UK Counter-Terrorism (merged thread)

[OUTLAW 09]

Newsweek‏
@Newsweek

Conspiracy theorist Alex Jones of Infowars called the victims of the horrible Manchester attack "liberal trendies"
http://bit.ly/2rRpCS5

Alex Jones is a proTrump alt rightist ie white nationalist and Trump often follows his comments on Infowars.....

During his divorce trial in Houston TX several weeks ago he described himself as a "performance artist" not a journalist......

BTW during Brexit he was a massive supporter of UKIP and Farage.....

[davidbfpo]

A useful summary from the BBC's Home Correspondent that starts with:

The UK has not seen a bomb attack like the Manchester outrage since 2005 for three simple reasons:

1. It takes some expertise, which is difficult to come by without help.
2. It requires a lot of planning and preparation, both of which increase the chances that MI5 and other agencies will discover what is going on.
3. Individuals who are sufficiently organised to put the first two together and determined enough to see the plan through to its awful conclusion are very rare.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england...ester-40012208
Sadly it also notes yesterday was the fourth anniversary of Drummer Lee Rigby's murder.

[davidbfpo]

Oh dear, with my emphasis:

The UK terror threat level has been raised to the highest level of "critical", meaning further attacks may be imminent, Theresa May has said.The move came after investigators were unable to rule out Manchester bombing suspect Salman Abedi acted alone, the prime minister said.
Military personnel would now be deployed to protect key sites. (Operation Temperer being the operational name).

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40023488

The suspect has been id'd as a UK national, of Libyan heritage, from Manchester; possibly radicalised and who had left university after two years. See:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017...e-bomber-know/

Earlier today there signs of annoyance, being polite, in London over information being provided to our "cousins" and within a short time it being provided to the US media (NBC), hours before the UK media were informed. Not that has not happened before.

[Bill Moore]

Oh dear, with my emphasis:Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40023488

The suspect has been id'd as a UK national, of Libyan heritage, from Manchester; possibly radicalised and who had left university after two years. See:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017...e-bomber-know/

Earlier today there signs of annoyance, being polite, in London over information being provided to our "cousins" and within a short time it being provided to the US media (NBC), hours before the UK media were informed. Not that has not happened before.

David, you should know if you want information leaked just give it to the Americans. The head of the French Secret Service said the same thing in his book titled the 4th World War. He would ask close Americans if he could share something with them, but he needed a guarantee it wouldn't be leaked. His U.S. friends couldn't make that promise, so the French took care of the issue repeatedly in the shadows without knowledge of the U.S. Our politicians leak intelligence to undermine one another, and now our intelligence agencies are leaking information to undermine U.S. political figures they don't like. Until there is accountability it will simply get worse.

Back on topic, you certainly have our condolences for your country's recent losses do to this senseless event.

[davidbfpo]

Last week William Matchett, a thirty year veteran of the RUC / PSNI Special Branch spoke at a book launch @ Policy Exchange, London and in summary his argument is:

Secret Victory shows what a successful rule of law approach looks like in an irregular war.

There is a 35 mins podcast (yet to listen to):https://policyexchange.org.uk/event/...liam-matchett/

The book 'Secret Victory: The Intelligence War that beat the IRA' was released in November 2016, in Ireland and has a plethora of five star reviews. Citing in part one review by Professor Michael Rainsborough, Head of War Studies, King’s College London:

The author trenchantly, and effectively deconstructs the dirty war thesis, illustrating that much of the narrative is partial, factually flawed or often simply incoherent and contradictory. The systematic critique of this popular orthodoxy through evidence and argumentation, along with the more detailed illumination of the Special Branch’s evolution as a vital arm in the security effort, constitutes a highly original contribution to knowledge and understanding of the Northern Ireland conflict.

Link:https://www.amazon.co.uk/Secret-Vict...secret+victory

Link to USA Amazon:https://www.amazon.com/Secret-Victor...secret+victory

[davidbfpo]

After a four month long trial as this BBC report goes into details rarely seen in public and part of the trail was held in secret. Note two defendants were convicted AQ supporters had moved to support Daesh / ISIS. They await sentencing.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40716747

Added later, a second detailed report:https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/...rrorist-attack

The author tweeted:

Inside the secret op that caught the "three musketeers": perhaps the most bizarre terror trial I've ever witnessed.

