Blog Post Critique of FM 3.07

[Old Eagle]

The point of 3-07 was to give substance to that block of full spectrum operations called stability operations. Mind you, I was forced to take 2.5 credit hours of STABOPS in undergrad a hundred years ago, so this is by no means "new".

In the years after the live fire exercise in Southeast Asia, we got exceptionally good at "two up and one back". The various MRE/MRXs made us an Army second to none in that area. But every major exercise I ever participated in, ENDEX was called, AAR, clean the gear and go home. This inculcated the misperception that in real combat, once the military force was defeated (or disappeared) we could declare victory, AAR, clean the gear and go home. Everything else was allocated to the "not my yob" box. This attitude is both wrong and dangerous, as we learned after completion of major combat operations in Iraq.

3-07 provides insight for planners and operators on what additional challenges might lurk around "2 up & 1 back" and ways to think about dealing with them.

[marct]

Overall the good professor is making the same argument that having a manual on stability operations creates stability operations. Thinking about something in advance is better than ignoring it until it bites our collective butts.

The Prof is mostly wrong on that but it does send a message that brilliant minds have considered this and it is feasible. It may not be -- Afghanistan being an example -- and it, unless you read the fine print (which Politicians are unlikely to do or understand even if they did) sends the message 'this can be done and we really know how.' IOW, the METT-TC problems are elided for the civilian policy maker who thus might make a flawed decision. I've noticed many of those do not trust folks in uniform and thus read our books to make their decisions...

John's point also comes into play -- people believe the book, rightly or wrongly. If the book say this is good, people will believe that -- even if it's dumber than a box of rocks as a thing to do. Therefor, what is written in the books becomes terribly important in the armed forces...

That was pretty much the point I was trying to get at in my ham fisted way, Ken. Basically, if you have a "book" then people who don't know better will think that you can do StabOps, and the activists amongst them will think that you should do them (think Darfur for an example). Whether we look at them as textbooks (here's how you do it), capabilities statements (look, we can do it) or political works (here is why you do it), they will be misread by a lot of people... including politicians !

ps. And yes, I do think that thinking in advance is an excellent idea, Tom .

[John T. Fishel]

Marc, ol' CvC was hamstrung by the German language which, like Spanish and others, uses one word - politika or politica - to mean both politics and policies. CvC uses it to mean both, depending on context and uses similar phrases throughout all 8 Books of On War.

Other than that, i'm with you.

Cheers

JohnT

[Bob's World]

Warning: I have not yet read this manual, and have only briefly scanned the comments in this thread, but a couple of quick comments:

1. [B]"address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world." [/B]

This is actually the essence of the "Indirect Approach" as presented by SOCOM and should be the main effort of any sound counterinsurgency effort; ideally executed by-with and through the host nation (they do the COIN, we do the FID). This should also be supported by a solid effort to go after the insurgent himself (direct approach) and establish security; again, executed ideally by-with-and through the Host nation.

(note to all who think "indirect approach" means using HN forces to kill rogue members of his populace -- it's not. That is still the direct approach, and still focused at the symptom of the true problem.)

2. I suspect the Army's approach to "root causes" is probably way way too focused on producing effectiveness of government. This is where I see us often making a multi-billion, multi-year, mistake. Insurgency is neither caused nor cured by ineffective governmental services per se. I stand by the much simpler standard of addressing "poorness" of governance. BW defined as some grievance, real or perceived, held by some significant segment of the populace that they feel so strongly about as to rise to violence; that they also perceive they have no legitmate means to address.

This means:
Leave the Battalions of foreign civilian workers at home; set your bag of effectiveness metrics down; and simply get out among the people and conduct some polling to identify and map these core issues. Then implement a program to help the HN to address these issues (which may well cause significant changes of that same government) concurrent with driving the devlopment of a reliable system for the populace to address such issues in the future short of conflict.

We make this harder than it needs to be; and meddling in another country's internal conflicts is hard enough as it is. Also, taking this leaner, less US-Centric approach also helps minimize the perception of US legitimacy over the HN government, and that should always be our primary goal of any engagement, be it with friend or foe.

