More killing. Less good deeds

[Gian P Gentile]

"Hearts and Minds" has always been a name, a label, a code applied in these kinds of small wars to ostensibly describe what folks wanted other folks to think were actually happening on the ground, and afterwards, what they wanted others to think did happen.

The British in Malaya broke the back of the communist insurgency there not between 1952-1954 under the hearts and minds campaign of Templer, but with the use of brute military force combined with Briggs's resettlement program between 1949-1951. Once the insurgency's back was broken, Templer in charge was able to use persuasion of hearts and minds to further things along. This explanation is real and is truthful and has been put forward by a number of leading British scholars over the past few years, most recently in a special issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies that challenges the Malaya Coin Paradigm.

Moreover, one can see the same thing being done by such high priests of population centric Coin like Gallieni and Lyautey in Madagascar and Morocco respectively. Lyautey especially would use the language of "peaceful penetration," of progressive development to better people's lives in order to soothe domestic tensions in France over imperial action and internal issues with the French Army. But again, these hearts and minds techniques were ostensible; actually Lyautey crushed resistance in Morocco by the more time honored process used by the French Army in that region: the Razzia. Historian Doug Porch's excellent campaign study of Lyautey in Morocco shows this to be the case.

Wilf is right, war is war, it is not "armed social science," and real war, not happy war sold through clever-speak of "hearts and minds" language involves killing and death. And in actuality the historical models that we use to prop up this ostensible notion of "hearts and minds" were won through killing and destruction that broke the back of the resistance.

It is time to get a clear view of what we think we are trying to do in places like Astan.

[Tom Odom]

"Hearts and Minds" has always been a name, a label, a code applied in these kinds of small wars to ostensibly describe what folks wanted other folks to think were actually happening on the ground, and afterwards, what they wanted others to think did happen.

Wilf is right, war is war, it is not "armed social science," and real war, not happy war sold through clever-speak of "hearts and minds" language involves killing and death. And in actuality the historical models that we use to prop up this ostensible notion of "hearts and minds" were won through killing and destruction that broke the back of the resistance.

It is time to get a clear view of what we think we are trying to do in places like Astan.

And neither are you, Gian. You both are offering reductionist viewpoints poised against a red herring reductionist view.

I agree that we need a clear view of Afghanistan. War is war is not a good start.

Tom

[J Wolfsberger]

Wilf, Gian, are you two really advocating that we scrap any attempt to win the support of the populace and just engage in a “war is war” killing spree? In which case we tell the AF to unleash the B-1s and -2s to bomb A’stan until the rubble is bouncing in a depopulated wasteland.

I doubt that’s your position, but it reads that way.

From the article,

A hearts-and-minds approach is predicated on the proposition that we foreign, Western, culturally Christian, invaders can persuade a sizeable proportion of the Pashtun population to cut themselves off from their cultural roots; subject themselves to an equally foreign and incomprehensible form of government resting largely on the customs of the tribes of pre-Roman Germany; and abandon their cultural birthright of unrivalled hegemony over “Pashtunistan”. To do this we offer some new buildings, some cash and more reliable electricity—none of which have been important to them so far in their history.[8] Attendant on these “inducements” of course is the removal of their ability to generate cash by farming poppies and the destruction of cultural mores—the subjection of women and the application of traditional law for example—that define them as a cultural group.

Nice straw man. Not “hearts and minds” as I’ve ever understood the concept. It is, however, a reasonably accurate summary of “nation building.” Let’s make that distinction, and then we can all agree that “nation building” is, indeed, a load of crap.

We can also discuss what "hearts and minds" is, or should be, in the context of developing an effective strategy for ending the violence and turning the country over to its own people, with their own government rooted in their own cultural traditions and norms.

In that context, Wilf is dead on about killing the right people. Gian is dead on in his observation about "happy war sold through clever-speak of "hearts and minds" language." But I think that we'd better keep in mind that Wilf also pointed out that killing the wrong people is counterproductive, and that our goals in places like A'stan and Iraq should be:

1. Stop the violence.
2. Turn the country back over to its own people.
3. Leave.

I don't see that happening without, at least, the tacit support of the population. I don't see that minimal level of support emerging unless we address the concerns of the population, beginning with the safety of "me and mine," while we're engaged in killing the right people.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, Gian, are you two really advocating that we scrap any attempt to win the support of the populace and just engage in a “war is war” killing spree?

No. That is no what, or I guess Gian is saying. To whit...

In that context, Wilf is dead on about killing the right people. Gian is dead on in his observation about "happy war sold through clever-speak of "hearts and minds" language." But I think that we'd better keep in mind that Wilf also pointed out that killing the wrong people is counterproductive, and that our goals in places like A'stan and Iraq should be:

1. Stop the violence.
2. Turn the country back over to its own people.
3. Leave.

That is why I am coming from.
Stopping the violence means stopping the violent people.
Build all the schools, hospitals and community centres, once you have a secure environment and THEY can maintain it.

[Entropy]

The title of is very familiar one: "How to Win in Afghanistan." What is "win?"

