Winning hearts and minds

[Ken White]

This is where theory and reality clash. Of course it's military business...If we must intervene, it is to our economic benefit (and I would say that more than economics is involved) to leave behind stable countries which can contribute to the stability of the global system... Part of this fight included 'nation building' operations which brings us back to Uboat509's wisdom.(emphasis added / kw)

Note the words I placed in bold -- that's the issue, the worth of Civil Affairs is not being attacked.

There's no question that Civil Affairs as a branch and discipline is necessary nor is there any doubt about the good things they've done. The question is who can best provide the sustained efforts to other nations to preclude the commitment of US Armed Forces in large quantities. If such a commitment is necessary, then Civil Affairs will of course be critically important until some stability is obtained and the civil side which is capable of long term effort is able to initially augment and then eventually supplant the CA effort so that CA can reset for the next effort.

Military force should be a last resort when all other options fail. If, however, it's committed, then of course CA is necessary. The goal should be to avoid commitments of the Armed Forces, it's hard on the bods...

No one is arguing that nation building has not been or is not necessary nor does anyone dispute how we we've done it in the past or that CA has done great work -- but we also used to ride to work on elephants...

[Surferbeetle]

... the worth of Civil Affairs is not being attacked.

Ken, no beef with you on this, you are consistent on this and other points in your postings.

The question is who can best provide the sustained efforts to other nations to preclude the commitment of US Armed Forces in large quantities.

Effective Interagency efforts can preclude wars and can help to end wars on more favorable terms. If a frog had wings...as of today our Interagency efforts are still not where they need to be, nor have they ever been in our past. This was why I posted the CA history; despite our best efforts wars will always occur and in every US war to date the Army screams 'Nation building is not my job' and then ends up having to do the bulk of it by default...I say again, the US Army has consistently repeated this same behavior since 1776.

Since repeating the same behavior and expecting different results is nonsensical, we need to permanently build in effective (staffing levels and range of skill sets) nation building capability into the Army. Call them CA (defined here as part of the SOF team AC & RC), call them Advisers, call them what you will, we need to admit we have a problem in this area of full spectrum operations and get 'Army Strong' in this area. Hindsight being 20/20, early Interagency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan might have been more successful in preventing/deflecting/reducing our troubles with additional SOF/Adviser assistance. Effective Interagency and SOF/Adviser efforts will almost certainly ease our passage from Iraq and Afghanistan.

Military force should be a last resort when all other options fail.

The goal should be to avoid commitments of the Armed Forces, it's hard on the bods...

Truly wise words here and you have argued elsewhere that if we build effective nation building capability (staffing levels and range of skill sets) into the US Military it will be used, which may lead to additional problems down the road. It's a good and wise analysis my friend, however the requirement still remains, and our history since 1776 reflects that we do not avoid these types of commitments. Accordingly, it is way, way past time for the Army to stand up and say 'Hi, my name is the US Army and I have a serious problem with nation building...'

-- but we also used to ride to work on elephants...

[Ken White]

If a frog had wings...as of today Interagency efforts are still not where they need to be, nor have they ever been in our past.

True on both counts. Just because the US government has always been shortsighted is indicative of the possibility that it will remain so. However, there is a slight if not an equal chance that can be changed.

Those who fight for the Status Quo are likely to get it.

This was why I posted the CA history: in every US war the Army screams 'Nation building is not my job' and then ends up having to do it by default...I say again, the US Army has consistently repeated this same behavior since 1776.

I don't think that is correct. As your own examples show, that was not true in and after WW II. It was not true in Korea or Viet Nam to my recollection. There was indeed an early burble in Viet Nam but that was because the Army deliberately pushed State and USAid out of the picture -- so whose fault was that...

Now we want to do that again?

We need to permanently build in effective (staffing levels and range of skill sets) nation building capability into the Army. Call them CA, call them Advisors, call them what you will we need to admit we have a problem in this area of full spectrum operations and get strong in this area.