The report starts with:

Four men have been convicted of planning a major terror attack in Birmingham after being caught in an elaborate undercover operation. The trial of Naweed Ali, Khobaib Hussain, Mohibur Rahman and Tahir Aziz at the Old Bailey has been one of the strangest - and most vigorously contested - terrorism cases of the past decade.

A significant feature became public, a police & MI5 "honey trap":

Hero Couriers had been in operation for up to four years. It had all the trappings of a real courier firm - vans, a corporate logo and a supposed headquarters in Hilton Hall, a stately home converted to offices, near Wolverhampton.But it was all bogus. The firm had no customers - it did no real deliveries. It existed only in order to watch suspects.

One undercover police officer spent two weeks in the witness box facing numerous allegations by the defence, as indicated in a report months ago:https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/...fying-evidence

Added. Sentenced:

Ali, Hussain and Rahman - who called themselves the Three Musketeers in group messages - were each sentenced to a minimum of 20 years in prison. All three refused to attend court. They have all previously served prison sentences for terrorism offences.Aziz, who joined the group days before the arrests. was sentenced to a minimum term of 15 years in prison.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40810970

Was stand alone until merged into the main UK CT thread.

[davidbfpo]

A short report from The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change and the summary says:

For more than 30 years, British jihadis have been fighting under the banner of an extreme Islamist ideology in conflicts from Algeria to the Philippines. For half of that time, the streets of the UK have been seen as a legitimate target. Ideologues made their home in Britain, having been rejected from Muslim-majority countries because the ideas they expounded were considered dangerous. From the UK, they influenced many. In the last five years, the conflict in Syria alone has attracted over 800 British fighters.
Their ideology justifies the use of violent jihad to achieve its aims. Its proponents believe in imposing their interpretation of Islam on others as state law, with no tolerance for alternatives. They believe in brutally punishing apostates and subjugating women. It is Muslims who make up the majority of their victims.
The global jihadi network they are a part of goes back decades. The violence it wreaks is felt all over the world. In the final months of 2016, more than 18,000 lives were lost to jihadi violence or efforts against it. In all, some 58 jihadi groups were involved in at least 2,312 violent incidents in 41 countries.
What connects these disaffected individuals from Beeston to Brighton? How has a global, violent ideology captured the minds of so many British citizens and residents? And what can be done to stop others going down this path?

Overview of the research method:

This research is based on the biographies of 113 British men, both citizens and residents, who had engaged in, supported, or abetted violent jihad. Information on each individual was gathered using open-source data. We used a wide range of online and offline sources to collect a comprehensive account of each individual’s background and journey to violent extremism. We examined socio-economic indicators, educational background, and international travel, among other factors, in order to build a picture of an individual’s life before and after their involvement with jihadism. The biographies were later coded according to recurring themes or traits across the sample. This allowed researchers to quantify the data and conduct more detailed analysis.

Link:http://institute.global/sites/defaul...y_04.09.17.pdf

Perhaps one day this will be merged into the radicalization thread.

[AdamG]

British IS recruiter Sally-Anne Jones was reportedly killed in a US drone strike in Syria, in June.
Jones, from Chatham in Kent, joined so-called Islamic State after converting to Islam and travelling to Syria in 2013.
Her death was first reported by The Sun.
The BBC's security correspondent Frank Gardner said Jones had been a useful propaganda agent for IS on social media and her death would be "significant".

http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-41593659

[davidbfpo]

Seven weeks ago a public report on UK counter-terrorism revealed, within reason (national security and operational methods mainly) a great deal and some pointers to what was to be implemented next. Apologies for the delay, only today was there time to read the report and related comments.

The catalyst being in the words of the author, David Anderson, the former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (whose role is to monitor UK counter-terrorism legislation for its fairness, effectiveness and proportionality):

The excellent recent record of MI5 and police in defending the UK from terrorist attack came to a brutal end this year at Westminster, Manchester Arena, London Bridge and Finsbury Park….After four such incidents over a short period, unsparing reflection was required.”