From the conclusion:

In Afghanistan a strategy focusing on the annihilation of Taliban power is the only way to achieve broad political progress. Until that is done, Afghan institutions; political, bureaucratic, police and military, will be denied the time and space they need to achieve a robust maturity. There will be a time when reconstruction and other aid will begin to produce dividends and that time will be marked by the establishment of security which, in Afghanistan, requires the removal of the insurgent and the extension of the coercive authority of the Afghan state into Pashtun areas. Until then NATO must be prepared to act as the proxy for the Afghan state in establishing control over the Pashtun population.

I think we need to consider the possibility that we are rearranging deck chairs and that no operational strategy (annihilation of the Taliban, pop-centric COIN or whatever) will achieve success given the various limitations on what we can do. While there are some compelling arguments in the piece, I don't see annihilation of the Taliban as practically achievable. For many of the same reasons, I don't think the pop-centric COIN can "win" at the end. There are several reasons, but the main problem is Pakistan. One can't annihilate the Taliban nor protect the population when the enemy has a safe haven - a safe haven that happens to be in a country that, for its own reasons, does not wish to see a strong, independent Afghan state. It's also a country where we cannot operate openly and the government has both limited ability and desire to establish the kind of control over both territory and resources necessary to dismantle the safe-haven.

The author makes several good points about "exhaustion" but the problem I see is that with a safe-haven, exhaustion works against an annihilation strategy as well.

IMO our problems with Afghanistan rest at the policy level where the objectives are murky and appear to change with the winds. The result is that those engaging in debates on operational strategy for Afghanistan often operate under differing sets of assumptions. Until things at the policy level become coherent I don't think these debates, nor the war itself, are going to go anywhere.

[pjmunson]

was probably better said here:

And neither are you, Gian. You both are offering reductionist viewpoints poised against a red herring reductionist view.

I agree that we need a clear view of Afghanistan. War is war is not a good start.

Tom

The argument was framed in ways that seemingly reject a large body of thought and practice with some relatively smug comments that are equally simplistic and reductionist as that accused of the other camp:
""COIN-oil" folks"

Gian Gentile's post acknowledges that both killing and "hearts and minds" were used, but then states: "war is war, it is not "armed social science," and real war, not happy war sold through clever-speak of "hearts and minds" language involves killing and death. And in actuality the historical models that we use to prop up this ostensible notion of "hearts and minds" were won through killing and destruction that broke the back of the resistance." Again, his own post shows that it is not either-or, but he ends with a statement that makes it seem like "hearts and minds" is a crock. I'd agree that imagining that you can win a war through hearts and minds alone is insane, but who is really arguing that you can fight COIN by hearts and minds alone?

The article rejects hearts and minds as a pipe dream: "A hearts-and-minds approach is predicated on the proposition that we foreign, Western, culturally Christian, invaders can persuade a sizeable proportion of the Pashtun population to cut themselves off from their cultural roots; subject themselves to an equally foreign and incomprehensible form of government resting largely on the customs of the tribes of pre-Roman Germany; and abandon their cultural birthright of unrivalled hegemony over “Pashtunistan”. To do this we offer some new buildings, some cash and more reliable electricity—none of which have been important to them so far in their history." This is a strawman argument. The hearts and minds he describes is of course a failing proposition. Yet, securing the population by killing, then staying, and helping to rebuild, while working to show why it is good to have you around is a good "hearts and minds" campaign. You aren't going to get Pashtuns to be eager "little Americans" but you can show them why it is worth their while to have you around.

At the end, I guess I just don't understand who is advocating a purely hearts and minds approach that doesn't advocate killing the insurgents to secure the population as an integral and primary goal. Unless there are large bodies of military leaders and policymakers that think you can "win" without killing by "winning hearts and minds", it seems that Kelley's argument is framed against a straw man. And I'd also like to know what his vision of winning is since he labels his article as "How to Win in Afghanistan."

To me, it is disturbing that such a reductionist argument is still ongoing 8 years into this fight. I would think that people would be arguing more about details rather than whether "hearts-and-minds" snake oil salesmen or people properly focused on killing and war as war has been for 3000 years are right. You need both and need to properly integrate all of your means and that is where the discussion should be: integration and synergy of the different means and ways.

[Ken White]

Gian Gentile's post acknowledges that both killing and "hearts and minds" were used, but then states: "war is war, it is not "armed social science,"...but who is really arguing that you can fight COIN by hearts and minds alone?

No one here, really, not even Gian. He appears here from time to time and gets published in the Op-Ed pages of the NYT and other papers and has articles in the Armed Forces Journal among others. You will see occasional references to the 'Gentile-Nagl' due to the fact the Gian is Mr. Anti-COIN to the point of vehemence. Armor guy, had a Cav Squadron in I-rak , historian and now teaches that at West Point. His concern is that the Army overemphasizes 'the new COIN' (and as an active practitioner of the old COIN, it is new in many respects, not all improvements) to the detriment of it's primary mission which is war fighting. I tend to agree with him on all counts -- COIN elements are required; the Army should not go overboard as they are prone to do on the new COIN and so on. He's more vocal but then I'm shy and retiring.

That position is of course not shared with Dr. LTC Retired John Nagl, the author of "Eating Soup With A Knife." They've had some discussions back an forth here.

