Winning hearts and minds

[marct]

Hi Wilf,

...but, do not underestimate the power of envy, or the stupid and convoluted thinking that sustains it, as a position, to make is seem other than what it is.

Really, REALLY good point! All too often, I find at any rate, that many people don't take basic emotions into consideration. Envy is a really good example, and one of the easiest ones to manipulate. The simplest version goes like this:

X: do you see what the Americans have?

Y: Yes

X: Why don't we have that?

Y: Because the Americans got it by stealing our natural resources

X: So it's all the fault of the Americans?

Y: Yes. They steal our resources and send us McDonalds and Bay Watch!

X: So they are both thieves AND immoral (I only watch Bay Watch so I can know my enemy!).

Y: Yes, and they also try to destroy our children by making them eat fast food and listen to their Satan worshipping music! We KNOW they are EVIL because all they have they stole from us!

Silly, but a good example of how envy can be used in an anti-American IO campaign.

[Bob's World]

Hi Wilf,



Really, REALLY good point! All too often, I find at any rate, that many people don't take basic emotions into consideration. Envy is a really good example, and one of the easiest ones to manipulate. The simplest version goes like this:

X: do you see what the Americans have?

Y: Yes

X: Why don't we have that?

Y: Because the Americans got it by stealing our natural resources

X: So it's all the fault of the Americans?

Y: Yes. They steal our resources and send us McDonalds and Bay Watch!

X: So they are both thieves AND immoral (I only watch Bay Watch so I can know my enemy!).

Y: Yes, and they also try to destroy our children by making them eat fast food and listen to their Satan worshipping music! We KNOW they are EVIL because all they have they stole from us!

Silly, but a good example of how envy can be used in an anti-American IO campaign.

I see the guy who is rich and all that he has, and wish I were rich too.

vice

I see a guy who stole my invention and got rich and I wish he were dead and I was rich instead.

Big difference. I agree that if you have created a perception that your wealth is ili-gotten, you will invite anger and attack; but it is not the disparity in status that incites that, it is the perceived injustice.

[marct]

I agree that if you have created a perception that your wealth is ili-gotten, you will invite anger and attack; but it is not the disparity in status that incites that, it is the perceived injustice.

I think that the disparity in material goods / lifestyle enhances the potential for creating a perception of "injustice" that opens the door to all sorts of manipulation. In effect, it makes it much easier to clothe envy in a mantle of rectitude so that it becomes "right and proper" to attack the (obvious) evil-doer. Hey, it's easier to sell that than interpret it as "Well, they got it because they worked their butts off!" .

[Ken White]

...I agree that if you have created a perception that your wealth is ili-gotten, you will invite anger and attack; but it is not the disparity in status that incites that, it is the perceived injustice.

That's very true but don't forget to add that the Rich guy who didn't steal your invention (well, he did steal some others but just a few) may have picked a few little items someone wasn't using here and there but while he's been fairly honest, he's been selfish and thus doesn't really have many friends (and many who seem to be friends not only do not wish him well but also work actively if in concealment to spread rumors about him and attempt to trip him up) and he's been prone to throw his wealth around lavishly (meaning well for sure but still garish and annoying to many).

There also those that wish to acquire some of his wealth and are endeavoring to do so by various means and, though they don't really like or dislike him, will do things that further their goal of separating the fool from his money. He's also annoyed a few real friends by publicly chiding them about one thing or another. He got in a couple of fights and won with people who have long -- really, really long -- memories...

So now he thinks that if he is less selfish, not so lavish with money and stops being more belligerent than most that others will cease saying bad things about him and he will merely become another wealthy guy who finally smartened up a bit. Everyone will let bygones be bygones?

Not going to happen. The rest of the world isn't as nice as most Americans seem to wish to think. Can we be in a better position by acting with more restraint and sense? Certainly -- but we are never going to be 'accepted' by the rest of the world as just another guy because we collectively violate too many norms.

China and India achieving great power status -- bound to happen -- will cause many to give us some slack. Others will use that change to attempt obtaining long wanted vengeance and still others will try to take what they can from the situation.

[Chris jM]

but I do see merit in the 'hearts and minds' phrase.

