Center of Gravity Construct

**Bill Moore** · 05-25-2006

Merv I don't disagree, but I would love to quote your source that the enemy said 80% of their battle space is the media if you can find and share it. I know we have all read and heard a lot over the years, so you may not have it at your fingertips.

From an effects based approach, the information system is definitely the most important, as it has a disproportionate impact on all the other systems such as political, economic, social, military, etc. We can win every kinetic battle and still lose if we can’t effectively influence the info sphere.

Although we discussed at length the failure of our ability to influence the info sphere in previous discussions, this is the first example I have seen where you framed the argument using the OODA loop construct, which is simply brilliant. Obvious in hindsight, but not until you pulled open the curtains.

I think we should run with this a little more. We may be able to convince our public affairs officers to get off their duff and respond quicker, but I don’t think that is the right answer. For those of us in the military, we all know we’re repelled by most commercials, and news on the Armed Forces Network (AFN). It comes across as simpleton in nature and disingenuous, I rather Korean, German, or Japanese television. Instead of having a polished prince presenting the approved official side of the story after the response has been murder boarded a few times, why not let one of our NCOs or younger officers speak directly to the media about what happened right after it happened? It may not be polished, but it will be genuine and from the heart and people will have no choice but to believe it. That is the type of IO that will have an impact.

I won’t even attempt to sugarcoat what we did in Abu Grab, and in my opinion the failure of our leadership to aggressively respond to it, gave the enemy an IO victory of enormous scale. Of course ever so slowly we brought several of the culprits to justice, but it was a behind the scenes show. How do you manage the damage for something like this? You don’t manage it, you stand on principle, what people around the world love us for, and you aggressively respond to the crime. Concurrently, and equally if not more important, we show what the terrorists are doing to the population, to include pictures of the tortured bodies. Hell, I read a depressing story today about a 12 year old Iraqi boy that was tortured to death, why wasn’t that one the front page or headline news? We have to show a clear contrast, which means we admit our mistakes, and in the case of the guilty we punish them. The terrorists are murdering pricks who brag about their atrocities online! Why can’t we get that across to the Arab street? It is a story right there to be told. We wear the white hat, that is obvious to us, but it isn’t all that clear to the Arab world. We can do better, much better.

I don't want to divert too much from the COG versus EBO argument, but this has merit.

**Merv Benson** · 05-25-2006

The 80 percent figure came from one of the intercepted al Qaeda communications. I will try to find it and post a link.

I do not think public affairs offices are set up to respond in a timely way to enemy media campaigns. The best analogy I can think of off hand is a groups of trial lawyers responding in real time to the other side in complex litigation situations. They have the sense of urgency to get their sides position out there and to tear down the assertions of the other side. If properly manged by a skilled attorney they can be devatatingly effective. This is not the same as lawyers giving legal advice on operational matters. It is about presenting a case in an understandable way that ordinary people can understand. Trial lawyers are very different from deal lawyers in terms of their OODA loops. They can't afford to let testimony bad for their case just hang out there without dealing with it while it is still fresh in the minds of the fact finders.

**Jones_RE** · 05-25-2006

Experienced trial lawyers tailor their message to the audience. They'll use different approaches depending upon the judge and jurors as they know them.

The Arab mindset seems a bit difficult for westerner's to wrap their heads around - certainly I don't grok it. Heightened concern for social honor, a penchant for paranoia, major concern over person to person relationships as opposed to detail oriented deal making, etc. It's easy to see how rotating a press secretary in and out of the Green Zone isn't going to cut it.

At the same time, the internet offers an incredible opportunity to insurgents everywhere - untraceable, immediate and virtually impossible to refute (because you can't verify anything online - thus folks believe the stuff they want to and ignore the rest). And for the finale - in Iraq you've got scads of local Imams whose livelihood is dependant upon their popularity and who have far more credibility and authority than any American.

Frankly, I can't think of a more difficult information operations environment.

**Larry Dunbar** · 05-25-2006

Originally Posted by Jones_RE

It's easy to see how rotating a press secretary in and out of the Green Zone isn't going to cut it.

Not a press secretary, a meme, which I suppose could be a collection of a single conscious (SOF).

**Merv Benson** · 05-26-2006

This is a link to a Multi-National Forces-Iraq press briefing where Maj. Gen. Lynch discusses the Zawahiri leter to Zarqawi.

...

