Center of Gravity Construct

[Larry Dunbar]

Larry claims to have a fast OODA loop, but I think we all do or we would simply perish, ....

My OODA loop is fast because I live in a simple environment, with very few influences trying to get into my orientation and decision-making. I, as all Americans do, have implicit laws that enable me to move quickly from my orientation to decision making.

If I were in Iraqi this would not be the case. I would still have those implicit laws, but I need to know my enemy’s orientation to influence his decision-making. To get up to speed, I would first try to get inside the insurgents OODA loop as outlined in the 28 articles on another post at this site. My speed would then depend on how fast I could understand the situation as it unfolds, I can't imagine it being all that fast.

but speed is not the sole essence of the OODA loop.

Exactly true. Trust is the real important quality, without trust you cannot enter your enemy's loop and he can't enter yours. You have to trust your enemy to act like you think he will. If he doesn't he has broken the link (trust) between you. If you act unlike your enemy thinks you will, he will have to adapt to the situation or be destroyed. It seems to me they are adapting. I have no knowledge if this is so, and will gladly concede this point.

We observe, we orient (perceive), we decide and we act, but both sides when they start a conflict are relatively weak at the orientation aspect due to the cultural biases we bring to the table.

“… when they start a conflict [they] are relatively weak at the orientation aspect…” Not true! The orientation aspect was strong (and quick) on both sides. We simply did not know each other’s orientations very well (the US military and the forces (all of them) in Iraq).

The information we needed in the beginning was in the Observation aspect. We had to know exactly what the enemy was doing and at all times. This was the reason for the rush to get information. This is especially true during a high maneuver strategy such as a blitzkrieg.

There is usually a learning curve (or should be) after observing the results of our actions.

Bill Moore's statement can't be over emphasized. After gathering information to satisfy our observation of the enemy, we needed to know him (28 articles) and ourselves. This new knowledge is what enables an army to plan what the enemy will do. We got into their OODA loop and they enter ours. Whoever reacts quicker wins the battle, but not necessary the war.

As for simply picking one system (COG or EBO) and running with it, why?

One reason might be because that is the system that the enemy knows you will use, and you know you can defeat him with it. According to Boyd, you want to react as your enemy's orientation dictates and not how yours dictate. If the only thing you know about the enemy is that he understands how you move, I guess you have to go with that. I know too little about your COG and EBO, so I really can't be more specific. Even if I did know more, I am a civilian so my overall knowledge on how the military operates is very limited.

Why do we have to have a regimented system that "limits" our ability to define and solve problems? We need less emphasis on planning systems/methods and more emphasis on independent thinking.

War has such a high level of chance and the outcome can be, well... so final, I wouldn't want any "limits", but then I don't know the limiting factors in the military.
Emboldening the front-line troops wins battles, but I am beginning to believe that it takes leaders with vision, and knowledge to win wars. I also believe this vision has to begin at the top. Independent thinking is great for winning battles, but the US military needs to present a unifying strategy to win this war.
If the COG is about installing leadership in the Iraqi government, I would say that sounds about right. If the EBO is directed at influencing that leadership, I would say that sounds about right. Using EBO against the enemy is great if all the effects it causes are known. I am just not sure if it can be known completely in such a complex situation.
If the companies are trying to sell you a system (pie-in-the-sky) that wins every battle, it is too late, you guys already accomplish that. Sounds to me like a bunch of whistles and bells you don’t need.
Your knowledge of the facts of the situation sound spot on. It sounds to me like the discussion for and against COG or EBO needs to be carried forward by qualified guys like you.

[Merv Benson]

In Iraq the enemy is primarily targeting noncombatants so that the media will say it is another example of the US sides failure to stop them from engaging in mass murder. Our primary response to this has been to concentrate on finding and taking out bomb builders and better intelligence in finding those doing the attacks. What is missing from this loop is an attempt to get inside the news cycle or to challenge the premise of the stories. The enemy has said that 80 percent of his battle space is in the media, yet we have no one in charge of fighting in that battle space. The weekly newsbriefings run as many as seven days behind the news cycle. Too often a charge is thrown out and it takes days and sometimes weeks for a response, by which time the cycle has moved on to a new charge to be investigated. If we took the same approach to a kinetic battle space, we would have a lot of friendly KIA's to deal with.

[SWJED]

Here is an example of an average day's worth of Iraq reporting (MSM, Official and Blogs):

