Center of Gravity Construct

[Ski]

Kind of thinking out loud here, so flame away as appropriate and required:

1. What if there is no COG in a conflict? Seems to me that searching for a COG is somewhat of a silver bullet scenario where if eliminate, destroy or otherwise a neutralize a COG = success. With so many different groups of people in the fights in the Ghan and Iraq, I don't think a single COG is definable. The Shi'a are broken into many sub-groups, as are the Sunni, perhaps the Kurds. Add religious and tribal differences to the mix as well. The same applies to Afghanistan where Pashtun, Uzbek, Hazara, etc...

So if there are numerous groups in play, there probably are multiple COG's as well. Identifying these are tough to say the least, and one while COG may very well prove to be the correct one for one group, it may be the antithesis to another.

I think we may be in a scenario where an "umbrella COG" does not exist, and in fact we may have an almost endless series of "smaller" COG's that apply to whatever group of people we deem an enemy (how do we destroy/neutralize,flip them) neutrals (how do we get them to stay neutral, avoid them flipping to the enemy, flip them towards us) and the friendlies (how to we keep them friendly).

2. COG's, I think, must transcend physical/kinetic operations. Almost a no-brainer.

3. I think this also applies to OODA Loops/Decision cycles. One group can act so slowly while another spins so quickly that we do not see the trees for the forest. Requires superb SA, OPSEC and patience.

4. The more diverse the group of people within the boundaries of a nation-state, the more potential COG's. Agree that many COG's enter the strategic/political level very quickly.

5. Strategic and tactical levels must be integrated - been reading LTG Chiarelli's article this morning at great length, and agree 100% that the traditional "prepare two levels up and down" is obselete. Would also perhaps take this to the grand strategic level - people must fight for something that they believe in.

Again, just some random musings and thoughts off the top of the skull.

[slapout9]

Kind of thinking out loud here, so flame away as appropriate and required:

1. What if there is no COG in a conflict? Seems to me that searching for a COG is somewhat of a silver bullet scenario where if eliminate, destroy or otherwise a neutralize a COG = success. With so many different groups of people in the fights in the Ghan and Iraq, I don't think a single COG is definable. The Shi'a are broken into many sub-groups, as are the Sunni, perhaps the Kurds. Add religious and tribal differences to the mix as well. The same applies to Afghanistan where Pashtun, Uzbek, Hazara, etc...

So if there are numerous groups in play, there probably are multiple COG's as well. Identifying these are tough to say the least, and one while COG may very well prove to be the correct one for one group, it may be the antithesis to another.

I think we may be in a scenario where an "umbrella COG" does not exist, and in fact we may have an almost endless series of "smaller" COG's that apply to whatever group of people we deem an enemy (how do we destroy/neutralize,flip them) neutrals (how do we get them to stay neutral, avoid them flipping to the enemy, flip them towards us) and the friendlies (how to we keep them friendly).


Again, just some random musings and thoughts off the top of the skull.

Outstanding!!! This is exactly why I believe EBO is more applicable to COIN warfare than most people give it credit for.
1- if no COG exists create one!!!!and this may be the greatest opportunity that their is to defeat an insurgency.

2-In a basic 5 rings analysis of COG's there is usually a minimum of 25 to 75 targets you will need to effect in order to change the system.


Have to leave now and go conduct EBO on my lawn mower.

[Ski]

Well, I don't know a great deal about EBO, but I would say that any kind of "effects based operations" seems to me to be a stretch when dealing with people.

You are basically dealing with human psychology, culture, mores, ethics, traditions and the like. Trying to change any of them by force, coercion or any other method will alienate some percentage of them because they simply won't change. And trying to force them to change seems to be some what dictatorial in my mind.

It becomes even more difficult when you have a different set of culture, mores, ethics, traditions and the like from the society you are working in. You become seen as an intruder at best.

This is why I thought the whole line of "bringing democracy" to Iraq was going to fail. Change has to come from within the different societies that have lived and existed in the area for generations.

Now - we can try and change them slowly, and with very subtle nuances, but having 160,000 troops in the country makes the job that much more difficult. But in the end run, it doesn't really matter if "effects based operations" or any other method of warfare is conducted - the people themselves must want to change.

Outstanding!!! This is exactly why I believe EBO is more applicable to COIN warfare than most people give it credit for.
1- if no COG exists create one!!!!and this may be the greatest opportunity that their is to defeat an insurgency.

2-In a basic 5 rings analysis of COG's there is usually a minimum of 25 to 75 targets you will need to effect in order to change the system.


Have to leave now and go conduct EBO on my lawn mower.

[pvebber]

1- if no COG exists create one!!!!and this may be the greatest opportunity that their is to defeat an insurgency.

Can you create a COG in an enemy system? Or is this a case of you recognising and exploiting the enemy COG when he may not have done his homework to figure out how to leverage it himself?...

