More killing. Less good deeds

[Rank amateur]

what about the combating of irregular enemies makes the nature of war different?

Irregulars can control their loss rate by hiding in the population. Something the Luffwaffe - for exampe - couldn't do. Therefore, if you strategy is "kill more insurgents," your strategy is easily defeated.

Not sure why a Brigadier can't figure out that soldiers in Afghanistan can't kill insurgents who are hiding in Pakistan. I'm not that bright and it's obvious to me.

[Ken White]

Irregulars can control their loss rate by hiding in the population. Something the Luffwaffe - for exampe - couldn't do. Therefore, if you strategy is "kill more insurgents," your strategy is easily defeated.

Leaving the Luftwaffe out as an irrelevancy, the answer to your statement is that you have to weed them out with good intel; thus your strategy is not defeated; your job is simply made a lot harder harder and it will take longer. As we have seen...

Not sure why a Brigadier can't figure out that soldiers in Afghanistan can't kill insurgents who are hiding in Pakistan. I'm not that bright and it's obvious to me.

You're bright, so's he. How Pakistan is addressed and discussed is more subject to sensitivities in Commonwealth nations in general and in their Armed Forces in particular. You can safely bet large sums of money that any Coalition service member of any rank concerned with Afghanistan is painfully aware of that border and the R&R centers on the other side of it. They are also frustrated that they know where the nodes on the other side are but can do nothing except wait helplessly until the R&R is over and the bad guys head north and enter Afghanistan.

[carl]

Leaving the Luftwaffe out as an irrelevancy, the answer to your statement is that you have to weed them out with good intel; thus your strategy is not defeated; your job is simply made a lot harder harder and it will take longer.

The best intel to weed out the bad guys comes from the people in the village or the neighborhood. They are not likely provide intel if they are pissed off at having been dissed by troops, had their fields ruined by a tank or having some of their relatives, friends and neighbors, near or distant, killed or maimed by an airstrike. Another disadvantage of the above listed events is their excitable teenage sons might go off and join a war band to get some revenge.

The advantage of COINdinistada is that it tends to highlight the disadvantages of making the locals mad at you.

It seems to me that part of what this discussion is all about is how you kill the ones who need to be done away with when the miscreants are near or among the people. Do you get them mostly with rifles and try to eschew air strikes, which I imagine can complicate things and will almost certainly result in more friendly casualties; or do you use the heavy weapons more, even thought that will most likely (given the recent history in Afghan, certainly) increase casualties amongst the locals?

[Ken White]

The best intel to weed out the bad guys comes from the people in the village or the neighborhood...

All true -- for some, for others, not so much. Every thing you say also applies to the opposition. said opposition is far more likely to antagonize the locals than are most western armies who take classes in how to be nice and usually don't steal the goats and chickens. So that aspect is about a wash. The issue then becomes who pays more...

Then, those western hunters also have several other means of intel gathering that do not rely on locals. Net advantage, the hunters.

The advantage of COINdinistada is that it tends to highlight the disadvantages of making the locals mad at you.

True. So too do common sense and human decency let halfway decently trained troops behave properly with no COIN knowledge at all. What COIN also does is convince you that human decency and logic are possessed by your opponents. That is not always true. COIN will also 'convince' you that you can fix things that you really cannot...

Or that you have a way to fix things that either don't really need to be fixed or for which you should not be the one to attempt the fix.

It seems to me that part of what this discussion is all about is how you kill the ones who need to be done away with when the miscreants are near or among the people...

There is no one size fits all, every war and every situation are different; one has to know and apply the principle of METT-TC. All day, every day.

COIN warfare is not the answer to any problem; it is a problem applied to correct another problem. Usually wrongly and usually too late -- almost invariably at great cost for little lasting change. The COIN fans are fond of telling us of insurgencies defeated. Name me one that has 20 or more years later proven to be a net benefit the major power involved. *

What started this whole thread was Wilf's very accurate statement that war is war. May irritate some but you can't sugar coat it and make it less than it is -- trying to do so has put us in deep Yogurt four times in my lifetime; the first two were tied games; the second two have yet to be determined but all four indubitably cost this nation a great deal in many respects. The inane belief that you can fight war 'nicely' is stupid and dangerous; we have killed a good many people because of that idiocy. War is war -- and COIN doesn't make it nice. Quite the contrary. 'Fixing' failed states is super arrogant and prone to failure.