Neither Gian not I or any of the other 'war is war' folks who comment here deny there is a place for what is called COIN -- though it is really not that -- techniques. What we do say is that if you're committing Armed Forces to an effort there is or will be a war of some sort. War is war, unchanging but warfare is constantly mutating and shifting and COIN like TTP may be needed and the force must be able to apply them but don't lose sight of the larger effort -- preparation for the full spectrum of warfare.

Some say that COIN is the graduate level of warfare; I once contended that it is not -- it's like middle school with all the envy, cliques, in and out people and things, jealousies, backbiting and more. Stability operations can be psychologically demanding but they are not as challenging as major combat operations to any part of the force by several orders of magnitude. Gian agreed with that, John Nagl probably would not.

Wilf, BTW, is a consultant and author but he's also British -- when he was serving (during the Reign of George III...), they had a civil service that would fall in on any COIN effort and take care of the civil side leaving the Army to strictly military tasks -- as directed by said Civilians. Very different system. His 'war is war' mantra is 'cause he's a Clauswitz fan. That's all background. I knew all that and you didn't; it may or may not make any difference to your perceptions. Terribly long way of saying you can't tell the players without a program...

The article rejects hearts and minds as a pipe dream...Germany; and abandon their cultural birthright of unrivalled hegemony over “Pashtunistan”...You aren't going to get Pashtuns to be eager "little Americans" but you can show them why it is worth their while to have you around.

Only if you can convince them you can keep the Talibs and all the other bad guys from visiting the villages in the night will they believe you are worthwhile -- and as soon as you do that, they'll want you gone. Afghans are not Arabs; they share some cultural similarities but they don't like the Ferenghee a bit better. I doubt that NATO et.al. will ever have enough troops to do that. So the 'COIN' approach cannot be fully implemented in Afghanistan and we'll have a hybrid op.

At the end, I guess I just don't understand who is advocating a purely hearts and minds approach that doesn't advocate killing the insurgents to secure the population as an integral and primary goal.

No one to my knowledge; that's not the issue -- the issue is future strategy and force structure. Does the Army follow the Corps and go with some units tailored for stability ops? Does it adjust TOEs to provide units tailored for such ops. Brother Nagl is the President of CNAS and is presumed to have clout in high places; he and other think that's the way to go. Gian, me, others do not agree.

And I'd also like to know what his vision of winning is since he labels his article as "How to Win in Afghanistan."

I thought he was pretty clear:
...................
""The approaches taken to countering insurgencies in Malaya, Vietnam, Northern Ireland and Iraq all contain some aspects that are transferable to Afghanistan but most are *. The counter-insurgency in Afghanistan is more intractable than any of these others.[* Believe a 'not' was omitted here / kw]

In Afghanistan a strategy focusing on the annihilation of Taliban power is the only way to achieve broad political progress...Until then NATO must be prepared to act as the proxy for the Afghan state in establishing control over the Pashtun population.

Without security there is nothing.""(all emphasis added /kw)
...................
My take on that is that he says more whittling down of the Taliban (and friends) or removal in some of way their ability to affect localities is required before the rebuilding can commence. My sensing from friends and all open sources is that is very much correct. Afghanistan is not an insurgency though there are aspects of one in place. It's a war with COIN like digressions.

To me, it is disturbing that such a reductionist argument is still ongoing 8 years into this fight.

Me too. Though I'm not sure it's reductionist -- it is an effort to make sense out of a very chaotic situation that has been exacerbated over a period of eight years -- or, actually, over a period of eight or more one year or less tours with a number of people going in different directions and no unity of command.

I would think that people would be arguing more about details rather than whether "hearts-and-minds" snake oil salesmen or people properly focused on killing and war as war has been for 3000 years are right. You need both and need to properly integrate all of your means and that is where the discussion should be: integration and synergy of the different means and ways.

True. That particular argument is not directed at Afghanistan other than peripherally. That argument is principally directed at FUTURE US Government policy, strategies and direction plus future (now in development) doctrine and force structure...

Afghanistan is on auto pilot with a coalescing mix of TTP -- no one's devoting much effort to it because what will happen there is pretty well locked in for the next three plus years.

It is simply being used as a How Not To Do It Training Aid by people on both sides of the very real doctrinal divide to point out their ideas for 2020. It's a big fight, it's real and has power players on both sides.

Sorry for the delay, two finger typist, sorry for the length, didn't want to leave much out; obviously discard all you think irrelevant.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, BTW, is a consultant and author but he's also British -- when he was serving (during the Reign of George III...), they had a civil service that would fall in on any COIN effort and take care of the civil side leaving the Army to strictly military tasks -- as directed by said Civilians. Very different system. His 'war is war' mantra is 'cause he's a Clauswitz fan. That's all background. I knew all that and you didn't; it may or may not make any difference to your perceptions. Terribly long way of saying you can't tell the players without a program...

"For those of you watching in black and white, Wilf is in the red-shorts"

Thanks, Ken. Yes, I am a product of my environment, and thanks to nuances of language, style and just plain good looks, I may not be as well understood, as I would hope. Let me clarify:

1. War is War. Read Clausewitz or Thucydides. Irregular Warfare against an insurgent, rebel, criminal, partisan or separatist relies on same basic dynamics of any war. In order to win, you have to break the enemies will to endure.
2. Breaking his will should be done by making him fear for his life or freedom.