Yes, it is simplistic. Yes, it is imperfect. And of course it provides no real basis for action or practical conduct in COIN. What three word phrase does, though? If we avoid 'hearts and minds', are we supplanting willing support of our cause with forced obedience, ala Niccolo Machiavelli -

And here comes in the question whether it is better to be loved rather than feared, or feared rather than loved. It might perhaps be answered that we should wish to be both; but since love and fear can hardly exist together, if we must choose between them, it is far safer to be feared than loved.

See how fear worked for Alexander and the Soviets in Afghanistan - it might be a temporarily expedient solution to the problem of insurgency, but hardly a sustainable one.

I don't see 'hearts and minds' about people loving us for who we are, but I do see it as convincing them through both the narrative we deliver as part of our IO and through our actions that the agenda we bring is better than the one the enemy (or even neutrality) offers. This means we have to win the minds - convincing them that the cost of supporting our strategy outweighs that opposing us - and the hearts, the belief that what we are doing is right for their communities, their families, etc as part of our strategy.

Spud. I agree that 'minds and wills' is probably more accurate to what we are trying to achieve in COIN, but arguing that 'wills' not 'hearts' is what we are after is chasing semantics more than anything. I do take issue with the claim that "we should be trying to make the population hate the insurgent more than they hate us not the touchy feely opposite which is make them love us more than they love the insurgent."

Make them hate us less? Again, I hear the drums of the Prince and it just doesn't sit well with me. Your Army has done very well in ETimor winning the hearts and minds since 1999, which has paid dividends in the second spate of deployments from 2006 onwards. Is that because they fear the diggers less than they feared the militias/ petitioners (rogue army faction), or because they genuinely believed that the Australian forces represented an agenda that best served their families security and their communities chance at prosperity? In order to make someone hate you less than an enemy - in my mind the easiest way to achieve this is to offer benefits, not aiming at fear-at-a-lesser-degree.

I put 'hearts and minds' into the same column where other sayings go - 'every soldier a sensor', 'no better friend, no worse enemy', 'find, fix, strike, exploit', etc etc. Only a fool would use them as the crux of their conduct, but as a saying trying to summarize or encapsulate a rough intent I see no issues with it.

To sum it up, I don't see 'hearts and minds' about making people like us, but I do see it as a valid expression about winning people to our cause.

[slapout9]

I see the guy who is rich and all that he has, and wish I were rich too.

vice

I see a guy who stole my invention and got rich and I wish he were dead and I was rich instead.

Big difference. I agree that if you have created a perception that your wealth is ili-gotten, you will invite anger and attack; but it is not the disparity in status that incites that, it is the perceived injustice.

Greed and Revenge were two of the most powerful and two of the most common motives for crimes that I saw in LE.

[Ken White]

Fore example:

...This means we have to win the minds - convincing them that the cost of supporting our strategy outweighs that opposing us - and the hearts, the belief that what we are doing is right for their communities, their families, etc as part of our strategy.

You're unlikely to win many minds if any. They are very unlikely to support you -- and that is true whether you are truly performing a COIN operation against insurgents here in the US or are assisting another nation with their insurgent problem.

That, BTW is not semantic -- it is a critical distinction because, quite simply, if you are the government with an insurgency, you can do certain things. OTOH if you are assisting another nation, THEY are the government and you can do only what they want or allow (see Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Iraq).

Regardless, the populace is unlikely to support you and most likely to just want you gone ('and take your Insurgents with you...'). The goal is not to win their minds or their support but simply to make their support for the insurgents certainly not active and hopefully not too much tacitly. Note I say not too much because the bad guys can use fear to obtain support whereas you cannot. Thus it is extremely difficult to wean the populace off at least some support to the insurgents.

The solution, of course is to remove the insurgents because if you do not you're just another Alexander or USSR...

As for the hearts and believing what we are doing is right for their communities, their families, etc., get rid of the insurgents and do nothing for their communities and families and they will be grateful; provide bike paths and coffee shops, clinics and spas and allow the insurgents to remain and they will hate you.

arguing that 'wills' not 'hearts' is what we are after is chasing semantics more than anything. I do take issue with the claim that "we should be trying to make the population hate the insurgent more than they hate us not the touchy feely opposite which is make them love us more than they love the insurgent."