If you have to engage in a stability op, do you need to use 'COIN principles?' Certainly -- and you have to apply them as UBoat said while you're trying to tamp down the insurgents. But you need to get the max number of insurgents dead quickly in order to let the civil sector take over the aid effort that the military force began. If you do not do that, you are headed for a very long slog and a rocky effort.


Wilf posted this: LINK. That caused Coldstreamer to post this: LINK. Exactly.

If you did it right, you wouldn't have to do COIN.

[IntelTrooper]

All true -- for some, for others, not so much. Every thing you say also applies to the opposition. said opposition is far more likely to antagonize the locals than are most western armies who take classes in how to be nice and usually don't steal the goats and chickens. So that aspect is about a wash. The issue then becomes who pays more...

Then, those western hunters also have several other means of intel gathering that do not rely on locals. Net advantage, the hunters.

As an especially insightful Marine LtCol and ETT mentor once said, "The Taliban get a lot more mileage out of threats than you do out of rice and blankets."

In my experience, the intel provided by concerned citizens was rarely of much use. And even then, we never charmed them into giving up their insurgent neighbors. I had a lot of lieutenants and squad leaders looking at me all puzzled because I refused to try to recruit sources when we were out having key leader engagements and such. We had more effective means of collection, and I didn't want the locals to associate my face with an American trying to pump them for information all the time, like some kind of armed Jehovah's Witness showing up every week to harass them.

When all the LLOs are in place and progressing, the masses who find that their best interest is to assist the counterinsurgents will find us. And then you get that pretty intelligence <--> operations loop thing. Until then, you have to be more creative.

[pjmunson]

Some of the very simplistic arguments made in this thread are a bit disturbing. I know (hope) that the people making them have much more nuanced positions lying behind their short posts, but the black-and-white, either-or way in which the argument is being laid out by some is intellectually lazy at a minimum.

A number of people have brought some of the nuance back in. I'll add my two cents.

What are the dangers? Applying means unsuited to the ends desired. Failing to recognize the nature of the war. "Kind-hearted people" thinking that a war could be won with little bloodshed. Thinking that an insurgency can be defeated quickly by technology and targeting. Thinking that military means alone can create lasting stability.

A purely hearts and minds strategy applied in the most simplistic and optimistic way could certainly fall into a number of these danger areas. But so too could a "war is war" approach. Many would argue that killing more people, better, faster, with more accurate targeting could lead to a neat and quick end to our problems. This is equally simplistic and dangerous. There are a number of crackpots, some who are in positions of responsibility and authority that they do not deserve, who subscribe to simplistic fantasies of the kinetic and non-kinetic kind. Fortunately, however, I believe that the vast majority of professionals have attained much more nuanced views in the past 8 years.

Security is an absolute requirement and security requires killing. At the same time, this kinetic campaign must not so alienate the populace to be secured that they would rather side with the insurgents anyway. Many of the tools to avoid alienating the population, from understanding their culture and language to precisely fixing the identity, aims, and factions of the insurgents and various other bad actors, come from the realm of social science. Social science can improve your kinetic targeting and therefore should not be poo-pooed out of hand.

Once security is initially attained, much if not all will be lost if you then abandon the populace to go seek out more killing as the insurgents will often come back to seek their revenge, again working against your ends.

Finally, even once you clear and hold, you have to build. This is cliche if taken at face value, building only playgrounds, pools, or schools. More broadly, you have to ensure that the populace begins to build the institutions, from security forces, to social services, to dispute resolution/justice systems, that will maintain stability. Not only does this promote long-term stability, but it also takes away a major aspect of many insurgents' attempts to create legitimacy in the eyes of the populace. They offer these services where the government cannot.

Neither a pure "hearts and minds" approach (which is a very poor choice of phrase as an earlier poster noted) nor a pure military kinetic approach will produce the desired results. Kill more better so we can leave is just as divorced from reality as win hearts and minds by building schools and women's centers. It takes kinetic, non-kinetic, arms, and social science to set the conditions for success. Kill the right people as efficiently as possible, which is a long and messy task, do so in a way that minimizes alienation of the populace (extremely challenging and often works against efficiency in task 1), and win loyalty to the host nation government by providing security and assistance while they build the institutions for long term stability. Reducing this to an either-or argument makes little sense.