The "how" of breaking the will (as opposed to why -cos it's a war!) has to done in a way that does not create popular support for the enemy, because popular support creates benefits for him. - the same way it does for some criminals.
You want to make the population as hostile (or neutral) as possible, primarily to enable the gathering of intelligence so as you can target the enemy. Try looking for Robin Hood in a village full of "Maid Marrions" (actually the biggest skank in Nottingham, but that's another story.)

The basis of a competition that says,
"If you support us (Govt.) we will make you safe, and better your life."
The insurgent says,
"Support us or we will kill you. They can never make you safe. We have friends living here, we know all about you, and we will remember who our friends and enemies were a 1,000 years from now."

What I dislike about "that competition" , is that it draws the population into the fight, when the purpose should be to exclude them!

If the population says, "we don't care about NATO, because they don't bother us. They only kill Talib," then I suggest that this is a basis on which to proceed. If NATO turn up once in a while and drop off food, do some medical care, and offer security advice, then the villagers have a chance to say "I know where the Talib are hiding."

.... of course the villagers may just hate you because of who you are, and support the Talib because they are family. Hearts and Minds will not help then anyway.

Gian, Ken and I are not the "Slay them all. God will see the souls of his own," brigade.

[pjmunson]

War is War. Read Clausewitz or Thucydides. Irregular Warfare against an insurgent, rebel, criminal, partisan or separatist relies on same basic dynamics of any war. In order to win, you have to break the enemies will to endure.[*]Breaking his will should be done by making him fear for his life or freedom.

I have read Clauzewitz and Thucydides and a few others. Clausewitz talks about absolute wars, limited wars, and wars among the people and acknowledges that the dynamic of war changes with its level of intensity and killing/destruction of the enemy or his will cannot always be fully achieved in limited wars. Many would argue that the crux of an asymmetric war (see Mack's "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars") is that they are fighting an unlimited war while we are fighting a limited one. In any case, as your ability to find, fix, and destroy the enemy is limited by internal and external restraints, the value of the political element rises. Even if we get much better at targeting insurgents, we won't be able to kill them completely out of business if we are making insurgents as quickly as we kill them due to ignoring the political element. I don't think this is an anti-Clausewitzian view. War is war in that the brutal nature of war and the elements that factor into it are unchanging. However, the way that war is used to attain one's political ends and the value of the various factors in that war change with the type of war being fought. I also like Delbruck's extension of Clausewitz's thoughts on limited versus absolute war being wars of exhaustion or annihilation. We cannot annihilate the Taliban in the same way that we could annihilate a conventional foe that came out to play.

[William F. Owen]

Many would argue that the crux of an asymmetric war (see Mack's "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars") is that they are fighting an unlimited war while we are fighting a limited one. In any case, as your ability to find, fix, and destroy the enemy is limited by internal and external restraints, the value of the political element rises. Even if we get much better at targeting insurgents, we won't be able to kill them completely out of business if we are making insurgents as quickly as we kill them due to ignoring the political element.

...but the vast majority of small wars have been won this way. That is inflicting so much pain on the enemy that he has given up military means. That is the limit of military power.

Those who say "Ahh... but the bad guys won by negotiation." Wallah! As long as the military has forced him to seek a resolution by peaceful means, then that is good enough. Military did it's job.

If what all this is really saying is that the US/NATO is not prepared to resource a military campaign properly and does not have the political will to support it, then by all means seek some other, less effective, form of resolution. Essentially the enemy has already broken our political will to endure, by making us under resource the war.

[marct]

Hi Gian,

Looks like it's time for a point by point deconstruction !

Wilf is right, war is war, it is not "armed social science,"

"War is war" is a tautology of the form X = X. It is also a logical fallacy that confuses the sign with the signified in that

if killing is involved, and
war is killing, therefore
this is war

By that logic, I would argue that the US is engaged in an ongoing COIN campaign in LA - one, I would note, that they appear to be loosing .

Second point, war is armed social science if, by social science, we mean an empirically grounded, predictive model of how a society operates in certain situations. The very concept of State-on-State, conventional warfare governed by "Laws" or "Rules" (e.g. Geneva Conventions, etc.) is predicated on the existence of a particular model that is both a) comprehensible to all involved and b) contains win, lose and draw positions (i.e. recognized end states in a recognized social process).

Taking the two together, "war is war" and "war is not armed social science", leaves us with a Hobbesian model of a war of all against all. If this is the case, and I would not argue that it has been at some times, then what are the limits of "war" if any?

and real war, not happy war sold through clever-speak of "hearts and minds" language involves killing and death.

Hmmm, nice rhetorical point, Gian . Yes, "real war" involves killing and death but let me also point out that all life involves death and all societies have killing; it is a matter of degree as to how much killing is acceptable in a society before it is called "war".

I do, however, totally agree with you about the dangers of selling a "happy war". That is a rhetorical trick used by the same people who are never willing to take responsibility for their actions and, IMO, is of the same ethical standards as the war as video game.

