More killing. Less good deeds
Started this thread, because I think this is spot on the money.
I like it because I think it is essentially correct. I hate it because this guy is saying everything I, and quite few other SWJ folks, have been saying for a long time, but just says it better. Plus being a Brigadier, can't hurt.
(I don't defer to rank, but the authoritarian tendency within most hierarchies does.)
I don't expect the "COIN-oil" folks to agree, but war is war, and winning wars hasn't really changed in 3,000 years.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
You are right. I won't agree regardless of how many times you proclaim that war is war. Over simplifying is every bit as bad as over complicating.Originally Posted by William F. Owen
The brigadier makes some good points and he make some doubtful ones. Most of the doubt comes with taking a point supposedly of the opposing view to its extreme and trying to paint it as middle of the road, as inMakes for a snappy read as in the 15 second sound bite to writing; does not reflect reality or COIN.Hearts-and-minds is also a strategy of exhaustion but one in which the enemy’s will to resist is undermined by largesse.
Tom
Hearts and Minds
I agree that there is much to support and admire in this essay - however I fundamentally believe that we must maintain the 'hearts and minds' concept at the core of what we do out there. It is in essence the centre of gravity in this struggle; it provides coherence across the spectrum of operations, from tactical to strategic, from Kabul to Kandahar to the villages and huts in Helmand; equally it provides a neccessary constraint in the battle against the insurgent. There is too much evidence about to suggest that our inability to constrain collateral damage, right at the lowest level in village and mudhut, when we take a route to remorselessly hunt down the enemy, would lead us to a position where we take 1 step forwards and 2 steps back. We must continue to get 'among the people' with all the attendant costs in men's lives and materiel. I firmly believe that the people there still want to be liberated from the threat of the Taliban; that does not preclude their ability to live and exist as a Pashtun people - the coalition offers the people a greater chance of achieving that than anything the Taliban can match. I agree that military victory is something that is not on the agenda, it need not be, its not about that. We must have the Afghan's 'hearts and minds' at the forefront of what we do if we are ever going see Afghanistan as a stable state that represents their culture and their way.
I concur that over simplifying something is not useful. I submit that usefully simplifying something is mostly necessary.
More to the point, my "proclamation" is aimed at attempting to illicit the views and perspectives of those who can accurately describe, what about the combating of irregular enemies makes the nature of war different?
Warfare does require different approaches. No one would contest that, but it is warfare none the less.
I agree. The 15 second sound bites that jar with me are "heats and minds" "human terrain" "80% political, 20% military" "complex war-fighting" and "you need a network to fight a network."Makes for a snappy read as in the 15 second sound bite to writing; does not reflect reality or COIN.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Spot on the money?
A lengthy commentary on the Afghan situation and whether it is really that vital a battleground; the author Rory Stewart has been a soldier, diplomat and academic and has travelled extensively in Afghanistan and Iraq. Living in Kabul in 2005: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...annot-win.html A slightly longer edition: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n13/stew01_.html
Worth reading through for its many pertinent comments and seems to fit here, even if killing is not the focus.
davidbfpo
Last edited by davidbfpo; 07-11-2009 at 11:10 AM.
gian p gentile
"Hearts and Minds" has always been a name, a label, a code applied in these kinds of small wars to ostensibly describe what folks wanted other folks to think were actually happening on the ground, and afterwards, what they wanted others to think did happen.
The British in Malaya broke the back of the communist insurgency there not between 1952-1954 under the hearts and minds campaign of Templer, but with the use of brute military force combined with Briggs's resettlement program between 1949-1951. Once the insurgency's back was broken, Templer in charge was able to use persuasion of hearts and minds to further things along. This explanation is real and is truthful and has been put forward by a number of leading British scholars over the past few years, most recently in a special issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies that challenges the Malaya Coin Paradigm.
Moreover, one can see the same thing being done by such high priests of population centric Coin like Gallieni and Lyautey in Madagascar and Morocco respectively. Lyautey especially would use the language of "peaceful penetration," of progressive development to better people's lives in order to soothe domestic tensions in France over imperial action and internal issues with the French Army. But again, these hearts and minds techniques were ostensible; actually Lyautey crushed resistance in Morocco by the more time honored process used by the French Army in that region: the Razzia. Historian Doug Porch's excellent campaign study of Lyautey in Morocco shows this to be the case.
Wilf is right, war is war, it is not "armed social science," and real war, not happy war sold through clever-speak of "hearts and minds" language involves killing and death. And in actuality the historical models that we use to prop up this ostensible notion of "hearts and minds" were won through killing and destruction that broke the back of the resistance.
It is time to get a clear view of what we think we are trying to do in places like Astan.
No, Wilf is not correct
And neither are you, Gian. You both are offering reductionist viewpoints poised against a red herring reductionist view.