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017...ons-just-nine/

The attacks were: 22nd March @ Westminster Bridge, London four deaths, with thirty-two injured by a suspect (shot dead) using a van and knives; 22nd May @ Manchester Arena, twenty-two dead, with one hundred and sixteen injured by a suicide bomber; 3rd June @ London Bridge, London, eight dead and forty-five injured by three men (shot dead) with a van and knives; and 19th June @ Finsbury Park Mosque, London one dead, eleven injured by a suspect in a van (currently on trial).

They are covered in the main thread:UK Counter-Terrorism (merged thread)

The Home Secretary's official statement is cited in part:

In the case of the Westminster attack, Khalid Masood was a closed subject of interest at the time of the attack. Neither MI5 nor the police had any reason to anticipate the attack. Regarding the Manchester Arena attack, Salman Abedi was also a closed subject of interest at the time of the attack, and so not under active investigation. In early 2017, MI5 nonetheless received intelligence on him, which was assessed as not being related to terrorism. In retrospect the intelligence can be seen to be highly relevant. Had an investigation been re-opened at the time, it cannot be known whether Abedi’s plans could have been stopped: MI5 assess that it would have been unlikely.
In the case of London Bridge, Khuram Butt was an active subject of interest who had been under investigation since mid-2015. A number of different investigative means were deployed against him, but they did not reveal his plans. His two conspirators had never been investigated by MI5 or CT Policing.
In regards to Finsbury Park, neither MI5 nor the police had any intelligence about this attack.
The recommendations made in the MI5 and police operational review fall into four broad categories:
First, there needs to be a concerted effort to enhance MI5 and the police’s ability to use data to detect activity of concern, and to test new approaches in the acquisition, sharing and analysis of data.
Second, MI5 should share its intelligence more widely, and work with partners such as local authorities on how best to manage the risk posed by closed subjects of interest in particular. We are considering undertaking multi-agency pilots in a number of areas including Greater Manchester, and I have already started discussing how to take this forward with Andy Burnham.
Third, there should be a new approach to managing domestic extremism, particularly extreme right wing groups, where their activity meets the definition of terrorism. Fourth, there are a large number of detailed and technical changes which could be made to improve existing operational counter-terrorism processes.

Link:https://www.gov.uk/government/speech...ter-and-london

I have selected from the report a few key points IMHO:

1.13 to 1.27 is a short section on terminology and in IMHO is the clearest explanation of how MI5 manages investigations and priorities in the public domain (There is a longer explanation in an Appendix pgs. 57-61; which has been amended after publication in an ISC report, November 2014).. 2.3 My more limited aim has been to give an idea of the quantity and quality of the intelligence that was available on each attacker at material times, thus introducing the context that needs to be understood before sense can be made of the recommendations in the various internal reviews.
2.38 Another tool promised well, but did not produce results in time. A process devised by MI5 to identify activity of renewed intelligence interest conducted by closed SOIs, using targeted data exploitation and other automated techniques, identified Salman Abedi as one of a small number of individuals, out of a total of more than 20,000 closed SOIs, who merited further examination.
2.77 How best to deal with the risk from persons not under active investigation has been a long-standing challenge for MI5, in respect of which a number of solutions have been tried in the past.39 Many of the recommendations in the OIR, summarised in chapter 3 below, are directed to improving coverage of such persons.

The report at 5.23 cites the Director General of MI5 recently described the work of his staff in the following terms

They are constantly making tough professional judgments based on fragments of intelligence: pin pricks of light against a dark and shifting canvas.

Link to the report:https://www.daqc.co.uk/wp-content/up.../12/Report.pdf and his introduction:https://www.daqc.co.uk/2017/12/05/re...dling-reviews/


To be continued.

[davidbfpo]

The Anderson Report (as it is known) was well covered at the time and I have selected three particular comments.

The first is a quote from the report:

The unpalatable lesson of London Bridge is that even priority subjects of interest in respect of whom sound decisions are being made ... may retain the ability to conceal their attack planning from the authorities.