And in actuality the historical models that we use to prop up this ostensible notion of "hearts and minds" were won through killing and destruction that broke the back of the resistance.

I think we'll have to agree to disagree on this one. It's not that I disagree with you on the use of killing and destruction, I don't. What I disagree with is whether or not it "broke the back of the resistance". I would suggest that what it did was to establish, beyond an immediate doubt, that certain forms of "resistance" were currently "unacceptable" (and bloody dangerous to their advocates!). This doesn't change the likelihood of "resistance", it merely shifts the form of it.

It is time to get a clear view of what we think we are trying to do in places like Astan.

Absolutely, and that has been a problem for a long time. It is also why war must be armed social science. Without an empirical model grounded in historical patterns, we are left with, as Max Forte would say, an "ideological septic tank" as the definer of "what will be". Maybe something along the lines of "Oh, let's just get rid of the nasty dictator and they will all become good republicans/democrats".....

[William F. Owen]

"War is war" is a tautology of the form X = X. It is also a logical fallacy that confuses the sign with the signified in that [INDENT]if killing is involved, and
war is killing, therefore
this is war

.... but that is not what "War is War," has ever aimed to impart.
War is war is an aphorism that correctly observes that that war has an enduring and fundamental nature, that has not changed over time. Thucydides and Clausewitz wrote about it, and did so usefully and accurately.

As Clausewitz, Foch and many others have said, "beware the people who tell you that you can have war without killing."

If that is wrong, then please show me how?

That is also why war must be armed social science.

How can a social science be aimed primarily at breaking the will of the enemy?

Putting in place all the humanitarian and social programs aimed at the civilian population, probably is social science, but that it does not break the enemies will to endure, in the same way killing him does. No social science has ever been founded on telling someone "do what we tell you to improve your life or we will kill you."

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

.... but that is not what "War is War," has ever aimed to impart.
War is war is an aphorism that correctly observes that that war has an enduring and fundamental nature, that has not changed over time. Thucydides and Clausewitz wrote about it, and did so usefully and accurately.

As an aphorism, I don't have a problem with it. Unfortunately, too many people interpret it not as an aphorism but as a fundamental (axiomatic) "Truth" in the logical sense. I do disagree that it has a fundamental "nature" (I'm not really that much into Platonic essentialism), but I certainly agree that it does have fundamental boundary conditions (although they vary in time, space and culture).

As Clausewitz, Foch and many others have said, "beware the people who tell you that you can have war without killing."

I agree, although I would have phrased it slightly differently. I can conceive of such a war being fought but, to the best of my knowledge, it never has been. As far as the aim of that warning, however, I totally agree - it is right up there with Pie in the Sky.

How can a social science be aimed primarily at breaking the will of the enemy?

Well, a "science" is a body of empirical regularities that has been abstracted into formulas of some type. Those regularities are what you termed its "nature". War is a social activity and it is aimed at social opponents (i.e. a society rather than an individual). Social science is the sub-branch of science that studies regularities in human societies and the individuals who compose them. How can you study war without studying social science?

Having said that, I never said that there was a specific social science aimed primarily at breaking the will of the enemy; although PSYOPs fits the bill as a sub-discipline of both psychology and communications. As a note, it is a major mistake to equate "social science" with "social work" - the two are by no means synonymous .

Putting in place all the humanitarian and social programs aimed at the civilian population, probably is social science, but that it does not break the enemies will to endure, in the same way killing him does.

Wilf, that's social work or development work - it's a sub-set of social science. You're also switching levels of analysis again. I agree, humanitarian and social programs may not break an enemies will. If you kill him by itself, however, you create new enemies unless you take a delenda Cartago est tactic which, at the moment, is improbable in the extreme.

No social science has ever been founded on telling someone "do what we tell you to improve your life or we will kill you."

Hmmm, try Russian psychology during the 1930's - 1950's or modern theories of governance .

[Ken White]

Tom said:

"Hearts-and-minds is also a strategy of exhaustion but one in which the enemy’s will to resist is undermined by largesse. "

Makes for a snappy read as in the 15 second sound bite to writing; does not reflect reality or COIN.

He's correct -- so is the statement he refutes. The COIN idea is more than largesse. However the COIN idea does rely on largesse to more than a small extent. The real truth is somewhere in between. That, however, is not the problem with COIN efforts, that problem is in application of COIN principle by a third party and not the government that has an insurgency issue. There are those who firmly believe in the need for such intervention and there are others that strongly doubt such interventions are or can be effective.

Those are two schools of thought. We are all exemplars of our inner selves. My suspicion is that if we could realistically categorize humans as pro-COIN or con-COIN, a heavy majority would be the latter and while an armed force can direct people to do things they do not agree with, the performance of people is enhanced when they believe in what they are doing and degraded if they do not believe. The basic problem is that the efficacy of COIN is in significant dispute; the rationale for its conduct is in dispute and the logic and / or morality of third party intervention is questioned by some.

This creates spotty performance which can exacerbate rather than solve the insurgency issue. That fact needs to be recognized.

I agree that we need a clear view of Afghanistan. War is war is not a good start.

