More killing. Less good deeds

[M-A Lagrange]

Quote:
The services provided by a number of Islamist NGOs throughout the Muslim world are critical to insurgencies in at least two ways. First they displace the government by providing essential services that the government should be providing, and second they serve as a platform to recruit and mobilize the people to support the insurgency.

Having been working for a Muslim NGO, I would not really agree with the statement.
First you have to separate Western and Middle East Muslim NGO. And after you have to separate between the progressist ones and the non-progressist ones.

They are tools but as said Wilf, if you say yes then you have to endure the consequences…
And basically, all NGO work is undermining state responsibility and providing services that should be given by the state. Not only Muslim once. Western NGO are just patching what governments are not capable to provide. But saying so, avoiding all NGO work would lead to disaster. But thinking NGO will give you more legitimacy is a false statement.

Additionally, if the Talibans/bad guys hospitals, schools and wells are instrumental to their policy, do you preserve them, once you control the area?

There you have a simple answer: it is illegal to destroy it. Back to Geneva Convention.

[William F. Owen]

There you have a simple answer: it is illegal to destroy it. Back to Geneva Convention.

To destroy yes. To "discontinue" or "change the use" is not. You can legitimately close down any facility.
Why allow a functional instrument of enemy policy to continue to provide service?

Obviously good judgement is required. EG: Why close down a functioning medical centre?

[slapout9]

To destroy yes. To "discontinue" or "change the use" is not. You can legitimately close down any facility.
Why allow a functional instrument of enemy policy to continue to provide service?

Obviously good judgement is required. EG: Why close down a functioning medical centre?

And that is the very essence of the original EBO theory as it relates to the original General Systems Theory

[M-A Lagrange]

To destroy yes. To "discontinue" or "change the use" is not. You can legitimately close down any facility.
Why allow a functional instrument of enemy policy to continue to provide service?

Obviously good judgement is required. EG: Why close down a functioning
medical centre?

Ok, let leave GC aside. You do not destroy it. (closing is not that much allowed). But still by disrupting it you alienate most of the population around and then you’re back to the starting point.

But what if you supply it, make it better with lower cost, extend its functionalities?
If you run it, you also control a strong point of command/recrutement (from my short experience in Lebanon). Keeping working stuff that is profitable to the population and turn it to your interrest would be much better, is it?

Return of experience from Afghanistan has shown that closing manufactures hold by ennemy did turn the population against the coalition. Before, taliban or not taliban, population was only interrested into getting incomes. The immediat effect/perseption of coalition presence has been unemployment.
Whit civilians, what you have to play with are the benefits they can earn from your presence. They will follow the one who provides the better benefits.
I bought a lot of security like this.

( Cf Zun Tsu: treat well the prisonners, they will gain your ranks. For those who like literature. )

[William F. Owen]

But what if you supply it, make it better with lower cost, extend its functionalities?
If you run it, you also control a strong point of command/recrutement (from my short experience in Lebanon). Keeping working stuff that is profitable to the population and turn it to your interrest would be much better, is it?

Concur, but on the provision that it furthers my aim and benefits my policy.

[Surferbeetle]

Building Schools, hospitals and digging wells does not defeat an insurgency. What is more, there is little to no evidence that it prevents one happening.

Do insurgencies build hospitals and dig wells - yes, sometimes, very rarely and almost always in areas they have captured. No one takes ground by building - or keeps it for that matter. I understand the "theory". I just see no evidence.

So before anyone builds anything, a good police forces would seem to be called for - BEFORE ANYTHING ELSE!

Brother Wilf,

Our area of agreement: Police/security forces are necessary to hold ground.

Our area of disagreement: Development is required to hold ground.

My thesis is that Governments remain in power by providing acceptable Government Services to their populaces. Acceptable Government Services are defined as security, basic services, economic benefits, and political representation to either the majority or key demographic factions. Insurgencies must either provide more acceptable Government Services than the Government in power does or they will fail. Neither side has the luxury of only focusing upon security services.

A year in Iraq during 03-04 and an excess of four decades spent living in various countries run by ‘functioning’ (as opposed to failed) governments able to provide basic services, economic benefits, and political representation to either the majority or key demographic factions rounds out my practical experience for this particular data point.

