Center of Gravity Construct

[TROUFION]

Lastdingo perhaps you should read Dr. Strange---

http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog1.pdf

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...les/PUB363.pdf

http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/reso...g/art4-w03.pdf

https://www.carlisle.army.mil/srp/ex.../Reilly_J_E_02

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-thry.htm-cog


Will and resolve are considered valid COG.

The question remains what makes up the trans-national guerilla-insurgent-terrorist CV? Based on each level of war. And what would be (genericaly) a local insurgents CV?

It is easy to pick out a counter-insurgents COG and CV. The counterinsurgent is tied to his nation state, or his organization-these are physical. The counter insurgent has to defend physical structures.

Both Lawrence and Vorbeck targeted thier enemies railroad lines-a physical structure. Both gained disproportionate results tieing down large numbers of enemy in static defenses and large amounts of resources in armoring trains etc. Why could they get away with it? Because their 'base' was protected, while the counterinsurgents 'base' was not.

If the 'base' loosely equated to the source of strength, which in turn equates to a COG, is will to resist or resolve to fight then what is the CV?

BTW-I am not stating a fact I am asking a question.

[Ski]

Will is probably the COG that is most important and most difficult to defeat.

I'd also add:

Funding sources
Equipping sources

They don't destroy the will, but will reduce a group to ineffectiveness quickly.

[walrus]

With respect I have to agree with Dingo, the use of the term "Centre of gravity" is misleading.

I think what you really mean Troufion, is what the German General Staff called the "Schwerpunkt" - focus point for your attack, even though in German it does mean "Centre of Gravity".

As a student of the same school as Dr. Kilcullen, the "schwerpunkt" in Iraq has to be denying the insurgents the support of the general population. Unfortunately a very large part of our activities until Petraeus and Kilcullen came along were counterproductive in this respect.

[TROUFION]

The definition for COG that I am using is that put forward by Dr. Joe Strange

Simple version: COG = strength & CV = weakness.

That is very simplifed of course.

The US Joint Pub definition is: COG are characteristics capabilities or locations from which a military force derives freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight.

Perhaps I should rephrase my question- if the guerilla or insurgents COG is the people (or their support), then what is his critical vulnerability?

[Lastdingo]

Oh great, two authors more with that silly idea (actually, I saw two of the texts before and skipped them because they were useless).
No, providing links to texts of some middle-ranking officers who cannot even translate Clausewitz quotes correctly* does not help the argument.

They tell their readers that they're right and others are wrong. This proves that at least one party is wrong in this affair acording to their own opinion.
They're wrong.
One's Schwerpunkt has absolutely nothing to do with one's weaknesses or vulnerabilities.

I've seen 'experts' of other branches working together, citing each other, writing acrticles/books/studies and trying to convince others of their weird theories. Such guys don't impress me at all - a couple of guys writing articles doesn't provide a state of the art for a science.
Being able to link some texts of authors which have the same opinion proves nothing - it would only help if the authors made good points. But these write nonsense.

The concept of Schwerpunkt is old, defined and well understood (by anyone who was able to understand the original works) since about 150 years. It's ridiculus to try to interpret the concept differently.

If they invent a new concept that far away from the Schwerpunkt, they shall invent a new name and stick only to it - and not misuse an old, well-defined name.







__________________

*:
“Denn nur durch diese Entscheidung werden
die Schwerpunkte der gegenseitigen Macht
und die von ihnen ausgehenden Kriegstheater
wirksame Dinge” (Vom Kriege, p. 813). Compare:
“It is the decision that changes the
centers of gravity on each side, and the operational
theaters they create, into active agents”
(On War, p. 488).

Wrong, it's not "active" but "effective". There are nine translations for "wirksam" to english (depending on adjective/adverb and context) and "active" is a wrong one in this context. It has too many possible (in this context wrong) significances and leads to a wrong interpretation. If Clausewitz had meant "active", he would have written "aktiv".
Now maybe he copied this from a english translation and didn't tranlate it by himself, but he's nevertheless wrong and obviously unable to comprehend the original text correctly in its details.