[John T. Fishel]

worked pretty well in El Salvador (FID/COIN - we do former they do latter), Panama (simple intervention followed by FID) but it didn't work and won't work in Haiti - a failed state in 1915, 1994, 2004, and today. The choice there is keeping the lid on and mitigating the worst effects of state failure for a very long time of finding the "root causes" of that failure and fixing them which may be mission impossible or at least mission too costly. I haven't mentioned the Balkan cases or Somalia but the latter has some similarities with Haiti made more urgent by piracy.... FM 3.07 attempts to tell the Army how to address all of these cases and remains a start point not not an end point.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

FM 3.07 attempts to tell the Army how to address all of these cases and remains a start point not not an end point.

A start point? IMO, if the Army has to implement the provisions of that manual in any degree, you've entered at a mid point if not a near end point. If the start point is usually predicted --and it is -- then failure of the US government to act in its interest to preclude deploying forces is a significant abrogation of responsibility and a potential error of great magnitude. That's for the future.

For the past, Viet Nam, Iraq and Afghanistan are exceptions, respectively due to a treaty (which should not have been signed); the need to send a strong message (made so by the failure to act of four previous administrations from both major parties. In the event, better timing and execution would've been nice); and a necessary response to undue provocation (which need not have entailed us saying we would stay and fix it -- but we did). Other smaller interventions on a low key basis have been much more successful; witness 1st SFG in the Philippines today. Even the exceptions noted prove the point that getting smarter up front is beneficial.

Bob's World is correct, the "Indirect Approach" encouraged by SOCOM should be the main effort of any sound counterinsurgency effort; ideally executed by-with and through the host nation and early enough to avoid a major troop commitment which is in no ones interest. He adds "they do the COIN, we do the FID". True but better to preempt that need if possible; if that's not possible as will occasionally be the case then the manual is adequate if over wordy. Like me

It is true that Haiti and Somalia are for various reasons particularly intractable and problematic. So is Afghanistan. Entry into the problems of such nations can be seen in advance as particularly onerous and should be avoided other than as one member of a large coalition -- in which we are NOT the largest contributor of money or troops (because the more we do, the less others will do). For that and other reasons, the use of large bodies of US Armed Forces in most of Africa should be diligently avoided. There are a lot of our non-friends just salivating over the idea we will be that foolish...

[Ron Humphrey]

For that and other reasons, the use of large bodies of US Armed Forces in most of Africa should be diligently avoided. There are a lot of our non-friends just salivating over the idea we will be that foolish...

Something that the new command would have been set up to help avoid.

[Ken White]

only hope...

[William F. Owen]

1. [B]"address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world." [/B]

This is actually the essence of the "Indirect Approach" as presented by SOCOM and should be the main effort of any sound counterinsurgency effort; ideally executed by-with and through the host nation (they do the COIN, we do the FID).

I submit that this not "an approach" but a statement of political intent, or at best a statement of personal belief, born of political opinions. Armies do not exist to address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world. They are instruments of policy. They are not the makers of the policy.

[Bob's World]

I submit that this not "an approach" but a statement of political intent, or at best a statement of personal belief, born of political opinions. Armies do not exist to address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations of the world. They are instruments of policy. They are not the makers of the policy.

The essence of SF is deal with root causes, and this has little to do with making policy, as we don't pick where we go or determine what our missions are when we get there.

It is far more a recognition of the old saying that "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure."

As big Army searches for validation for sustaining itself into the next QDR timeframe they are drilling hard into how to be such a prevention force as part of "Irregular Warfare" and "Security Force Assistance"... Certainly there is a role they can play as they possess so much tremendous capacity and talent, but as a whole are far better at "pounding out a cure" than subtlely preventing the problem in the first place; which probably gets to the heart of WILF's concern.

[Mark O'Neill]

US SOCOM is not the 'owner' of the idea of the 'indirect approach'. It was (to the best of my knowledge)first codified by Liddell Hart in Strategy (Faber and Faber, London, 1954) and subsequently expanded upon by Andre Beaufre ('war in the minor key') inAn introduction to strategy (1965) and strategy of action (1967?).

An indirect approach is not a uniquely SOF concept, particularly when one considers that its genesis predates the creation of US SOF.....

Cheers

Mark

[marct]

Hi John,

Marc, ol' CvC was hamstrung by the German language which, like Spanish and others, uses one word - politika or politica - to mean both politics and policies. CvC uses it to mean both, depending on context and uses similar phrases throughout all 8 Books of On War.

Other than that, i'm with you.

Hmm, didn't know that - thanks, John! Quite the argument in support of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis .

[Ken White]

As big Army searches for validation for sustaining itself into the next QDR timeframe they are drilling hard into how to be such a prevention force as part of "Irregular Warfare" and "Security Force Assistance"...

Stupid argument. We're all supposed to be on the same side...

And don't cite 'reality' -- it is reality only because people who should know better and care more continue to perpetrate and encourage it for their own ends. Parochialism is as or more deadly than politics...

[Ken White]

An indirect approach is not a uniquely SOF concept, particularly when one considers that its genesis predates the creation of US SOF

A lot of things predate the creation of US SOF as it exists today. Some of were doing that stuff before the current version hatched. Some of us were there at the creation. Many of us who strongly support the Force and have done so for years question some of the directions now apparently being taken.

I'd also add that doing the totally expected thing on bad route and / or repetitiously is NOT an indirect approach...

[Bob's World]

US SOCOM is not the 'owner' of the idea of the 'indirect approach'. It was (to the best of my knowledge)first codified by Liddell Hart in Strategy (Faber and Faber, London, 1954) and subsequently expanded upon by Andre Beaufre ('war in the minor key') inAn introduction to strategy (1965) and strategy of action (1967?).

An indirect approach is not a uniquely SOF concept, particularly when one considers that its genesis predates the creation of US SOF.....

Cheers

Mark

Agree Agree! First place I saw the term is in Sun Tzu. I meant the current GWOT use of the phrase within the US military as based upon operations in OEF-Philippines.

Clearly it is an old phrase with many meanings. The meanings I lay out are those that match its application to the operations that have put it back on the table. No copy right infringement intended!

[John T. Fishel]

The article on Sapir-Whorf is interesting. Politica/politika really doesn't cause a problem because what is meant by the term is usually quite clear from the context. It sometimes becomes problematic in translation but then all translation is problematic. A particularly interesting linguistic example from English v Spanish is the verb to compromise. In English it can mean to become committed or to reach an agreement where each sid gives up something. In Spanish the only meaning of comprometer is to become committed. Kind of like being a littel pregnant - uh, embarasada - embarrassed

Cheers

JohnT

[William F. Owen]

It is far more a recognition of the old saying that "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure."

OK, but that's not a decision SOCOM or anyone else in the Armed Forces can make. Military engagement is an entirely political decision driven by party politics that underpin the US foreign policy.

You guys do what the politicians tell you. Helping the disenfranchised is a party political decision.

[John T. Fishel]

Don't mistake the US political system for a European style party system. The 1920s - 30s Oklahoma cowboy humorist, Will Rogers, put it well when he said, "I'm not a member of an organized political party, I'm a Democrat!" While our political parties are the single best predictors of how our Congressmen and Senators vote, the correlation is far from perfect. When Senator Arlen Spector changed parties from Republican to Democrat his new party was well aware that he would vote against them whenever he chose to do so - unlike when Winston Churchill crossed the aisle to become a Conservative again after many years as a Liberal.
Remember too, that there is as much battle between the institutions of government - Pres v Congress - as between the parties. Mr Obama has appointed a couple of Republicans to his Cabinet - most prominent is SECDEF Bob Gates - as his predecessor had appointed at least one Democrat. American policies are not party policies, although party preferences do have an effect on shaping them. They are the product of institutional and personal experiences, education, and training tempered somewhat by party.
So, the American military responds to its political masters far more on an institutional basis than on a party basis. Moreover, by our law - the National Security Act of 1947 as amended - and through 62 years of practice, the American military in the form of the CJCS is very much involved in the deliberations that establish Presidential policy. While the CJCS is a "statutory advisor" to the Pres, SECDEF, and the NSC, he is a full member of the policymaking Principals Committtee, the VCJCS is a full member of the Deputies Committee, and Joint Staff officers are full members of the intergency working groups/committees (by whatever name they currently have) that make defense and foreign policy under the NSC.
In short, our system is unlike that of the UK, any other English speaking democracy, or that of Israel, or any other country for that matter. Indeed, our process is simply messier than most others.

Cheers

JohnT

[William F. Owen]

In short, our system is unlike that of the UK, any other English speaking democracy, or that of Israel, or any other country for that matter. Indeed, our process is simply messier than most others.

Understood, and thanks. However, I think my broad point is still valid. The military does not choose the strategy to which they contribute.

Nor, for the most part can they usefully predict what that strategy maybe, unless they can predict political developments world wide - which history shows, none of us can!