So much for my experience…let us look at a historical data point of interest to you and I: Israel

My armchair observation is that before and during Israel’s War of Independence an Israeli shadow government, consisting of the Va'ad Leumi, the Haganah, and other elements taxed its people and provided Government Services which were more acceptable than those provided by the British.

The Political Department of the JNC was responsible for relations with the Arabs, ties with the Jewish Agency and negotiations with the British government. As the yishuv grew, the JNC adopted more functions, such as education, health care and welfare services, internal defense and security matters, and organized recruitment to the British forces during World War II. In the 1940s, departments for physical training, culture and press and information were added.

The report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry issued in 1946, stated:

"The Jews have developed, under the aegis of the Jewish Agency and the JNC, a strong and tightly-woven community. There thus exists a virtual Jewish nonterritorial State with its own executive and legislative organs..."[1]

When the State of Israel was established in 1948, this departmental structure served as a basis for the government ministries. On March 2, 1948, the JNC decided to form an interim government and on May 14, 1948, (the expiration day of the British Mandate), its members gathered at the Tel Aviv Museum of Art and ratified the proclamation declaring the establishment of the State of Israel. The members of the JNC formed the provisional government of the nascent State of Israel.

I do acknowledge that there is always a gap between drafting a plan and executing one, nonetheless current US FID/COIN (or the noun de jour) doctrine (operational & tactical) acknowledges the historical record and explicitly recognizes that Governments remain in power by providing acceptable Government Services to their populaces. Current US doctrine also provides adequate descriptions for developing the necessary ends, ways, and means needed to accomplish the task.

Providing appropriate and adequate resourcing and staffing to accomplish this full spectrum mission are, in my opinion, the roach parts in the schwarma. As always my position is that those who wish to accomplish this particular mission must work with and in support of the populace and power structures on the ground in the country involved in order to accomplish the mission. Limiting resourcing and staffing to that required for a stereotypical CvC/Fulda Gap/All Kinetics All The Time approach fails to address full spectrum mission requirements, and does not address the lessons provided by the Va'ad Leumi, the Haganah, and others.

Best,

Steve

[Bill Moore]

Posted by M-A Lagrange

Having been working for a Muslim NGO, I would not really agree with the statement.
First you have to separate Western and Middle East Muslim NGO. And after you have to separate between the progressist ones and the non-progressist ones.

M-A please note I used the term Islamist NGOs. While probably far from an ideal term, we in the west general use that term to refer to radicalized or violent extremist Muslims (or more simply, but less accurately terrorists). My point is that some NGOs have the specific purpose of enabling the violent extremists through various methods such as political organization, propaganda, fund raising, radicalization process, etc. I have no issue with Muslim NGOs that legitimately want to help their fellow Muslims.

posted by Surferbeetle,

current US FID/COIN (or the noun de jour) doctrine (operational & tactical) acknowledges the historical record and explicitly recognizes that Governments remain in power by providing acceptable Government Services to their populaces.

Steve, good post, and I even agree with the portion of your post that I copied above to a point, but I think it might be a little too simplistic and may explain why we haven't done well with our efforts related to providing essential services. First we don't identify what the "essential" services really are, because culturally we're terrible listeners. Second, there is something more to be a good government than providing good services. Case in point, the North Koreans are starving, yet according to multiple sources they remain loyal to their government. The government has effectively blamed the crisis (a crisis that has been in existence for many years) on the outside world, so they're able to stroke the flames of nationalism. We assume when we go to a place like Iraq or Afghanistan and build a medical clinic we made friends and are shocked when we return and hit an IED and everyone plays dumb. I don't think your statement is wrong, just incomplete, and once we figure out how to complete it we'll get a lot closer to accomplishing our objectives. Note, when I say we, the intent is to ensure that the government we want to help is getting the credit, so I guess that is point 3, they have to build it and we need to stay in the background as much as possible. We do that well in places like the Philippines, but what I saw in Iraq is every American Officer wanted his Kodak moment next to "his" project.

Another key to success is finding a way to deflate our enlarged western egos.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Slapout

And that is the very essence of the original EBO theory as it relates to the original General Systems Theory

Slap, I think EBO is still a Barbie doll anyway you try to redefine her. She looks good, but she has no substance. You can keep putting different dresses on her, push up bra's, bikinis, high heeled shoes, Victoria Secret's finest lingere, etc., but she is still just a doll made of plastic. That last dress you put on her, was an attempt at a 1990s flashback, but you mis-stepped and actually had her strut down the catwalk in a 1970's dress.

