Center of Gravity Construct

[Strickland]

Perhaps, I should have stated my opinion in the original posting. I believe that Dr. Strange's COG construct of Critical Capability(s), Critical Requirement(s), and Critical Vulnerability(s) is VERY useful. However, I do not believe that we as planners should be slaves to this construct. The true utility of this construct is in assisting planners conduct conceptual planning and visualize the threat. No, not all adversaries fit neatly into this construct; however, by going through the process, one is capable of finding a 90% solution that will assist in futher detailed planning.

For Iraq, I would argue that there are 2 main adversaries - Sunni Rejectionists and Terrorists/Foreign Fighters. Most would agree that little can be done to positively influence the later except for direct kinetic acts, thus we are left with Sunni Rejectionists. Yes, I recognize that Sadr is not a Sunni Rejectionist; however, I would assert he is a minor threat who has demonstrated a desire to be included in the legitimate political process. In addition, I recognize that there are criminals that continue to destabilize the country, but that is no different than in the US, thus hardly worthy of comparison with rejectionists and terrorists.

Is it possible that the strategic and operational center of gravity for OIF is the Muslim - Sunni perception/feeling of marginalization - victimization? If coalition forces and the Iraqi government could somehow eradicate this perception and feeling, would our troubles not largely disappear? I say largely disappear due to the fact most agree that terrorists represent a small fraction of insurgents in Iraq. It is this feeling of victimization that leads Muslims to strike back. It is this sense of being victims of Israeli or American power that fuels anti-Western hatred. It is this sense of victimization that leads 300,000 former members of the Iraqi Intel, Security, and Military services to contribute to the insurgency.

If we accept this a the COG, then how is it vulnerable. Immediately, we see inclusion as the answer in Iraq, and not as we are currently mandating it through the "democratic" process. I put democratic in quotations due to the fact that any system which mandates 25% female representation regardless of the one man one vote idea is not democratic.

In the end, if the Brits can live with Martin McGuiness or Gerry Adams taking a seat in Parliament, then we can live with the Baath Party in Iraq.

ps - I have heard compelling arguments that the COG is the enemy's continued ability to destabilize the country, and that the critical requirement necessary for this to continue is our continued presence.

[Bill Moore]

In resposne to Strickland's post:

I respect most, if not all, contributors to this council, for their contributions to the body of knowledge we are all trying to master, yet I still find many of their arguments against EBO illogical, especially when they turn around and embrace the center of gravity theory. While it does have limited application, it also is an extremely limited construct that doesn’t facilitate a strategy for winning a war. In some cases it may allow a strategy to defeat a particular enemy, but that is seldom enough. During phase III of OIF the COG was the Saddam Regime, and as we saw that foucs only provided a worthwhile intermediate objective, but destroying it didn’t allow us to win the war, of which military power is a only a part of.

Getting back to your comments, while thought provoking I think your example is a perfect illustration of the limits of the COG construct. It is a desire to identify a single enabler for a complex problem set, so we can focus our limited assets on a few enabling decisive points around that COG (as close to a silver bullet solution as possible), then we call victory and go home. This is a practice that some have associated with EBO, but I think it is much more prevalent in the COG approach.

The Sunni rejectionist problem you identified must be addressed, but you can’t address it in isolation. Also identifying the Sunni rejectionist as a COG doesn’t give a planner much to work with. You can’t wish away the other problem sets, since they are all interconnected. We can’t fix the Sunni rejectionist problem without establishing a viable economy, you can’t do that without security, you can’t have security within a criminal society with foreign fighters and ethnic hostilities or regional nations that don’t support security, etc.

Little can be done to influence the foreign fighters except kinetic acts? I disagree and this is a problem of trying to find the foreign fighter COG within Iraq. Assuming there is a COG for foreign fighters, maybe it exists outside of Iraq? Foreign fighters can be addressed through a number of indirect means, to include engaging the source nations with information and assisting them with economic development, not to mention swinging the stick when needed. Another indirect approach which is effective in some areas in Iraq is to turn the population against the foreign fighters which denies them sanctuary, and greatly impedes their ability to operate. By the way this is an effects based approach.