Maybe. War is war. That, as Wilf and Marc say, an aphorism and not an immutable fact -- but we need to recognize Afghanistan is a war; it is not a COIN operation. As was Iraq, it is more complex than that. In fact Afghanistan is far more complex and a far tougher nut than is Iraq. In any event, we are committed to a course in Afghanistan that entails the use of some COIN principles, no question.

kingo1RTR summarizes the current problem thusly:

We must have the Afghan's 'hearts and minds' at the forefront of what we do if we are ever going see Afghanistan as a stable state that represents their culture and their way.

I suspect that is right at this point. We have started on a course and we have an obligation IMO to finish it reasonably successfully. He's correct that military victory is not on the agenda -- never was -- but an acceptable outcome can be obtained.

That is a problem with any COIN action, that's the best that can be hoped for in this era, an acceptable outcome.

The problem is that with an intervention, the slices of acceptability are smaller due to more players -- and the dominant player's "acceptable" may not coincide at all well with the goals and desires of the others -- particularly those who live in the nation that the dominant player can leave. Thus, that inclines the dominant player to go for a more warlike effort -- if his armed forces are involved -- than might the government with the insurgency.

Gian sums it up really well:

It is time to get a clear view of what we think we are trying to do in places like Astan.

We are committed to an effort in Afghanistan. We should finish what we started.

Gian correctly addresses the broader issue for the future. What we should also do is determine whether this intervention stuff in other nations is advisable. We should then prepare to try to avoid such interventions OR be better prepared to perform them.

Either way, circumstances may dictate that we have no choice and must intervene -- but we need to insure that before we do, we sort out the roles and missions, understand the costs and that the armed forces are trained to perform the military functions and understand what those functions entail while the civil side of government is prepared and trained to undertake its responsibilities at the earliest opportunity.

Both J Wolfsberger and Entropy contribute very valid comments on the issue of Afghanistan. Points that should've been considered eight years ago -- and whose probable answers were known eight years ago...

marct:

...then what are the limits of "war" if any?

Good question. I suspect the answer is that "You ain't seen nothin' yet." As my Mother used to say, it'll probably get worse before it gets better; a statement applicable both to Afghanistan and to war in general...

He then really wraps it up very neatly:

... It's not that I disagree with you on the use of killing and destruction, I don't. What I disagree with is whether or not it "broke the back of the resistance". I would suggest that what it did was to establish, beyond an immediate doubt, that certain forms of "resistance" were currently "unacceptable" (and bloody dangerous to their advocates!). This doesn't change the likelihood of "resistance", it merely shifts the form of it.

And that is the problem with COIN...

It's an ill advised effort to solve problems that are better solved in other ways. If you commit Armed Forces to such an effort, you are placing an instrument of war in position to start and / or exacerbate a war and the probability is that it will not do that well. That can only end badly or, at best, with an acceptable outcome.

Acceptable to whom and for how long...

[kingo1rtr]

Ken

Thats a very taut and accurate summary of the debate to date. I'll start reading these strings from the bottom in future!

[jcustis]

My suspicion is that if we could realistically categorize humans as pro-COIN or con-COIN, a heavy majority would be the latter and while an armed force can direct people to do things they do not agree with, the performance of people is enhanced when they believe in what they are doing and degraded if they do not believe. The basic problem is that the efficacy of COIN is in significant dispute; the rationale for its conduct is in dispute and the logic and / or morality of third party intervention is questioned by some.

As usual, Ken is right on point with this view, and how prevalent it can be. Like my pops says, "Don't you go and take any chances with those people, shoot first and ask questions later."

And as I often feel the tingling on the back of my neck when sitting through ROE training/review with troops, Better to be judged by twelve than carried by six, is not only uttered often under their breath, I can sense it on the mind of a majority of them. That has extended to several officers and senior SNCOs, and when we fail to get those folks on board, we are failing miserably.

Edited to add: Wilf, if your view is indeed what you claim it is, after getting a stir from folks, then simply re-title this thread as: "More killing of the right folks first...then do good deeds."

[Uboat509]

From where I'm sitting, a lot of this debate seems to buried in semantics. The term "Hearts and Minds" is at the forefront of course. People who have worked in these environment naturally aren't going to like that term, at least if it meant literally. It's a really poorly chosen phrase. Of course we are never going to win the hearts and minds of any significant segment of the population. If I believed that that was really our goal, I would be skeptical too. But, as LTC Kilcullen has noted "hearts and Minds" isn't about making them like us, it's about convincing them that it is in their best interests to side with us, or at least not with our enemies.

Another problem seems to be the idea that COIN proponents are saying that we can achieve our acceptable outcome without killing. Well, of course that is ridiculous. Of course you will have to kill some bad guys to achieve the acceptable outcome. We will also have to teach the host nation how to kill bad guys. Saying otherwise would be naive. The thing is, I have never heard a COIN proponent say that we can achieve an acceptable out come with out killing. The ones that I have heard have only said that we cannot kill our way to victory and the killing the enemy should not be our main focus.