The EBO style, which emerged in the 90s had nothing to do with the sosphisticated point that M-A addressed, rather it was focused on technical sensors and putting steel on target, and predicting the effect of the outcome (see all, know all, shape all). EBO gradually evolved to assuming we could accurately guess second and third order effects of human/social behavior in reaction to our interagency activities. I think that line of thought developed about the same time that Meth became the drug of choice in our universities

[Bill Moore]

Posted by WILF,

Also the FARC in Colombia provide a wide range of social services. - However these are only in areas they control!

Agree 100%, thus you must agree then that we have to develop HN capacity to secure the area, since we can only control so much?

All war is political. It's why we fight wars. We do not fight wars to provide health care or dig wells. Those things are being presented as being instrumental to policy, and as such we have to be very sure that are reaping the rewards commensurate with the effort.

Hopefully this makes sense, I agree all war is fought for political purposes, but not all wars are fought using politics as a primary effort at the "tactical" level. That is perhaps the difference between irregular and regular warfare. To say all war is political is like saying all war is war, it is true, but not useful. The character of each war/conflict is different, and it is important that we understand it, or we'll likely fail to address the real threat or solve the real problem.

Additionally, if the Talibans/bad guys hospitals, schools and wells are instrumental to their policy, do you preserve them, once you control the area?

M-A's comment captured my thoughts. Looking at schools specifically, the building isn't that important, but rather who appoints the instructors and monitors their curriculum that is critical.

[slapout9]

Posted by Slapout

Slap, I think EBO is still a Barbie doll anyway you try to redefine her. She looks good, but she has no substance. You can keep putting different dresses on her, push up bra's, bikinis, high heeled shoes, Victoria Secret's finest lingere, etc., but she is still just a doll made of plastic. That last dress you put on her, was an attempt at a 1990s flashback, but you mis-stepped and actually had her strut down the catwalk in a 1970's dress.

coffee spill.......

[Steve the Planner]

M-A's point: NGO's (and military), by building wells, schools, medical clinics, actually undermines the governments we intend to support/extend unless there is a downstreaming process for them to rapidly take it over and make it work.

The more I look at this, I think that Money as a Weapon of military stability is just an openly failed medium to long-term strategy. Quick hits and low hanging fruit (and the photo op).

When we occupy a country and remove the current government, we have to recognize the limits of our ability to put something new in place. Instead, US (and probably not the military), has to learn how to jump in to support and expand existing governmental systems, Period.

If Spanish NGOs, US AID Constratcors, and US civilian-employee-assignees pressured to serve, had commandeered the US reconstruction efforts Post-WWII, we would still be there threshing it out. The first Marshall Plan phase was, to a great extent punative and explicitly involved dismantling factories, services: one characterization was that the goal was to turn Germany into a pastoral agricultural land. It was not until we gave up on that, moved to the Germanification plans, that things began to work.

If we are genuinely trying to politically outcompete Taliban affinities through extension of essential services, and the values of an alternate lifestyle, when are we really going to start?

Clear, Hold and Build without a strong development and service extension program is just Clear, Clear, Re-Clear. Having said that, actual Afghan involvement would probably not result in so many schools, health clinics, and expensive NGO projects, but more on small scale, community-supported projects---things that would add a dollar (MA's point) to somebody's pocketbook), and gradually move them a step better than last year.

Strategic patience.

Steve

Steve

[Steve the Planner]

John Prado, NSC Historian, has been reading the accounts of Mac Bundy, trying to assess the decision-framework in front of the President.

In his article posted on the History News Network, he underscores how,like Vietnam, military efforts at clearing, clearing, and re-clearing are not going to result in success without a strong civilian success process to hold and build. The path of decision-making that a president must follow after an escalation decision, it seems history is suggesting, becomes very narrow and fraught with risks.

http://www.hnn.us/articles/118034.html

"In Vietnam in 1967, to return to the Johnson analogy, for some months things seemed to go well enough, except for the lack of visible military or counterinsurgency progress. But the political side of the equation did not improve. Desperate for success, President Johnson launched a PR campaign designed to showcase the supposed gains in the war. Light could be seen at the end of the tunnel intoned the American ambassador to South Vietnam. Then came the Tet Offensive and America was visibly shaken. We need not engage the argument about the true outcome at Tet to make the point that the Vietnamese adversary could carry out their country-wide initiative because the measures possible for Johnson were not ones that actually affected the adversary’s capability. And such real progress as there was could not alter the final outcome of the war, except for adding to the toll in blood and treasure.