[Rex Brynen]

Neither a pure "hearts and minds" approach (which is a very poor choice of phrase as an earlier poster noted) nor a pure military kinetic approach will produce the desired results. Kill more better so we can leave is just as divorced from reality as win hearts and minds by building schools and women's centers. It takes kinetic, non-kinetic, arms, and social science to set the conditions for success. Kill the right people as efficiently as possible, which is a long and messy task, do so in a way that minimizes alienation of the populace (extremely challenging and often works against efficiency in task 1), and win loyalty to the host nation government by providing security and assistance while they build the institutions for long term stability. Reducing this to an either-or argument makes little sense.

Well said!

There might have been some value in the initial starkness with which the debate was framed, whether to point to the weaknesses of a kinetic-only approach, stress the importance of social analysis and engagement, highlight the dangers of an institutional overemphasis on COIN, or raise legitimate warnings about COIN fetishism. That being said, in the blogosphere it now approaches point of mutual caricature (straw insurgents?)

Meanwhile, on the ground, it seems perfectly evident IMHO that both the kinetic and non-kinetic strands are important, at times working at cross purposes, but even more often mutually supporting when done right.

The key issue, it seems to me, is context. When do assertive kinetic activities pay major dividends in terms of weakening opponent capabilities and will, and when do they alienate locals to the point of fueling the insurgency? When does building school and well help to shift local attitudes, and when does it have negligible effect (either because gains can't be secured, or because the locals aren't swayed)? This is complicated stuff--it not only varies from insurgency to insurgency, but from town to town, valley to valley, and month to month. Likely, not even the locals can agree on what might be needed to stabilize the situation (ask ten random people in a shopping mall how to fix the health care system, and see what I mean).

In one of the other threads, Davidpfpo posted a link to a scathing newspaper article that, among other things, mentions building a park for women and children in Lashka Gar at a time when security was deteriorating--much to the annoyance of the locals. Understandable--it sounds a stupid project. But in a better security environment, it might have sent power signals to the population about the benefits of stabilization, and the hopes for their children might have for a better future. Again, the context matters.

How then do we know what works, why, when and how? To some extent this is an analytical issue. To some extent it is an intelligence collection challenge. To a large extent it is, in my view, addressed through leadership, training, preparation, empathy, and common sense within military, diplomatic, and aid agencies. Precisely because of the complexity and variation involved, I think there is only so much you are going to resolve by sharpening analytical (or doctrinal) tools.. I think a very great deal depends on who exactly is on the ground, and the individual qualities that they bring to process (and also help promote within their units).

In many ways, therefore, its a human resource management problem too. I'm struck how many times, when participants in successful stabilization missions are asked to explain that success, they highlight the key role not of a particular $1 million, or a new piece of kit, or a press release from a donor conference, but key individuals who, at critical times and critical places, knew how best to deal with complex political, military, and humanitarian-developmental issues.

[Ken White]

Some of the very simplistic arguments made in this thread are a bit disturbing. I know (hope) that the people making them have much more nuanced positions lying behind their short posts, but the black-and-white, either-or way in which the argument is being laid out by some is intellectually lazy at a minimum.

and will plead guilty to being intellectually (among other ways) lazy. It seems to me that you said pretty much the same thing Uboat509 said above. I agreed with him as well.

I'm not sure what's nuanced and what isn't and I'm also unsure anyone else has said anything that really contradicts either of you. No one that I recall has gone to a 'kill 'em all' position and no one has gone to a pure sweetness and light position. I just reviewed the entire thread to include re-reading Brigadier Kelly's comments and I have to ask:

Who has reduced it to an either or argument?

What, specifically is disturbing?

[MikeF]

In my experience, the intel provided by concerned citizens was rarely of much use. And even then, we never charmed them into giving up their insurgent neighbors. I had a lot of lieutenants and squad leaders looking at me all puzzled because I refused to try to recruit sources when we were out having key leader engagements and such. We had more effective means of collection, and I didn't want the locals to associate my face with an American trying to pump them for information all the time, like some kind of armed Jehovah's Witness showing up every week to harass them.

Intel, I would suggest that you change tactics. If what you're doing isn't working, adjust. Charming or not, I would suggest (without knowing enough of the situation) that the phrase "when we were out having key leader engagements" is the key to your dilemma.