Now I am just an enlisted swine. I don't have any extra letters after my name nor have I attended any of the cool military schools that teach all about such things. I haven't read Clausewitz or Jomani or any other military philosopher/theorist. I have never been to any "Symposium" on COIN or anything else. I have only my own experiences and views to draw from but here is my take, for whatever it's worth, on the fight we face now, whether you choose to call it COIN or irregular war or "Overseas Contingency Operations," whatever the label Du jur is currently. Wilf and others maintain, that we should focus on killing the enemy first and then, once the insurgency has been defeated, start doing things to help the populace (the so-called hearts and minds stuff) in order, I presume, to reduce the likelihood that the insurgency will restart. My experience tells me that if we don't do both things simultaneously then we will never get to the point that we can transition to the other. It's pretty obvious what would happen if we just did the "hearts and minds" stuff without also killing bad guys, that's why I haven't heard anyone advocate that. On the other hand, if you just focus on killing bad guys and don't do the "hearts and minds" stuff, you will run out of national will to fight before they run out of bad guys. The insurgents do not have a standing army to be defeated. They have an ideology (actually a series of ideologies, there is more than one insurgency going on. But that doesn't change the central point). That ideology is what attracts people to support and/or fight for them. Now part of the attractiveness of that ideology is derived from the things that the host nation government does or fails to do (as Bob's World has pointed out) and part is derived from what we do or fail to do. If we do nothing but focus on killing the enemy then we are doing little reduce the attractiveness of the insurgent ideology. So, we keep killing bad guys and members of the populous keep joining and it ends up being a huge game of Whack-a-Mole that we (as in the American/Allied people) will ultimately lose our taste for and leave. If, on the other hand, we can push the host nation government to do its job, while we continue to do things that make the insurgent ideology less attractive (the infamous "hearts and minds" stuff) then our kinetic operations will have a better chance of creating the security we need to achieve our acceptable outcome.

Now some maintain that by focusing on the kinetic fight we are reducing the attractiveness of the insurgent ideology. After all, joining an insurgency which has a good chance of ending in your death is irrational, right? Unfortunately, in my experience, rationality is not necessarily an inborn trait in humans. If you only have one tool, the stick OR the carrot, you will end up missing large parts of the population and you may even have counter-productive results. Again, I have not heard many people advocating a "carrot only" approach, not anyone credible anyway. The "stick only" approach has many more supporters. They believe that by making it so dangerous to support the insurgency that they can break the will of the people to support the insurgency. Now, I am no historian by any means, but I can think of several historical examples where this type of thinking failed. In WWII the Germans executed whole towns of people in both fronts in order to crush the insurgency but were never able to do so. The Germans all but leveled London and the Allies did level several German and Japanese cities but neither succeeded in breaking the will of the other's populous. Even the commonly held belief that Hiroshima and Nagasaki broke the will of the Japanese people is, as I understand it, false. Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not break the will of the Japanese people, rather it broke the will of a Japanese person, the Emperor. As I understand it, if he had ordered the Japanese to continue fighting to the last, they would have.

That, in a nut shell, is my decidedly non-scholarly, and somewhat rambling take on the COIN vs. Kinetic debate.

SFC W

[MikeF]

By that logic, I would argue that the US is engaged in an ongoing COIN campaign in LA - one, I would note, that they appear to be loosing .

Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (JP 1-02).

Using the definitions of COIN found in JP 1-02 and FM 3-24, COIN is an action that a government takes to quell internal rebellion or strife. Along those lines, the only COIN that the US can accomplish is within our internal borders. When we intervene in another countries internal affairs, the matter is inherently difficult as we must pick a side. IMO, this distinction is important, and our failure to address the issue only muddies the waters. In effect, when we intervene, we are picking a side. In Iraq, we back the Shia-heavy government over the Sunnis. In Afghanistan, we back the Karzai-heavy government over the Taliban. Both governments were put in place through elections, and we are hoping that these governments will eventually stabalize internal strife AND share our collective national security interests.

Uboat suggests that those who rebel against the host governments do so out of ideology.

They have an ideology (actually a series of ideologies, there is more than one insurgency going on. But that doesn't change the central point). That ideology is what attracts people to support and/or fight for them.

. In some cases, particularly AQ, I believe he is correct. However, many other insurgents are simply fighting over an internal power struggle. In Iraq, the majority of Sunnis refused to vote during the last election, and they simply are not willing to accept a Shia government. Moreover, many Shia groups within the government view their newfound power as payback time for years of repression and neglect during Saddam's Baath party rule.

Along these lines, I concur with Tom's comments in other threads as far as the current state of Iraq goes. For a time, we defeated AQI and Shia extremist groups, we stabilized the country, we continue to help build the Iraqi Security Forces, and we attempting to afford the Iraqis the opportunity to elect a permanent government. But how did we get here? I would suggest that this is where Wilf, COL Gentile, and Ken's points come in.

1. Stop the violence.
2. Turn the country back over to its own people.
3. Leave.

Stopping the violence in Iraq was not simply population centric. Yes, in Baghdad, we secured the populace through urban reconstruction and secure neighborhoods, but in many other areas, we secured through blunt force trauma...i.e. killing bad guys.Rank amateur contends that

Irregulars can control their loss rate by hiding in the population. Something the Luffwaffe - for exampe - couldn't do. Therefore, if you strategy is "kill more insurgents," your strategy is easily defeated.

I disagree. This statement assumes that one cannot seperate the insurgent from the populace.