Not going to happen. Not affordable or sustainable. We can add some and will; we can better train everyone to do this better and we seem to be doing so. We can take SF / SOCOM / CA elements and apply them in the pre-emptive mode (which is what Bob's World and I are essentially saying) and we can apply others as adjuncts or augmentation to better trained GPF units 'enhanced' to provide advisory and nation building support where necessary -- as is being done.

You know as well as I do that the capability to get all the required skills aboard and keep them current only exists in the RC and those units have to compete with others for spaces, further, that the turnover and mobility in many of those skills mitigates against any significant expansion.

If the Army were to take your unaffordable advice and significantly enhance the internal 'nation building' capability and that cape were not used for, say five to ten years -- do you really think either the Army or Congress would allow those mostly unused space and units to remain in the structure? They never have in the past and that's what caused your cited problem in prior wars. The bulk of the CA effort was where it should have been, in the Reserve (I'd add some in the Guard, as well for several reasons). An AC buildup to augment BCTs is underway and that's all you're likely to get.

As for the RC guys, I've got more than a little familiarity with a number of nominally Civic Action / Training projects here and there including these LINK. Read the practical stuff, pgs 5-7 of the .pdf. GAO is not that swift but other assessments broadly agreed on the training and diplomatic benefits. That is not a knock, merely to point out that you have to grope and spend big bucks for small return to find productive training.

Thus it is in everyone's interest to push the USG to develop the Civil and State / USAid capability because if you don't:

if we build the capability it will be used, which may lead to additional problems down the road.

Just so. Inviting problems to solve is the preferred course of action?

...but once again we have had to do this type of work since 1776...

I say again: "but we also used to ride to work on elephants."

The requirement will never go away. It is way, way past time for the Army to stand up and say 'Hi, my name is the US Army and I have a serious problem with nation building...'

I totally agree! you're absolutely correct. Good point.

It will never go away and the Army needs to be prepared for probable employment and possible expansion as required of both civil affairs and general nation building efforts. We can agree on that. Where we disagree I think is on the extent or limits of sensible expansion in view the world situation today. My sensing is that you wish a significant expansion and my sensing is that the requisite skills are not going to flock to the Army -- especially if we avoid interventions for a while and they are in uniform but way underemployed. IOW, be careful what you ask for , you may get it

We also, it appears, differ in that you seem to be of the opinion the Army should want the mission and stand up to say we can do it and we can do it better. I strongly disagree. It is not a core task and while it was absorbed by a large conscripted Army of 12M bodies in WW II, it is undesirable in a small professional force -- underline 'small' -- that cannot afford too many off core missions or to devote to may resources to missions that are inherent (like CA etc.). It is one thing to be prepared for full spectrum contingencies and for nation building as many of us advocate. It is quite another to develop excess capability for one spectrum that will adversely impact others and which is unlikely to ever be large or robust enough to operate at needed capacity lacking another major existential war. IOW, if it is almost certainly going to need augmentation, better that augmentation be available.

Going a step further, it is not desirable in my view for the Armed Forces to be the only elements of the USG to have to "embrace the suck" as they say. That needs for many reasons to be shared for the sake of all the nation. So given that, the 'augmentation' problem plus staffing and recruiting realities it seems to me the best course of action is for the Army to stand up and say 'Hi, my name is the US Army and I have a serious problem with nation building -- I can and will provide entry and non-secure environment capability but it is our considered professional opinion and advice that it would be better for the nation to avoid such cases if at all possible through better intelligence assessments followed by diplomatic, aid and development assistance. However, in the event all that fails and if a military commitment is unavoidable, the nation should be prepared at the earliest possible time to augment then replace the Army's capability." We've about worn out the "Yessir, yessir, three bags full... " option. History also shows where that has gotten us...