Link:https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/...david-anderson

Dan Lomas, an academic observer, commented:

Yet headlines like these are misleading, neglecting the nuance in Anderson’s report that the decision to ignore or misinterpret the intelligence on Abedi was “understandable” in the circumstances, overlooking the complex nature of counter-terror investigations. So could the Manchester bombing really have been prevented?

Link:https://theconversation.com/the-manc...ht-bias-88708?

From a privacy pressure group:

The report states that there is “certainly room for improvement in analysing and sharing data”, and identifies three potential changes as being particularly important:

• Improving “the ability of MI5 and the police to exploit data to detect activity of concern”: in particular, “a better strategy for acquiring, analysing and sharing data across intelligence and policing, for example through wider use of bulk personal datasets”;

• “Enhancement of tools” such as a process devised by MI5 “to identify activity of renewed intelligence interest conducted by [suspects]”, through “data exploitation and other automatic techniques”;

• Allowing intelligence agencies such as MI5 to share its knowledge “beyond intelligence

The security and intelligence services should make their decisions based on objective evidence, not algorithmic speculation which may result in UK citizens’ privacy rights being infringed.

Link:https://bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/2017/...ch-terrorists/

[davidbfpo]

Last week an Iraqi teenage asylum seeker Ahmed Hassan, who had been in foster care for two years, was convicted for a bomb attack on the London Underground, the bomb was faulty and only partly worked, injuring fifty-one. The foster parents knew nothing about his intentions, nor that for a year he had been subject of a counter-radicalisation action. Hassan awaits sentencing.

The carers were interviewed by ITV and this link is a detailed account. It ends with:

We've asked ourselves time and time again 'what did we miss?

Link:http://www.itv.com/news/2018-03-19/s...suspected-him/
The BBC News report is shorter:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-43463856

[davidbfpo]

His day in court:

Passing sentence, the judge, Mr Justice Haddon-Cave, said he would be treating the incident as a terrorist offence.In a January 2016 immigration interview, Hassan told officials he had been in contact with the Islamic State group and had been "trained to kill". The trial also heard he blamed the UK for the death of his father in Iraq.
The judge told Hassan: "There is no doubt that you are a very dangerous and devious individual. You quietly went about planning and executing this terrorist bomb attack with ruthless determination and almost military efficiency, whilst pretending to be a model asylum-seeker. I am satisfied you were determined to create as much death and carnage that day as possible."

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-43519540

The day before there was a report that the police investigation had missed his motivation; clearly the judge did not need that evidence:

Our investigations show that police found evidence of Hassan’s affiliation with the terrorist group, but misinterpreted the material and sent flawed information to prosecutors.

Link:https://www.independent.co.uk/news/u...-a8267601.html

[davidbfpo]

From the BBC Newsnight team and placed on YouTube (19 mins):

A year ago a 52 year old British man - Khalid Masood - brought terror to the heart of Westminster. More than fifty people were injured - five were killed. This Newsnight investigation by Richard Watson and Maria Polachowska reports on who he was and how he was radicalised.

Link:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sEXNuVFVfDM

[davidbfpo]

A quick overview on this problem by James Brandon and an almost laughable, sadly true passage:

In contrast to this tough approach abroad, the treatment of many returnees has been exceedingly lenient, with only a fraction of returnees prosecuted. Indeed, a recent parliamentary report on terrorist sentencing recommended that—such was the level of prison radicalization and that absence of an effective de-radicalization scheme—those convicted of more minor terrorism offensives should receive a non-custodial sentence.

Link:https://jamestown.org/program/the-th...liphates-fall/

[davidbfpo]

A long article reflecting on Fusilier Rigby's murder (run down by a car and knifed / axed) nearly five years ago by Raffaello Pantucci, of RUSI and sub-titled:

The murder of Lee Rigby five years ago ushered in a wave of ‘easy’ extremist violence. But will such random acts result in radical Islam losing its malign ideological power?

Link:https://www.theguardian.com/commenti...urder-woolwich

[davidbfpo]

This post covers several topics so in a moment it will be copied to other threads on CT, lone wolves (inside the USA and beyond).

Bruce Hoffman has two articles on the rise of the extreme right as a threat.

