Center of Gravity Construct

[Strickland]

Unfortunately, I have limited experience with EB planning, and each of those experiences was a poor one. Maybe I am paralyzed by personal experience; however, I believe that EBO requires a level or amount of intelligence that is unreasonable in order to work effectively.

Again, I am not arguing for a single COG; however, am suggesting that in order to get our heads around a complex problem, one must pick something instead of continuously arguing that whatever is selected is wrong.

[Bill Moore]

Larry claims to have a fast OODA loop, but I think we all do or we would simply perish, but speed is not the sole essence of the OODA loop. John Boyd focused on speed when he used the OODA loop model from a fighter pilot perspective, but expanded the OODA loop concept considerably to address what we're now calling 4th generation warfare while he was assigned to Thailand.

We observe, we orient (perceive), we decide and we act, but both sides when they start a conflict are relatively weak at the orientation aspect due to the cultural biases we bring to the table. There is usually a learning curve (or should be) after observing the results of our actions. OIF is a perfect example where we learned after repeated failures that mass search and sweep operations were not effective at catching or killing bad guys, and they further alienated the local population, which in the end played into the enemy's hands. If you have some sort of effects based approach you'll learn and adapt, but if you're beholden to a COG you'll tend to stay the course regardless.

As for simply picking one system (COG or EBO) and running with it, why? Why do we have to have a regimented system that "limits" our ability to define and solve problems? We need less emphasis on planning systems/methods and more emphasis on independent thinking.

I'm not a big advocate of Effects Based Operations methods that are coming out of OSD and JFCOM, and concur with your comments on EBO, the planning episodes I have witnessed have been disappointing to say the least. We have tech centric leadership at OSD now, and if they keep evolving EBO into an information technology reliant system it will fail, as many of us have already seen, yet there are still some good aspects of using an effects based approach that will enable us to become a learning organization. It won't keep us from making mistakes initially, but it will allow us to steer in the right direction sooner (I think).

The pie in sky dream of an on line, all knowing, Operational Net Assessment (ONA) Tool that can lay out every node, predict every effect, etc. is not just a fantasy, but a dangerous one that will make a few contractors rich, and in the end DoD will have wished they spent that money on weapons systems, getting spare parts for helicopters, etc.

[GorTex6]

speed is not the sole essence of the OODA loop.

It is the ability to analyze a spectrum of "noise", deduce information, and synthesize a new reality ie. build snowmobiles

Fast thinkers are impulsive, slow thinkers think big

[Larry Dunbar]

Larry claims to have a fast OODA loop, but I think we all do or we would simply perish, ....

My OODA loop is fast because I live in a simple environment, with very few influences trying to get into my orientation and decision-making. I, as all Americans do, have implicit laws that enable me to move quickly from my orientation to decision making.

If I were in Iraqi this would not be the case. I would still have those implicit laws, but I need to know my enemy’s orientation to influence his decision-making. To get up to speed, I would first try to get inside the insurgents OODA loop as outlined in the 28 articles on another post at this site. My speed would then depend on how fast I could understand the situation as it unfolds, I can't imagine it being all that fast.

but speed is not the sole essence of the OODA loop.

Exactly true. Trust is the real important quality, without trust you cannot enter your enemy's loop and he can't enter yours. You have to trust your enemy to act like you think he will. If he doesn't he has broken the link (trust) between you. If you act unlike your enemy thinks you will, he will have to adapt to the situation or be destroyed. It seems to me they are adapting. I have no knowledge if this is so, and will gladly concede this point.

We observe, we orient (perceive), we decide and we act, but both sides when they start a conflict are relatively weak at the orientation aspect due to the cultural biases we bring to the table.

“… when they start a conflict [they] are relatively weak at the orientation aspect…” Not true! The orientation aspect was strong (and quick) on both sides. We simply did not know each other’s orientations very well (the US military and the forces (all of them) in Iraq).

The information we needed in the beginning was in the Observation aspect. We had to know exactly what the enemy was doing and at all times. This was the reason for the rush to get information. This is especially true during a high maneuver strategy such as a blitzkrieg.

There is usually a learning curve (or should be) after observing the results of our actions.