__________________

Now to clarify:

Auch in einer Hauptschlacht können Nebenzwecke dem Hauptzweck beigemischt sein, und sie wird manchen besonderen Farbenton von den Verhältnissen annehmen, aus denen sie hervorgeht, denn auch eine Hauptschlacht hängt mit einem größeren Ganzen zusammen, von dem sie nur ein Teil ist; allein man muß, weil das Wesen des Krieges Kampf, und die Hauptschlacht der Kampf der Hauptmacht ist, diese immer als den eigentlichen Schwerpunkt des Krieges betrachten, und es ist daher im ganzen ihr unterscheidender Charakter, daß sie mehr als irgendein anderes Gefecht um ihrer selbst willen da ist."

Book 4, Chapter IX. Die Hauptschlacht

This quote tells without doubt that one must consider the main army as the Schwerpunkt. Always. It's there - "immer" = "always" (and = ever, invariably, perennially, throughout, whensoever, at all times...).

In the whole work he repeats (in everytime different words) that the Schwerpunkt is the concentrated power of a warring party.

What those authors misunderstood completely is what shows their superficiality.
Clausewitz repeated many times (influenced by the Napoleonic Wars) that the destruction of the concentrated enemy power (disarmament by destruction of his army) leads to victory (because of the loss of the ability to resist).
It's a thorough misunderstanding to assume that this means that Schwerpunkt means the weak point. It's the strongest thing that can be attacked at all. This is why eventual victory against it shall lead to victory in war - all else is too weak to enable further resistance after the loss of the Schwerpunkt.
It's no recipe at all for an easy victory - if someone wants an easy victory, he should either be very superior from the beginning or he should not use Clausewitz' clash of the concentrated powers/main armies. Clausewitz merely advises to concentrate one's power better and not waste power on secondary and indecisive actions.
Any search of weak points should always avoid the Schwerpunkt as that is the realisation of the enemy's strength, not its weakness.
Defeating an enemy by seeking and hitting his weak points / lifelines is foreign to Clausewitz as Clausewitz and his Schwerpunkt were focused on overpowering.


"Will and resolve are considered valid COG. "
Morale is treated by Clausewitz in Book Three.
http://www.namico.net/non-commerce/l...om_kriege3.php
Original text - have a look. Search for "Schwerpunkt". It's a chapter in "Vom Kriege" without mention of Schwerpunkt.
Sorry, if they want something else than the original meaning, then they should invent something new, with new name. As quoted above, Clausewitz considered the main force (strongest army) of a state or alliance as Schwerpunkt, "immer".
He's the one who invented the Schwerpunkt as military term, so he had the privilege to define it, not some unimportant officers of a foreign army approx. 170 years later.

[Van]

The CoG of guerrillas/insurgents/buzz-name-of-the-day is their sanctuary. No guerrilla who preserves their sanctuary has failed, no guerrilla who has lost their sanctuary has succeeded (although, I would be willing to listen to a counter-example if presented with one). Traditionally, this would be a geographically contiguous location outside the ability of the opponent to attack, but with the internet and FedEx this is no longer necessarily the case. Yemeni and Indonesian sanctuaries supporting folks in CONUS for example.

If you accept that sanctuaries are a CoG, then it follows that sanctuaries and lines of communication between the sanctuaries and operations would be operational and strategic CVs.

Whether the sanctuary is a 'no-go' area within the borders of the sovereign state in the midst of a Small War, or a balmy tropical island half way around the world, the sanctuary, communication with the sanctuary, and movement of personnel and supplies between the operational areas and the sanctuary are the most important strategic and operational targets. The problem with Islamofascism is the extremely decentralized nature of the sanctuaries and lines of communication. The coward mufsid who practice hirabah and send brave but deluded young people to their deaths from sanctuary should be in the sight picture first, as should the even more reprehensible swine who send them money and other resources without sharing their risks. The challenge is squaring this with political and diplomatic needs as they hide in sovereign territory that hasn't authorized direct action yet.