I talk about the Zawahiri letter to the point where you might be tired of me talking about it. But there is something that I have not talked about in the last several press conferences that I want to emphasize. In the letter from Zawahiri, the second in command, if you will, of al Qaeda, he told Zarqawi - he says, "Remember, Zarqawi" - he says, "Half the battle is in the battlefield of the media." Half the battle is in the battlefield of the media. The terrorists will use the media as a combat multiplier to hide their limited capabilities. And let me use an example that you're all very familiar with to highlight that point.

...

This is a link with a link to the text of the letter in both English and Arabic.

...

Among the letter's highlights are discussions indicating:

* The centrality of the war in Iraq for the global jihad.

* From al Qa'ida's point of view, the war does not end with an American departure.

* An acknowledgment of the appeal of democracy to the Iraqis.

* The strategic vision of inevitable conflict, with a tacit recognition of current political dynamics in Iraq; with a call by al-Zawahiri for political action equal to military action.

* The need to maintain popular support at least until jihadist rule has been established.

* Admission that more than half the struggle is taking place "in the battlefield of the media."

...

Elsewhere, the 80 percent figure has been used, but in either case the point is the same, we are not really engaged in half or more of the battle space.

I would point out that the Arab audience is not the only one these attacks are suppose to infleunce and probably not the most important. Part of the design is to reduce support for the war in the US. That has been the most successful aspect of the enemy's war strategy, and people who can make the case in the US are certainly important to the continued success of the operation. The enemy's goal is to change our policy even if he can not win militarily.

**slapout9** · 05-26-2006

Several of you have just given good explinations of what EBO realy is. Our enemy understands it better then we do. Specifically you are talking about Col. Wardens ring #4 connection to population groups. Which is a COG and if you can manipulate public opinon through population EBO ops and achieve your political objective you can win at a cheap price. When you do EBO ops against all 5 rings at the same time you have what Warden would call parrallel warfare.

**Strickland** · 09-25-2006

So back to the original question - what is or are the center(s) of gravity in Iraq? We have been in Iraq for 42 months, so I would imagine someone must have figured it out by now.

**Jedburgh** · 05-26-2006

Originally Posted by Merv Benson

The 80 percent figure came from one of the intercepted al Qaeda communications. I will try to find it and post a link.

Merv, I agree 100% with you in that we are the IO campaign to date has been a failure. As Bill stated, there is a great deal of potential leverage to bring into play in a properly orchestrated and synched IO campaign. We do have people (not many, and damn sure not enough for all the missions they are in demand for) with the requisite local and cultural knowledge to develop such a campaign. There's been plenty of doctrinal ink spilled, and lots of high-level discussion, regarding effective integration of IO at the tactical and operational levels, but it ain't happening on the ground.

Not that it matters that much, but the 80% figure Merv quoted from Al-Qa'ida is in relation to pre-attack intelligence gathering rather than media battlespace. In the Al-Qa'ida training manual it states (on page 42 of the pdf file) that ...by using public sources openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at least 80 percent of all information required about the enemy.

**S-2** · 06-02-2006

"...those characteristics, capabilities, or locations from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight."

Lot of smart guys here, so I'll be weighing in with some trepidation. The above is the "official" DoD definition of COG. Most of this conversation has revolved around "effects based oriented" operations (EBO?) relating to our enemy's perception of coalition vulnerabilities and vice versa-in Iraq. Collectively, you guys have seemed to narrow this to the conduct of Info Ops (I.O.), both ours and theirs-and the relative skill which each side brings to the fight.

What about Afghanistan? There, I'd suggest a more tangible COG exists-Opium. When I consider this as a COG, I acknowledge the monetary importance it plays to the Taliban. I see the physical connection opium establishes between our opponent and the community- coercive and corruptive. I consider the correlation between smuggling routes leading to labs outside, and enemy LOCs leading inside to Afghanistan, as I'd bet they are one and the same. Finally, opium connects the interdependance between the drug warlords and the Taliban. Like LOCs, finding one almost certainly means finding the other.

I welcome disagreement, but HERE seems to lie a tangible/material center of gravity in a low intensity/C.I. battlefield. However, while tangible and material, it would also appear elusive, as it seems both insidious and culturally pervasive.

Curious to your thoughts, thanks.

**sgmgrumpy** · 06-05-2006

A COG is the source of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance — what Clausewitz called “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends . . . the point at which all our energies should be directed.”

A COG comprises the source of power that provides freedom of action, physical strength, and will to fight.

COGs exist in an adversarial context involving a clash of moral wills and/or physical strengths. They are formed out of the relationships between the two adversaries and they do not exist in a strategic or operational vacuum.