Center of Gravity Construct

[marct]

Hi RTK,

You make soem interesting points that I'd like to pull apart a bit.

I'm not sure that targeting will is necessarily a feasible goal. Targeting and mitigating ideology in a fanatical people isn't going to get you very far. To say that we'll target their will infers that adversarial will is based upon logic and reason. When you're an extremist, no amount of logic or reason is going to allow you to look at the other side of the coin.

I have to disagree with you on this - specifically your last sentence. One thing most Anthropologists learn pretty quickly is that "logic" and "reason" are cultural constructs rather than absolutes. What we, in the West, assume to be logic (and it is for us) may not operate in other cultures. This is not because they are not "logical" but, rather, because other cultures use different axiomatic assumptions and different syllogisms of logic.

Given we're strangers in a society as unfamiliar with us as we are of them, IO must be an imperitive in COIN operations. Many of the preconceptions Iraqis have of Americans is based upon the information operations that insurgent groups propegate amongst the people of the society. In this sence, the insurgents are winning the IO war. We must make IO as important to us as combat operations are.

Hmmm, again, I think you may be understating Iraqi sources of information on America. Yes, you are quite correct about the IO from the insurgents, but I don't think that it is a good idea to forget about all of the information comming in from other sources as well. In particular, I am thinking about Internet based sources, family diasporic networks, and IO passed through tribal lines.

There's a model in Anthropology that may be useful for looking at this. "Information" is just a set of sensory perceptions which must then be interpreted for and by individuals. Most of these sensory perceptions are "value neutral" originally and get their valuation during the interpretation stage. This "interpretation stage" is where cultural logics and interpretive schema get added into the mix and, if they run long enough, get converted into "rules of thumb" which, in turn, are passed throughout personal networks. In order to establish something as a "rule of thumb" interpretation (aka a "meme") within a given population, there has to be fairly strong reinforcement in the environment for that interpretation.

One of the most successful IO campaigns I saw in Ninwah province was a series of fliers with pictures of children killed by a homicide car bomber. After that flier went out, tons of tips came in, most actionable. The problem is that after doing this once or twice, we figure that the momentum will continue. Oftentimes we kill our own initiative by resting on our laurels and figuring that one or two fliers is enough, particularly if they produce some sort of temporary action. By constantly reengaging the IO target, we chip away at the base of support the insurgents enjoy until eventually its a moot point.

Yup. In effect, you are doing it by creating your own memes, "rule of thumb" interpretations, and then reinforcing them. Let me take this situation a little further and see how it could have been extended, and please excuse me if I'm unaware of a chunk of the details of this specific situation.

From the sounds of it, right after the car bombing, flyers with pictures of the dead children went out and the tips started coming in. Did any military personelle go to the funerals and show grief over their deaths? If not, they should have.

"Momentum" in most pastoralist societies is based on ongoing personal connections and relationships and, grotesque as it may sound, this was a perfect opportunity to establish this type of personal relationship while, at the same time, clearly showing that Americans value the lives of Iraqi children. More importantly, the people who should have attended would be the ones involved in tracking down the others involved in the car bombing. This action would have been perfectly understandable to the Iraqi people since it would be interpreted as a blood vendetta.

As has been written in multiple threads, the only way to do this properly is to understand the culture with which you are working. Obviously, what would be sound logic in the United States doesn't necessarily work in Iraq or Afghanistan. Its up to small unit leaders in both of these areas to get to know their populace, forge relationships with local leaders, and get inside the psyche of those their working around, with, and for.

I totally agree, and probably the best way to do that is to look at cultural parallels. For example, most Western cultures understand blood feuds even if we don't use them (well, most of the time). Most pastoralist cultures have them as central to their orientation. Most Western cultures say that personal relationships are not as important as legal relationships, but the reality is that they are, in all probability, more important (e.g. "networking"). In most pastoralist cultures, personal ties are crucial to social operations.

If we really want to hammer at the will of the insurgency, then we have to do it by changing the interpretations of action, the memes, of the population such that the commonalities with the Coalition are stronger than the commonalities with the insurgency.

Marc

[RTK]

Hi RTK,

You make soem interesting points that I'd like to pull apart a bit.