I agree that we need a clear view of Afghanistan. War is war is not a good start.
Tom
Hi Gian,
Looks like it's time for a point by point deconstruction!
"War is war" is a tautology of the form X = X. It is also a logical fallacy that confuses the sign with the signified in thatif killing is involved, andBy that logic, I would argue that the US is engaged in an ongoing COIN campaign in LA - one, I would note, that they appear to be loosing
war is killing, therefore
this is war.
Second point, war is armed social science if, by social science, we mean an empirically grounded, predictive model of how a society operates in certain situations. The very concept of State-on-State, conventional warfare governed by "Laws" or "Rules" (e.g. Geneva Conventions, etc.) is predicated on the existence of a particular model that is both a) comprehensible to all involved and b) contains win, lose and draw positions (i.e. recognized end states in a recognized social process).
Taking the two together, "war is war" and "war is not armed social science", leaves us with a Hobbesian model of a war of all against all. If this is the case, and I would not argue that it has been at some times, then what are the limits of "war" if any?
Hmmm, nice rhetorical point, Gian
I do, however, totally agree with you about the dangers of selling a "happy war". That is a rhetorical trick used by the same people who are never willing to take responsibility for their actions and, IMO, is of the same ethical standards as the war as video game.
I think we'll have to agree to disagree on this one. It's not that I disagree with you on the use of killing and destruction, I don't. What I disagree with is whether or not it "broke the back of the resistance". I would suggest that what it did was to establish, beyond an immediate doubt, that certain forms of "resistance" were currently "unacceptable" (and bloody dangerous to their advocates!). This doesn't change the likelihood of "resistance", it merely shifts the form of it.
Absolutely, and that has been a problem for a long time. It is also why war must be armed social science. Without an empirical model grounded in historical patterns, we are left with, as Max Forte would say, an "ideological septic tank" as the definer of "what will be". Maybe something along the lines of "Oh, let's just get rid of the nasty dictator and they will all become good republicans/democrats".....
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
Irregulars can control their loss rate by hiding in the population. Something the Luffwaffe - for exampe - couldn't do. Therefore, if you strategy is "kill more insurgents," your strategy is easily defeated.
Not sure why a Brigadier can't figure out that soldiers in Afghanistan can't kill insurgents who are hiding in Pakistan. I'm not that bright and it's obvious to me.
Nope on both.
Leaving the Luftwaffe out as an irrelevancy, the answer to your statement is that you have to weed them out with good intel; thus your strategy is not defeated; your job is simply made a lot harder harder and it will take longer. As we have seen...You're bright, so's he. How Pakistan is addressed and discussed is more subject to sensitivities in Commonwealth nations in general and in their Armed Forces in particular. You can safely bet large sums of money that any Coalition service member of any rank concerned with Afghanistan is painfully aware of that border and the R&R centers on the other side of it. They are also frustrated that they know where the nodes on the other side are but can do nothing except wait helplessly until the R&R is over and the bad guys head north and enter Afghanistan.Not sure why a Brigadier can't figure out that soldiers in Afghanistan can't kill insurgents who are hiding in Pakistan. I'm not that bright and it's obvious to me.
The best intel to weed out the bad guys comes from the people in the village or the neighborhood. They are not likely provide intel if they are pissed off at having been dissed by troops, had their fields ruined by a tank or having some of their relatives, friends and neighbors, near or distant, killed or maimed by an airstrike. Another disadvantage of the above listed events is their excitable teenage sons might go off and join a war band to get some revenge.
The advantage of COINdinistada is that it tends to highlight the disadvantages of making the locals mad at you.
It seems to me that part of what this discussion is all about is how you kill the ones who need to be done away with when the miscreants are near or among the people. Do you get them mostly with rifles and try to eschew air strikes, which I imagine can complicate things and will almost certainly result in more friendly casualties; or do you use the heavy weapons more, even thought that will most likely (given the recent history in Afghan, certainly) increase casualties amongst the locals?
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
The Luftwaffe was actually hiding very well. The aircraft were hidden close to the airfields, often in forests. Lots of CCD as well.
The Luftwaffe's problem was rather that its country (cities, industry) wasn't able to hide and got treatment as fair game by the Allies.
KenHe's correct -- so is the statement he refutes. The COIN idea is more than largesse. However the COIN idea does rely on largesse to more than a small extent. The real truth is somewhere in between. That, however, is not the problem with COIN efforts, that problem is in application of COIN principle by a third party and not the government that has an insurgency issue. There are those who firmly believe in the need for such intervention and there are others that strongly doubt such interventions are or can be effective.
I held that statement up as an example of putting a simple statement out and leaving it hanging as a 15 second sound bite.
The largesse the author refers to is targeted toward the population and shoring up their support for the government, not undermining the enemy's will to resist. Kill and capture is generally the best solution to the enemy.