[Lastdingo]

The CoG of guerrillas/insurgents/buzz-name-of-the-day is their sanctuary. No guerrilla who preserves their sanctuary has failed, no guerrilla who has lost their sanctuary has succeeded (although, I would be willing to listen to a counter-example if presented with one).

Mao gave up his sanctuary with the long March, yet succeeded. Actually, many rebellions have no safe heavens / sanctuaries at the beginning. Remember Castro in 1959 - he was hunted around for weeks or months, always on the move. Algerian insurgents around 1960 lost most sanctuaries they had due to aggresive paratrooper tactics - but they won because the enemy lost the will to continue (due to the immorality of his own tactics).



Clausewitz did probably plan to include small wars in his works with the revision that he planned. He told someone before his death that not all wars fit his description and he'd need to read and change the books accordingly sometime.
Death prevented such changes to the books.

The closest thing to Schwerpunkt that Guerillas could have would are imho
- an area of particular strength with most guerilla fighters in it
- an assembly of many guerillas before a large battle (like Dien Bien Phu)
In both cases, it needs to present such a large share of their power that a loss would be a disaster.

Clausewitz is not always correct and gives not always the best advice - his works were not intended to fit small wars (although he for sure knew enough about the Spanish insurgents against Napoleon) and some of his concepts are of limited value for small wars. He ws also quite weak on including naval affairs into his works - English Schwerpunkt was always the fleet, French Schwerpunkt was Napoleon (and at the same time the army he commanded). It was impossible to collide for both Schwerpunkte, a case not considered by Clausewitz as Vom Kriege is essentially a work about land warfare between states / state alliances.

Islamofascism

This is a propagada term, made to mark enemies as especially bad people beyond rational reasoning. It's a PR trick to do things like this - who can name a phenomenon can influence how others sense it.
It's better not to use such a term. In fact, there's little resemblance to fascism.

[TROUFION]

Mao gave up his sanctuary with the long March, yet succeeded. Actually, many rebellions have no safe heavens / sanctuaries at the beginning.

The closest thing to Schwerpunkt that Guerillas could have would are imho
- an area of particular strength with most guerilla fighters in it
- an assembly of many guerillas before a large battle (like Dien Bien Phu)
In both cases, it needs to present such a large share of their power that a loss would be a disaster.

The final phase of a Maoist syle revolution. I see it. What then allows the insurgent teh freedom to Mass even after he has been crushed multiple times? The willing and coerced complicity of the general population? Or something else.

questions:
1) when the insurgents physical base is destroyed what keeps his movement alive? This was what I was trying to address with the Lettow-Vorbeck analogy, (agreed his operation was more of a 'irregular' conventional force action, similiar to Mosby and Forrest in the US Civil War, I'm not trying to get off the track here so Civil War Buffs give me a little slack). Mao is probably the better example, when his physical base was destroyed he went on the lamb, by rights his army and his movement should have disintigrated, but it did not. Al Qeada (the base) similarly were defeated in Afghanistan, and yet they still influence. The base for an insurgent at the strategic level, is what? His will to survive, will to fight or his will to achieve his movements end state? Mao-communist state. Bin Laden-the new caliphate. Ideas are intangible and much harder to attack and defeat. Clausewitz would have seen this phenomena in Spain, Napoleon was used to winning the decisive battle and the state surrendering totally, Spain's uprising had to be frustrating beyond belief for him. (Goesh-Pontiac and the Prophet had the charisma, but they also had a message to build upon, one that resonated with the people, their charisma fueled the latent fire of the desire to resist the whitemans incurssions and to protect their land).

2) when looked at in this light what are the strength and weaknesses (forget the cg-cv vs schwerpunkt argument for now) of the insurgent, what allows him his freedom of action? Is it the complicity of the people or is it the power of an unassailable idea? I would venture (my opinion) that the people represent the medium in which the idea exists. (very maoist here). Though we normally equate it with the temporal not the immaterial. The insugent is free to act so long as his ideaology remains intact. It apears that the islamic insurgent is freer to act becuase he is willing to give his life knowning that his ideaology will survive and he will be rewarded in heaven while his family is honored on earth for his sacrifice.

