Center of Gravity Construct

[Jedburgh]

Military Review, Sep-Oct 07: Linking Doctrine to Action: A New COIN Center-of-Gravity Analysis

Just as there is no one weapon that guarantees superiority in conventional warfare, there is no silver bullet when it comes to counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, provides a firm doctrinal foundation, as corroborated in Battle Command Knowledge System chat rooms, training at the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center and the Taji Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence, and field experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even so, there is still a gap between doctrine and tactical results in COIN warfare. This article seeks to fill that gap by introducing what we believe is a useful planning tool: the COIN center of gravity (COG) analysis, integrated as the culminating step of COIN intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). COIN COG analysis translates theory into practice from the bottom up, exposing insurgent lines of operation (LOOs) and suggesting possible counters to them. Rather than thrusting objectives from the top down that may or may not apply to a given situation, it balances counterinsurgent efforts and provides metrics. Links between COIN IPB and the root causes of a conflict, and between COIN COG analysis and tactical actions, are analyzed to figure out how to preempt insurgent activity instead of merely reacting to it. The process approaches COIN from the dual perspective of the nature of the population and the nature of the insurgent, not from the perspective of the counterinsurgent.....

[Jedburgh]

Second COG Article, same issue of Military Review:

A Logical Method for Center-of-Gravity Analysis

Largely due to its enigmatic nature, the center of gravity (COG) determination process has always been considered more of an art than a science. But even art has rules and structures that can turn chaotic sounds into language and language into poetry. Currently, the COG determination process described in joint doctrine lacks the clear rules and structure that might rationalize, discipline, and therefore improve campaign planning. Joint doctrine only describes the COG construct and its utility to military planning. This is unfortunate because the value of this conceptual tool cannot be overstated. Joint Pub 5-0, Joint Operational Planning, clearly states the critical role of COG analysis: “One of the most important tasks confronting the JFC’s [joint force commander’s] staff in the operational design process is the identification of friendly and adversary COGs.” It is the “most important task” because “a faulty conclusion resulting from a poor or hasty analysis can have very serious consequences, such as [impairing] the ability to achieve strategic and operational objectives at an acceptable cost.”

This paper explores using the strategic framework of ends, ways, and means; a validation test; and a clear COG terminology to provide a logical and disciplined method for COG determination. In military planning, determining the center of gravity is too important to leave to guesswork; therefore, any technique or method that improves COG determination is certainly worth exploring. My experience as an instructor at the School of Advanced Military Studies and the U.S. Army War College, combined with recent operational experience as a strategist with U.S. Central Command and Multi-national Forces-Iraq, has convinced me that there must be a better process for determining a center of gravity than the current guess-and-debate method....

[TROUFION]

A QUICK SEARCH OF THE THREADS SHOWS THE COG HAS CROSSED INTO ALMOST EVERY DISCUSSION LINE IN THE SWC. JUST AS THE DISCUSSION OF COG HAS PERMEATED US MILITARY SCHOOL HOUSES.

Social Contagion theory ( 1 2 3 ... Last Page)
Rob Thornton 12 Hours Ago
by Tom OC 33 1,084 Social Sciences, Moral, and Religious
Sticky: Tell Us About You #2... ( 1 2 3 ... Last Page)
SWCAdmin 13 Hours Ago
by sgmgrumpy 285 8,047 Tell Us About You
U.S. Africa Command? ( 1 2 3 ... Last Page)
Tom Odom 1 Day Ago
by kwtusn 106 7,365 Africa
In COIN how do we describe the relationship of the levels of war? ( 1 2 3 ... Last Page)
Rob Thornton 2 Days Ago
by slapout9 76 1,376 Futurists & Theorists
What would you do/say? ( 1 2 3)
Strategic LT 3 Days Ago
by redbullets 25 781 Media & Information Warriors
Groups: Bin Laden plans video on 9/11 ( 1 2 3 ... Last Page)
Sarajevo071 3 Days Ago
by Ken White 31 579 Adversary / Threat
Army Officer Accuses Generals of 'Intellectual and Moral Failures' ( 1 2 3 ... Last Page)
SWJED 2 Weeks Ago
by jonSlack 238 14,263 Military - Other
Memetics in the battle of ideas? ( 1 2 3 ... Last Page)
JD 2 Weeks Ago
by JD 38 862 Media & Information Warriors
Good Anthropology, Bad History: The Cultural Turn in Studying War ( 1 2 3)
Jedburgh 07-26-2007
by marct 22 821 Social Sciences, Moral, and Religious
Is time really on the side of Insurgents? ( 1 2)
Brian Gellman 07-12-2007
by Abu Buckwheat 16 487 Futurists & Theorists
Who Will Sound The Call to Service? ( 1 2)
SWJED 07-05-2007
by 120mm 14 831 Politics In the Rear
What is a Guerilla's Center of Gravity? ( 1 2 3 ... Last Page)
TROUFION 07-04-2007
by ilots 38 1,133 Futurists & Theorists
Do we require a victory or a Triumph? ( 1 2 3 ... Last Page)
Rob Thornton 06-28-2007
by Ray 47 1,001 International Politics
Iran: Open Thread Until H-Hour... ( 1 2 3 ... Last Page)
SWJED 06-24-2007
by Tom Odom 92 5,056 Middle East
Iraq - the Modern Equivalent of the Spanish Civil War ( 1 2)
SWJED 06-20-2007
by goesh 16 282 Brave New War Roundtable
A Thin Blue Line in the Sand ( 1 2 3 ... Last Page)
SWJED 06-18-2007
by Doug Ollivant 35 775 US Policy, Interest, and Endgame
Ralph Peters on Dreams & Islam
Rob Thornton 06-14-2007
by Steve Blair 3 320 Global Issues & Threats
Kinetic vs Empathetic Warfare ( 1 2)
TROUFION 06-13-2007
by TROUFION 18 769 Social Sciences, Moral, and Religious
Googleing COIN in Iraq
Rob Thornton 06-07-2007
by goesh 5 347 The Information War
Future Peer Competitor? ( 1 2 3 ... Last Page)
Granite_State 06-07-2007
by goesh 48 1,194 Global Issues & Threats
Strategic Directions in Iraq - and the idea of Cultural Identity as a CoG ( 1 2 3)
Rob Thornton 06-07-2007
by wm 21 568 US Policy, Interest, and Endgame
Theoretical Constructs
Martin 10-18-2006
by Martin 7 3 Social Sciences, Moral, and Religious