Iraq and OIF / Telic / Catalyst

• Bush Says U.S., Iraq Will Assess Troop Levels - Reuters
• Coalition, Iraqi Leaders Meet to Discuss Future of Iraqi Security - AFPS
• Talks on Security Continue in Iraq - Los Angeles Times
• PM: Iraqi Forces Could Stand Alone in 2007 - Agence France-Presse
• Bush to Make Assessment of Iraq's Needs for U.S. Military Help - VOA
• Delay in Key Iraqi Ministries Will Affect U.S. Troop Levels - VOA
• U.S., Britain to Start Iraq Exit in July - The Australian
• Far From Model Army but Iraq's Troops Battle On - London Daily Telegraph
• Iraqi Security Forces Leading Operations in More Areas - AFPS
• Diggers to Pull Out of Muthanna if Iraqis Take Over - The Australian
• Armed Groups Propel Iraq Toward Chaos - New York Times
• Iraqi Insurgent Gives Chilling Confession - Washington Post
• 30 Iraqis Die in Attacks Across the Nation - New York Times
• 40 Killed in Iraq, 11 Near Shiite Mosque - Associated Press
• Bomb Kills at Least 11 at Baghdad Shi'ite Mosque - Reuters
• Hands-Off or Not? Saudis Wring Theirs Over Iraq - Los Angeles Times
• Rights Under Assault In Iraq, U.N. Unit Says - Washington Post
• U.S. Is Faulted for Using Private Military Workers - Los Angeles Times
• Amnesty Urges U.S. on Iraq Contractors - Associated Press
• U.S. Urged to Stop Paying Iraqi Reporters - New York Times
• Judging Iraq On Its Own Terms - Christian Science Monitor Editorial
• Iraq's Next Giant Step - Seattle Times Editorial
• Revisionist History - Wall Street Journal Commentary
• For Neocons, the Irony of Iraq - Washington Post Commentary
• Iraqi Progress - Washington Times Commentary
• Securing Baghdad is a Numbers Game - Los Angeles Times Commentary
• Troop Withdrawal To Speed Up: Guardian - Captain's Quarters Blog
• U.S. & Great Britain Will Start Iraq Exit in July - Gateway Pundit Blog
• Government Forms; Recent Counterterrorism Ops - Counterterrorism Blog

The list with the links is here. I read most of it and post the links every day. I feel many of the same frustrations as Merv in reference to lagging behind the MSM daily news cycle on events in Iraq, Afghanistan and the GWOT.

Many of the blogs pick up some of the slack but they do not have the wide exoposure the MSM does. Moreover, many (if not most) of the blog readers tend to be selective and visit blogs that more or less reinforce their particular views on Iraq and other issues.

The official DoD press reporting and transcripts lag behind events and tend towards straight forward script that reads like press releases.

DoD did try to get into the enemy's IO OODA Loop but the program to pay Iraqi reporters was outed and the MSM had a field day with that, to say the least.

[Bill Moore]

Merv I don't disagree, but I would love to quote your source that the enemy said 80% of their battle space is the media if you can find and share it. I know we have all read and heard a lot over the years, so you may not have it at your fingertips.

From an effects based approach, the information system is definitely the most important, as it has a disproportionate impact on all the other systems such as political, economic, social, military, etc. We can win every kinetic battle and still lose if we can’t effectively influence the info sphere.

Although we discussed at length the failure of our ability to influence the info sphere in previous discussions, this is the first example I have seen where you framed the argument using the OODA loop construct, which is simply brilliant. Obvious in hindsight, but not until you pulled open the curtains.

I think we should run with this a little more. We may be able to convince our public affairs officers to get off their duff and respond quicker, but I don’t think that is the right answer. For those of us in the military, we all know we’re repelled by most commercials, and news on the Armed Forces Network (AFN). It comes across as simpleton in nature and disingenuous, I rather Korean, German, or Japanese television. Instead of having a polished prince presenting the approved official side of the story after the response has been murder boarded a few times, why not let one of our NCOs or younger officers speak directly to the media about what happened right after it happened? It may not be polished, but it will be genuine and from the heart and people will have no choice but to believe it. That is the type of IO that will have an impact.

I won’t even attempt to sugarcoat what we did in Abu Grab, and in my opinion the failure of our leadership to aggressively respond to it, gave the enemy an IO victory of enormous scale. Of course ever so slowly we brought several of the culprits to justice, but it was a behind the scenes show. How do you manage the damage for something like this? You don’t manage it, you stand on principle, what people around the world love us for, and you aggressively respond to the crime. Concurrently, and equally if not more important, we show what the terrorists are doing to the population, to include pictures of the tortured bodies. Hell, I read a depressing story today about a 12 year old Iraqi boy that was tortured to death, why wasn’t that one the front page or headline news? We have to show a clear contrast, which means we admit our mistakes, and in the case of the guilty we punish them. The terrorists are murdering pricks who brag about their atrocities online! Why can’t we get that across to the Arab street? It is a story right there to be told. We wear the white hat, that is obvious to us, but it isn’t all that clear to the Arab world. We can do better, much better.

I don't want to divert too much from the COG versus EBO argument, but this has merit.

[Merv Benson]

The 80 percent figure came from one of the intercepted al Qaeda communications. I will try to find it and post a link.

I do not think public affairs offices are set up to respond in a timely way to enemy media campaigns. The best analogy I can think of off hand is a groups of trial lawyers responding in real time to the other side in complex litigation situations. They have the sense of urgency to get their sides position out there and to tear down the assertions of the other side. If properly manged by a skilled attorney they can be devatatingly effective. This is not the same as lawyers giving legal advice on operational matters. It is about presenting a case in an understandable way that ordinary people can understand. Trial lawyers are very different from deal lawyers in terms of their OODA loops. They can't afford to let testimony bad for their case just hang out there without dealing with it while it is still fresh in the minds of the fact finders.