Lastly and most importantly and back to the real point -- the USG should expend more effort to AVOID wars instead of trying to get into them and then screwing the pooch. If you do not force the Diplomats and Policy Makers to send civilians and guardsmen and reservists off to wars, they will have no reason to avoid them. Again, build a capability that aches to be used and it will be.

[Steve Blair]

Actually there was a point where the Army very much wanted to get into the business of what we would now call nation-building. Review the history of our own country between, say, 1850 or so and 1891. There was life before WW 2, after all..... (I'm just sayin'...)

I'm honestly starting to think that one of the few ways we can avoid military engagement is to go semi-isolationist again. Our system simply isn't set up to develop and maintain a long-term foreign policy of the one Ken seems to be recommending. Grand strategy (no matter what some pundits might say) is really at the polar opposite from our electoral system. Even the much-vaunted Manifest Destiny and the Cold War both lurched along historically, MD more so than the Cold War, and there was never a sort of centralized direction that might seem so crystal clear in hindsight (or that might be claimed by those with agendas good, bad, and neutral). And as I mentioned in another thread, the money to build up State, USAID, etc. will have to come from somewhere...and I just don't see DoD giving up any of its share in the pie. So we end up where we started.

[Ken White]

...I mentioned in another thread, the money to build up State, USAID, etc. will have to come from somewhere...and I just don't see DoD giving up any of its share in the pie. So we end up where we started.

even though it is emphatically in their long term interest to do so, they will not want to give up their perceived clout.

So someone will have to make them give up some of it. And they'll have to get used to buying enough 'good enough' items instead of the a surfeit of the 'best.' That would reduce OM costs and with smart buys, could cut personnel requirements which in turn reduce sunk and hidden costs...

I agree the Electoral system is at odds with anything long term. Before, we managed to achieve a degree of continuity with the senior civil service types; they've now been pushed aside by a far larger number of political appointees (LINK) and their ranks have proliferated and the OPM system moves them frequently to totally different jobs (sounds like the Army, huh...) to such an extent they no longer have much clout. Therefor, there is not nearly as much continuity as there once was and that hurts. Congressional short-termism also hurts. Service senior leader short termism is not helpful.

The way to fix that is attack the bureaucracy; design and stack it so it will do what's needed.

[Uboat509]

Hi Wilf,



Really, REALLY good point! All too often, I find at any rate, that many people don't take basic emotions into consideration. Envy is a really good example, and one of the easiest ones to manipulate. The simplest version goes like this:

X: do you see what the Americans have?

Y: Yes

X: Why don't we have that?

Y: Because the Americans got it by stealing our natural resources

X: So it's all the fault of the Americans?

Y: Yes. They steal our resources and send us McDonalds and Bay Watch!

X: So they are both thieves AND immoral (I only watch Bay Watch so I can know my enemy!).

Y: Yes, and they also try to destroy our children by making them eat fast food and listen to their Satan worshipping music! We KNOW they are EVIL because all they have they stole from us!

Silly, but a good example of how envy can be used in an anti-American IO campaign.

This is true but it can work both ways. I believe that at least part of the reason for the fall of communism was that people in communist countries got tired seeing all the things that we had in the West while they were waiting in long lines for old bread. They may have been jealous of us and hated us for what we had but they hated the system that kept them from getting it themselves more.

SFC W

[Kiwigrunt]

So someone will have to make them give up some of it. And they'll have to get used to buying enough 'good enough' items instead of the a surfeit of the 'best.' That would reduce OM costs and with smart buys, could cut personnel requirements which in turn reduce sunk and hidden costs...

I fear that that someone, or a large number of someones, are the ones holding the biggest ricebowls. And they would need to break a lot of ricebowls.

...and their ranks have proliferated...
The way to fix that is attack the bureaucracy; design and stack it so it will do what's needed.

Totally agree.....good luck....
Appears to me that said bureaucracy has grown into such a large beast, with so many self lickers and self fuelers, that it would almost need some sort of revolution to attack it (I'm not suggesting muskets and bayonets.....but then I don't know what I'm suggesting).
Wonder where hearts and minds at home would fit into all that

[Ken White]

I fear that that someone, or a large number of someones, are the ones holding the biggest ricebowls. And they would need to break a lot of ricebowls.