Bill Moore's statement can't be over emphasized. After gathering information to satisfy our observation of the enemy, we needed to know him (28 articles) and ourselves. This new knowledge is what enables an army to plan what the enemy will do. We got into their OODA loop and they enter ours. Whoever reacts quicker wins the battle, but not necessary the war.

As for simply picking one system (COG or EBO) and running with it, why?

One reason might be because that is the system that the enemy knows you will use, and you know you can defeat him with it. According to Boyd, you want to react as your enemy's orientation dictates and not how yours dictate. If the only thing you know about the enemy is that he understands how you move, I guess you have to go with that. I know too little about your COG and EBO, so I really can't be more specific. Even if I did know more, I am a civilian so my overall knowledge on how the military operates is very limited.

Why do we have to have a regimented system that "limits" our ability to define and solve problems? We need less emphasis on planning systems/methods and more emphasis on independent thinking.

War has such a high level of chance and the outcome can be, well... so final, I wouldn't want any "limits", but then I don't know the limiting factors in the military.
Emboldening the front-line troops wins battles, but I am beginning to believe that it takes leaders with vision, and knowledge to win wars. I also believe this vision has to begin at the top. Independent thinking is great for winning battles, but the US military needs to present a unifying strategy to win this war.
If the COG is about installing leadership in the Iraqi government, I would say that sounds about right. If the EBO is directed at influencing that leadership, I would say that sounds about right. Using EBO against the enemy is great if all the effects it causes are known. I am just not sure if it can be known completely in such a complex situation.
If the companies are trying to sell you a system (pie-in-the-sky) that wins every battle, it is too late, you guys already accomplish that. Sounds to me like a bunch of whistles and bells you don’t need.
Your knowledge of the facts of the situation sound spot on. It sounds to me like the discussion for and against COG or EBO needs to be carried forward by qualified guys like you.

[Merv Benson]

In Iraq the enemy is primarily targeting noncombatants so that the media will say it is another example of the US sides failure to stop them from engaging in mass murder. Our primary response to this has been to concentrate on finding and taking out bomb builders and better intelligence in finding those doing the attacks. What is missing from this loop is an attempt to get inside the news cycle or to challenge the premise of the stories. The enemy has said that 80 percent of his battle space is in the media, yet we have no one in charge of fighting in that battle space. The weekly newsbriefings run as many as seven days behind the news cycle. Too often a charge is thrown out and it takes days and sometimes weeks for a response, by which time the cycle has moved on to a new charge to be investigated. If we took the same approach to a kinetic battle space, we would have a lot of friendly KIA's to deal with.

[SWJED]

Here is an example of an average day's worth of Iraq reporting (MSM, Official and Blogs):

Iraq and OIF / Telic / Catalyst

• Bush Says U.S., Iraq Will Assess Troop Levels - Reuters
• Coalition, Iraqi Leaders Meet to Discuss Future of Iraqi Security - AFPS
• Talks on Security Continue in Iraq - Los Angeles Times
• PM: Iraqi Forces Could Stand Alone in 2007 - Agence France-Presse
• Bush to Make Assessment of Iraq's Needs for U.S. Military Help - VOA
• Delay in Key Iraqi Ministries Will Affect U.S. Troop Levels - VOA
• U.S., Britain to Start Iraq Exit in July - The Australian
• Far From Model Army but Iraq's Troops Battle On - London Daily Telegraph
• Iraqi Security Forces Leading Operations in More Areas - AFPS
• Diggers to Pull Out of Muthanna if Iraqis Take Over - The Australian
• Armed Groups Propel Iraq Toward Chaos - New York Times
• Iraqi Insurgent Gives Chilling Confession - Washington Post
• 30 Iraqis Die in Attacks Across the Nation - New York Times
• 40 Killed in Iraq, 11 Near Shiite Mosque - Associated Press
• Bomb Kills at Least 11 at Baghdad Shi'ite Mosque - Reuters
• Hands-Off or Not? Saudis Wring Theirs Over Iraq - Los Angeles Times
• Rights Under Assault In Iraq, U.N. Unit Says - Washington Post
• U.S. Is Faulted for Using Private Military Workers - Los Angeles Times
• Amnesty Urges U.S. on Iraq Contractors - Associated Press
• U.S. Urged to Stop Paying Iraqi Reporters - New York Times
• Judging Iraq On Its Own Terms - Christian Science Monitor Editorial
• Iraq's Next Giant Step - Seattle Times Editorial
• Revisionist History - Wall Street Journal Commentary
• For Neocons, the Irony of Iraq - Washington Post Commentary
• Iraqi Progress - Washington Times Commentary
• Securing Baghdad is a Numbers Game - Los Angeles Times Commentary
• Troop Withdrawal To Speed Up: Guardian - Captain's Quarters Blog
• U.S. & Great Britain Will Start Iraq Exit in July - Gateway Pundit Blog
• Government Forms; Recent Counterterrorism Ops - Counterterrorism Blog