I have to disagree with you on this - specifically your last sentence. One thing most Anthropologists learn pretty quickly is that "logic" and "reason" are cultural constructs rather than absolutes. What we, in the West, assume to be logic (and it is for us) may not operate in other cultures. This is not because they are not "logical" but, rather, because other cultures use different axiomatic assumptions and different syllogisms of logic.

__________________________________________________ ___________

Hmmm, again, I think you may be understating Iraqi sources of information on America. Yes, you are quite correct about the IO from the insurgents, but I don't think that it is a good idea to forget about all of the information comming in from other sources as well. In particular, I am thinking about Internet based sources, family diasporic networks, and IO passed through tribal lines.


Marc

Marc,

I have no hope in going toe to toe with a Ph.d in Anthropology. My undergraduate degree will only get me so far.

In the long run, we're essentially saying the same thing, though you're more elloquent than I. I was trying to make the point that what we view as logic and reason doesn't necessarily apply in the same way as it does to your everyday Iraqi. Breaking it into the lowest common denominator, this is difficult for our soldiers to understand.

As for the IO sources available to the citizenry of Iraq; I intentionally focused on one aspect of all their sources. Just as a western citizen has numerous media outlets to choose from, Iraqis have the same. It's a matter of which one they pick. Some are more overt than others. In a society where tribal links are paramount to everything else, obviously this will take a precedence of all else. Depending on the tribe, emphasizing these ties will help or hurt our side of the issue, given our relationship as soldiers with those particular tribe.

After 2 years in Iraq I can tell you that it really depends on where you are. We had success in Al Anbar when I was there in 2003-4 but our success was entirely dependant on the support of tribal leades. My second tour last year in Ninewa Province enjoyed a fantastic relationship with tribal leaders which enhanced our success.

I agree with you and acknowledge all your points. Again, I broke it down to the user level with some fairly specific examples.

[marct]

Marc,

I have no hope in going toe to toe with a Ph.d in Anthropology. My undergraduate degree will only get me so far.

Drat, I certainly wasn't trying to set it up as a fight (wry grin).

In the long run, we're essentially saying the same thing, though you're more elloquent than I. I was trying to make the point that what we view as logic and reason doesn't necessarily apply in the same way as it does to your everyday Iraqi. Breaking it into the lowest common denominator, this is difficult for our soldiers to understand.

I agree, it definately is difficult to understand. Sometimes, I think it is harder for Ph.D's to understand that for the people on the ground .

I think I was reacting to the idea, call it a "sense interpretation", that the extremists are not using logic and reason. I've seen a little too much of that coming from politicians, and all I see it serving to do is to seperate "us" from "them".

There's a debate I get into with a lot of my friends about why we need to be really careful about semantics (okay, yeah, it's a soapbox of mine). We use language in a lot of ways to construct our understandings of reality and the habits of speach we use often condition the people who listen to us. So if "we" deny "them" the use of logic, then we are saying that we can never get them to change since their is no basis of communication other than a kinetic strike. I would far rather see us set up a situation where we assume that they do use logic and that we can manipulate that logic to our benefit.

Okay, I'm off my soapbox

As for the IO sources available to the citizenry of Iraq; I intentionally focused on one aspect of all their sources. Just as a western citizen has numerous media outlets to choose from, Iraqis have the same. It's a matter of which one they pick. Some are more overt than others. In a society where tribal links are paramount to everything else, obviously this will take a precedence of all else. Depending on the tribe, emphasizing these ties will help or hurt our side of the issue, given our relationship as soldiers with those particular tribe.

I totally agree with you on this, and I certainly understand why you focused on the insurgents as the primary means of information. I have to wonder how more effective the IO operations could be in the immediate situation. Believe me, I'm certainly not faulting anyone in the field - that would be nuts! But, if we have to play catch-up, what can be done to make that more effective?

After 2 years in Iraq I can tell you that it really depends on where you are. We had success in Al Anbar when I was there in 2003-4 but our success was entirely dependant on the support of tribal leades. My second tour last year in Ninewa Province enjoyed a fantastic relationship with tribal leaders which enhanced our success.