-TROUFION

[wm]

[W]hat are the strength and weaknesses (forget the cg-cv vs schwerpunkt argument for now) of the insurgent, what allows him his freedom of action? Is it the complicity of the people or is it the power of an unassailable idea? I would venture (my opinion) that the people represent the medium in which the idea exists. (very maoist here). . . . The insugent is free to act so long as his ideaology remains intact. It apears that the islamic insurgent is freer to act becuase he is willing to give his life knowning that his ideaology will survive and he will be rewarded in heaven while his family is honored on earth for his sacrifice.

Perhaps it is not a question of the strengths/weaknesses of the insurgent. Perhaps it is, instead, the feelings of the indigenous population (the fish among whom the guerrillas swim). I suspect that the average folks would prefer jnust to be left alone. As long as the guerrillas do not disturb the locals' life style too much, they are alllowed to do pretty much as they see fit. Once they start to disrupt the locals' lives too much, then things start happening.

I doubt we are looking at local complicity with the insurgents. Rather, I think we are looking at local apathy, especially in cultural milieus marked by Inshallah and other fatalistic world views (such as those espoused by many east Asian religions). I would submit that we are dealing with inertia here--inertia of rest. Let the guerrillas or the COIN forces disturb that local inertia at their peril. Apathy would be replaced with antipathy. The Islamic insurgent in an Islamic country may be freer to act simply because he is less likely to disturb the cultural status quo (what I just described as inertia of rest).

To return to one of Troufion's original example, Lettow-Vorbeck was able to operate in East Africa simply because he was leading a group of locals who understood the culture of the area in which the operated. The British (with their West African carriers) and Belgian forces were complete outlanders, even more so when they brought in troops from their Indian and South African forces.

[Van]

Mao gave up his sanctuary with the long March, yet succeeded. Actually, many rebellions have no safe heavens / sanctuaries at the beginning. Remember Castro in 1959 - he was hunted around for weeks or months, always on the move. Algerian insurgents around 1960 lost most sanctuaries they had due to aggresive paratrooper tactics - but they won because the enemy lost the will to continue (due to the immorality of his own tactics).

Mao relocated his sanctuary with the Long March, and never lost his sanctuary in the Soviet Union, a source of support through out the revolution. Castro launched from Mexico and preserved his sanctuaries in the hills of Cuba. Yes, the Algerians lost most, but not all sancuaries, and preserved the ones outside the borders of Algier. Sanctuaries can be dynamic and can be numerous, and this is the greatest single issue of the GWOT.

I would accept the argument that disruption of a guerrilla sanctuary starts a countdown for the movement, but that countdown can be reset with the establishment of a new sanctuary. More important than the sanctuaries within the area of operations are the ones the established government can't reach (like Cambodia and China in Vietnam, like Iran in Iraq today, like the USSR for so many small movements through the Cold War).

And thank you Jimbo, for your support.

Islamofascism -This is a propagada term, made to mark enemies as especially bad people beyond rational reasoning. It's a PR trick to do things like this - who can name a phenomenon can influence how others sense it. It's better not to use such a term. In fact, there's little resemblance to fascism.

PR term, yes, but we're in an IO war, and Al Qaeda and affiliates certainly won't reason or negotiate with the West in good faith. If you posit that the Taliban in Afghanistan was the Islamofacsist vision for the world (and a good Salifi will confirm this), it was a totalitarian government with constant threats of punishment (fascism-from the Latin fasces, a symbol of government authority to punish) based on Sharia law, Islamic law.

Nope, I'm not buying your argument, this shoe fits, and it supports efforts directed against one of these guerrillas' CoG.

[tequila]

Don't think the shoe fits at all.

The foundation of Fascism is the conception of the State, its character, its duty, and its aim. Fascism conceives of the State as an absolute, in comparison with which all individuals or groups are relative, only to be conceived of in their relation to the State. The conception of the Liberal State is not that of a directing force, guiding the play and development, both material and spiritual, of a collective body, but merely a force limited to the function of recording results: on the other hand, the Fascist State is itself conscious and has itself a will and a personality -- thus it may be called the "ethic" State....

