More killing. Less good deeds

**carl** · 07-12-2009

Ken: I don't know how to insert parts of quotes so I will answer as best I can.

Mission of course is the first thing. What concerns me about "war is war" is that if killing becomes the prime requirement, that will lead to sort of an industrial view. If killing is the prime mission, then efficient killing is a good thing. If efficiency is defined as your losses vs. bad guys killed that leads to a lot of heavy weapons use which is bad for the locals. COIN theory as I understand it stresses that killing isn't the ONLY thing, and in some circumstances it is much less important. It tends to change the view of the mission which would change behavior.

That a defeated insurgency ultimately benefits the big power involved just confirms the wisdom of the big power.

Sometimes the opposition irritates the locals more than our guys. AQI really irritated the locals. But if AQI hadn't been there, would our guys have irritated the locals more than the nationalist insurgents? Did the VC in their hey day irritate the locals more than the ARVN? I don't think it is always a wash and our guys are more likely to trained not to step on toes if COIN has some influence.

As far as technical means go, we have that advantage in Afghan and I wonder how far it is getting us.

Having to apply COIN is the result of a mistake made before, granted. But those mistakes are going to be and have been made and we must use the best tool to deal with it.

Sometimes, as you said the enemy is as decent and logical as your side. If COIN teaches you that, that is good. It is always good when you realize the enemy can be as good, bad, smart or stupid as you.

I don't think COIN says that war is nice, quite the opposite. I read about decades long, frustrating operations where close combat by infantry is preferred over heavy weapons. That does not sound clean to me. That sounds grim and bloody.

Fixing failed states is as you said. In our two current cases though, as Powell said, we broke it so we bought it.

**Ken White** · 07-12-2009

Originally Posted by carl

What concerns me about "war is war" is that if killing becomes the prime requirement, that will lead to sort of an industrial view.

You can never forget that war is war and it means killing -- there is no other way and no easy route. That does NOT mean you take an 'industrial' view.

If killing is the prime mission, then efficient killing is a good thing.

Yes it is -- but not nearly as good as effective killing; i.e. the right versus not the wrong persons --and don't kill their goats and dogs.

If efficiency is defined as your losses vs. bad guys killed that leads to a lot of heavy weapons use which is bad for the locals.

That would be a really stupid metric and I don't know anyone who'd advocate that (except Robert McNamara and he's dead).

COIN theory as I understand it stresses that killing isn't the ONLY thing, and in some circumstances it is much less important.

All combat training emphasizes that and everybody gets the Law of War.

It tends to change the view of the mission which would change behavior.

Thank you for making my point.

It does not change the view Joe and most NCO take toward the mission; it does not change the view of all Officers toward the mission -- it can change the view of people in the rear and at home and of the politicians. That's the danger.

That a defeated insurgency ultimately benefits the big power involved just confirms the wisdom of the big power.

I don't understand that comment, if it's a response to my question:

"The COIN fans are fond of telling us of insurgencies defeated. Name me one that has 20 or more years later proven to be a net benefit the major power involved."

Note the wording. My contention is that no major power obtained a net benefit (outcome versus all costs) from participating in a COIN action.

Did the VC in their hey day irritate the locals more than the ARVN? I don't think it is always a wash and our guys are more likely to trained not to step on toes if COIN has some influence.

Yes to the VC being slightly more annoying most of the time to the population. With respect to stepping on toes that's dependent on many things and COIN training is absolutely no guarantee of proper performance. That whole bit is very much unit dependent.

Sometimes, as you said the enemy is as decent and logical as your side. If COIN teaches you that, that is good. It is always good when you realize the enemy can be as good, bad, smart or stupid as you.

I don't recall saying that but it's true. I do know that much COIN oriented training is more likely to inculcate a belief that the opponent is deserving of better treatment and that can adversely affect a lot of folks and make them hesitant to act.

Fixing failed states is as you said. In our two current cases though, as Powell said, we broke it so we bought it.

Powell said a lot of things he probably shouldn't have. Be that as it may, as I said, we are in Afghanistan, we do need to finish the job we started because we said we would -- we shouldn't have, but we did -- we will continue to apply some COIN principles but that does not change the fact that it's a war, not a COIN operation.

"War is cruelty. There is no use trying to reform it. The crueler it is, the sooner it will be over."

William Tecumseh Sherman

**Bob's World** · 07-12-2009

While I can't get on the "war is war" wagon (the resolution of conflict lies in the roots of the conflict, and not all roots are the same even if the plants that break the surface look the same. To carry that further, if our job is just to trim it down to bare dirt and not worry about what springs back up or when, then I guess "war is war." To me though that is a dangerously simplistic approach.

Will agree with Ken as to neither Iraq or Afghanistan being COIN for the US, and add that I think it dangerously blinds us to what we reallly need to do to finish up and go home when we look at it as "COIN."

My take (and this is my take alone, so place full blame on my shoulders and not any organization I may support) is that:

Afghanistan is "Post-UW FID" and Iraq is "Post-regime change FID." Only HN forces conduct COIN in my view, and to believe that we are doing that HN business is to risk dangerous degradation of the HN governments already shakey legitimacy, and also increase perceptions of US legitimacy that IMO placed us on the target list of groups like AQ in the first place.

Just one guy's perspective.

**Spud** · 07-12-2009

Originally Posted by Bob's World

My take (and this is my take alone, so place full blame on my shoulders and not any organization I may support) is that:

Afghanistan is "Post-UW FID" and Iraq is "Post-regime change FID." Only HN forces conduct COIN in my view, and to believe that we are doing that HN business is to risk dangerous degradation of the HN governments already shakey legitimacy, and also increase perceptions of US legitimacy that IMO placed us on the target list of groups like AQ in the first place.

Just one guy's perspective.

Thanks Sir ... that's exactly the argument I've been pushing around the college over the past few weeks -- the only time we can be doing COIN is if we're fighting an insurgency in Australia. (Must've got some notice because they just asked me to drop my preferred COIN elective in the final term and take on Complex Planning instead

). I'm noticing an overwhelming desire by most to be the "COIN" guy but utilising what we've been doing over the past 18-months as the example of COIN campaigning. I've always said we're just (supposedly) helping the other guy do COIN.

I know its all semantics but it appears that semantics are everything in our line of work.