You may do so but reality is rarely all that pleasant. It's also more than semantic,the phrase induces a dangerous mindset and tends to lead people into erring on the side of development (often excessively so) and avoiding tough issues with respect to security. People love easy, 'nice' solutions. Spud's correct, they are not going to love you no matter what, you're a foreigner. Wealthy, helpful -- no matter. You're still from outside and you will leave and they'll still be where they are. They are very much aware of that immutable fact...

To sum it up, I don't see 'hearts and minds' about making people like us, but I do see it as a valid expression about winning people to our cause.

So do many others and that's the problem with the phrase. It tends to paint a quite false picture of what is realistically achievable in most insurgencies. You are not going to win them to your cause, the best you can do is get them to cease supporting your opponents.

To put it in even tighter perspective, take Afghanistan for an example. Very serious and pertinent question: What precisely is our cause?

[Chris jM]

Ken, I believe that I understand your argument.

Putting forward a response in counter to your views:

Stepping back to the big picture - and I do understand that this opens up a lot of unanswered questions as I will tend to veer into theory here, but stay with me - in COIN military forces are serving a political purpose as well as a military one.

The defeat of an insurgency by military means is only part of the mission. In being deployed in a expeditionary COIN role the aim is to defeat the insurgency and set the conditions for a sustainable peace whereby the insurgency will not flare up again. This means, unavoidably, that a COIN mission must conduct a social/ political/ developmental role to address the underlying factors that created the original armed dissension. There is minimal merit in the concept of defeating one insurgent group and pulling out, only for the underlying, unchanged conditions to produce another insurgency.

As such the NATO army in Afghanistan stands not only for the defeat of the TB, but for the promotion of a sustainable representative govt whose policies do not encourage or harbor a security threat to the developed world (i.e. a western friendly GoIRA). This means the west, primarily the uniformed part of ISAF but including the other aspects of national power (diplomatic, economic) has to convince the Afghan population that a govt acceptable to us is also the best option for them. It will bring the benefits of good governance, representation and so on, as well as reaping the benefits of being a developing nation accepted in the global community.

Militarily we seek to conduct all those good tactical task verbs on the Taliban and the insurgents, but if we accept that this course of action is our aim we are undoubtedly fighting a war of attrition against the enemy - and one in which they are better placed to fight, given that they do not have governments constantly facing re-election. Far more efficient is the combination of the security aspect as the stick while showing them the carrot of development (if any debate is to be judged on the use of metaphors, I would instantly lose with that crude example.)

The logical conclusion to your argument, in a hypothetical victory, is to the defeat of the TB with the Afghan population retracting support to a failed TB cause. Any such stability would be ephemeral. Withdraw, and the same causation factors that deny Afghanistan an effective, central government remain. In this sense we are fighting both economics and geography for without progress in either of these areas Afghanistan remains prone to decentralized power-structures and eventual in-fighting. Merely cutting off the head of the current threat in no way secures Afghanistan against the reappearance of the next militant or extremist group.

In seeking to defeat the TB, the easier option is to take away the support of the people by establishing a viable and sustainable alternative. Through pure security means - difficult. By employing all our available resources to gather the population behind a legitimate western style government - still difficult, but a slightly easier and more feasible course, I hope. (I imagine this is something you will disagree with, and I would be interested in knowing if this is an assumption I could be wrong in).

A security-only focus might eventually win, especially if it strengthens the ANSF sufficiently so that they can maintain the legitimacy of the central government. As I see it is far more efficient to simultaneously work towards security while capacity-building the other arms of the government for eventual self-sufficiency.

And... that's it. I doubt I have stated anything new to you, but nonetheless I am interested in your response. As an infantry officer I'd like to be find that you are right and that I can ditch the loathed CIMIC skill sets I have been forced to acquire.

My greatest fear is that I am right, and my profession is now one of armed social work.

[Chris jM]

Spud's correct, they are not going to love you no matter what, you're a foreigner. Wealthy, helpful -- no matter. You're still from outside and you will leave and they'll still be where they are. They are very much aware of that immutable fact...So do many others and that's the problem with the phrase. It tends to paint a quite false picture of what is realistically achievable in most insurgencies. You are not going to win them to your cause, the best you can do is get them to cease supporting your opponents.