This too is characteristic of the Afghan war today. Reconstruction and civil affairs efforts will be unable to win the hearts and minds of Afghans disgusted at the dishonesty and profligacy of the Karzai government. A plan to mobilize massive friendly forces will founder in the crevasses of Afghan politics and the reluctance of the people to take up arms. An American or NATO buildup at any level will be incapable of actually winning the battle. The Taliban enemy, safely ensconced in bases across the border in Pakistan, chooses when it wants to fight. Widely touted plans to separate factions of Taliban by paying them off, depend on the entirely unsubstantiated thesis that there are enemy groups just waiting to be bought. In short the military strategy does not affect the fulcrum that might change the balance. The best U.S. force may be able to accomplish—like Vietnam—is likely to be prolonging stalemate. And the longer that persists—worse if deterioration becomes evident—the more restricted become the options for President Obama. This is the real Afghan problem."

[Surferbeetle]

...without a good NCO around they tend to get into trouble.

Steve, good post, and I even agree with the portion of your post that I copied above to a point, but I think it might be a little too simplistic and may explain why we haven't done well with our efforts related to providing essential services. First we don't identify what the "essential" services really are, because culturally we're terrible listeners. Second, there is something more to be a good government than providing good services. Case in point, the North Koreans are starving, yet according to multiple sources they remain loyal to their government. The government has effectively blamed the crisis (a crisis that has been in existence for many years) on the outside world, so they're able to stroke the flames of nationalism. We assume when we go to a place like Iraq or Afghanistan and build a medical clinic we made friends and are shocked when we return and hit an IED and everyone plays dumb. I don't think your statement is wrong, just incomplete, and once we figure out how to complete it we'll get a lot closer to accomplishing our objectives. Note, when I say we, the intent is to ensure that the government we want to help is getting the credit, so I guess that is point 3, they have to build it and we need to stay in the background as much as possible. We do that well in places like the Philippines, but what I saw in Iraq is every American Officer wanted his Kodak moment next to "his" project.

Another key to success is finding a way to deflate our enlarged western egos.

Bill, assessing and describing complex things accurately can be a tough gig, and I certainly do not have a lock on things. North Korea is a bit of a black box to me, with a potentially ugly succession looming. How about a quick flyby of Kurdistan, a region which I have visited, and its experiences with Advising, Insurgency, and Governance?

Kurdistan appears to be a region in which development and conflict has coexisted for some time. As I understand things Kurdistan received a boost towards autonomy from the rest of Iraq in April of 1991 with UN SC Resolution 688 and the resulting no fly zones. UN SC Resolution 986 and UN SC Resolution1153 (effective 1996 and 1998) resulted in Kurdistan receiving a legal cut of Iraq’s oil revenues and helped to fund a fair amount of development efforts. Alongside this development effort the PUK, KDP, and other Kurdish organizations fought among themselves for control as well as with and against Iraqi, Iranian, and Turkish elements using a variety of warfare methods. The US was able to mediate a fairly functional reconciliation between thePUK and KDP with the Washington Agreement of September 1998.

During my time in Iraq I noted that Kurdish construction and engineering companies regularly pushed out into the Mosul area. My trips to Kurdistan revealed a vibrant business community, good infrastructure, a capable security force, rule of law, and visible participation in daily life by both sexes. The Kurds appear to have a concerned diaspora, Turkey appeared to be a major of supplier of goods to the region, and it is my understanding the Iran is another major supplier of goods. Upon my return home I have been following the KRG as it navigates the rough diplomatic and security conditions hemming it on all sides. They are making some interesting moves.