DoD is made of thousands of small ones; like any operation, you just have to attack the nodes. As Slapout will tell you, in SBW, you have to identify those with motive, means and opportunity. That changes from time to time but one can generally track the power centers. For example, Project Manager FCS is no longer one though I'm sure they're fighting for another name and a transfusion.

Appears to me that said bureaucracy has grown into such a large beast, with so many self lickers and self fuelers...

True, like I said, many, many -- just hit the right ones, perhaps a couple of dozen. Most of 'em are alright and need little modification, just change the few that one believes need to be modified -- or killed.

Wonder where hearts and minds at home would fit into all that

Nowhere. Bureaucracies are heartless and mindless. This is a good thing, don't need to be sympathetic when attacking them and you can outsmart them. Plus they all have blind spots. However, some do have Scouts and early warning systems and some are devious -- just have to be a little smarter, a bit stealthy and flank 'em on the blind side...

[marct]

Hi Uboat,

This is true but it can work both ways. I believe that at least part of the reason for the fall of communism was that people in communist countries got tired seeing all the things that we had in the West while they were waiting in long lines for old bread. They may have been jealous of us and hated us for what we had but they hated the system that kept them from getting it themselves more.

Yup, it can work that way, especially when there is a concerted effort to "blame the Yanks" for, say, 40 years or so while extolling your own "virtues"... as everyone stands in line for 6 month old bread .

Where the inverse you point to fails is when there is a constant re-inforcement of real world examples where everyone can "see" it's the Yanks fault. Things like constantly harping on the Palestinian problem and the absolute windfall, from an IO point of view, of the invasion of Iraq. When we were back in the Cold War, people had a hard time pointing to specific, empirical (in the sense that people can perceive them even if those perceptions are interpreted by others), acts.

[MikeF]

Interesting responses, and I appreciate the comments...If taken holistically, many of the finer points of this discussion and Wilf's debate on violence in COIN may one day add to the overall benefit on US Foreign Policy...

I waited a bit to share my own thoughts so others could provide theirs...Before I share my comments, I want to clarify a couple of issues...

1. Kuwait- Not a free capitalistic democracy. I've spent some time there, Kuwait is basically a city ran by an Islamic-monarchy. The majority of its residents are not citizens. They are aliens- Phillipinoes and Egyptians working 9-5 jobs to support their families abroad.

2. Korea. Excellent example of a thriving nation-state that embraces democracy and capitalism after U.S. intervention; however, the Korean war is still not officially over, and they cannot yet defend their own borders...So, I'm at a crossroads with this one.

Okay, with that said, to the meat of the issue. I assumed that COL Jones (Bob's World) and others would suggest the Phillipines and Colombia as successess. In many ways, I concur, but it is essential to determine our effects AND our limitations and constraints in these operations over the past nine years.

1. Colombia. The Clinton Administration authorized Plan Columbia in the late 1990's to assist the Colombian government in its efforts to defeat the FARC. At the time, the FARC was a narco-terrorist organization focused on drug-trafficking. It is important to understand that it was not an insurgency bent on overrunning the government. After 9/11, the Bush Administration provided additional support to Plan Colombia, and the results have been rather effective...More on that later.

2. Phillipines. Every mom and their dad loves to promote 1st Group's success in Mindanou and Basilan in the Southern Phillipines. It is classic FID, and it worked. The mission of OEF-P was to assist the Phillipino government in defeating Abu Sayef- Under the GWOT, Abu Sayef was categorized as terrorist organization aligned with al Qaeda. I differ. I would suggest that Abu Sayef was simply another criminal organization akin to the FARC. OEF-P was highly successful in defeating Abu Sayef; however, the Phillipines still faces an insurgency (Communist) and a seperatist group (Islamist).