The list with the links is here. I read most of it and post the links every day. I feel many of the same frustrations as Merv in reference to lagging behind the MSM daily news cycle on events in Iraq, Afghanistan and the GWOT.

Many of the blogs pick up some of the slack but they do not have the wide exoposure the MSM does. Moreover, many (if not most) of the blog readers tend to be selective and visit blogs that more or less reinforce their particular views on Iraq and other issues.

The official DoD press reporting and transcripts lag behind events and tend towards straight forward script that reads like press releases.

DoD did try to get into the enemy's IO OODA Loop but the program to pay Iraqi reporters was outed and the MSM had a field day with that, to say the least.

[Bill Moore]

Merv I don't disagree, but I would love to quote your source that the enemy said 80% of their battle space is the media if you can find and share it. I know we have all read and heard a lot over the years, so you may not have it at your fingertips.

From an effects based approach, the information system is definitely the most important, as it has a disproportionate impact on all the other systems such as political, economic, social, military, etc. We can win every kinetic battle and still lose if we can’t effectively influence the info sphere.

Although we discussed at length the failure of our ability to influence the info sphere in previous discussions, this is the first example I have seen where you framed the argument using the OODA loop construct, which is simply brilliant. Obvious in hindsight, but not until you pulled open the curtains.

I think we should run with this a little more. We may be able to convince our public affairs officers to get off their duff and respond quicker, but I don’t think that is the right answer. For those of us in the military, we all know we’re repelled by most commercials, and news on the Armed Forces Network (AFN). It comes across as simpleton in nature and disingenuous, I rather Korean, German, or Japanese television. Instead of having a polished prince presenting the approved official side of the story after the response has been murder boarded a few times, why not let one of our NCOs or younger officers speak directly to the media about what happened right after it happened? It may not be polished, but it will be genuine and from the heart and people will have no choice but to believe it. That is the type of IO that will have an impact.

I won’t even attempt to sugarcoat what we did in Abu Grab, and in my opinion the failure of our leadership to aggressively respond to it, gave the enemy an IO victory of enormous scale. Of course ever so slowly we brought several of the culprits to justice, but it was a behind the scenes show. How do you manage the damage for something like this? You don’t manage it, you stand on principle, what people around the world love us for, and you aggressively respond to the crime. Concurrently, and equally if not more important, we show what the terrorists are doing to the population, to include pictures of the tortured bodies. Hell, I read a depressing story today about a 12 year old Iraqi boy that was tortured to death, why wasn’t that one the front page or headline news? We have to show a clear contrast, which means we admit our mistakes, and in the case of the guilty we punish them. The terrorists are murdering pricks who brag about their atrocities online! Why can’t we get that across to the Arab street? It is a story right there to be told. We wear the white hat, that is obvious to us, but it isn’t all that clear to the Arab world. We can do better, much better.

I don't want to divert too much from the COG versus EBO argument, but this has merit.

[Tom Odom]

Adam,

EBO (strat and opn level) is an extensive process; I won't argue for it or against it.

But an effects based process at tactical level does work and it achieves the magic word "synchronization" of lethal and non-lethal effects. The intel requirements to support such a approach are heavily tactical--that is soldier and small unit; but that is the same in any COIN/stability opns environment.

the key to using an effects process is to modifying it to meet the tactical level; constructs such as COGs must be (and are) adjusted to match the user level.