From a CA-centric standpoint Kurdistan might be seen as a model for the successes associated with spending more effort on advising a Government as opposed to ‘building’ one. Both efforts require skilled and experienced folks but only advising fully relies upon local folks for success. I had a very interesting conversation with a smart, capable, and conservative GO about this particular friction point which lies between mission failure, acceptable risk, and mission success. GO’s have a lot of responsibility to juggle and are understandably looking for the sure thing; yet I contrast this with my many experiences in which I have found that local civilians are very capable of accomplishing the development mission in the right circumstances with the right support. No easy answers tonight…

[Steve the Planner]

Steve:

Still struggling my way through Gareth Stansfield's latest tome:

Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and Compromise
by Liam Anderson, Gareth Stansfield (Aug 2009)

He was with us on the UN Disputed Boundaries Team (one of eighteen equivalent experts), so his book is a digest of much of the dispute team's as-yet-unpublished research, together with his huge insights into the history of the region.

Steve

PS- Unlike him (an Exeter College Prof), all the US PRTs and civilian experts have a one year non-disclosure agreement. Tick, tick, tick.

[Surferbeetle]

Still struggling my way through Gareth Stansfield's latest tome:

Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and Compromise
by Liam Anderson, Gareth Stansfield (Aug 2009)

He was with us on the UN Disputed Boundaries Team (one of eighteen equivalent experts), so his book is a digest of much of the dispute team's as-yet-unpublished research, together with his huge insights into the history of the region.

Steve

PS- Unlike him (an Exeter College Prof), all the US PRTs and civilian experts have a one year non-disclosure agreement. Tick, tick, tick.

Steve,

Greatly appreciate the reference. One of the ones that I am currently working on is John J. Mearsheimer's The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.

Well if you publish I'll buy a copy if you sign it.

Here is another thinker...

Guns Germs and Steel_1 of 3

Jun 7, 2007 - 54:34
Jared Diamond’s journey of discovery began on the island of Papua New Guinea. There, in 1974, a local named Yali asked Diamond a deceptively simple question: “Why is it that...

Guns Germs and Steel_2 of 3

Jun 7, 2007 - 54:33
On November 15th 1532, 168 Spanish conquistadors arrive in the holy city of Cajamarca, at the heart of the Inca Empire, in Peru. They are exhausted, outnumbered and terrified – ahead of t...

Guns Germs and Steel _3 of 3

Jun 7, 2007 - 54:58
So far, Jared Diamond has demonstrated how geography favoured one group of people – Europeans – endowing them with agents of conquest ahead of their rivals around the world. Guns, germs an...

[Steve the Planner]

Have to dust off my Morgenthau for yours.

Review talked about the UN as a frail....

I found it interesting working with the UN on many levels, but not on outcomes. Actually, before I joined their team, I read Samantha Powers' book Chasing the Flame. She may have intended to glorify SRSG De Mello, but some parts of it truly shook me to the core, and not about the HQ Bombing in Baghdad.

But, the UN's ability, as with the disputed boundary team, has an unprecedented convening power to bring the likes of Gareth and Wilfred Buchta to a conflict zone to deeply study the problems, and visit all the parties (including the surrounding countries). Our team's members were meeting with he-who-shall-not-be-named in Iraq, plus every surrounding leader, and their folks could meet with Sistani and others first hand. The initial results, as with the unpublished KRG reports, and the election snafu in Afghanistan, are almost predictably watered down, but the secondary effect of bringing these deep experts to the scene does,in fact, do something immensely positive, if only after the fact (once they publish), and the re-set they can bring to an issue in later stages.

Still scratching my head a little though.

Steve

[Steve the Planner]

Steve:

"Well if you publish I'll buy a copy if you sign it."

It's called "The Mapmaker's Tale." Using the frame story method of the Arabian Nights, it tells the story of the political/administrative boundary disputes and related population and government administration issues in and around Iraq and Afghanistan, and our inability to come grasp with and address them.

In prior days, maps were the big thing that nations and military intel fought over for their intrinsic value.

Now, at least on the civilian side, it is just a fight over turf, and contracts. We couldn't get the right map in the right hands until all the agencies finished bleeding it to death for its internal merits. And by then, it is too late for whatever the long-forgotten purpose was.

We've certainly come a long way on the path to Byzantine Empire.

Not the big picture of these places, but, perhaps an interesting lesson yet to be learned.

Still, a long way from draft to final publication.

Steve

[William F. Owen]

Brother Wilf,

Our area of agreement: Police/security forces are necessary to hold ground.

Our area of disagreement: Development is required to hold ground.