[Jones_RE]

Experienced trial lawyers tailor their message to the audience. They'll use different approaches depending upon the judge and jurors as they know them.

The Arab mindset seems a bit difficult for westerner's to wrap their heads around - certainly I don't grok it. Heightened concern for social honor, a penchant for paranoia, major concern over person to person relationships as opposed to detail oriented deal making, etc. It's easy to see how rotating a press secretary in and out of the Green Zone isn't going to cut it.

At the same time, the internet offers an incredible opportunity to insurgents everywhere - untraceable, immediate and virtually impossible to refute (because you can't verify anything online - thus folks believe the stuff they want to and ignore the rest). And for the finale - in Iraq you've got scads of local Imams whose livelihood is dependant upon their popularity and who have far more credibility and authority than any American.

Frankly, I can't think of a more difficult information operations environment.

[Larry Dunbar]

It's easy to see how rotating a press secretary in and out of the Green Zone isn't going to cut it.

Not a press secretary, a meme, which I suppose could be a collection of a single conscious (SOF).

[Merv Benson]

This is a link to a Multi-National Forces-Iraq press briefing where Maj. Gen. Lynch discusses the Zawahiri leter to Zarqawi.

...

I talk about the Zawahiri letter to the point where you might be tired of me talking about it. But there is something that I have not talked about in the last several press conferences that I want to emphasize. In the letter from Zawahiri, the second in command, if you will, of al Qaeda, he told Zarqawi - he says, "Remember, Zarqawi" - he says, "Half the battle is in the battlefield of the media." Half the battle is in the battlefield of the media. The terrorists will use the media as a combat multiplier to hide their limited capabilities. And let me use an example that you're all very familiar with to highlight that point.

...

This is a link with a link to the text of the letter in both English and Arabic.

...

Among the letter's highlights are discussions indicating:

* The centrality of the war in Iraq for the global jihad.

* From al Qa'ida's point of view, the war does not end with an American departure.

* An acknowledgment of the appeal of democracy to the Iraqis.

* The strategic vision of inevitable conflict, with a tacit recognition of current political dynamics in Iraq; with a call by al-Zawahiri for political action equal to military action.

* The need to maintain popular support at least until jihadist rule has been established.

* Admission that more than half the struggle is taking place "in the battlefield of the media."

...

Elsewhere, the 80 percent figure has been used, but in either case the point is the same, we are not really engaged in half or more of the battle space.

I would point out that the Arab audience is not the only one these attacks are suppose to infleunce and probably not the most important. Part of the design is to reduce support for the war in the US. That has been the most successful aspect of the enemy's war strategy, and people who can make the case in the US are certainly important to the continued success of the operation. The enemy's goal is to change our policy even if he can not win militarily.

[Strickland]

So back to the original question - what is or are the center(s) of gravity in Iraq? We have been in Iraq for 42 months, so I would imagine someone must have figured it out by now.

[Jedburgh]

The 80 percent figure came from one of the intercepted al Qaeda communications. I will try to find it and post a link.

Merv, I agree 100% with you in that we are the IO campaign to date has been a failure. As Bill stated, there is a great deal of potential leverage to bring into play in a properly orchestrated and synched IO campaign. We do have people (not many, and damn sure not enough for all the missions they are in demand for) with the requisite local and cultural knowledge to develop such a campaign. There's been plenty of doctrinal ink spilled, and lots of high-level discussion, regarding effective integration of IO at the tactical and operational levels, but it ain't happening on the ground.

Not that it matters that much, but the 80% figure Merv quoted from Al-Qa'ida is in relation to pre-attack intelligence gathering rather than media battlespace. In the Al-Qa'ida training manual it states (on page 42 of the pdf file) that ...by using public sources openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at least 80 percent of all information required about the enemy.

[S-2]

"...those characteristics, capabilities, or locations from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight."

Lot of smart guys here, so I'll be weighing in with some trepidation. The above is the "official" DoD definition of COG. Most of this conversation has revolved around "effects based oriented" operations (EBO?) relating to our enemy's perception of coalition vulnerabilities and vice versa-in Iraq. Collectively, you guys have seemed to narrow this to the conduct of Info Ops (I.O.), both ours and theirs-and the relative skill which each side brings to the fight.

What about Afghanistan? There, I'd suggest a more tangible COG exists-Opium. When I consider this as a COG, I acknowledge the monetary importance it plays to the Taliban. I see the physical connection opium establishes between our opponent and the community- coercive and corruptive. I consider the correlation between smuggling routes leading to labs outside, and enemy LOCs leading inside to Afghanistan, as I'd bet they are one and the same. Finally, opium connects the interdependance between the drug warlords and the Taliban. Like LOCs, finding one almost certainly means finding the other.

I welcome disagreement, but HERE seems to lie a tangible/material center of gravity in a low intensity/C.I. battlefield. However, while tangible and material, it would also appear elusive, as it seems both insidious and culturally pervasive.

Curious to your thoughts, thanks.