So what?

Positives:

1. We helped two governments confront internal threats.

Constraints:

1. Both governments are still facing issues to the sovereignty and legitimacy to the rule of law.

Lessons Learned:

1. The host nations had been in conflict with both enemy groups for some time (20-30 years) before they asked us to help.
2. In both cases, military advisors were constrained by Congress or the HN on what they could and could not do.
3. Both operations were highlighted by majority State Dept involvement focused on the rule of law and goveranance...US Military action was minimal.
4. As Dr. Tyrell states, the final results will take years.

On the other hand, we can examine what I would propose as three of the US worst interventions in the past fifty years.

1. Iran (1959-1976).
2. Guatemala (1960-2000).
3. Afghanistan (1980-2000).

Each case study is worth at least an essay not simply a post on a blog...It's just something to think about while we try and determine best measures of policy.

v/r

Mike

[Ken White]

Define intervention, please. With respect to Iran during the dates you mention I'm confused. To me, the word intervention used with respect to the affairs of nations implies this:

a. To involve oneself in a situation so as to alter or hinder an action or development
b. To interfere, usually through force or threat of force, in the affairs of another nation.

[George L. Singleton]

I know the Philippines politically and their economy. A former, long term dictatorship, their entire economy is weak, depend on Western and Japanese bank roll overs forever of national lines of credit to the Government of the Philippines. Huc Communist rebels have existed in far eastern part of the Philippine Islands since the end of WW II, communist guerillas now several generations "deep", a guerilla way of life, so to speak.

But, there actually are Muslims native to the Philippines and they are infected by the radical dogma of extremist Sunni Islam as being promoted worldwide by Saudi's Wahabbi Sunni terrorist style of so-called theology.

The US still runs a VA Hospital in Manila for the few WW II Filipino vets still living, dating back to WW II when these islands were still a US Territory.

In short, the world's central banks, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund carry the entire Philippine national economy perpetually...otherwise they would become a dictatorship or go communist for sure.

Kicking out US bases was one the dumbest things, cost thousands of jobs never found as effectively elsewhere in the Philippine economy.

[Bob's World]

To clarify:

I would never say that OEF-P is either a "victory", nor that it in of itself could ever resolve the Insurgency in the Southern Philippines. The first isn't true, and the second isn't possible.

Why?

The Philippines is a collection of thousands of islands, with diverse cultures and backgrounds, bundled neatly under one flag by the King of Spain. I doubt he consulted the locals first. As Spain grew old and feeble, and the US strong and ambitious, with the continental US fimly under control, looked outward for our own opportunities to be a real world (defined then as "colonial") power. A maritime nation, we understood the sea and the value of sea power, so set out to establish a string of US Coaling stations and harbors across the Pacific. Hawaii we simply claimed; Guam and the Philippines we took easily (both flags taken by a handful of Oregon Volunteers) from a feeble Spain. Grab Cuba while we're at it.

BL is that US interests in the Philippines have never had much to do with making the Philippines a stable populace, with strong governance and a robust economy. It has been a major power projection platform first and foremost; and strong governments are a pain to deal with, as George mentions above. They sometimes don't allow you to simply do whatever you want from their ports and airfields.


So, what is it that I think is the successful lesson people should take from our engagement in the Philippines?

1. We asked their permission to come in, and we followed their rules while we were there; subjugating our interests to those of the HN government.

2. We carefully avoided taking on enhanced perceptions of US legitimacy over the government of the Philippines; and have in fact enhanced the perceptions of legitimacy of the Philippine government in the South through our careful mentoring and support.

3. While JI still finds sanctuary in the area (concurrently, with little US help, the Malaysian and Indonesian security forces have done a TREMENDOUS job of enhancing the security of their populaces, so as one squeezed the balloon, the air goes somewhere...and the Southern Philippines is still the best bet due to the relationship between the Muslim poulace of the region and the Catholic government of the nation.); as does the largely criminal, but clinging to Jihad for legitimacy, ASG; among the primarily political MILF and MNLF communities: there is greater stability and security now than there used to be. (This is tenuous though, and really must be met with real action from the government in Manila if it is to be sustained or really develop).