Development cannot "hold ground." It may benefit the population and that may make them support your policy, but that does not make the ground secure. Guns create swing votes. What keeps the ground secure is the Police/Security Forces.

My armchair observation is that before and during Israel’s War of Independence an Israeli shadow government, consisting of the Va'ad Leumi, the Haganah, and other elements taxed its people and provided Government Services which were more acceptable than those provided by the British.

....but the policy being set forth was the State of Israel. The "idea" was "act like nation, become a nation." It was very context dependant. The French Resistance never set up any hospitals, nor did the Mau-Mau, the MRPLA, or many other insurgencies. You have to be the de-facto administration to mimic an administration.

Given a specific context, social services are Why you are fighting the war. They are not How you fight the war.

[William F. Owen]

Agree 100%, thus you must agree then that we have to develop HN capacity to secure the area, since we can only control so much?

Yes you must increase HN security forces. Absolutely! Do you have to dig a well and build a school? What do the civilians want and can you protect for the next 10 years, 24/7? Context, context and context.

Hopefully this makes sense, I agree all war is fought for political purposes, but not all wars are fought using politics as a primary effort at the "tactical" level. That is perhaps the difference between irregular and regular warfare. To say all war is political is like saying all war is war, it is true, but not useful. The character of each war/conflict is different, and it is important that we understand it, or we'll likely fail to address the real threat or solve the real problem.

Well we will probably differ here as I believe in the unitary model of war. I think War is War is very useful, because it usefully simplifies and identifies those aspects that differentiate wars and conflict from each other. I dispute that you "fight using politics". I suggest precisely the opposite. You fight so that you can apply politics. If you can apply "policy" without fighting, then great.

Looking at schools specifically, the building isn't that important, but rather who appoints the instructors and monitors their curriculum that is critical.

Concur. - so do you need a building?

[M-A Lagrange]

Hello everybody,

Well, I will not quote everybody (mainly Bill and Steve) as there are too many things to be address.

Basically what Steve and Bill are saying is basically the roots of the Master in crisis management I'll be defending at La Sorbonne in 1 month.

The question is how using NGOs (local and international) to provide security or at least support security efforts.

The solution that comes in first though is that you need to centralise money. By pooling all donors together,you reduce the number of donors actors. Basically you will remain with USAID, ECHO (European Union) and DFID. What has been done as an experiment is to rally all small donors like CIDA,SIDA, Belgium, Spain, JICA... Under 1 umbrella. (this dream did happen and has been 1 failure and 1 success, actually working with the failure and participating to a book on the success).

Once you have this you can actually coordinate for real the NGO work as you control money. You can orient NGO presence through funding to areas you want and in sectors you want. To do so you need to involve the UN. It is the only body NGO will feel confortable with to be commanded. There comes the first trap: the UN. They are so much not use to be accountable and in charge that they may #### up all the things (My actual location). For that you need a strong well controled Humanitarian Coordinator and a strong Head of OCHA. (Otherwise you end up with idiots doing what they what and weasting the money, believe me, they are just good at it).

The second action is to develop specific activities that will contribue to build population security. For that you need creative NGOs with a high acceptance of the ratio risk/benefits. Basically local NGOs: they are made by the people and have an obligation of success. While international NGO have a low acceptance of the ratio risk/benefits and then will be reluctant to work in dirty places or will go against new idears, just by definition.

The main idea is not to replace military/police work with NGO: this simply does not work. Security has to be taken by professionals and NGO workers are not (believe, I know what I'm talking about. Just reading military theories makes you an alien and a dangerous spy...). But where the military comes in place in that is through cooperation with NGO. Basically it is anot so much sophisticated PSYOP that youconduct to make believe NGO they are telling you what to do when actually you are monitoring what they do.
This also has been experimented with + and -. Mainly due to the way military are integrating them selve into NGO information sharing network. (the basic is to go to the NGO through their channel openly and aske for advice. Not that simple.)

Comments welcomed, the people I will present that next month cannot be tuffer that all of you.

For Bob: I did have you point on Islamic NGO. The thing is that it is much, much more complicate. Part from Islamic Relief International Saudi Arabia (not to mess with the UK based Islamic Relief World Wide or Islamic Relief Pakistan) the picture is far from being that simple. But I also agree with you.

For Wilf: what is the difference in what you propose and IDF strategy on Gaza?