More killing. Less good deeds

[IntelTrooper]

I don't believe anybody has advocated being "excessively nice" to a Talib group moving down a valley. Destroy them.

What if we just ignore them? Or better yet, frighten them away like so many mice using illum (ala 3-1 BCT)?

Sorry, that was rhetorical. Return to your regularly scheduled discussion.

[Ken White]

I feel like I am trying to hit a moving target. You said name 1 example of participation benefiting the big power. I named, as you agreed, at least 4. It was being "involved" and now it is "participating". I am getting confused.

Here's the first query: ""The COIN fans are fond of telling us of insurgencies defeated. Name me one that has 20 or more years later proven to be a net benefit the major power involved. *
Last edited by Ken White; 1 Week Ago at 12:32 AM. Reason: Removed an extraneous 'not' and added 'to be a net' at the *""

Here's the second:""The COIN fans are fond of telling us of insurgencies defeated. Name me one that has 20 or more years later proven to be a net benefit the major power involved."

Note the wording. My contention is that no major power obtained a net benefit (outcome versus all costs) from participating in a COIN action.""

Involved was used twice, once in the initial question, once in the follow-on -- participating only once in my explanation of why the question was asked. Not in the question(s), no intent to move goal posts.

Your list essentially made the point I was trying to make, to wit: ""Perhaps. My point is that if the participation is limited, there may be a net benefit (Philippines post 45, El Salvador, Greece [?], Oman). If it is a large commitment, it is not (Malaysia)."" You can substitute 'involvement' for 'participation' there with no change in meaning or result.

I would also submit that a Malaysia 50 years on that is a relatively peaceful and stable state with a fairly good economy is of net benefit to Great Britain, though the word "net" will make for endless argument.

Yes, it will -- plus it would be difficult to determine the total costs. That will always be true and the answer will most often lie in the mind of the beholder. My overall point was and is that such involvement is costly, rarely produces a measurable benefit in relation to costs and thus, simply, such involvement should be very carefully weighed.

...is pretty close to being a fallacy of the false alternative...But the way it is presented it is almost a pacifism vs. mass murder kind of thing.

I obviously didn't see it a false alternative, merely trying to point out that your Forrest quote didn't so much trump my Sherman quote as it did your own desire for more 'COIN centric' effort as if -- you did not say this but I, perhaps wrongly, inferred it -- that would result in less mayhem; a nicer war, so to speak. Any idea of making war nice is, IMO, dangerous. Even thinking that the right techniques can make it a little better is fallacious all too often.

I don't believe anybody has advocated being "excessively nice" to a Talib group moving down a valley...That isn't being "excessively nice" to the Talibs, that is being decent to the civilians, which is sensible.

True -- and my points have been that the 'COIN' thing is overblown on that score, that our failure to train adequately is not going to be rectified by applying training to fix that aspect of military behavior and that belief in 'COIN' efforts is a dangerous fallacy. Every Army needs to know how to do them; no country should seek them.

I think also we are going to the same place, by the same path even, but without seeing each other. All your parenthetical statements in this thread, when taken together, make a pretty good outline of how a small war should be fought.

Probably true. What set me off was this:

The best intel to weed out the bad guys comes from the people in the village or the neighborhood. They are not likely provide intel if they are pissed off at having been dissed by troops, had their fields ruined by a tank or having some of their relatives, friends and neighbors, near or distant, killed or maimed by an airstrike. Another disadvantage of the above listed events is their excitable teenage sons might go off and join a war band to get some revenge.

That statement of the obvious disregards two things; many nineteen year old Americans are poorly raised and tend to diss anyone they can and you can't believe the fun in trying to control that if you haven't done so. Still that's a leadership problem and it doesn't occur in good units; all units will never be good, by definition half are good and half are not.

The second factor is that killing relative friends and neighbors is a fact of war; again, good units try to avoid that.