So, I have to ask, how were those relationships established and maintained? I'm asking because if you enjoyed good relationships with the tribal leaders, then you were doing something right that needs to be communicated both with other people going into the field and in the international mediaspace.

I agree with you and acknowledge all your points. Again, I broke it down to the user level with some fairly specific examples.

Thanks and, again, I apologize if I appeared to be coming down on you. mea culpa.

Marc

[RTK]

So, I have to ask, how were those relationships established and maintained? I'm asking because if you enjoyed good relationships with the tribal leaders, then you were doing something right that needs to be communicated both with other people going into the field and in the international mediaspace.
Marc

I'm in the beginnings of a COIN handbook written as little AARs for direct actions, CMO operations, IO, and partnership with local leaders and security forces. Hopefully some of what we did can be highlighted and shared with the force.

In reply to your question, we didn't do anything that we felt was out of the ordinary. Having said that, in retrospect, we did a lot of things that others evidently aren't doing:

• We placed one platoon within a restive town and they lived with both the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police.
  
• Everything we did was combined with Iraqi Security Forces.
  
• We met with town councils on average of about once a week.
  
• We met with tribal leaders at least once a week, oftentimes more.
  
• We'd stop by the houses of key leaders as a matter of routine to check in on them, much like you might do with a good friend who lives down the block from you.
  
• We never made promises we couldn't keep
  
• In working everything combined, we put an Iraqi face on operations, not an American face. In hanging out in the shadows and only appearing when we had to it also gave the impression (rightly so) that the Iraqis were in charge of their own area, not just being paraded around by us as puppets
  
• We took council of their concerns and worked together to correct them. After we would produce they would tell their tribesmembers what had taken place.
  
• When our leading advocate, a tribal sheik, died suddenly, we attended the wake without body armor or protective gear to pay respects. We left our rifles in our vehicles (we kept our pistols). This may have been ballsy, but it showed the people we were there to mourn with them and were not afraid of what could happen to us. (This was planned for, however, like an operation, with the rest of my troop pulling an observation cordon out of sight and mind, but with the ability to act as a QRF if things got bad).

In essence, we treated them as equals, not as people who didn't know what they were doing. We ate their food, drank their tea, exchanged gifts, and stories. By the end of it, the aforementioned tribe adopted us.

My measuring stick for success was this; when we talked to these people for the last times before we left theater the second time, tears were shed on both sides. I have gifts from them in my office. They have pictures of as all like a family photo on their wall. I worry about them constantly, like I'd worry about a part of my family. I think once you get to that level of understanding then you can stamp the entire experience with the success label.

This may be a stretch, but if you look at Kevin Costner's character in "Dances with Wolves," maybe we need to start looking at that as a model for bilateral engagement progression. In simple terms, that's essentially what we did.

[marct]

I'm in the beginnings of a COIN handbook written as little AARs for direct actions, CMO operations, IO, and partnership with local leaders and security forces. Hopefully some of what we did can be highlighted and shared with the force.

In reply to your question, we didn't do anything that we felt was out of the ordinary. Having said that, in retrospect, we did a lot of things that others evidently aren't doing:

You know, your list is a really great checklist for how to do it right . And. leaving out the fact that we usually aren't armed, it's pretty much what Anthropologists do in the field - live with the people you are studying and "become" one of them.

• ...
• When our leading advocate, a tribal sheik, died suddenly, we attended the wake without body armor or protective gear to pay respects. We left our rifles in our vehicles (we kept our pistols). This may have been ballsy, but it showed the people we were there to mourn with them and were not afraid of what could happen to us. (This was planned for, however, like an operation, with the rest of my troop pulling an observation cordon out of sight and mind, but with the ability to act as a QRF if things got bad).

This is just the type of thing that would work, especially the leaving the rifles behind (honouring their ability to protect you) and carrying your side arms (showing your willingness to protect them under guest right in case of an attack). Brilliant !!!!

In essence, we treated them as equals, not as people who didn't know what they were doing. We ate their food, drank their tea, exchanged gifts, and stories. By the end of it, the aforementioned tribe adopted us.