Best
Tom

[Rifleman]

"A COG is the source of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance — what Clausewitz called “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends . . . the point at which all our energies should be directed.”

I don't know if 19th century U.S. Army officers were familiar with Clausewitz, but evidently they understood how the concept of COG applied to a non state enemy in their situation.

I believe most senior Army officers encouraged buffalo hunting and pioneer settlement. These two things did more to defeat the Plains Indians than military operations. The Plains Indians needed room to roam and a mobile commissary. When they lost those two things they lost physically, spiritually, and emotionally.

The down side is that we still have a Bureau of Indian Affairs and a reservation system over 100 years later. Even if a COG can be identified in a non state or guerilla enemy is it always wise to strike it? Maybe if total subjugation and dependency is the goal, but otherwise?

Maybe I'm way off base with that last statement. I like military boards for the tactical discussions, my understanding of strategic ideas like COG and EBO are vague at best.

[Bill Moore]

Ah now you're getting at the key difference between the way we currently use the COG construct and EBO. Most military officers think in terms of directing their forces/efforts against a COG to puncture the enemy's ballon sort of speak. EBO on the other hand allows indirect approaches to achieve desired effects. There is almost always more than one COG, and the type of enemy we're fighting today will adapt to COG based strategies has he has been doing quite effectively in Iraq.

Is opium really a logistical COG for the Taliban? If we took the opium away (somehow) do you believe the second order effect would be that the Taliban would be finished ecomonically? I don't know, but I do recall that the Taliban eradicated opium in the Afghanistan when they ruled it, and they still seemed to function. I do think if you targeted the opium you would alienate a number of clans that would then form a temporary allegiance of convenience with the Taliban to fight the coalition.

[Jimbo]

COG's are still relevant, we just have to be mentally agile enough to make the jump from physical space and locations to intangibles such as peopl's will, public opinion, and such. IMO, we do a poor job at IO, it is under-resourced and misunderstood.

[Shek]

I don't know, but I do recall that the Taliban eradicated opium in the Afghanistan when they ruled it, and they still seemed to function. I do think if you targeted the opium you would alienate a number of clans that would then form a temporary allegiance of convenience with the Taliban to fight the coalition.

Bill,

The Taliban stopped growing opium to appease the international community and then reaped the profits of selling the previous years bumper crops at increased prices due to the lack of a current crop. However, that being said, opium is a critical piece of the puzzle in Afghanistan for multiple parties, but you correctly identify that whether it would be beneficial to eliminate it immediately on balance is a tough question to answer and hence a tough nut to crack.

[Bill Moore]

Shek, wrong thread, but I understand and concur. I read the piece that Jedburgh attached and it explained that the Taleban was basically trying to create a shortage to increase the value of their product.

Jimbo, I'll bite, so tell me what "the people's will" means to a military planner as a COG?

I think it is obvious we're always targeting the enemy's will, but I can't focus military efforts on their will unless they're a rational actor. How do I target Al Qaeda's will? (I mean target as lethal and non lethal)

[RTK]

I think it is obvious we're always targeting the enemy's will, but I can't focus military efforts on their will unless they're a rational actor. How do I target Al Qaeda's will? (I mean target as lethal and non lethal)

I'm not sure that targeting will is necessarily a feasible goal. Targeting and mitigating ideology in a fanatical people isn't going to get you very far. To say that we'll target their will infers that adversarial will is based upon logic and reason. When you're an extremist, no amount of logic or reason is going to allow you to look at the other side of the coin.

However, isolating insurgent groups from their support basin will. One of the only things that seperates the disenfranchised Bubba at the end of your block who hates the government and the insurgent population is the amount of localized support he receives from his neighbors. If Bubba started blowing up mailboxes and putting bombs on the sides of roads, his neighbors will turn him in.

I use the term "support" loosely, as passive support would include those who are so afraid of the reprocussions of action that they do nothing, allowing the insurgent to continue his reign of terror. We need to do a better job, through IO, of debasing the grasp insurgent groups have on the population. Depending on what part of the country we're talking about (Al Anbar having a higher concetration of insurgent supporters), we're only looking at about 5% of the population with an overt support of the insurgency. What we need to worry about is the 80% or so who passively let it happen out of fear of reprocussion to themselves or their families. How do we mitigate this? We show them, through our own actions, that it is more adventageous to them to turn in the wacko down the street than it is to sit by and do nothing.