If the problem is as you state it, then state the problem, not a simplistic war is war aphorism as Wilf calls it, tautolgy as he so often uses it.
Wilf,
When you actually go beyond the bumper sticker, you start to make sense as in:
TomWhat I dislike about "that competition" , is that it draws the population into the fight, when the purpose should be to exclude them!
If the population says, "we don't care about NATO, because they don't bother us. They only kill Talib," then I suggest that this is a basis on which to proceed. If NATO turn up once in a while and drop off food, do some medical care, and offer security advice, then the villagers have a chance to say "I know where the Talib are hiding."
Defeat, secure, then use civil affairs for "hearts & minds"
I agree with logic you first beat and kill the enemy, then you deal in hearts and minds in a major way for the civil affairs follow up. But I do not agree you can expect to do both simultaneously, that just creates "scrambled eggs" which is what we have been doing and results in blowing up new schools, housing, roads, bridges, etc. when we have not first and foremost defeated the terrorists and established long term security control...which security needs to be provided more by national forces and less and less by NATO/allied forces.The British in Malaya broke the back of the communist insurgency there not between 1952-1954 under the hearts and minds campaign of Templer, but with the use of brute military force combined with Briggs's resettlement program between 1949-1951. Once the insurgency's back was broken, Templer in charge was able to use persuasion of hearts and minds to further things along. This explanation is real and is truthful and has been put forward by a number of leading British scholars over the past few years, most recently in a special issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies that challenges the Malaya Coin Paradigm.
My two cents and I think all histories of warfare at all levels support my "view."
You have to do both at the same time. You can't defeat an insurgent force in a matter of months or even a year, so while you're chasing him around, you also have to be showing the populace that you/the government is going to make their life better. If, while you're chasing the insurgents around, people are living their life in ####, they aren't going to support you and they are going to be much more likely to buy into the insurgents' arguments.
And one of the biggest issues in winning their "hearts and minds", is to show them that once you come through and rid their town of the insurgent, you're not going to go off chasing him miles away, only to have the insurgents quietly return to slash the throats of those who come out in support of the government/COIN force.
Critically, the image of quickly thrown together schools with cheesy ribbon cutting ceremonies that then end up getting destroyed by a later wave of insurgency is not an example of doing both the right way, it is an example of doing both the wrong way. You kill the insurgent, you keep him away, and you focus on the sorts of stability things that really matter. Patrolling, building security forces, building trust in the security forces, getting people to open up because they believe you're not leaving tomorrow, and providing the basic services and infrastructure that people need to live until their government can begin providing the niceties.
Raw sewage in the streets or no power = insurgent support. No jobs or no income = guys planting IEDs to feed their families. No mechanism for justice = lawlessness = criminal income and assistance for the insurgency. All of these things if left untreated make your kinetic job more difficult.
So don't build the school if you have not done the kinetic things to drive the insurgents off in the first place, and still don't build it if you are not going to put forces in place to keep the populace safe. This comes into the resourcing problem mentioned earlier. You are chasing mercury if you do not have the forces to create persistent security.
Finally, while it would be nice if the military could focus on "purely military" things while others took care of the CA stuff, a reminder that the U.S. military has more bandsmen than the State Department has diplomats should tell us how the budget pie is, and will continue to be cut up. Until we are willing to give up some bandsmen (metaphorically speaking, and the we here is really Congress and the Executive branch budgeteers) then the military is going to have to be willing to do more than purely military tasks.
How bad processes replicate...
But -- as you say below, you have to do both in at least a semi-intelligent manner. Also, the populace isn't buying anything. They are being pulled in two directions and fear always trumps goodies.Partly correct. You'll win his grudging tolerance and polite responses. You aren't getting his heart or his mind and will get very little respect. And you're still a foreigner...And one of the biggest issues in winning their "hearts and minds", is to show them that once you come through and rid their town of the insurgent, you're not going to go off chasing him miles away, only to have the insurgents quietly return to slash the throats of those who come out in support of the government/COIN force.True but the three things you named are all civil functions. Military knowledge and capability in all three efforts is in extremely short supply. I do not see that changing. Ergo you're looking at Contractors or civil service folks -- who need a modicum of security before they appear. If you start too soon (see Iraq) you'll have three to five times as much effort and expense due to destruction of your premature efforts (see Iraq).Raw sewage in the streets or no power = insurgent support. No jobs or no income = guys planting IEDs to feed their families. No mechanism for justice = lawlessness = criminal income and assistance for the insurgency. All of these things if left untreated make your kinetic job more difficult.
All that can be fixed at a cost in time and effort if there is adequate security; if not, you're just sticking fingers in dikes.That repeats what you said above, I still agree.So don't build the school if you have not done the kinetic things to drive the insurgents off in the first place, and still don't build it if you are not going to put forces in place to keep the populace safe. This comes into the resourcing problem mentioned earlier. You are chasing mercury if you do not have the forces to create persistent security.