The best we can do is to get them to cease supporting an opponents cause by replacing it with a cause we champion, I would argue. It's not 'hearts and minds' for altruism, as you have stated, but winning over their hearts and minds to an agenda that benefits our side as well as theirs.

To put it in even tighter perspective, take Afghanistan for an example. Very serious and pertinent question: What precisely is our cause?

I sense a trap. If I can answer this question satisfactorily, I'm putting in for an instant promotion.

But to take a stab at it - regardless of our original reasons for intervention, we are in Afghanistan to prevent militant Islam from becoming a viable force. We are combating the virulent form of militant Islam promoted by the TB with an acceptable form of Islamic government that is acceptable to the west.

Now...unleash! What was that, a partial failure or complete and utter failure of a response?

[Steve Blair]

My greatest fear is that I am right, and my profession is now one of armed social work.

If this is the case, it's really nothing more than a return to some of the profession's original functional (as opposed to envisioned doctrinal) roles, at least in the US. But since history's passe, I won't bore anyone with gory examples....

[IntelTrooper]

If this is the case, it's really nothing more than a return to some of the profession's original functional (as opposed to envisioned doctrinal) roles, at least in the US. But since history's passe, I won't bore anyone with gory examples....

I came for the combat and stayed for the social program administration.

[Ken White]

...in COIN military forces are serving a political purpose as well as a military one.

In COIN, they are indeed. Do recall that in Afghanistan and Iraq, we're not doing COIN, we're doing FID and that distinction is important because in FID you CANNOT do all the good things you might do if you were in charge. In FID, you are not in charge. So yes, a political purpose is being served but whose purpose can be an issue...

deployed in a expeditionary COIN role the aim is to defeat the insurgency and set the conditions for a sustainable peace whereby the insurgency will not flare up again.

Is it? Perhaps in some cases that should be the case and is not, in others it is truly intended and circumstances change.

There is minimal merit in the concept of defeating one insurgent group and pulling out, only for the underlying, unchanged conditions to produce another insurgency.

Possibly true; also, in the case of an intervening nation (i.e. the US) not something that can be controlled. (See Viet Nam, El Salvador post US intervention and today). Problem is that is the purview of the host nation, not those who intervene.

...for the promotion of a sustainable representative govt...This means the west, primarily the uniformed part of ISAF but including the other aspects of national power (diplomatic, economic) has to convince the Afghan population that a govt acceptable to us is also the best option for them. It will bring the benefits of good governance, representation and so on, as well as reaping the benefits of being a developing nation accepted in the global community.

Here's where we part company. That is, I believe, a position held by many so you are far from alone. It is also IMO an extremely arrogant and shortsighted idea, flies in the face of a long history and is almost certainly NOT what the Afghan people want. Nor, frankly, do I think there's a chance in a thousand that will be the end result.

I also am surprised that anyone's who's been to Afghanistan can expect it to join the ranks of developing nations any time soon. That gets to the real point, the one that transcends any differences over political goals:

How long do you think that will take?

That also returns to my original question re: Afghanistan, "What precisely is our cause?"

I presume you stated your idea of that cause. Is that the cause of the US Government? Or is this Government prepared to accept a lesser solution?

The logical conclusion to your argument, in a hypothetical victory, is to the defeat of the TB with the Afghan population retracting support to a failed TB cause. Any such stability would be ephemeral.

First, wipe out any idea of 'victory.' In an insurgency (which is part of the fight in Afghanistan but not all of it), there is no victory, no win or lose -- the best that can be obtained is an acceptable outcome. So I'm not suggesting a 'victory.' What I am saying is that you cannot produce a functioning government or any real development without security. You do not have that in Afghanistan at this time. Nor do you have or are you likely to ever have the troop strength to provide it unless some real innovation is practiced on the ground. That could happen but I doubt it, I think we've grown to risk averse.

You're not going to defeat the Taliban, there is no way to do that. All you can do is make the area so secure you limit their ability to move and proselyte. Given adequate troops, you can do that. If, as is the case, you do not have enough people -- then you have a problem, as we in fact do...