In both cases, the good unit factor is true and 'COIN' training in large measures is no indicator of improvement. Thus, your paragraph that followed the above:

The advantage of COINdinistada is that it tends to highlight the disadvantages of making the locals mad at you.

Shows the flaw that I was probably outsmarting myself by trying to get to in a roundabout way:

-- Excessively COIN centric thinking does far more harm than good. --

Aside from lulling national policymakers into believing they can ignore problem nations to concentrate on domestic priorities because the Army can fix it if it blows up, in the Armed Forces it covers other more significant training shortfalls and lulls people who should know better into thinking "this will all work out okay if we just do it right..."

Teaching COIN centric TTP will not make those bad to mediocre units better. Better training in the basics of the trade will make them a little better and improved selection of combat leaders versus 'whoever's turn it happens to be' will make them a lot better. COIN centric thinking only masks deeper problems and for that reason, it merits far more skepticism than it draws.The COIN lovers, civilian and military, believe that war can be made to accomplish social change -- it will but rarely in the way the arbiters of such change want or expect.

I can paraphrase you: The disadvantage of COINdinistada is that it tends to hide the advantages of not making the locals mad at you -- by staying out of their country. It almost never does work out right...

Because, ala Billy Sherman, Nathan B. and Ken White, you surely will hack off and kill a bunch of the locals -- no matter how nice you are.

[Surferbeetle]

-- Excessively COIN centric thinking does far more harm than good. --

Aside from lulling national policymakers into believing they can ignore problem nations to concentrate on domestic priorities because the Army can fix it if it blows up, in the Armed Forces it covers other more significant training shortfalls and lulls people who should know better into thinking "this will all work out okay if we just do it right..."

Teaching COIN centric TTP will not make those bad to mediocre units better. Better training in the basics of the trade will make them a little better and improved selection of combat leaders versus 'whoever's turn it happens to be' will make them a lot better. COIN centric thinking only masks deeper problems and for that reason, it merits far more skepticism than it draws.The COIN lovers, civilian and military, believe that war can be made to accomplish social change -- it will but rarely in the way the arbiters of such change want or expect.

I can paraphrase you: The disadvantage of COINdinistada is that it tends to hide the advantages of not making the locals mad at you -- by staying out of their country. It almost never does work out right...

Because, ala Billy Sherman, Nathan B. and Ken White, you surely will hack off and kill a bunch of the locals -- no matter how nice you are.

From tonight's Der Spiegel:

Afghanen und Bundeswehr starten Großoperation gegen Taliban

Von Matthias Gebauer und Shoib Najafizada

Vor der Wahl hat Afghanistans Militär mit Hilfe der Bundeswehr eine Offensive gegen die Taliban gestartet. Bei der Mission setzen die deutschen Streitkräfte auch Panzer ein. Die Lage ist angespannt: Das Camp der Bundeswehr wurde mit Raketen beschossen, weitere Angriffe werden erwartet.

My translation...

Afghanis and the Bundeswehr begin large operation against the Taliban

By Matthias Gebauer and Shoib Najafizada

Before the election Afghanistan’s Military with help from the Bundeswehr have started an offensive against the Taliban. As part of the mission the German forces are also employing(placing) tanks. The situation is tense: The Bundeswehr camp has been rocketed and additional attacks are expected.

[Ken White]

your quote of my comments and the Der Spiegel report.

However, since you posted them, I'm sure there is one. You keep forgetting I'm old and slow...

[Surferbeetle]

...I'll buy the older bit...not so sure about the slow.

The other day in a similar thread we had covered the 'American' vs. 'European' approaches and I had noted that it appeared that adapting to the requirements of the battlefield in Afghanistan is causing a certain amount of convergence between the two approaches.

I see tonight's Der Spiegel article as another datapoint point which appears to be located along a similar trendline which I observed in Iraq...judiciously applied power is respected and leads to less problems in the longer run, although it's a pretty tough balance to get things right.