I don’t buy into your comparison of Iraqi criminals with U.S. criminals; thereby, disregarding a problem that is equal on scale to the stability of Iraq as the Sunni rejectionists. There is a difference between a criminal and a criminal economy. What we’re really trying to focus on is the underground or informal economy. Let’s face it, at the end of the day the economic system really determines who as the power, so if a tribe makes its wealth (limited as it may be) from emplacing IEDs, kidnapping, or black market fuel sales, then what is the incentive to support a central government in Iraq that at present cannot provide a viable economic alternative to the tribes? The economy and underground economy are the key competing factions regarding the future of Iraq as a stable state. I think that criminals (who are also frequently terrorists and insurgents) are a bigger threat than the Sunni rejectionists, because they are undermining the very concept of the state.

In summary I think an effects based approach is far superior to the center of gravity construct.

[Strickland]

Unfortunately, I have limited experience with EB planning, and each of those experiences was a poor one. Maybe I am paralyzed by personal experience; however, I believe that EBO requires a level or amount of intelligence that is unreasonable in order to work effectively.

Again, I am not arguing for a single COG; however, am suggesting that in order to get our heads around a complex problem, one must pick something instead of continuously arguing that whatever is selected is wrong.

[Bill Moore]

Larry claims to have a fast OODA loop, but I think we all do or we would simply perish, but speed is not the sole essence of the OODA loop. John Boyd focused on speed when he used the OODA loop model from a fighter pilot perspective, but expanded the OODA loop concept considerably to address what we're now calling 4th generation warfare while he was assigned to Thailand.

We observe, we orient (perceive), we decide and we act, but both sides when they start a conflict are relatively weak at the orientation aspect due to the cultural biases we bring to the table. There is usually a learning curve (or should be) after observing the results of our actions. OIF is a perfect example where we learned after repeated failures that mass search and sweep operations were not effective at catching or killing bad guys, and they further alienated the local population, which in the end played into the enemy's hands. If you have some sort of effects based approach you'll learn and adapt, but if you're beholden to a COG you'll tend to stay the course regardless.

As for simply picking one system (COG or EBO) and running with it, why? Why do we have to have a regimented system that "limits" our ability to define and solve problems? We need less emphasis on planning systems/methods and more emphasis on independent thinking.

I'm not a big advocate of Effects Based Operations methods that are coming out of OSD and JFCOM, and concur with your comments on EBO, the planning episodes I have witnessed have been disappointing to say the least. We have tech centric leadership at OSD now, and if they keep evolving EBO into an information technology reliant system it will fail, as many of us have already seen, yet there are still some good aspects of using an effects based approach that will enable us to become a learning organization. It won't keep us from making mistakes initially, but it will allow us to steer in the right direction sooner (I think).

The pie in sky dream of an on line, all knowing, Operational Net Assessment (ONA) Tool that can lay out every node, predict every effect, etc. is not just a fantasy, but a dangerous one that will make a few contractors rich, and in the end DoD will have wished they spent that money on weapons systems, getting spare parts for helicopters, etc.

[GorTex6]

speed is not the sole essence of the OODA loop.

It is the ability to analyze a spectrum of "noise", deduce information, and synthesize a new reality ie. build snowmobiles

Fast thinkers are impulsive, slow thinkers think big

[Larry Dunbar]

Larry claims to have a fast OODA loop, but I think we all do or we would simply perish, ....

My OODA loop is fast because I live in a simple environment, with very few influences trying to get into my orientation and decision-making. I, as all Americans do, have implicit laws that enable me to move quickly from my orientation to decision making.

If I were in Iraqi this would not be the case. I would still have those implicit laws, but I need to know my enemy’s orientation to influence his decision-making. To get up to speed, I would first try to get inside the insurgents OODA loop as outlined in the 28 articles on another post at this site. My speed would then depend on how fast I could understand the situation as it unfolds, I can't imagine it being all that fast.

but speed is not the sole essence of the OODA loop.

Exactly true. Trust is the real important quality, without trust you cannot enter your enemy's loop and he can't enter yours. You have to trust your enemy to act like you think he will. If he doesn't he has broken the link (trust) between you. If you act unlike your enemy thinks you will, he will have to adapt to the situation or be destroyed. It seems to me they are adapting. I have no knowledge if this is so, and will gladly concede this point.

We observe, we orient (perceive), we decide and we act, but both sides when they start a conflict are relatively weak at the orientation aspect due to the cultural biases we bring to the table.

“… when they start a conflict [they] are relatively weak at the orientation aspect…” Not true! The orientation aspect was strong (and quick) on both sides. We simply did not know each other’s orientations very well (the US military and the forces (all of them) in Iraq).

The information we needed in the beginning was in the Observation aspect. We had to know exactly what the enemy was doing and at all times. This was the reason for the rush to get information. This is especially true during a high maneuver strategy such as a blitzkrieg.