Withdraw, and the same causation factors that deny Afghanistan an effective, central government remain... Merely cutting off the head of the current threat in no way secures Afghanistan against the reappearance of the next militant or extremist group.

True and it's an even greater problem when you cannot snip that head -- and you cannot. It's not a head in any event, it's the arm of a Starfish and even if you lopped it off, it will simply regenerate. The Talibs or something like them will reappear no matter what we do; it may be after I'm dead 'cause I'm old but write it down as it will happen.

In seeking to defeat the TB

Recommendation: In this kind of war, purge words like defeat and victory, win and lose, with respect to the entire operation from your lexicon. None of those terms is appropriate. You can win or lose contacts but broadly peaking, you can only deter or inhibit the Talibs, you won't defeat them. Nor can they defeat you.

the easier option is to take away the support of the people by establishing a viable and sustainable alternative. Through pure security means - difficult... (I imagine this is something you will disagree with, and I would be interested in knowing if this is an assumption I could be wrong in).

Yes, I do disagree. You're applying a perfectly normal and sensible western outlook. Unfortunately, you are I believe, applying it to a South Asian society that is very independent, tribal and has a very different morality standard (not wrong, BTW, just different). In short, I doubt they'll agree with you on many aspects. I believe their goals and desires trump ours and that we have no right to impose our standards and values on others. The fact that the Afghans will unite and fight us if we try should and hopefully will deter some from even attempting to impose our ways on them.

A security-only focus might eventually win, especially if it strengthens the ANSF sufficiently so that they can maintain the legitimacy of the central government. As I see it is far more efficient to simultaneously work towards security while capacity-building the other arms of the government for eventual self-sufficiency.

You seem to continually assume things I did not say or imply. You cannot do security-only and I didn't suggest that. What I did say was you must have security for true development to take place. I also said you're unlikely to attain that state due to inadequate troop strength; implying that you're unlikely to get significant development or a truly functional government of any type unless we get really innovative.

As an infantry officer I'd like to be find that you are right and that I can ditch the loathed CIMIC skill sets I have been forced to acquire.

Hang on to those skills, they will always stand you in good stead. Just remember what your Grandmother may have told you as both mine pounded into me -- all things in moderation. Should've listened when they said it instead of finding out years later they were right.

Those CIMIC skills are really just common sense, good TTP, doing what's right and treating people decently -- that's always good. Even in MCO, that doesn't go wrong.

My greatest fear is that I am right, and my profession is now one of armed social work.

Not to worry. Everything goes in cycles, the pendulum will swing back. Almost 30 years as a grunt, trained to go to Europe and fight the Red Horde. Never went to Europe; ate a lot of rice, though. Different hordes, too. Including late night skulkers. Easily whipped, just out-skulk * them.

* CAUTION: Not approved for Do It Yourself efforts, additional training and holy water required.

However, not much; mostly needs will in high places. It could happen, so could a couple of other things. All is not lost, not even. We'll see

In the mean time, don't give up and keep thinking about it -- no one has all the answers.

[Ken White]

The best we can do is to get them to cease supporting an opponents cause by replacing it with a cause we champion,

I submit they (most any 'theys' anywhere) are not going to support your cause; nor should they. Anyway, I thought we were there to support their cause...

I would argue. It's not 'hearts and minds' for altruism, as you have stated, but winning over their hearts and minds to an agenda that benefits our side as well as theirs.

Sigh. You are not going to win their hearts. Ever. You can get them to realize that active support of your opponents is bad ju-ju and /or that said opponents are not going to win and thus, their minds will tell them to 'support' you. They won't, really but they'll take what looks like the best deal and be polite.

I sense a trap. If I can answer this question satisfactorily, I'm putting in for an instant promotion...But to take a stab at it - regardless of our original reasons for intervention, we are in Afghanistan to prevent militant Islam from becoming a viable force. We are combating the virulent form of militant Islam promoted by the TB with an acceptable form of Islamic government that is acceptable to the west.