I'll temper this observation with the acknowledgment that I have only researched/thought about Afghanistan semi-seriously over the last year or so and never been there...if you went, did you enjoy Afghanistan? Iraq was 80/20 for me with the 20 being pretty seriously crappy...here's an additional late night observation ca-bubbas were part of some a-teams back in the day, didn't know that...dad brought back a montagnard crossbow for me and stories about livers...he was a tech guy who didn't bump into very many a-teams though...

[Ken White]

...Afghanistan is causing a certain amount of convergence between the two approaches.

will always cause that -- even enemies converge to an extent. People and geography affect methods and TTP. I've also long been -- and still am -- worried that the bad guys will do something really stupid in Europe and get them aroused; they haven't always been this 'peace loving'...

judiciously applied power is respected and leads to less problems in the longer run, although it's a pretty tough balance to get things right.

Agree. It is very tough to get right but tolerating attacks and probes in the ME or South Asia sends a dangerous message and encourages more tests so you do have to get it right and the quicker, the better...

if you went, did you enjoy Afghanistan?

Only got a far as Herat from Iran and only stayed one day so basically I don't count the 'Stan among my places observed. While in Iran, I did get to Mashhad and Zahedan a few times each, lot of Afghans there; Zahedan was the capital of Baluchistan so there were also plenty of Baluch who are hill folks like the Afghans and have many of the same attributes. I liked both of them and the Kurds. Hillbilly togetherness, I suppose.

ca-bubbas were part of some a-teams back in the day, didn't know that...dad brought back a montagnard crossbow for me and stories about livers...he was a tech guy who didn't bump into very many a-teams though...

Yeah, varied a bit but some teams had ASA, CA, Engineer Companies, Medical Dets -- little bit of everything on occasion. Our Airplane Infantry Bn in 66 had a couple of CA guys from Strom Thurman's 360th in Columbia. Brigade I was with in 68 had a crew from California.

The guys sipping the wine reminded me that the Rice wine wasn't too bad but the Cassava wine mixed with pig or goat blood was the world's greatest hangover producer...

[carl]

Ken:

I think we've arrived at the same place, or at least I got to where you were; I'm late as usual.

I can well believe the difficulty of controlling the young 19 year old gentlemen. I spent a number of years chasing them around and having to listen to them explain to me why any reasonable person would have tried beat that guy senseless so why are you arresting me. It is kind of fun to say in real life "tell it to the judge."

[Ken White]

I spent a number of years chasing them around and having to listen to them explain to me why any reasonable person would have tried beat that guy senseless so why are you arresting me. It is kind of fun to say in real life "tell it to the judge."

Sons prematurely gray from doing that...

They do have some great stories though.

On the thread, different approaches to the same problem can cause confusion but as long as everyone's after the same result, it usually works out. That guy who wrote the song about tomatoh and tomahto knew what he was talking about..

Not to mention I frequently get wrapped around the axle and over complicate things.

Be careful over there...

[UrsaMaior]

Novit enim Dominus qui sunt eius." — "Kill them all, the Lord will recognise His own."

From here it looks like some people are suggesting Arnaud Amary's approach to insurgencies. Well I would sincerely like to believe that we have left the Middle Ages FAR behind us.

BTW it is uncorrectly quoted in unnumerous occasions that Alexander has also failed to conquer Astan. He did. That part which he needed to get to India. It was called Bactria and he did so by securing one of the strongest local tribe's support. Simply by marrying the famous Roxanne.

[William F. Owen]

Novit enim Dominus qui sunt eius." — "Kill them all, the Lord will recognise His own."

From here it looks like some people are suggesting Arnaud Amary's approach to insurgencies. Well I would sincerely like to believe that we have left the Middle Ages FAR behind us.

So who do you think is suggesting this approach?

[UrsaMaior]

I can agree with your approach, but in my limited experience collateral damage, and friendly fire (to name but two euphemisms) occurs way too often to accept it as a general guideline.