My measuring stick for success was this; when we talked to these people for the last times before we left theater the second time, tears were shed on both sides. I have gifts from them in my office. They have pictures of as all like a family photo on their wall. I worry about them constantly, like I'd worry about a part of my family. I think once you get to that level of understanding then you can stamp the entire experience with the success label.

Absolutely! Have you managed to keep in touch with them at all?

This may be a stretch, but if you look at Kevin Costner's character in "Dances with Wolves," maybe we need to start looking at that as a model for bilateral engagement progression. In simple terms, that's essentially what we did.

I've got my own take on Dances with Wolves but, yes, the idea of partially "going native" is something that really needs to be done. It has its own dangers in some ways, but it certainly makes what is happening more comprehensible to everyone and, IMHO, would probably make for a better model of engagement that of occupier and occupied.

I'd love to see that handbook when you get it done, either as a draft or as a final product. I hope you'll be able to share it.

Marc

[Bill Moore]

Gentlemen, the intent of this thread is to clearly show the superiority of effects based planning versus using the outdated center of gravity construct.

Put your guns down, I'm only joking! Great comments, but I would still like to see how the "people's will" as the center of gravity could be useful in a functional way to a military planner?

Using an effects based approach which is intended to integrate all of our government agencies, and hopefully academia, still seems more appropriate than trying to make centers of gravity work in this situation. Sometimes there are COG's, other times the COGs are unsuitable to facilitate planning, such as the people's will.

Marc, you bring a much needed voice to the council, and I was hoping you might share some ideas on where you think you could fit into the planning process to help us get off on the right track? Let's say we were going into country X to assist the government defeat an insurgency. What would you consider must know information to facilitate you giving advice to military planners? What type of advice do you think you give that could help military planners? I use the term planner, but that isn't restricted to the future operations planners at the joint level, but inclusive of the company commander that is developing a strategy for his area of operations.

[marct]

Hi Bill,

Gentlemen, the intent of this thread is to clearly show the superiority of effects based planning versus using the outdated center of gravity construct.

Put your guns down, I'm only joking! Great comments, but I would still like to see how the "people's will" as the center of gravity could be useful in a functional way to a military planner?

Okay, I will apologize in advance for sounding like an academic .

As far as I see it, "centre of gravity" is a concept, a mental schema if you will, that is already embedded in the minds of many military planners. Whether it is a worthwhile concept, or whether EBP would be a "better" concept is, for this point, moot. The short answer is that using the "people's will" as a centre of gravity is useful because it is drawing on a concept that already exists in the minds of the military planner. What tends to be missing from the concept is the operational specification. Still and all, it is always easier to "sell" a modification or "amplification" of an existing idea/concept than it is to sell a "new" or "different" concept. It's really just a matter of changing the referential semantics of the debate.

Can it be useful functionally? Probably, but some modification would be needed. First, I think we would have to change the name of the main focus from "people's will" to something like "people's beliefs". Second, it would probably be useful to "create" new foci for "insurgent's will" and, hmm, "COIN will" (where the popluation of the latter is those people who are actively engaged in COIN operations, both "native" and "non-native").

This allows us to stay in the emotionally "safe" construct of centre of gravity, and to shift the EBP into an operationalization of how these centres interact and how those interactions can be manipulated.

Using an effects based approach which is intended to integrate all of our government agencies, and hopefully academia, still seems more appropriate than trying to make centers of gravity work in this situation. Sometimes there are COG's, other times the COGs are unsuitable to facilitate planning, such as the people's will.

Honestly, I think that you are quite correct here, at least as far as actual operational planning, in the broadest sense of the term, is concerned.

Marc, you bring a much needed voice to the council, and I was hoping you might share some ideas on where you think you could fit into the planning process to help us get off on the right track? Let's say we were going into country X to assist the government defeat an insurgency. What would you consider must know information to facilitate you giving advice to military planners? What type of advice do you think you give that could help military planners? I use the term planner, but that isn't restricted to the future operations planners at the joint level, but inclusive of the company commander that is developing a strategy for his area of operations.

Hmmm, that definately is the "put up or shut up" question, isn't it . I'm going to have to think about this a lot more, but I will try and take a stab at answering some of the questions.