Good job, subtle modification to what you said earlier but more accurate -- and achievable -- now. My sensing is that you're correct and that was the position of the Bush Administration and seems to be the more or less implied current position of the serving Administration. It can be achieved, I think but time is going to be the determining factor. We'll see how it goes.

Now...unleash! What was that, a partial failure or complete and utter failure of a response?

Pretty good, I say. You dropped some of the earlier 'developing,' 'good governance' and 'representation' which isn't really our call and which we can only hope to influence but not dictate. So, 13,999 Attaboys and tell the 503d you do not have to paint The Rock and should be immediately promoted because some ORF of a SGM said so...

P.S.

Do not fret if 'immediate' takes a while, you know how slow the Army is...

[Spud]

Spud. I agree that 'minds and wills' is probably more accurate to what we are trying to achieve in COIN, but arguing that 'wills' not 'hearts' is what we are after is chasing semantics more than anything. I do take issue with the claim that "we should be trying to make the population hate the insurgent more than they hate us not the touchy feely opposite which is make them love us more than they love the insurgent."

Make them hate us less? Again, I hear the drums of the Prince and it just doesn't sit well with me. Your Army has done very well in ETimor winning the hearts and minds since 1999, which has paid dividends in the second spate of deployments from 2006 onwards. Is that because they fear the diggers less than they feared the militias/ petitioners (rogue army faction), or because they genuinely believed that the Australian forces represented an agenda that best served their families security and their communities chance at prosperity?

But I think that's the difference ... trying to align our Timor experience with COIN in far-off lands is problematic. The Timorese were ethnically (somewhat), religiously and historically pre-disposed to INTERFET and what it brought. The fact that our Government did not act 'til well past the last safe moment in many ways set the mission up for success. We truly were liberators in the eye of the population, not occupiers pretending to be liberators. We had the population on side from the beginning and that is the lesson that has to be drawn from INTERFET so that it is not incorrectly applied elsewhere. In essence we didn’t have to win the minds and wills of the majority of the Timorese … it was already done. The key issue was maintaining it. Every one of these operations is about context and the Timor context can not be applied elsewhere. There was nothing pre-emptive or preventive about that deployment ... it was purely a reaction that had the support of the region (including Indonesia) and the world. We could/can only lose their support ... we did not really have to work to hard to gain it. Neither AFG nor IRQ had the Timor start state.

In 2006 it was essentially criminal gangs and disaffected Government workers not an insurgency. And yes the people (government in particular) did hate them more than they hate us. There's a large percentage of the Timor population that wants us gone from their streets now. There's an equally large percentage of Timorese Government officials who want us to stay because it provides them breathing space.

[Greyhawk]

"take Afghanistan for an example. Very serious and pertinent question: What precisely is our cause? "

A fine question. I've another:

Why did Ken have to ask?

[Uboat509]

Ken Said:

As for the hearts and believing what we are doing is right for their communities, their families, etc., get rid of the insurgents and do nothing for their communities and families and they will be grateful; provide bike paths and coffee shops, clinics and spas and allow the insurgents to remain and they will hate you.

I don't agree with this statement. If you get rid of the insurgents and leave them with nothing, they may grateful temporarily, depending on how they were treated by the insurgents, but they will not appreciate being left with nothing either. You have to get rid of the insurgents and help them by building clinics, schools, wells, agricultural improvements, etc.

SFC W

[Bob's World]

Neither public service nor the Insurgent is most important. Get rid of the core grievance, the underlying condition of poor governance that gave rise to the insurgency in the first place, and the movement will fade away of its own accord. But do so in a manner that you do not impose yourself so significantly that you take on an inappropriate perception of legitimacy over this goverment that you were helping to fix.

Hitler would have just been another drunk ranting down at the beer hall if the conditions of poor governance (imposed by the Treaty of Versailles; and exacerbated by the fact that the Germany Army was never defeated in battle in WWI; and the strains of the Depression); and his Nazi Ideology would have only appealed to a few ignorant crackpots. Did we need to send a huge effort to Germany to build infrastructure? No, it would have been pointless as it did not address the root cause. How about capture kill operations to take out Hitler and his cronies early? No, they would have been replaced by other leaders and new ideology as the root cause still existed; also such actions would have enhanced the support of the populace to some sort of uprising in general.