So how do you find the enemy and kill him? Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Human Collection, and Targeting. As a company commander,
60-70% of ALL operations were devoted to intelligence collection. This allowed us to find the enemy. Next, we you find him, you attempt to persuade him to either join the government or settle his grievances on the political level. If he is willing, fine. If not, then you must attack and destroy him. At this point in the game, it is really that simple. Otherwise, the conflict is protracted and civilian casualties continue to soar.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, many General Purpose Forces (GPF) are transitioning to Security Force Assistance (SFA). In another time, these actions were known as Foreign Internal Defense (FID). In theory, Coalition Forces will mentor, train, and combat advise Security Forces. A conversation with several NCO's deploying on that mission disturbed me:

"So, when the Afghan Army refuses to do a mission, how will you react?"

"C'mon sir, you damn well know that we will do it ourselves."

I know this post has been long and covered the gambit of COIN theory to SFA to tactical operations, but I suppose it covers the difficult questions that we must attempt to answer:

What are we doing?
What should we be doing?
What can we accomplish?

There are no easy answers here, but I can attest that winning the hearts and minds is not one of them. Regardless, as long as the soldiers and marines are deployed, they will continue to fight the best that they can.

v/r

Mike

[marct]

Hi Mike,

Using the definitions of COIN found in JP 1-02 and FM 3-24, COIN is an action that a government takes to quell internal rebellion or strife. Along those lines, the only COIN that the US can accomplish is within our internal borders. When we intervene in another countries internal affairs, the matter is inherently difficult as we must pick a side. IMO, this distinction is important, and our failure to address the issue only muddies the waters.

Yup. This is FID using COIN tactics. More on muddied waters in a minute...

In effect, when we intervene, we are picking a side. In Iraq, we back the Shia-heavy government over the Sunnis. In Afghanistan, we back the Karzai-heavy government over the Taliban. Both governments were put in place through elections, and we are hoping that these governments will eventually stabalize internal strife AND share our collective national security interests.

This is where I think semantics are crucial. In these instances, was it "picking" a side or "creating" a side? Both the Iraqi and Afghan governments were created by external force of arms and then "legitimated" through elections. I put "legitimated" in quotes, because the elections themselves did not allow the defeated governments to run (I doubt that SH would have won, but I'm not sure about the Taliban...), and the elections themselves were imposed.

Under one set of interpretations, it could be argued that what is being supported are a series of puppet regimes that were created by the US. Now, I'm not arguing for that particular interpretation (although I will mumble it ), but it does have some pretty serious implications. For example, the SOFA agreement with Iraq that led to the drawdown in troop commitments and the pulling out from the urban areas indicates, to me at least, that the GOI is being treated as if it were an independant, legitimate gov't. Good move.

Afghanistan, OTOH, is much more questionable. For example, the government of the Mayor of Kabul does not appear to have any control over the various foreign militaries, and many local, acting in his country (vide his repeated requests regarding the use of air strikes). Afghanistan is, IMO, the more interesting case, in part because the coalition is there acting under a UN mandate which includes rebuilding the government. It is less of an FID operation than a UN reconstruction operation (similar, at least in legal theory [yes, I'm waiting for JMM to jump in ] to the occupation of Germany and Japan after WW II, but without offical surrenders). So, is it FID? COIN? "War"? What?

My suspicion is that the semantic confusion as to exactly what is going on is at the heart of many of the problems we are facing there.

[MikeF]

So, is it FID? COIN? "War"? What?

My suspicion is that the semantic confusion as to exactly what is going on is at the heart of many of the problems we are facing there.

Hi Marc,

I agree with many of your thoughts, and I suppose that on the strategic level (my weakness), our analysis is akin to trying to play historian to present day actions. No doubt, our interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq will redefine modern warfare- call it hybrid, irregular or whatever. In some ways, we'll simply see how it plays out.

Paradoxically, I honestly believe that there is nothing new under the sun. War is war, and our continued efforts to redefine FID into SFA, COIN into IW, and differentiate between big and small wars, regular and irregular wars, only continues to muddy the waters; however, this distinction or semantics maybe a result of the continued evolution of our economies and modern nation-state system/governance. I suppose it is a chicken and an egg type debate.

I wish I had an answer. I do not.

Regardless, on the tactical level (my perceived expertise), the answer is simple. If and when you intervene, you must bring the "hate" to control the populace. These actions may require more than simple population centric "soft" approaches. In many areas, it requires killing the enemy. FM 3-24 refers to it as "stopping the bleeding" or an analogy to a gunshot victim in an emergency room.

After you have achieved control, then you can bring the "love" of nation-building. I would assert that this is more of a psychological action- a psychologist attempting to mend, adjust, or simply treat a victim of trauma after the incident.

Again, we'll see how it plays out. I'm cautious to accept that we can re-invent or redefine societies (particularly in a limited time frame). One of the greatest lessons that I've learned in studying small wars, emerging nations, failed and failing states, is the importance of time and patience- not a particular forte of the United States.

One needs only look at modern day Malaysia, Burma, Vietnam, Guatemala, and the Phillipines.

With that said, how does this intertwine with the observations/analysis of an anthropologist?

v/r

Mike