"Islamofascism" is primarily an IO term aimed at a domestic audience, intending to conflate Islamic violent extremism with the threats of the past, i.e. Nazism or Communism. People who dispute its usefulness can be accused of Chamberlainian weakness and failure to recognize the "grave and gathering" threat. Conversely advocates of the term can pose as Churchill reincarnated.

It has absolutely zero use, and is possibly harmful, as IO directed outside of the United States' political context.

[wm]

As Jimbo and Tacitus have noted, insurgencies move through phases, depending on the general population's degree of support for the principles of the insurrectionists.

Although others would dispute this, I think old Dead Carl was on top of this as well:

We therefore repeat our proposition, that War is an act of violence
pushed to its utmost bounds; as one side dictates the law to the other,
there arises a sort of reciprocal action, which logically must lead to
an extreme. This is the first reciprocal action, and the first extreme
with which we meet (FIRST RECIPROCAL ACTION). (On War ,Book, Chap, sec 3--Gutenberg Project version of the 1873 J.J. Graham translation)


The point to draw from von C is that warfare goes through a process of move and countermove, escalating in violence. In an insurgency, as in any other military campaign, what counts as a strength or weakness will change over time for each party to the conflict. I suggest that trying to identify a single strength or vulnerability is a mistake. I proposed on a different thread that in insurgencies,we are looking at multicausal events, not something like the old fire triangle that we were taught about as children during Fire Prevention Week.

[goesh]

you always fight for your buddies and your Commander. It is the latter's charisma, his personality, his paternalism, his spiritual power, his personal magnetism that binds the cohesiveness of a unit(s) together. Attached ideologies and goals are extraneous. Guzman from the Shining Path, Boudica of the Iceni and Massoud of the Northern Alliance are classic examples of the cult of personality. On our own land, the 250+ years of Native American insurgency was fueled by strong, competent, inspirational leaders. Seneca, Corn Stalk, Gall, Roman Nose, Geronimo, Quanah Parker, Chief Joseph, Cochise, Louis Rael, Tecumseh, Crazy Horse, 'King' Phillip, Red Cloud, Buffalo Hump, Little Turtle, Blue Jacket, Sitting Bull, Little Crow, Victorio, Pontiac and many others were the driving force behind the insurgency. These Indian guerillas didn't rush the cavalry with cries of " let's save the buffalo!" or " This one's for the deer!" - they charged, fought and died in emulation and loyalty to the men in front leading them. I think sometimes it's difficult for us to realize that people who blow up civilians, torture and behead have a sense of duty, honor and loyalty.

[slapout9]

Lastdingo, didn't Clausewitz talk about war of limited objectives? Do you think he was talking about small wars in that context. Briefly I remember sections where he talks about seizing a vital province of the enemy or doing him damage in a general way without his complete overthrow? Your comments on this?

[tequila]

I think sometimes it's difficult for us to realize that people who blow up civilians, torture and behead have a sense of duty, honor and loyalty.

Let's not romanticize. Native Americans did not hesitate to do any of the above against civilian populations, either from rival tribes or against European colonists. Such attacks were much more common than battles against other warriors or armies, similar to the ravaging that made up so much of medieval and early modern warfare. European armies did not hesitate to pay them back in full and more.

What made the Native American COIN experience different was that it was also a struggle over territory, where control of the civilian population did not constitute the main objective.

TROUFION: I see kind of where you are going, but it is important to note that Mao and the Communists were Long Marching somewhere - another secure base, in this case. OBL and AQ decamped from Afghanistan to another secure base, this time in Pakistan. Ideas are critically important, but every fighter needs someplace to rearm and rest to sustain the fight.

[Lastdingo]

Lastdingo, didn't Clausewitz talk about war of limited objectives? Do you think he was talking about small wars in that context. Briefly I remember sections where he talks about seizing a vital province of the enemy or doing him damage in a general way without his complete overthrow? Your comments on this?

I don't think so. The wars with limited objectives that he meant were rather the cabinet wars of 18th century (not the seven years war) than what we call small wars today.