In this sence, one of the lines of operation in the COIN environment must be Information Operations. By making IO a LOO within the mission development cycle, we're placing as much weight in IO as we would with combat operations. I submit that the four LOOs all units should follow in Iraq are:

1. Combined Combat Operations
2. Development of Security Forces
3. Civil-Military Operations
4. Information Operations

Given we're strangers in a society as unfamiliar with us as we are of them, IO must be an imperitive in COIN operations. Many of the preconceptions Iraqis have of Americans is based upon the information operations that insurgent groups propegate amongst the people of the society. In this sence, the insurgents are winning the IO war. We must make IO as important to us as combat operations are.

One of the most successful IO campaigns I saw in Ninwah province was a series of fliers with pictures of children killed by a homicide car bomber. After that flier went out, tons of tips came in, most actionable. The problem is that after doing this once or twice, we figure that the momentum will continue. Oftentimes we kill our own initiative by resting on our laurels and figuring that one or two fliers is enough, particularly if they produce some sort of temporary action. By constantly reengaging the IO target, we chip away at the base of support the insurgents enjoy until eventually its a moot point.

Certainly there are those whose minds we will not change. They are labled collaborists and must be dealt with appropriately as well. The burden is on individual units to A). Know the enemy their dealing with, B). Determining their base of support, C). Mitigating or neutralizing that support within every means at their availability, and D). constantly pursuing innovative ways to diminish passive support.

As has been written in multiple threads, the only way to do this properly is to understand the culture with which you are working. Obviously, what would be sound logic in the United States doesn't necessarily work in Iraq or Afghanistan. Its up to small unit leaders in both of these areas to get to know their populace, forge relationships with local leaders, and get inside the psyche of those their working around, with, and for.

[Tom Odom]

The reality is that as we practice tactical effects thinking here, we use COG analysis as a fundamental tool in understanding effects. I would certainly endorse both in this context.


best
Tom

[RTK]

Physical:
- Cities
- Infrastructure (water sources, communications, electricity)
- Line of Communication

Organizational:
- Tribal links
- Religious ideology
- Political parties
- Ethnic factions (Sunna, Shia, Kurd)
- Kurdish political parties
- Iraqi Security Forces

[Jimbo]

Since Clausewitz would contend that the purpose of war is to make another nation or people submit to your will. I will bring up people's will as a planning construct is important because it is the key terrain in an insurgency. What actions are you going to take make the local population neutral to passively friendly, and break the will of the insurgent. RTK posted alot of "how to" information. The key in using "people's will" as a COG for planning is that it helps drive and synchronize your CMO, IO, and security operations. It is tied to public perception and public opinion. As a military planner it is important because we try to avoid it and pawn it of on other government entities that either don't exist, or they are not resourced for it (state/commerce/IMF,UN,etc). Since the NGO's/PVO's/agencies can't do it, as a militayr planner I have to. I saw the shoulder shrug, hell I shrugged my shoulders, in May and June of 2003 when we had not factored people's will and how to win it as a planning construct in Iraq.

[marct]

Symbolic

- Communications media
- Symbolic associations between individuals and actions (i.e. "stereotype" expectations)
- Emotional evocations of sensory input (e.g. how do the locals emotionally react to a patrol)
- Interpretations of religious ideology
- Interpretations between religio-legal systems
- A symbolic "repatterning" of basic emotional equations (e.g. value of children)
- Construction of a "safe space" for symbolic discourse

Physical (a few additions)

- Food
- Fuel
- Communications media and programming (e.g. Voice of America style a la WWII & cold war)
- Medical care
- Infrastructure reconstruction, especially at the personal level (e.g. housing, means of livelihood, etc.)

[slapout9]

What is the defeat mechanism we should use to win?

[Strickland]

Maybe I misunderstood or misread Clausewitz, but dont COGs have to offer resistance? How does either terrain or infrastructure provide resistance?