Is any of this military business? BINGO! No. Militaries fight wars, but it is the Pols who start and end them. Most cases it is bad or out dated policies that lead to being sucked into someone elses conflict; and it is failures of governance at home that lead to internal conflict. Populaces do not fail the government; it is always government that fails the populace.

[Surferbeetle]

Uboat509 as usual cuts to the heart of the matter.

If you get rid of the insurgents and leave them with nothing, they may grateful temporarily, depending on how they were treated by the insurgents, but they will not appreciate being left with nothing either. You have to get rid of the insurgents and help them by building clinics, schools, wells, agricultural improvements, etc.

SFC W

As always I appreciate Bob's World's posts, but I do not agree with all of the points being presented.

Neither public service nor the Insurgent is most important. Get rid of the core grievance, the underlying condition of poor governance that gave rise to the insurgency in the first place, and the movement will fade away of its own accord. But do so in a manner that you do not impose yourself so significantly that you take on an inappropriate perception of legitimacy over this government that you were helping to fix.

Well said. The next paragraph however should have reflected some of Uboat 509's points, instead it covered:

Hitler would have just been another drunk ranting down at the beer hall if the conditions of poor governance (imposed by the Treaty of Versailles; and exacerbated by the fact that the Germany Army was never defeated in battle in WWI; and the strains of the Depression); and his Nazi Ideology would have only appealed to a few ignorant crackpots. Did we need to send a huge effort to Germany to build infrastructure? No, it would have been pointless as it did not address the root cause. How about capture kill operations to take out Hitler and his cronies early? No, they would have been replaced by other leaders and new ideology as the root cause still existed; also such actions would have enhanced the support of the populace to some sort of uprising in general.

Is any of this military business? BINGO! No. Militaries fight wars, but it is the Pols who start and end them. Most cases it is bad or out dated policies that lead to being sucked into someone elses conflict; and it is failures of governance at home that lead to internal conflict. Populaces do not fail the government; it is always government that fails the populace.

This is where theory and reality clash. Of course it's military business: 'you break you buy it'. Lets compare US Military history with the thesis that this is not military business:

Early History

Civil Military Operations (CMO) conducted by the U.S. Military go back at least to the American War for Independence. During that conflict, all sides employed civil affairs in every colony/state. Military authorities managed activities that civilians had managed prior to the war. The occupation of Canada was an early example of "how-not-to-do-it", as Patriots were pitted against Tories in 1775 by the first U.S. occupational military government in Montreal.

In the U.S.-Mexican War, Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott could be considered the "Father of Civil Affairs." He displayed a deep respect for the Mexican people and their culture. Scott enjoyed great success in keeping civilian problems from interfering with military operations by issuing General Order No. 20 and ensuring the Provost Marshals office enforced it. The United States Army considers this to be where Civil Affairs (CA) originated.

At the end of the 19th century, and well into the 20th U.S. Army was involved in numerous military interventions in several of the Caribbean and Latin American nations before and after World War I. After the Spanish-American War ended in 1898, Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood restored order in Cuba with CA forces. The Army returned to Cuba in 1905, again in 1912, and starting in 1917, was there for a period of fien years. It was again called upon to protect American interests by military intervention in the Dominican Republic (1916 – 1924), Haiti (1915 – 1934), and Nicaragua (1926–1934). The Army was also called to Panama in 1903 to ensure the birth of that nation when it broke away from Colombia to become independent. According to the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center & School located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, at worst, the CMO performance was highhanded and overbearing, while at best, the Army restored more stable economic and political situations in those areas.

Showing "Uncle Sam with a schoolbook in one hand and a Krag rifle in the other" best summarized the civil-military policy in the Philippines, which was also acquired by the United States as a result of the Spanish-American War. While Cuba became independent in 1902, the Philippines was granted the status of a territory, with the promise of independence. They became independent after the Second World War in 1946. The payoff of an enlightened military government policy was the Filipinos were the only Pacific colonized peoples to resist the Japanese on any scale.