If you live amoungst the populace (IW, COIN, FID, etc...), employ appropriate measures, then the populace will come to you. In the current environment, we sometimes confuse metrics and words with truth. Moreover, I rarely considered if the citizens were concerned or not. It is simply another muddled term...

Remember, on the ground level, in the most simplest form, these conflicts have nothing to do with us. You should never have to sell your job. At times, you may have to force it on others, but you should never try to charm. If you have an AO, then the people should determine you to be the key leader, not vice-versa.

I never went door to door trying to sell anything. My clients came to me. And yes, I'm fully aware of our other means of collection, but living on a FOB or airfield hanger waiting for the silver bullet is not the answer.

v/r

Mike

[William F. Owen]

Sorry to be reductionist again, but I can't help feeling that the argument is best described as follows,

• Route A: Kill-capture/Focus on the enemy in order to win "hearts and minds"
• Route B: Win hearts and minds in order to "defeat the insurgency."

Now I suspect the right path is 60% A with 40% B, but let's not quibble. That is going to be dependant on context. ...but the problem here is What is hearts and minds?

We keep referring to it like it is a specific definable set of actions. It is not. That is the problem. It's actually a huge raft of some quite good and some very bad ideas, that is waved around as if it is the solution to the problem. Clearly it is not, and never has been.

I am not against providing humanitarian aid. In fact I consider it essential. Restoring and maintaining electricity and sanitation is also something that needs to be done. Beyond that, I think context and specifics becomes extremely critical.

[carl]

Ken: I don't know how to insert parts of quotes so I will answer as best I can.

Mission of course is the first thing. What concerns me about "war is war" is that if killing becomes the prime requirement, that will lead to sort of an industrial view. If killing is the prime mission, then efficient killing is a good thing. If efficiency is defined as your losses vs. bad guys killed that leads to a lot of heavy weapons use which is bad for the locals. COIN theory as I understand it stresses that killing isn't the ONLY thing, and in some circumstances it is much less important. It tends to change the view of the mission which would change behavior.

That a defeated insurgency ultimately benefits the big power involved just confirms the wisdom of the big power.

Sometimes the opposition irritates the locals more than our guys. AQI really irritated the locals. But if AQI hadn't been there, would our guys have irritated the locals more than the nationalist insurgents? Did the VC in their hey day irritate the locals more than the ARVN? I don't think it is always a wash and our guys are more likely to trained not to step on toes if COIN has some influence.

As far as technical means go, we have that advantage in Afghan and I wonder how far it is getting us.

Having to apply COIN is the result of a mistake made before, granted. But those mistakes are going to be and have been made and we must use the best tool to deal with it.

Sometimes, as you said the enemy is as decent and logical as your side. If COIN teaches you that, that is good. It is always good when you realize the enemy can be as good, bad, smart or stupid as you.

I don't think COIN says that war is nice, quite the opposite. I read about decades long, frustrating operations where close combat by infantry is preferred over heavy weapons. That does not sound clean to me. That sounds grim and bloody.

Fixing failed states is as you said. In our two current cases though, as Powell said, we broke it so we bought it.

[Ken White]

What concerns me about "war is war" is that if killing becomes the prime requirement, that will lead to sort of an industrial view.

You can never forget that war is war and it means killing -- there is no other way and no easy route. That does NOT mean you take an 'industrial' view.

If killing is the prime mission, then efficient killing is a good thing.

Yes it is -- but not nearly as good as effective killing; i.e. the right versus not the wrong persons --and don't kill their goats and dogs.

If efficiency is defined as your losses vs. bad guys killed that leads to a lot of heavy weapons use which is bad for the locals.

That would be a really stupid metric and I don't know anyone who'd advocate that (except Robert McNamara and he's dead).

COIN theory as I understand it stresses that killing isn't the ONLY thing, and in some circumstances it is much less important.

All combat training emphasizes that and everybody gets the Law of War.

It tends to change the view of the mission which would change behavior.

Thank you for making my point.

It does not change the view Joe and most NCO take toward the mission; it does not change the view of all Officers toward the mission -- it can change the view of people in the rear and at home and of the politicians. That's the danger.

That a defeated insurgency ultimately benefits the big power involved just confirms the wisdom of the big power.