There is usually a learning curve (or should be) after observing the results of our actions.

Bill Moore's statement can't be over emphasized. After gathering information to satisfy our observation of the enemy, we needed to know him (28 articles) and ourselves. This new knowledge is what enables an army to plan what the enemy will do. We got into their OODA loop and they enter ours. Whoever reacts quicker wins the battle, but not necessary the war.

As for simply picking one system (COG or EBO) and running with it, why?

One reason might be because that is the system that the enemy knows you will use, and you know you can defeat him with it. According to Boyd, you want to react as your enemy's orientation dictates and not how yours dictate. If the only thing you know about the enemy is that he understands how you move, I guess you have to go with that. I know too little about your COG and EBO, so I really can't be more specific. Even if I did know more, I am a civilian so my overall knowledge on how the military operates is very limited.

Why do we have to have a regimented system that "limits" our ability to define and solve problems? We need less emphasis on planning systems/methods and more emphasis on independent thinking.

War has such a high level of chance and the outcome can be, well... so final, I wouldn't want any "limits", but then I don't know the limiting factors in the military.
Emboldening the front-line troops wins battles, but I am beginning to believe that it takes leaders with vision, and knowledge to win wars. I also believe this vision has to begin at the top. Independent thinking is great for winning battles, but the US military needs to present a unifying strategy to win this war.
If the COG is about installing leadership in the Iraqi government, I would say that sounds about right. If the EBO is directed at influencing that leadership, I would say that sounds about right. Using EBO against the enemy is great if all the effects it causes are known. I am just not sure if it can be known completely in such a complex situation.
If the companies are trying to sell you a system (pie-in-the-sky) that wins every battle, it is too late, you guys already accomplish that. Sounds to me like a bunch of whistles and bells you don’t need.
Your knowledge of the facts of the situation sound spot on. It sounds to me like the discussion for and against COG or EBO needs to be carried forward by qualified guys like you.

[Merv Benson]

In Iraq the enemy is primarily targeting noncombatants so that the media will say it is another example of the US sides failure to stop them from engaging in mass murder. Our primary response to this has been to concentrate on finding and taking out bomb builders and better intelligence in finding those doing the attacks. What is missing from this loop is an attempt to get inside the news cycle or to challenge the premise of the stories. The enemy has said that 80 percent of his battle space is in the media, yet we have no one in charge of fighting in that battle space. The weekly newsbriefings run as many as seven days behind the news cycle. Too often a charge is thrown out and it takes days and sometimes weeks for a response, by which time the cycle has moved on to a new charge to be investigated. If we took the same approach to a kinetic battle space, we would have a lot of friendly KIA's to deal with.

[Tom Odom]

Adam,

EBO (strat and opn level) is an extensive process; I won't argue for it or against it.

But an effects based process at tactical level does work and it achieves the magic word "synchronization" of lethal and non-lethal effects. The intel requirements to support such a approach are heavily tactical--that is soldier and small unit; but that is the same in any COIN/stability opns environment.

the key to using an effects process is to modifying it to meet the tactical level; constructs such as COGs must be (and are) adjusted to match the user level.

Best
Tom

[Rifleman]

"A COG is the source of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance — what Clausewitz called “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends . . . the point at which all our energies should be directed.”

I don't know if 19th century U.S. Army officers were familiar with Clausewitz, but evidently they understood how the concept of COG applied to a non state enemy in their situation.

I believe most senior Army officers encouraged buffalo hunting and pioneer settlement. These two things did more to defeat the Plains Indians than military operations. The Plains Indians needed room to roam and a mobile commissary. When they lost those two things they lost physically, spiritually, and emotionally.

The down side is that we still have a Bureau of Indian Affairs and a reservation system over 100 years later. Even if a COG can be identified in a non state or guerilla enemy is it always wise to strike it? Maybe if total subjugation and dependency is the goal, but otherwise?

Maybe I'm way off base with that last statement. I like military boards for the tactical discussions, my understanding of strategic ideas like COG and EBO are vague at best.

[Bill Moore]

Ah now you're getting at the key difference between the way we currently use the COG construct and EBO. Most military officers think in terms of directing their forces/efforts against a COG to puncture the enemy's ballon sort of speak. EBO on the other hand allows indirect approaches to achieve desired effects. There is almost always more than one COG, and the type of enemy we're fighting today will adapt to COG based strategies has he has been doing quite effectively in Iraq.