[pvebber]

One of the biggest problems with COG related analysis at the deckplates level is the misunderstanding or COG and Critical vulnerability among a lot of planners. Even "decision makers". Several times I've heard Flad level commanders criticize plans for "not directly attacking the COG". Then he gets back a COA that attacks a CV, but has no discussion of the COG.

COGs are leverged or exploited, CV's are attacked or defended. COGs increasingly exist in the moral and cognitive domains, CVs in the physical - where our prefered kinetic capabilities reside.

Even when you find a true COG there is often a "so now what do I do with it" since the leveraging and exploiting of COGs tend to be in the strategic domain, vice tactical.

This is an important educational issue - you can't get too much practice doing the planning analysis of COGs CV, etc, and a little bit can give you a false sense of expertise...

[slapout9]

COGs are leverged or exploited, CV's are attacked or defended. COGs increasingly exist in the moral and cognitive domains, CVs in the physical - where our prefered kinetic capabilities reside.

Absolutely agree..Col. Warden defined them as the point of GREATEST leverage on the system.

[Ski]

Kind of thinking out loud here, so flame away as appropriate and required:

1. What if there is no COG in a conflict? Seems to me that searching for a COG is somewhat of a silver bullet scenario where if eliminate, destroy or otherwise a neutralize a COG = success. With so many different groups of people in the fights in the Ghan and Iraq, I don't think a single COG is definable. The Shi'a are broken into many sub-groups, as are the Sunni, perhaps the Kurds. Add religious and tribal differences to the mix as well. The same applies to Afghanistan where Pashtun, Uzbek, Hazara, etc...

So if there are numerous groups in play, there probably are multiple COG's as well. Identifying these are tough to say the least, and one while COG may very well prove to be the correct one for one group, it may be the antithesis to another.

I think we may be in a scenario where an "umbrella COG" does not exist, and in fact we may have an almost endless series of "smaller" COG's that apply to whatever group of people we deem an enemy (how do we destroy/neutralize,flip them) neutrals (how do we get them to stay neutral, avoid them flipping to the enemy, flip them towards us) and the friendlies (how to we keep them friendly).

2. COG's, I think, must transcend physical/kinetic operations. Almost a no-brainer.

3. I think this also applies to OODA Loops/Decision cycles. One group can act so slowly while another spins so quickly that we do not see the trees for the forest. Requires superb SA, OPSEC and patience.

4. The more diverse the group of people within the boundaries of a nation-state, the more potential COG's. Agree that many COG's enter the strategic/political level very quickly.

5. Strategic and tactical levels must be integrated - been reading LTG Chiarelli's article this morning at great length, and agree 100% that the traditional "prepare two levels up and down" is obselete. Would also perhaps take this to the grand strategic level - people must fight for something that they believe in.

Again, just some random musings and thoughts off the top of the skull.

[slapout9]

Kind of thinking out loud here, so flame away as appropriate and required:

1. What if there is no COG in a conflict? Seems to me that searching for a COG is somewhat of a silver bullet scenario where if eliminate, destroy or otherwise a neutralize a COG = success. With so many different groups of people in the fights in the Ghan and Iraq, I don't think a single COG is definable. The Shi'a are broken into many sub-groups, as are the Sunni, perhaps the Kurds. Add religious and tribal differences to the mix as well. The same applies to Afghanistan where Pashtun, Uzbek, Hazara, etc...

So if there are numerous groups in play, there probably are multiple COG's as well. Identifying these are tough to say the least, and one while COG may very well prove to be the correct one for one group, it may be the antithesis to another.

I think we may be in a scenario where an "umbrella COG" does not exist, and in fact we may have an almost endless series of "smaller" COG's that apply to whatever group of people we deem an enemy (how do we destroy/neutralize,flip them) neutrals (how do we get them to stay neutral, avoid them flipping to the enemy, flip them towards us) and the friendlies (how to we keep them friendly).


Again, just some random musings and thoughts off the top of the skull.

Outstanding!!! This is exactly why I believe EBO is more applicable to COIN warfare than most people give it credit for.
1- if no COG exists create one!!!!and this may be the greatest opportunity that their is to defeat an insurgency.

2-In a basic 5 rings analysis of COG's there is usually a minimum of 25 to 75 targets you will need to effect in order to change the system.


Have to leave now and go conduct EBO on my lawn mower.