UK is equipped to monitor the known knowns (even though this remains very difficult), triaging new leads is a separate issue in the context of encryption. That of course doesn’t mean that ‘backdoors’ into encrypted services are the answer. But we need to be clear on the nature of the different problems facing intelligence agencies. And most importantly, have a grown-up conversation about new terrorism realities. Must we always apportion blame beyond the attacker?

Link:https://counterterrorismmatters.word...ent/#more-1092