Marc, you bring a much needed voice to the council, and I was hoping you might share some ideas on where you think you could fit into the planning process to help us get off on the right track?

First off, thanks. As it currently stands, I see myself "fit[ing] into the planning process" primarily in two areas:

1. As a Canadian academic, I am somewhat constrained in who I have access to talk to. I am truly grateful for the existence of SWJ and for the council in listening to what I have to say, since this is one of the few venues I have to make my ideas heard by people who can actually do something. Certainly, what I have to say will not be heard by many Anthropologists (more on that one later - I'm putting an article together on it).
2. I think the greatest contribution I can make to the planning process is in working with people to develop adaptive methodologies that integrate culture, media, and actual operations. I think that the advantages I would bring to this are that I am an expert in "systems of meaning" (i.e. how people construct reality via symbols), I have a background in comparative religion as well as Anthropology and, finally, as a Canadian, I view US operations through a different, if friendly, lense.

(Sheesh! I feel like I'm writing a cover letter for a job application . Still, you asked and honest question, and deserve an honest answer.)

Let's say we were going into country X to assist the government defeat an insurgency. What would you consider must know information to facilitate you giving advice to military planners?

I would have to say that two things were crucial at the start of such an operation. First, what is / are the local culture(s)? Most of that material is already available in libraries, but until you know the general structures of a group, their symbol systems don't really make that much sense. Actually, it's more complex than that, but that's the basic part. Then I would have to tie in the symbol systems to those structures.

The second imperative would be to look at the insurgency's propaganda. For any insurgency to succeed, it has to operate using a symbol system that derives from or is cognate with the local symbol system(s). Most of the time, this will be tied in to a crucial, everyday "lived experience" that the vast majority of the general population can experience. By way of example, Guevera's campaign in Bolivia hinged around land distribution and when the land was redistributed by the government, the insurgency collapsed.

The case in Iraq is much more complex than that of Bolivia, unfortunately (sigh). At the absolute minimum, there are four seperate cultures to examine and each of them extends beyond the geographic boundaries of Iraq.

What type of advice do you think you give that could help military planners? I use the term planner, but that isn't restricted to the future operations planners at the joint level, but inclusive of the company commander that is developing a strategy for his area of operations.

I think that in order to answer that question, it would probably be better to split it into three seperate areas:

1. Initial planning
2. Company level "advice"
3. Ongoing analysis

Initial planning
Most of what could be done in the initial planning stage would be what I was talking about earlier: identifying the structures, symbol systems and propaganda nodes. Once they are identified, then certain initial "suggestions" could be made on how to operate. Honestly, I'd be a fool to say that any advice coming out of this would work 100% of the time. Based on WWII experience in the Pacific theatre, we would be lucky to get about 60%-70%. Still, that would be better than nothing.

Company level advice
Again, initially, it would come out of the initial planning stage. The trick, I think, would be to set up a "cultural intelligence" operation where information from the field is sent back ASAP for analysis and reworking, which brings us to...

Ongoing analysis
To my mind, this is the core "value add" that Antrhopology can bring to the table (not that most of my colleagues would do so ). We have had a lot of discussions about how much cultural training the strategic corporal and other frontline troops can have. The reality, at least as much as I see it at present, is that the mind set required for someone to be a good combat soldier is quite different from that required to be a good cultural analyst. Having said that, however, I think that it is absolutely imperative that information, analysis and observations flow freely back and forth between the two groups.

Let me return, for a second, to the tangential conversation RTK and I were having. Notice that both of us mentioned showing up at funerals. In my case, I was placing that type of action in a cultural symbolic context. In RTK's case, he was placing it in an operation and personal context. How would this work together? Well, if nothing else, I would hope that when RTK produces his COIN handbook, he includes that "story" along with a recommendation that other people do the same where possible. Why? Because it not only establishes and strengthens individual personal relationships, but also because it honours the local system of tribal honour.

Bill, I don't know if this has answered your questions. I know that I'm not happy with it on the whole, but I wanted to give you a quick answer before taking a week or two to put something more complete together.

Marc