So who do you think is suggesting this approach?

OTOH I respect you too much to answer the way you asked it.

[William F. Owen]

I can agree with your approach, but in my limited experience collateral damage, and friendly fire (to name but two euphemisms) occurs way too often to accept it as a general guideline.

So you agree with the approach, but you have doubts about the skill of those employing it? Well fair enough, but then the problem is not the approach, but the training and education needed to apply it.

My great gripe with the "POP-Coin" pose, is that the constant implication is that targeting the enemy is somehow counter-productive or useless. That is simply not true.
Clumsy, ill-thought out, irresponsible actions are counter productive and useless.
The central sub-text of POP-Coin seems to be "we are too stupid to apply force well, so let's do something else."
Now if the sub-text is actually "We protect the population, by killing the enemy," then explicitly state it.

[MikeF]

I can agree with your approach, but in my limited experience collateral damage, and friendly fire (to name but two euphemisms) occurs way too often to accept it as a general guideline.

OTOH I respect you too much to answer the way you asked it.

UrsaMaior,

Please don't provide a drive-by answer. I appreciated your initial post, and I was awaiting your response to Wilf's question. Wilf speaks from the realities of ground combat not the utopian dreams of academic theory. He never implied killing innocent civilians.

If you have a better,realistic solution other than Wilf's CvC argument, then please present it. Thus far, you have only presented an emotion (killing is bad); you have not presented an alternative.

v/r

Mike

[UrsaMaior]

Being an academic-to-be I dont have combat experience. Being a non-native speaker I may phrase my thoughts inappropiately.

All I was trying to say is that we should not be carried away. After a couple of decades where violence was all bad and insurgents/terrorists were always right (at least some people wanted all of us to think so) we should not think that every single person who opposes our intentions is a legal target. We have to kill the right person (who does not want to cooperate and that's an imperative) BUT not someone or horribile dictu everyone who looks or thinks similar. Yes Singh quashed the Panjab insurgency mostly by killing the medium level cadres at a higher ratio than the "movement" could replace them causing it to collapse. But he also took great care to avoid accidents and punished those who used excessive force.

Just my 0,02 EUROS ;-)

One more thing. The focal issue of our conversation is who do we consider the enemy aka legal target. In my opinion, no pun intended you Wilf think that a much broader segment of the local population is a legal target than I do.

[MikeF]

Being an academic-to-be I dont have combat experience. Being a non-native speaker I may phrase my thoughts inappropiately.

All I was trying to say is that we should not be carried away. After a couple of decades where violence was all bad and insurgents/terrorists were always right (at least some people wanted all of us to think so) we should not think that every single person who opposes our intentions is a legal target. We have to kill the right person (who does not want to cooperate and that's an imperative) BUT not someone or horribile dictu everyone who looks or thinks similar. Yes Singh quashed the Panjab insurgency mostly by killing the medium level cadres at a higher ratio than the "movement" could replace them causing it to collapse. But he also took great care to avoid accidents and punished those who used excessive force.

Just my 0,02 EUROS ;-)

One more thing. The focal issue of our conversation is who do we consider the enemy aka legal target. In my opinion, no pun intended you Wilf think that a much broader segment of the local population is a legal target than I do.

Unfortunately, that may only be doubling up in the current financial crisis. I appreciate the response, and I would only add that this thread is devoted to what a military force should do within a given area of responsibility.

I think that you will find the military guys on SWJ to be the most anti-war advocates, but when we must intervene, it must be done harshly.

v/r

Mike

[William F. Owen]

I'd urge everyone to look at this Item here:
Operational Check Fire

I find myself in broad agreement with most if not all the observations contained in the document.
Of particular note is:

Stop all development and capacity building activities. There is no measurable relationship between these activities and strategic or operational success in the region. These capacity-building actions are largely based on a western perspective of what some think the Afghani or Pakistani populations need, likely reinforced by local government leaders who may be well-meaning or see an opportunity for increased graft and corruption with every new project. After spending billions of dollars in the region, the security and stability situation is more tenuous today than even five years ago. There is simply no value-added or return on investment; these activities serve as a distraction from accomplishing other relevant operational goals.