I don't understand that comment, if it's a response to my question:

"The COIN fans are fond of telling us of insurgencies defeated. Name me one that has 20 or more years later proven to be a net benefit the major power involved."

Note the wording. My contention is that no major power obtained a net benefit (outcome versus all costs) from participating in a COIN action.

Did the VC in their hey day irritate the locals more than the ARVN? I don't think it is always a wash and our guys are more likely to trained not to step on toes if COIN has some influence.

Yes to the VC being slightly more annoying most of the time to the population. With respect to stepping on toes that's dependent on many things and COIN training is absolutely no guarantee of proper performance. That whole bit is very much unit dependent.

Sometimes, as you said the enemy is as decent and logical as your side. If COIN teaches you that, that is good. It is always good when you realize the enemy can be as good, bad, smart or stupid as you.

I don't recall saying that but it's true. I do know that much COIN oriented training is more likely to inculcate a belief that the opponent is deserving of better treatment and that can adversely affect a lot of folks and make them hesitant to act.

Fixing failed states is as you said. In our two current cases though, as Powell said, we broke it so we bought it.

Powell said a lot of things he probably shouldn't have. Be that as it may, as I said, we are in Afghanistan, we do need to finish the job we started because we said we would -- we shouldn't have, but we did -- we will continue to apply some COIN principles but that does not change the fact that it's a war, not a COIN operation.

"War is cruelty. There is no use trying to reform it. The crueler it is, the sooner it will be over."

William Tecumseh Sherman

[Bob's World]

While I can't get on the "war is war" wagon (the resolution of conflict lies in the roots of the conflict, and not all roots are the same even if the plants that break the surface look the same. To carry that further, if our job is just to trim it down to bare dirt and not worry about what springs back up or when, then I guess "war is war." To me though that is a dangerously simplistic approach.

Will agree with Ken as to neither Iraq or Afghanistan being COIN for the US, and add that I think it dangerously blinds us to what we reallly need to do to finish up and go home when we look at it as "COIN."

My take (and this is my take alone, so place full blame on my shoulders and not any organization I may support) is that:

Afghanistan is "Post-UW FID" and Iraq is "Post-regime change FID." Only HN forces conduct COIN in my view, and to believe that we are doing that HN business is to risk dangerous degradation of the HN governments already shakey legitimacy, and also increase perceptions of US legitimacy that IMO placed us on the target list of groups like AQ in the first place.

Just one guy's perspective.

[Fuchs]

Irregulars can control their loss rate by hiding in the population. Something the Luffwaffe - for exampe - couldn't do. Therefore, if you strategy is "kill more insurgents," your strategy is easily defeated.

Not sure why a Brigadier can't figure out that soldiers in Afghanistan can't kill insurgents who are hiding in Pakistan. I'm not that bright and it's obvious to me.

The Luftwaffe was actually hiding very well. The aircraft were hidden close to the airfields, often in forests. Lots of CCD as well.

The Luftwaffe's problem was rather that its country (cities, industry) wasn't able to hide and got treatment as fair game by the Allies.

[Tom Odom]

He's correct -- so is the statement he refutes. The COIN idea is more than largesse. However the COIN idea does rely on largesse to more than a small extent. The real truth is somewhere in between. That, however, is not the problem with COIN efforts, that problem is in application of COIN principle by a third party and not the government that has an insurgency issue. There are those who firmly believe in the need for such intervention and there are others that strongly doubt such interventions are or can be effective.

Ken

I held that statement up as an example of putting a simple statement out and leaving it hanging as a 15 second sound bite.

The largesse the author refers to is targeted toward the population and shoring up their support for the government, not undermining the enemy's will to resist. Kill and capture is generally the best solution to the enemy.

If the problem is as you state it, then state the problem, not a simplistic war is war aphorism as Wilf calls it, tautolgy as he so often uses it.

Wilf,

When you actually go beyond the bumper sticker, you start to make sense as in:

What I dislike about "that competition" , is that it draws the population into the fight, when the purpose should be to exclude them!

If the population says, "we don't care about NATO, because they don't bother us. They only kill Talib," then I suggest that this is a basis on which to proceed. If NATO turn up once in a while and drop off food, do some medical care, and offer security advice, then the villagers have a chance to say "I know where the Talib are hiding."