The first is quite short and the second via WoTR is longer.

So No.1:https://www.cfr.org/article/how-seri...list-terrorism and No.2:https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/ba...f-lone-wolves/

Paul Gill, a UK-based academic writes on lone wolves after Christchurch:https://www.radionz.co.nz/national/p...oural-analysis

Raffaello Pantucci (RUSI) adds his commentary, which mainly applies to the UK:https://raffaellopantucci.com/2019/0...-not-any-more/

Then Steve Metz on why lone wolves and a somewhat pessimistic viewpoint IMHO:https://www.theamericanconservative....olf-terrorist/

A NYT graphic on the links between white extremists:https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/...istchurch.html

[davidbfpo]

A joint CT police and Security Service (MI5) statement in late March:https://www.counterterrorism.police....terror-threat/

Two reports on a recent CT trial where the defendant was a white extremist or extreme right wing activist:https://www.theguardian.com/world/20...ght-plot-to-mp and a critical viewpoint on policing the XRW by the Hope not hate charity involved:https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/...-hope-not-hate

Of note is that the catalyst and evidence for this came from a XRW activist who defected to a charity that fights extremism.

Then last week reports on two trials, one concluded and the second of a sixteen year old that continues:https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/201...ected-revenge/ and https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-leeds-47854783

[davidbfpo]

A rather large (46 pgs) document by David Anderson, the former Independent Reviewer of CT Legislation, who was asked to conduct an assessment of progress has been made

This is the unclassified summary of a stock-take of the progress made by MI5 and Counter-Terrorism Policing (CTP) in implementing the recommendations arrived at in the Operational Improvement Review and Post-Attack Reviews of 2017.It summarises progress to 31^st January 2019 and looks in greater depth in some key areas: use of data, management of closed subjects of interest (CSOIs), multi-agency centre (MAC) pilots, and non-Islamist extremism.

Link:https://assets.publishing.service.go...stock_take.pdf

A lot there, often optimistic in tone and with some snippets not previously seen e.g. co-location of CT policing for London and the Security Service (MI5). This "fusion" (not called that here) happened outside London now over twelve years ago.

The 'use of data' by MI5 is currently under judicial review after an application by pressure groups following a report by the oversight body (headed by a judge). The judge stated:

Without seeking to be emotive, I consider that MI5’s use of warranted data … is currently, in effect, in ‘special measures’ and the historical lack of compliance … is of such gravity that [the watchdog Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office] IPCO will need to be satisfied to a greater degree than usual that it is ‘fit for purpose.

Link:https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/jun/11/mi5-in-court-accused-of-extraordinary-and-persistent-illegality 26k up since

[davidbfpo]

Raffaello Pantucci, ex-IISS & ex-RUSI, is now in Singapore and has added this analysis of the most recent attack in London by a recently released, convicted terrorist - who thankfully was under armed police surveillance at the time.
Link: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publica.../#.XkEndFIzbOQ

[davidbfpo]

Following a conviction for a pre-empted terror attack an anonymous senior (police) CT officer made these remarks:

This is quite a critical issue and is obviously a dilemma for us in terms of taking passports off extremists. The dilemma is if they want to carry out a terrorist attack they are constrained to carry it out here. It is one of those risk factors when we take passports off people. Are we actually making the risk of them carrying out a terrorist attack here higher?
It is called the home and away debate. Do you let them go? Are they going to be dangerous overseas or more dangerous here? It is a dilemma for us and it is not an easy one.
It depends on other factors at play. It depends on where they are going to go and what they are going to do. If the risk of them carrying on being radicalised and carrying on this activity is reduced by them going to another country then there may be a consideration to let them go because they are more of a risk here and more of a threat here with the company they are keeping.
They may have a relative or a family (overseas) and that may moderate them...Generally speaking we do not want to be letting or allowing a radicalised individual here to go to a war zone or a place like Syria where they can then come back even more trained and back to their home country on their own passport. Most of the time, if we can, we are going to stop them travelling.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...or-threat.html


One wonders if this issue has some political involvement and may jar with some partners. Or just maybe others do this as a public policy, just do not say so publicly.