[Bill Moore]

WILF, you may be right, perhaps the capacity building is a major waste of dollars and manpower (but still profitable to some contractors). The reason we're building capacity is to ultimately deny space to Al Qaeda, yet there doesn't seem to be a broad concerted effort within the ANA or Afghan Police to effectively resist AQ (or the insurgents, assuming they're actually married by network). Worse yet, the Afghan Police reportedly are as corrupt as they ever were, which is one of the reasons the Taliban came to power in the first place.

Yet if our goal is to downsize our forces while denying space/safe haven to AQ in Afghanistan, then how do you do that without building a residual security capacity with the locals? My argument isn't that it isn't needed, but rather we did it poorly.

Shifting to development, it appears that effort has also failed to date because we're promising too much and delivering too little. I think development is helpful with our efforts to undermine AQ and deny space to them on a number of levels, but it must be modest (thus delivered rapidly) and tangible to the Afghan people. The Afghan people must believe that their life is getting better (that doesn't mean an annual paid vacation to Vegas, but simply improvements in their life). Right now our credibility is on the line because we promised the make believe Wolfowitz world. One glaring example of a point of failure is that the Afghan people are reportedly turning voluntarily to the underground Taliban sharia courts to resolve issues rather than going to the local police we invested in. Call me a critic, but something seems wrong with this picture (using Ralph Peters' words).

Can't disagree with the author's quote as it stands now, but was the approach wrong or the execution of the approach?

After spending billions of dollars in the region, the security and stability situation is more tenuous today than even five years ago.

More to the point:

There is no measurable relationship between these activities and strategic or operational success in the region.

If the above activities were done correctly (assuming that is possible in Afghanistan), I would disagree with the author, but to date he seems to be right.

However, I don't find his recommendations overly helpful. He is basically saying we should ignore Pakistan's sovreignty and go after AQ. While that would probably be effective to some degree, it ignores the risks to the region at large and that the consequences may be worse than allowing AQ to rent a few caves in the FATA. If we were going to this, IMO we should have done it within the first 6 months of the 9/11 attacks, but while we may be able to rewrite history in a way that pleases us, we can't undue it. So where do we go from here? Do you really think attacking into Pakistan without Pakistan's permission will advance our position?

[William F. Owen]

The reason we're building capacity is to ultimately deny space to Al Qaeda, yet there doesn't seem to be a broad concerted effort within the ANA or Afghan Police to effectively resist AQ (or the insurgents, assuming they're actually married by network). Worse yet, the Afghan Police reportedly are as corrupt as they ever were, which is one of the reasons the Taliban came to power in the first place.

Building Schools, hospitals and digging wells does not defeat an insurgency. What is more, there is little to no evidence that it prevents one happening.

Do insurgencies build hospitals and dig wells - yes, sometimes, very rarely and almost always in areas they have captured. No one takes ground by building - or keeps it for that matter. I understand the "theory". I just see no evidence.

Yet if our goal is to downsize our forces while denying space/safe haven to One glaring example of a point of failure is that the Afghan people are reportedly turning voluntarily to the underground Taliban sharia courts to resolve issues rather than going to the local police we invested in. Call me a critic, but something seems wrong with this picture (using Ralph Peters' words).

So before anyone builds anything, a good police forces would seem to be called for - BEFORE ANYTHING ELSE!

So where do we go from here? Do you really think attacking into Pakistan without Pakistan's permission will advance our position?

...but is not defeating AQ the strategic imperative for the US?
If so, then who care about Pakistan? The current US logic is that if NATO and the US leaves, AQ will grow again and conduct another 911. - given that as a driver, why is Pakistan's sovereignty any issue? A'Stan's sovereignty never held anyone back?