The versions that he mentioned were a war waged to disarm and therefore break the enemy and a war that merely consisted of favorable maneuvers to improve the position for peace talks (no decisive, grand battle). Serious peace talks aren't necessary in the more total version of war that ended in the defenselessness of one warring party.

So his less intense version of war fits many modern small wars, but doesn't even remotely describe them. It's like saying water is blue - the relevant properties and consequences are not mentioned, yet the description is sort of correct.

Both types of war could - as history shows - also be present in a single conflict. Look at the Second Boer War. The British wanted to break the Boers and make them defenseless, achieving total victory in a small war (a challenging one, as it turned out).
The Boers practiced the limited war version - they merely wanted a status quo ante peace treaty.



Van

Mao relocated his sanctuary with the Long March, and never lost his sanctuary in the Soviet Union, a source of support through out the revolution. Castro launched from Mexico and preserved his sanctuaries in the hills of Cuba. Yes, the Algerians lost most, but not all sancuaries, and preserved the ones outside the borders of Algier. Sanctuaries can be dynamic and can be numerous, and this is the greatest single issue of the GWOT.

I would accept the argument that disruption of a guerrilla sanctuary starts a countdown for the movement, but that countdown can be reset with the establishment of a new sanctuary. More important than the sanctuaries within the area of operations are the ones the established government can't reach (like Cambodia and China in Vietnam, like Iran in Iraq today, like the USSR for so many small movements through the Cold War).

If the loss of a sanctuary is so easily compensated for, then it's most likely not a critical loss. The interesting weak point needs to be searched somewhere else than in something that's so easily replaced. Supporting states can hardly count as sanctuary unless they act as operations base as in the similar Hezbollah example.


By the way, I don't believe that in the so-called GWOT (another term not easily agreed on) it's important at all what the military can do. Most of AQ, for example, is/was rather a third world private army than a group of persons actually able to execute intelligent strikes in the west. Killing them helps little if at all. Several thousand persons were AQ personnel at some time, but only a small fraction of them were the right kind of people for complex strikes. Most were simply using AQ as a kind of travel & logistics agency to Jihad inside of a muslim country.
If I was tasked to fight AQ based on my current open source knowledge, I would concentrate on the hard core and make recruiting of more hard core fighter (actual terrorists, not just jihadists) as tough as possible to dry the pool out over time. But my information on AQ is certainly very inferior to that of our government agencies.

[TROUFION]

Lastdingo, thanks for the german lesson. I am as always impressed by individuals who are bi-lingual or multi-lingual. It takes a lot to be able to converse intelligently in two languages. I see your disagreement with Dr. Strange and Col Irons and the folks that followed their lead. I realize that Clausewitz is translated many different ways. Many of varying quality and as in any translation points and concepts are often lost and very often altered.

That said the way I presented COG is based on the Official US Joint definition. You don't have to agree with it, it is what it is. 170 years after Clausewitz's wife published the final version of his unfinished classic the interpretation is bound to change. I imagine Sun Tzu has changed a few million times. The world has changed and warfare has changed. Old Carl would have a hard time fathoming much of what a current battlefield is like just as todays troops would have a hard time marching shoulder to shoulder in line and column with bayonets fixed.

Your critique of the COG definition set currently in use by the US is valid. However, you are not being productive in doing so. Nor are you being gracious in your presentation. What would be more practical would be for you to redefine the argument to suit your classical definition and reset the question. For instance, How would, in your opinion, Clausewitz define the schwerpunkt of the modern insurgent, trans-national and local. I assume you would say it is the people. Then the second part of the origional question, what is the weakness of the insurgent within the people and how would you suggest it be approached. But this is me presenting a hypothetical as to how you might redefine the origional question to fit your definitions.

I am but a simple 'footslogger' meaning I actually have to go out and lead men to battle. Personally I wish we had never borrowed the 'dead german' school to discuss military action. We did and we modified it to fit American arms and the American Way of War. Both are distinctly different from the various European schools. Our definitions of CG and CV may have been born of Clausewitz but they are now ours one hundred percent. I do not claim to be an expert on the definitions but I do know the current ones served me very well in combat, and I think the old guy wouldn't mind that.

-TROUFION