World War I saw few, if any, civil affairs activities; however, during post-Armistice weeks, the U.S. Army administered the government of an overseas enemy population in the German Rhineland and in Luxembourg where no stable government existed after Germany’s defeat and exit of the region. Between World War I and World War II, the U.S. Army was involved in a surprising number of civic action projects such as the Civilian Conservation Corps.

"The American army of occupation lacked both training and organization to guide the destinies of the nearly one million civilians whom the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty", stated Col. Irwin L. Hunt, Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army, in his report on U.S. military government in Germany after World War I.

He wrote further, "Military government, the administration by military officers of civil government in occupied enemy territory, is a virtually inevitable concomitant of modern warfare. The US Army conducted military government in Mexico in 1847 and 1848; in the Confederate States during and after the Civil War; in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Cuba after the Spanish American War; and in the German Rhineland after World War I. In each instance, neither the Army nor the government accepted it as a legitimate military function. Consequently, its imposition invariably came as a somewhat disquieting experience for both, and the means devised for accomplishing it ranged from inadequate to near disastrous."

World War II saw the U.S. Army receive its Civil Affairs "charter." The Pentagon in 1943 activated the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division (CAD). The major problem faced by the CAD was heavy destruction of the infrastructure. Never before or since has U.S. Army Civil Affairs been so extensively involved in nation rebuilding for so long. The CAD was responsible for 80 million European civilians; yet no documented case of overt opposition has ever come to light. Post-war military government proved extremely successful in our former enemies’ nations. The CAD also returned untold millions of dollars worth of national treasures to their country of origin. The post-war period was the first planned use of Civil Affairs by the modern United States Army, and the greatest use of CA assets to date.[1]

A quick economic compare/contrast using Wolfram Alpha for Germany, Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan is instructive. If we must intervene, it is to our economic benefit (and I would say that more than economics is involved) to leave behind stable countries which can contribute to the stability of the global system. Lets just focus on US imports for those of us who subscribe to the theory that 'the US is a lone grizzly': 2.351 Trillion dollars per year, with China, Canada, Mexico, Japan, and Germany as the top five. Just to reiterate my point, we did in fact fight with Mexico, Japan, and Germany. Part of this fight included 'nation building' operations which brings us back to Uboat509's wisdom.

[William F. Owen]

Ken You have to get rid of the insurgents and help them by building clinics, schools, wells, agricultural improvements, etc.

I can agree you have to get rid of the insurgents, but what you do next is very context specific. Schools, clinics, etc, may not be what they want.

[Ken White]

I don't agree with this statement. If you get rid of the insurgents and leave them with nothing, they may grateful temporarily, depending on how they were treated by the insurgents, but they will not appreciate being left with nothing either. You have to get rid of the insurgents and help them by building clinics, schools, wells, agricultural improvements, etc.

I named the items I did and not the items you named. I agree that leaving them with nothing is not a good idea and the items you name as desirable are valuable and will increase their gratitude -- if gratitude is what you're after.

Better than their gratitude is helping those who need it with no thought of recompense. If you act like you expect gratitude, you're likely to get resentment instead and if you get practical and offer a ### for tat trade, you're highly likely to find out you got snookered by a sharper trader than you are who'll take your Clinic and well and still support the guys who come in the night...

My list, excepting the Clinics, is all fluff and unnecessary stuff. That was a deliberate jab at us, the US Government (to include all the Armed Forces), for too often providing and building a lot of excessively esoteric stuff that we would like and not down to earth, sensible things (as your list) that will really help them and they will like. You must really understand the culture and the area to know what's important and will be kept and used beneficially versus what's just nice to have or will be discarded as useless or too difficult to operate and maintain.

I'll also note that you cannot provide and sustain much of lasting value until you have security because the smart bad guys will tear it up as quickly as you build it.

Bob's world says something that needs to be repeated because it's really important:

Is any of this military business? BINGO! No. Militaries fight wars, but it is the Pols who start and end them. Most cases it is bad or out dated policies that lead to being sucked into someone elses conflict...

That's about 100 times more important than is the argument over Hearts and Minds.

Once you commit Armed Forces as opposed to Diplomatic, Intelligence and Special Forces you've admitted error in the vast majority of cases. Read Olson's article "Mistakes Were Made" on the SWJ. It's a lesson plan for how not to do it...