[Bill Moore]

we had other strategic interests, and for the most part those strategic interests still persist. Is a nation only allowed to have one strategic goal? By point is that Pakistan may represent more strategic interests than simply the Al Qaeda.

If so, then who care about Pakistan? The current US logic is that if NATO and the US leaves, AQ will grow again and conduct another 911. - given that as a driver, why is Pakistan's sovereignty any issue? A'Stan's sovereignty never held anyone back?

You're the one who reminded about context, and I think there are several contexts (political, economic, geographic, regional stability, etc.) that also weigh in on the decision calculus in this case. Last time I checked Afghanistan didn't have nukes, nor did the Taliban even pretend to be a friend of America after 9/11. No one more than I wants to march into the safe havens of Pakistan, but accept there may be reasons not to up to a point, but if Pakistan fails to address the issue then we may not have a choice.

Building Schools, hospitals and digging wells does not defeat an insurgency. What is more, there is little to no evidence that it prevents one happening.

Do insurgencies build hospitals and dig wells - yes, sometimes, very rarely and almost always in areas they have captured. No one takes ground by building - or keeps it for that matter. I understand the "theory". I just see no evidence.

http://74.125.155.132/search?q=cache...&ct=clnk&gl=us

You may remember the 1st Place winner in the 2007 DePuy Writing Contest:

S.W.E.T. and Blood: Essential Services in the Battle between Insurgents and Counterinsurgents - Major Erik A. Claessen, Belgian Armed Forces

Is there evidence? There are definitely correlations, and you need look no further than your pest to the north and study how Hezbollah has used these civil projects to great effect. I saw this methodology used to great effect in Southern Iraq by the Shi'a and in Northern Iraq by the Kurds.

The services provided by a number of Islamist NGOs throughout the Muslim world are critical to insurgencies in at least two ways. First they displace the government by providing essential services that the government should be providing, and second they serve as a platform to recruit and mobilize the people to support the insurgency.

This is a different type of war, it is much more political in nature, so while killing is still essential, it will not win the conflict alone. If we don't provide at least a modest increase in the population's welfare, we're going to feed the insurgent's propaganda machine.

So before anyone builds anything, a good police forces would seem to be called for - BEFORE ANYTHING ELSE!

Security forces in some form or fashion as appropriate. Assuming Afghanistan will never really be a State, then maybe we just win over the tribe and they agree to provide the security? Ultimately we're after Al Qaeda, not winning the humanitarian of the year award, but in some cases it isn't just pragmatic it is essential to give the people a little love.

[William F. Owen]

Is there evidence? There are definitely correlations, and you need look no further than your pest to the north and study how Hezbollah has used these civil projects to great effect. I saw this methodology used to great effect in Southern Iraq by the Shi'a and in Northern Iraq by the Kurds.

Also the FARC in Colombia provide a wide range of social services. - However these are only in areas they control!
As concerns Hezbollah, if you want Hezbollah social services, then you have to be potentially prepared to let them use your house as an ATGM firing point.
Provision of social services does not trump military power. It only speaks to the policy, - not the instrument.

The services provided by a number of Islamist NGOs throughout the Muslim world are critical to insurgencies in at least two ways. First they displace the government by providing essential services that the government should be providing, and second they serve as a platform to recruit and mobilize the people to support the insurgency.

Again, they are the policy. They are not the means.

This is a different type of war, it is much more political in nature, so while killing is still essential, it will not win the conflict alone. If we don't provide at least a modest increase in the population's welfare, we're going to feed the insurgent's propaganda machine.

All war is political. It's why we fight wars. We do not fight wars to provide health care or dig wells. Those things are being presented as being instrumental to policy, and as such we have to be very sure that are reaping the rewards commensurate with the effort.

Additionally, if the Talibans/bad guys hospitals, schools and wells are instrumental to their policy, do you preserve them, once you control the area?