3. We do this with 500 people. Not 5,000. Not 50,000. Not 500,000. 500. In this business less is more. But they have to be the right people, with the right leadership, executing the right mission, in the right manner. This is complex, and it is not warfare. The worst thing we could do (and many smart military guys waaay more senior than I have grown frustrated with the "lack of progress") and clammored to "just go in and whack those guys!" So far we have held the hawks in check, as such actions would destroy everything acomplished to date; make us liars and damage tremendously our national credibility, not just in the Philippines, but across the region and the world. Operations in Columbia were even smaller.

[Surferbeetle]

Americans live the Stone Soup parable every day. We have all been that traveler living on his wits who walks into a town with a stone and walks out with a meal. Part of the reason we do it so well is that our collective family histories pull from every nation on earth where everybody makes soup differently. DOD took a page from this type of thinking when it configured our military forces. Unfortunately things within DOD having gotten out of balance and our problems are compounded by a general systemic failure to practice making stone soup with other government agencies. Fortunately there are still localized exceptions within DOD that believe in and practice the parable.

We are all thinking about what Full Spectrum Warfare/Unrestricted Warfare is.

The multiplication of the means of waging war has expanded the scope of military activities, amended the idea that "war is bloody politics" and of "war as the final means for settling disputes." The object of war is no longer just to "use military force to force the enemy to accept one’s will" but now is "use any method, including military and non-military means, lethal and non-lethal means to force the enemy to satisfy one’s own interest". [p. 55]

Just because the US government has always been shortsighted is indicative of the possibility that it will remain so. However, there is a slight if not an equal chance that can be changed.

Those who fight for the Status Quo are likely to get it

My point exactly; it is my argument that we are consistently weak in integrating the non-lethal/non-kinetic means portion into the warfare spectrum and that we have the ability to transform that weakness into a strength in a fiscally conservative manner. The reflexive counter argument that is often heard is that things are just fine the way they are.

Unlike the reflexive counter argument your well thought out and nuanced counter argument provides some opportunities to examine how we can cost effectively integrate the non-kinetic portion into the warfare spectrum

If the Army were to take your unaffordable advice and significantly enhance the internal 'nation building' capability and that cape were not used for, say five to ten years -- do you really think either the Army or Congress would allow those mostly unused space and units to remain in the structure? They never have in the past and that's what caused your cited problem in prior wars.

This is the crux of things right here Ken. It is my contention that if you take Uncle Sugar’s Nickel, irrespective of what your civilian attire/uniform color is, you have to ride on the merry-go-round.

Consider the headcount that exists solely in USG personnel who are presently resident in funded positions in USAID, DOS, USPHS, DOJ, USACE, Marine CAG/ENG/MC/NC (AC & RC), Army SF/CA/PSYOP/JAG/MP/ENG/MC/NC/MSC (AC, RC, & ARNG), USN Seals/JAG/ENG/MC/NC/MSC (AC & RC), and USAF JAG/ENG/MC/NC/MSC (AC, RC, AFNG).

Let’s sum that headcount number and assign it the variable X. Let's then assign the ideal number of people needed to accomplish our overseas non-kinetic mission the variable Y (and yes I am very aware that some of these folks are already multiskilled and can also do kinetic work).

It is my opinion that the ratio of X/Y multiplied by 100 is much greater than 100%. After designating nondeployables my contention remains that our existing personnel ratio is still much greater than 100%.