The issue is how do you do that if you do not have enough troops?
The obvious if unlikely to happen answer is get more troops. An alternative is to pre-empt these things before they get to the cluster stuck damage control level. We may or may not do that. Bad processes replicate because we lazily let them. We didn't learn a thing in Viet Nam because everybody cued on the wrong lessons; what really needed to be done was known but was put in the 'too hard' box by some seriously flawed Flag Officers who allowed that to happen. We appear likely to repeat that error if in a different direction if some have their way.Again true. Add to that the fact that such a realignment entails the breaking of Rice Bowls, will be resisted by Congress and many in DoD and it is possible that little change will occur. Yetl, there are some good moves afoot and some of them will appear in Afghanistan over the next few months, others will take longer. After all, we used to ride to work on Elephants, it took a while but we finally parked 'em...Finally, while it would be nice if the military could focus on "purely military" things while others took care of the CA stuff, a reminder that the U.S. military has more bandsmen than the State Department has diplomats should tell us how the budget pie is, and will continue to be cut up. Until we are willing to give up some bandsmen (metaphorically speaking, and the we here is really Congress and the Executive branch budgeteers) then the military is going to have to be willing to do more than purely military tasks.
A past problem was that most reacted with "We can do this, we'll make it work somehow. We'll just do it right next time." I've heard that bit too many times. As one of my pet Generals said "We 'can-do' ourselves to death." His Aide, a bright young Major, was fond of occasionally asking "What flavor of kool-Aid is popular in DC today?"
Fortunately, this time more people are more connected and more questions are being asked, many are beginning to say the conventional wisdom didn't work; we gotta change things. That is a good thing.
Make security not war
One of the early contentions in this thread was the premise that war is war. I wonder if we ought to be making security in Afghanistan, not war. Why?
Armies can make war in the classic sense - but what about making security? What role should we play in crisis management, building police, judiciary, prisons, a sense of security - not for ourselves in FOBs but for locals in village and mud hut. IMO these must be done in tandem with the kinetic action - no point in capturing Taliban if there is no system by which to arrest, try and imprison and vitally rehabilitate him - there isn't a day when the war ends and this process starts.
Yet security is deeply embedded in the 'minds' aspect of COIN - for both the local population [Reassure] and the insurgent [Deter to Prevent]. Death cannot be the only outcome of military intervention. Yet prisons, police and judiciary are the domain of the civilian component, key pillars of societal security. Making security must be a coherent and concurrent strategy alongside kinetic activity.
To illustrate this I've got an 'arty farty' quote from the play "A Man For All Seasons":
'William Roper: So, now you give the Devil the benefit of law!
Sir Thomas More: Yes! What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil?
William Roper: Yes, I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
Sir Thomas More: Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned 'round on you, where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? This country is planted thick with laws, from coast to coast, Man's laws, not God's! And if you cut them down, and you're just the man to do it, do you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake!'
My point being if we kick every door down to get at the Taliban (and most of those doors belong to locals), and do get our man, what use is it if we turn round and there is nothing to hand him to, if we have failed to create the security, in doing so failing to win the 'minds' of the local, are we not ultimately failing, simply creating a tactical gain but underpinning operational failure and ultimately strategic stalemate?
Apologies again for brief amateur foray into high literature - I'm going to lie down now....
While you're dozing, contemplate the fact that you're correct
You have just cited a superb and I think accurate rationale for why these types of operations are best avoided. That means identifying future problems early on, increasing the Corps Diplomatique locally, sending in a few SAS / SF and some Police Assisters on a low key basis and putting USAid or DFID to work BEFORE one needs to send the Army in. Thus hopefully to preclude having to do so.
Once you send in the Armies, the potential for escalation is significant, that for war almost assured. Armies break things. If they do that well (and they are worthless if they do not), they'll almost certainly do the foreign internal development thing poorly for a number of practical reasons.
Armies need to be trained to and able to do that mission, no question -- and the US was quite remiss in not being so prepared eight years ago and that has cost us -- but to expect more than a marginal performance and problem free execution from any decent Armies in such missions is deluded.
So you're spot on.
Now to get the Politicians aligned...
That's okay, George, you don't have to bribe me...
Even without your two cents, my history of warfare totally corroborates your views.
Good Post.
The pat American solution of throwing money at a problem has led us astray in Foreign Policy and in the COIN arena. I have watched a tremendous amount of waste as our gifts and aid are misused for things not intended, unused due to being totally inappropriate, trashed as not understood or just destroyed because the bad guys could do so. Total security is not required before embarking on projects -- but you better be above 50% surety before you pass out more than food, health and comfort aid.
We also need to be really careful to whom we give even that...
Clear and cool couple of hundred miles south of you...
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