Tom

[Ken White]

I held that statement up as an example of putting a simple statement out and leaving it hanging as a 15 second sound bite.

It was but what I shoulda said was that it is a cheap shot but there is also danger in a myth that says we can buy support -- as you know, they'll take what you give and ask for more but that frequently doesn't change who they support. Sometimes yes, sometimes no. You have to try, no question but I think you also have to acknowledge that it sometimes isn't very successful and we sometimes buy / present the wrong things. The Hospital in Mosul comes to mind. It is not easy.

The largesse the author refers to is targeted toward the population and shoring up their support for the government, not undermining the enemy's will to resist. Kill and capture is generally the best solution to the enemy.

Yep. Agreed. I'm sure you guys today do a better job than we did in Veet Nam -- a lot of Aid went to Chuck. Hard to tell who was who sometimes. Plus our 'Allies' sometimes cheated on us. Shameful behavior. .

If the problem is as you state it, then state the problem, not a simplistic war is war aphorism as Wilf calls it, tautolgy as he so often uses it.

Stop with them ol big words, I ain't wrapped too taut. Nor very tightly either.

On a more important note, you stay alert...

[goesh]

- let them grow beards and lighten the damn combat load for starters - you come passing through with a huge load of unknown goods on the back of a man and you get curiosity and apprehension at the same time, it pulls attention away from the man as a human - you wonder what is in the pack and not how many kids he has at home - they are used to armed men but not beardless ones - Im reminded of this Viking movie I saw one time, a young man comes down river to call for help, he appears out of the fog so he has to stand around on the shore for most of a day while it is decided if he is a human or a spirit - first contacts in the Amazon are like that too - they gotta check you out and cross cultural bonds have to be seen and felt, not talked about - the fact that they've set the Marines to drinking tea as well as doing combat duty mandates some fundamental changes at a very basic level

[Ken White]

- let them grow beards and lighten the damn combat load for starters.

The problem with beards is that most westerners don't wear beards so when the Afghans see those with beards they know they're not Afghans by the way they walk so they call them 'Jews' on the basis that only Afghans and Jews are bearded; most westerners nowadays are not.

It's not a pejorative with them -- but it is an indicator that it's a superficial trick of little real value.

[Bob's World]

Just one comment on "hearts and minds," as many seem to take very black and white/absolutist positions on these things that are rarely either one:

Winning the "hearts and minds" of the populace is every bit as valid, and very similar to "earning the respect of ones men."

Every leader understands that it is his goal to ultimately earn such a status among his men, but any leader who sets out upon a course of action designed solely to garner such respect will quickly be identifed as a fraud by those same men. Instead, the good leader goes about his duty in a professional competent manner, not doing anything to conciously dimenish his status in the eyes of his men.

Everyone understands this, yet for some reason aren't applying the same logic to "hearts and minds." Its how I look at it, so hopefully this helps. This is in the realm of the art of war, so there is no checklist or TTP for success; just understand that it is important and try to do the right thing.

Oh, and like respect, it is far easier to lose than gain.

[IntelTrooper]

The problem with beards is that most westerners don't wear beards so when the Afghans see those with beards they know they're not Afghans by the way they walk so they call them 'Jews' on the basis that only Afghans and Jews are bearded; most westerners nowadays are not.

It's not a pejorative with them -- but it is an indicator that it's a superficial trick of little real value.

Uh oh... I'm about to disagree with Ken... check The Weather Channel for sub-terranean temperatures!

The beards, in my experience, do make a subtle difference but I don't think necessarily they should be proliferated across the board. I think anyone who is required to work closely with locals (ETT mentors, SF, PsyOps, CA, intel) should have the option to grow them, and possibly even maneuver commanders and others who will be in a lot of shuras and talking to elders. When I would accompany an American officer into a shura, or KLE, or out on patrols, people would tend to gravitate towards me and ignore the American trying to conduct the meeting (of course, that would usually change once free stuff started getting handed out).

As far as getting identified as Jews, that might be area-specific. I once had some children tell me I was an Afghan, even though I couldn't speak the language, and tell my clean-shaven interpreter that he was the American. I'm sure the vast, vast majority knew we were Americans but in my area, bearded Americans had a reputation of being smarter, more approachable, and able to get things done (probably thanks to SF more than anything else).