Tying nonkinetic USG civilian slots to an equivalent number of nonkinetic reserve/national guard slots (this force needs to be rebalanced -Advisors~SF/CA/PSYOP/ENG/JAG/MP/MC/NC/MSC) stretches our scarce taxpayer dollars, brings in valuable insights & methodologies not common to the US Military, and as a method of ‘Democracy in Action’ it keeps us out of unnecessary wars…

You know as well as I do that the capability to get all the required skills aboard and keep them current only exists in the RC and those units have to compete with others for spaces, further, that the turnover and mobility in many of those skills mitigates against any significant expansion.

Again my point exactly; non-kinetic skills are practiced daily in the civilian world and are best fielded by reserve/national guard types who have and practice the needed skill sets. Serving in the guard and reserve will expand your experience base, to include that of the concept of turnover as taught in the active component. Due to pesky fiscal (and other) constraints it is not uncommon to find people who will serve 20 or 30 years in their state or even a unit. Unit cohesiveness benefits as a result.

We also, it appears, differ in that you seem to be of the opinion the Army should want the mission and stand up to say we can do it and we can do it better. I strongly disagree.

Again it is my contention that if you take Uncle Sugar’s Nickel, irrespective of what your civilian attire/uniform color is, you have to ride on the merry-go-round. USG is USG…kind of like War is War.

Lastly and most importantly and back to the real point -- the USG should expend more effort to AVOID wars instead of trying to get into them and then screwing the pooch. If you do not force the Diplomats and Policy Makers to send civilians and guardsmen and reservists off to wars, they will have no reason to avoid them. Again, build a capability that aches to be used and it will be.

We are in violent agreement here….

[Ken White]

some minor obstacles...

...it is my argument that we are consistently weak in integrating the non-lethal/non-kinetic means portion into the warfare spectrum and that we have the ability to transform that weakness into a strength in a fiscally conservative manner.

That is true and is unlikely to change; we have the ability but Congressional desire is required. They may do the right thing. That would be different...

It is my opinion that the ratio of X/Y multiplied by 100 is much greater than 100%. After designating nondeployables my contention remains that our existing personnel ratio is still much greater than 100%.

Possibly true but don't forget to decrement those doing other things that cannot be deployed because they're deployed elsewhere -- also, do not forget a rotation stack, ideally that means four of everything; three could work, so could two in a pinch but not for long.

Again it is my contention that if you take Uncle Sugar’s Nickel, irrespective of what your civilian attire/uniform color is, you have to ride on the merry-go-round. USG is USG…kind of like War is War.

True dat...

[carl]

In post #37, Bob's World states that the German Army was never defeated in battle in WWI. I misread things at times so I am wondering if that is stated as a fact or an example of Nazi propaganda and post WWI German wishful thinking?

[George L. Singleton]

I had hoped someone would have answered the question I asked over a week ago about who was the Navy Air Commander in, bases, in the Philippines from end of WW II to 1947.

So, I will attempt to guess at the answer myself, since no one else has.

I think the overall 45-47 Naval Air Commander was Admiral Spruance, while the Navy on the ground air bases throughout the Philippines was commanded by Commodore Arthur Gavin, USN.

Now, can anyone else elaborate or correct me on the Navy air structure, who was in command, etc. at end of WW II in and on the Philippines. I may be either wrong or incomplete in these guessed at answers. Thanks.

[Surferbeetle]

...and no one walked away unscathed.

In post #37, Bob's World states that the German Army was never defeated in battle in WWI. I misread things at times so I am wondering if that is stated as a fact or an example of Nazi propaganda and post WWI German wishful thinking?

The Battle of the Marne is but one example.

The Battle of the Marne (also known as the Miracle of the Marne) was a First World War battle fought between the 5th and 12th of September 1914. It resulted in a Franco-British victory against the German Army under Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke the Younger. The battle effectively ended the month-long German offensive that opened the war and reached the outskirts of Paris. The counter-attack of Allied forces during the First Battle of the Marne ensured that a quick German victory was impossible, and set the stage for four years of trench warfare on the Western Front.[1]

[Ken White]

Here are two big defeats, there are others.

LINK.

LINK.

And here's how it wrapped up: LINK .