(aside: Something I fear we suffer from far more than our adversaries...Where do we articulate our COGs and promote an understanding of them publically? Does it make sense for an open society to keep them secret? Particularly if they tend to relate to the openness of our society?)

...Or is this represenative of that desire to "directly attack the COG?"

2-In a basic 5 rings analysis of COG's there is usually a minimum of 25 to 75 targets you will need to effect in order to change the system.

Not to be too pedantic (but likely anyway ...) The targets are not the COG, but nodes that make up a CV, the attack of which can change a system which affects the adversary's ability to exploit his COG. I'm not sure a "System can be a COG" - I have to think about that...

Also, Only when you are dealing with a "complicated" but fundamentally "Simple" physical domain systems.

(Aside: As opposed to a complex system in the adative, emergent behavior sense - simple systems can be extremely complicated systems of physical componants - even with some "comples" subsystem behaviors concealed in "black boxes", but don't exhibit adaptive emergent behaviors at the macro scale - like power grids - they have a "black box" of repair capbility that is somewhat emergent and adaptive, but the overall power grid is a physically grounded, very complicated "simple system".)

The 5 -rings model applies to hierarchical "nation-state" type adversaries with predominantly physical CVs organized in "simple" system domains (the rings). Targets in the sense you use are the result of a functional analysis or a particular rings CVs into discrete people, places, or things - a physical domain focused view of the problem.

Are AQ-like entities amenable to "5-rings analysis"? - I would argue not in the strict sense, but may have a different "N-rings analysis" we may not have synthsized yet. Though likely not as phyiscial-domain centric as we would like.

An interesting related papaper: "Five Rings or a Loop in 4GW"

[slapout9]

Ski, Ring #4 Population groups deals with just the subject you are talking about, how to effect groups with non-lethal means. Largely through what we are calling IO operations. Also Col. Warden was on TV when we were just talking invading Iraq when he made the suggestion that we use "Madison Avenue" to conduct IO operations because they would probably be better at it as far as figuring out an Islamic response.


[B]pvebber,[/B
1- I would offer that an insurgency is a prime example of creating a COG within a system. From their viewpoint the countries government would be an enemy system and they are creating an insurgency or COG within that system.


2-I agree with you about the terminology which is becoming more confusing than ever, targets are also persons,places,or things and so are COG's. When the new Joint Publication on an Effects Based approach came out they it made it more complicated by calling targets "Nodes" both have the same definition.



Also I just heard on the news that AQI has killed the main Sheik that was helping us in An bar province. That is a ring #1 Leadership target. Not a good day for our side.

[Ski]

I don't think IO amounts to a hill of beans for the most part. Trying to change other's people cultures is a Sysphian task and wars have been fought over much less.

I read some of the Checkmate stuff for a Master's degree paper I wrote a few weeks ago. I think the most successful part of that particular "EBO" was the fact that it played right to the USAF's founding myth - that it is a strategic bombing force. IIRC, the #5 ring was the enemy troop concentrations...so we ignored TACAIR, in the hope that the Iraqi people would get pissed off and rise against Saddam. Obviously, it didn't, and history would have shown that the strategic bombing campaigns almost always result in the people being bombed having more anger and resolve than the if they were left alone. Outside of the atomic bombs dropped on Japan, and maybe Kosovo (there were other factors at play there), strategic bombing has never brought a country to submission, regime change, etc...

I remain skeptical of EBO in the physical realm of warfare, and I think (again, I realize my limitations with little in depth study of EBO) it would very hazardous to one's health if we tried to use it to change human behavior.


[QUOTE=slapout9;25815]Ski, Ring #4 Population groups deals with just the subject you are talking about, how to effect groups with non-lethal means. Largely through what we are calling IO operations. Also Col. Warden was on TV when we were just talking invading Iraq when he made the suggestion that we use "Madison Avenue" to conduct IO operations because they would probably be better at it as far as figuring out an Islamic response.

QUOTE]

[slapout9]

Ski I would agree with you about how IO operations are currently being conducted, but that doesn't mean we should not be learning how to use them. Are enemies are very good at it, and I think we could be if we work on it. This doesn't mean changing a culture but it dose mean changing the IO environment to allow us to achieve our objective.

EBO has nothing to do with bombing (I agree that the Air Force thinks that it does) EBO as it was first conceived was a process used to develop a strategy to win, this is the part that is forgotten and has been poorly applied in many ways especially as you point out when used by people with a bomber mentality.

I was part of how this process was used in Law Enforcement and although I can not talk about most of it(it was repeated in several cities across the US) I think it shows how flexible and adaptable the process is when it is used how it was meant to be used and not just as some type of bombing theory.


I am trying to get permission to post some things about the early Warden models of EBO which would help show the differance and how it has little to do with Startegic Bombing as it is most often associated.

[Old Eagle]

COGs always exist. Issue is defining them correctly. Haven't digested the new Military Review referenced on SWJ homepage, but it contains at least two articles on identifying COGs. I've heard Mark Ullrich's pitch before and it bears close examination.