Is opium really a logistical COG for the Taliban? If we took the opium away (somehow) do you believe the second order effect would be that the Taliban would be finished ecomonically? I don't know, but I do recall that the Taliban eradicated opium in the Afghanistan when they ruled it, and they still seemed to function. I do think if you targeted the opium you would alienate a number of clans that would then form a temporary allegiance of convenience with the Taliban to fight the coalition.

[Jimbo]

COG's are still relevant, we just have to be mentally agile enough to make the jump from physical space and locations to intangibles such as peopl's will, public opinion, and such. IMO, we do a poor job at IO, it is under-resourced and misunderstood.

[Shek]

I don't know, but I do recall that the Taliban eradicated opium in the Afghanistan when they ruled it, and they still seemed to function. I do think if you targeted the opium you would alienate a number of clans that would then form a temporary allegiance of convenience with the Taliban to fight the coalition.

Bill,

The Taliban stopped growing opium to appease the international community and then reaped the profits of selling the previous years bumper crops at increased prices due to the lack of a current crop. However, that being said, opium is a critical piece of the puzzle in Afghanistan for multiple parties, but you correctly identify that whether it would be beneficial to eliminate it immediately on balance is a tough question to answer and hence a tough nut to crack.

[Tom Odom]

The reality is that as we practice tactical effects thinking here, we use COG analysis as a fundamental tool in understanding effects. I would certainly endorse both in this context.


best
Tom

[RTK]

Physical:
- Cities
- Infrastructure (water sources, communications, electricity)
- Line of Communication

Organizational:
- Tribal links
- Religious ideology
- Political parties
- Ethnic factions (Sunna, Shia, Kurd)
- Kurdish political parties
- Iraqi Security Forces

[Jimbo]

Since Clausewitz would contend that the purpose of war is to make another nation or people submit to your will. I will bring up people's will as a planning construct is important because it is the key terrain in an insurgency. What actions are you going to take make the local population neutral to passively friendly, and break the will of the insurgent. RTK posted alot of "how to" information. The key in using "people's will" as a COG for planning is that it helps drive and synchronize your CMO, IO, and security operations. It is tied to public perception and public opinion. As a military planner it is important because we try to avoid it and pawn it of on other government entities that either don't exist, or they are not resourced for it (state/commerce/IMF,UN,etc). Since the NGO's/PVO's/agencies can't do it, as a militayr planner I have to. I saw the shoulder shrug, hell I shrugged my shoulders, in May and June of 2003 when we had not factored people's will and how to win it as a planning construct in Iraq.

[marct]

Symbolic

- Communications media
- Symbolic associations between individuals and actions (i.e. "stereotype" expectations)
- Emotional evocations of sensory input (e.g. how do the locals emotionally react to a patrol)
- Interpretations of religious ideology
- Interpretations between religio-legal systems
- A symbolic "repatterning" of basic emotional equations (e.g. value of children)
- Construction of a "safe space" for symbolic discourse

Physical (a few additions)

- Food
- Fuel
- Communications media and programming (e.g. Voice of America style a la WWII & cold war)
- Medical care
- Infrastructure reconstruction, especially at the personal level (e.g. housing, means of livelihood, etc.)

[slapout9]

What is the defeat mechanism we should use to win?

[Strickland]

Maybe I misunderstood or misread Clausewitz, but dont COGs have to offer resistance? How does either terrain or infrastructure provide resistance?

[Larry Dunbar]

I respect most, if not all, contributors to this council, for their contributions to the body of knowledge we are all trying to master...

I am one guy you don't have to respect. As far as COG goes, I think the best maneuver is a flanking move, EBO to me is the firebombing of Japan during WWII, and I believe the forces in Iraq are composed of remnants of the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and the Arabs, not to mention the forces of the USA. In short, I am completely ignorant. I believe COG keeps our troop alive; EBO only works if the General in charge envisions it, and I believe we are in the middle of wars fought long ago for goals both won and lost. I am a simpleton. While this makes me without a place in today’s complex world, I have an extremely fast OODA loop.

In the end, if the Brits can live with Martin McGuiness or Gerry Adams taking a seat in Parliament, then we can live with the Baath Party in Iraq.

I think it is too late for the Baath party, they should be eliminated from the planet earth. Our strategy should be one of transformation instead of reform. This comes from the visions of our Generals and not through our civilian leadership.

[DDilegge]

I am a simpleton. While this makes me without a place in today’s complex world, I have an extremely fast OODA loop.

Sometimes I read all the "smart guy" stuff and wonder what planet that conference was held on...