Tom said:
"Hearts-and-minds is also a strategy of exhaustion but one in which the enemy’s will to resist is undermined by largesse. "

Makes for a snappy read as in the 15 second sound bite to writing; does not reflect reality or COIN.
He's correct -- so is the statement he refutes. The COIN idea is more than largesse. However the COIN idea does rely on largesse to more than a small extent. The real truth is somewhere in between. That, however, is not the problem with COIN efforts, that problem is in application of COIN principle by a third party and not the government that has an insurgency issue. There are those who firmly believe in the need for such intervention and there are others that strongly doubt such interventions are or can be effective.

Those are two schools of thought. We are all exemplars of our inner selves. My suspicion is that if we could realistically categorize humans as pro-COIN or con-COIN, a heavy majority would be the latter and while an armed force can direct people to do things they do not agree with, the performance of people is enhanced when they believe in what they are doing and degraded if they do not believe. The basic problem is that the efficacy of COIN is in significant dispute; the rationale for its conduct is in dispute and the logic and / or morality of third party intervention is questioned by some.

This creates spotty performance which can exacerbate rather than solve the insurgency issue. That fact needs to be recognized.
I agree that we need a clear view of Afghanistan. War is war is not a good start.
Maybe. War is war. That, as Wilf and Marc say, an aphorism and not an immutable fact -- but we need to recognize Afghanistan is a war; it is not a COIN operation. As was Iraq, it is more complex than that. In fact Afghanistan is far more complex and a far tougher nut than is Iraq. In any event, we are committed to a course in Afghanistan that entails the use of some COIN principles, no question.

kingo1RTR summarizes the current problem thusly:
We must have the Afghan's 'hearts and minds' at the forefront of what we do if we are ever going see Afghanistan as a stable state that represents their culture and their way.
I suspect that is right at this point. We have started on a course and we have an obligation IMO to finish it reasonably successfully. He's correct that military victory is not on the agenda -- never was -- but an acceptable outcome can be obtained.

That is a problem with any COIN action, that's the best that can be hoped for in this era, an acceptable outcome.

The problem is that with an intervention, the slices of acceptability are smaller due to more players -- and the dominant player's "acceptable" may not coincide at all well with the goals and desires of the others -- particularly those who live in the nation that the dominant player can leave. Thus, that inclines the dominant player to go for a more warlike effort -- if his armed forces are involved -- than might the government with the insurgency.

Gian sums it up really well:
It is time to get a clear view of what we think we are trying to do in places like Astan.
We are committed to an effort in Afghanistan. We should finish what we started.

Gian correctly addresses the broader issue for the future. What we should also do is determine whether this intervention stuff in other nations is advisable. We should then prepare to try to avoid such interventions OR be better prepared to perform them.

Either way, circumstances may dictate that we have no choice and must intervene -- but we need to insure that before we do, we sort out the roles and missions, understand the costs and that the armed forces are trained to perform the military functions and understand what those functions entail while the civil side of government is prepared and trained to undertake its responsibilities at the earliest opportunity.

Both J Wolfsberger and Entropy contribute very valid comments on the issue of Afghanistan. Points that should've been considered eight years ago -- and whose probable answers were known eight years ago...

marct:
...then what are the limits of "war" if any?
Good question. I suspect the answer is that "You ain't seen nothin' yet." As my Mother used to say, it'll probably get worse before it gets better; a statement applicable both to Afghanistan and to war in general...

He then really wraps it up very neatly:
... It's not that I disagree with you on the use of killing and destruction, I don't. What I disagree with is whether or not it "broke the back of the resistance". I would suggest that what it did was to establish, beyond an immediate doubt, that certain forms of "resistance" were currently "unacceptable" (and bloody dangerous to their advocates!). This doesn't change the likelihood of "resistance", it merely shifts the form of it.
And that is the problem with COIN...

It's an ill advised effort to solve problems that are better solved in other ways. If you commit Armed Forces to such an effort, you are placing an instrument of war in position to start and / or exacerbate a war and the probability is that it will not do that well. That can only end badly or, at best, with an acceptable outcome.

Acceptable to whom and for how long...