Center of Gravity Construct

[Bill Moore]

In my opinion the center of gravity construct which many of our officers cling to blindly demonstrates a serious deficency in our professional education process. COG's are rarely correctly identified (assuming they exist), or the COG identified (such as the enemy's will) is useless from a strategy stand point. Furthermore, using the COG construct (assuming it works at all) only results in the defeat of the enemy's forces, but does not result in a victory (eg OIF). It doesn't allow for planning in depth. The sooner we shelve this concept, or at least subordinate it to other methodologies the better for the force.

[GorTex6]

In my opinion the center of gravity construct which many of our officers cling to blindly demonstrates a serious deficency in our professional education process. COG's are rarely correctly identified (assuming they exist), or the COG identified (such as the enemy's will) is useless from a strategy stand point. Furthermore, using the COG construct (assuming it works at all) only results in the defeat of the enemy's forces, but does not result in a victory (eg OIF). It doesn't allow for planning in depth. The sooner we shelve this concept, or at least subordinate it to other methodologies the better for the force.

Center of gravity is viewed and handled from only a physical standpoint.

[DDilegge]

Center of gravity is viewed and handled from only a physical standpoint.

At times we seem to get enamored with physical centers of gravity because they fall into the easy to do category and can be assigned relatively simple metrics / measures of effectiveness. Second and third order effects are easy to identify, nodal analysis is easy, and the list can go on…

Problem with Small Wars and COIN is that it is the human element and how it interacts with the physical environment that presents the problem set we face.

Several schools of thought have emerged over the last several years – one is that the civilian population is always the COG, another is that there are multiple COG’s, and yet another is there are no "true" centers of gravity in a Small Wars / COIN scenario.

Somewhere in all this – Lines of Operations fall out and I believe that probably is the best way to go… At least in getting a grasp on the systems of systems human and physical environment we are faced with.

[Larry Dunbar]

Center of gravity is viewed and handled from only a physical standpoint.

Again, I apologize for commenting on something I know so little about. This quote from GorTex6 seems completely true to me.

Unless you want to break the trust of your enemy, the enemy needs to see you exactly as you are. If the enemy sees you as an adaptive force that controls the COG in all situations, then, to remain in his OODA loop, which was formed when we penetrated his country, you have to give the enemy your complete trust and remain an adaptive force that controls the COG in all situations. Once the trust is broken the enemy has to readapt to the situation, which he seems to be very good at accomplishing. Strategically it may remain a good way to keep a lot of the enemy’s energy occupied by making him adapt, and in time the political force in Iraq might change for the better.

[Strickland]

Perhaps, I should have stated my opinion in the original posting. I believe that Dr. Strange's COG construct of Critical Capability(s), Critical Requirement(s), and Critical Vulnerability(s) is VERY useful. However, I do not believe that we as planners should be slaves to this construct. The true utility of this construct is in assisting planners conduct conceptual planning and visualize the threat. No, not all adversaries fit neatly into this construct; however, by going through the process, one is capable of finding a 90% solution that will assist in futher detailed planning.

For Iraq, I would argue that there are 2 main adversaries - Sunni Rejectionists and Terrorists/Foreign Fighters. Most would agree that little can be done to positively influence the later except for direct kinetic acts, thus we are left with Sunni Rejectionists. Yes, I recognize that Sadr is not a Sunni Rejectionist; however, I would assert he is a minor threat who has demonstrated a desire to be included in the legitimate political process. In addition, I recognize that there are criminals that continue to destabilize the country, but that is no different than in the US, thus hardly worthy of comparison with rejectionists and terrorists.

Is it possible that the strategic and operational center of gravity for OIF is the Muslim - Sunni perception/feeling of marginalization - victimization? If coalition forces and the Iraqi government could somehow eradicate this perception and feeling, would our troubles not largely disappear? I say largely disappear due to the fact most agree that terrorists represent a small fraction of insurgents in Iraq. It is this feeling of victimization that leads Muslims to strike back. It is this sense of being victims of Israeli or American power that fuels anti-Western hatred. It is this sense of victimization that leads 300,000 former members of the Iraqi Intel, Security, and Military services to contribute to the insurgency.

If we accept this a the COG, then how is it vulnerable. Immediately, we see inclusion as the answer in Iraq, and not as we are currently mandating it through the "democratic" process. I put democratic in quotations due to the fact that any system which mandates 25% female representation regardless of the one man one vote idea is not democratic.

In the end, if the Brits can live with Martin McGuiness or Gerry Adams taking a seat in Parliament, then we can live with the Baath Party in Iraq.

ps - I have heard compelling arguments that the COG is the enemy's continued ability to destabilize the country, and that the critical requirement necessary for this to continue is our continued presence.

[Bill Moore]

In resposne to Strickland's post:

I respect most, if not all, contributors to this council, for their contributions to the body of knowledge we are all trying to master, yet I still find many of their arguments against EBO illogical, especially when they turn around and embrace the center of gravity theory. While it does have limited application, it also is an extremely limited construct that doesn’t facilitate a strategy for winning a war. In some cases it may allow a strategy to defeat a particular enemy, but that is seldom enough. During phase III of OIF the COG was the Saddam Regime, and as we saw that foucs only provided a worthwhile intermediate objective, but destroying it didn’t allow us to win the war, of which military power is a only a part of.

Getting back to your comments, while thought provoking I think your example is a perfect illustration of the limits of the COG construct. It is a desire to identify a single enabler for a complex problem set, so we can focus our limited assets on a few enabling decisive points around that COG (as close to a silver bullet solution as possible), then we call victory and go home. This is a practice that some have associated with EBO, but I think it is much more prevalent in the COG approach.

The Sunni rejectionist problem you identified must be addressed, but you can’t address it in isolation. Also identifying the Sunni rejectionist as a COG doesn’t give a planner much to work with. You can’t wish away the other problem sets, since they are all interconnected. We can’t fix the Sunni rejectionist problem without establishing a viable economy, you can’t do that without security, you can’t have security within a criminal society with foreign fighters and ethnic hostilities or regional nations that don’t support security, etc.

Little can be done to influence the foreign fighters except kinetic acts? I disagree and this is a problem of trying to find the foreign fighter COG within Iraq. Assuming there is a COG for foreign fighters, maybe it exists outside of Iraq? Foreign fighters can be addressed through a number of indirect means, to include engaging the source nations with information and assisting them with economic development, not to mention swinging the stick when needed. Another indirect approach which is effective in some areas in Iraq is to turn the population against the foreign fighters which denies them sanctuary, and greatly impedes their ability to operate. By the way this is an effects based approach.

I don’t buy into your comparison of Iraqi criminals with U.S. criminals; thereby, disregarding a problem that is equal on scale to the stability of Iraq as the Sunni rejectionists. There is a difference between a criminal and a criminal economy. What we’re really trying to focus on is the underground or informal economy. Let’s face it, at the end of the day the economic system really determines who as the power, so if a tribe makes its wealth (limited as it may be) from emplacing IEDs, kidnapping, or black market fuel sales, then what is the incentive to support a central government in Iraq that at present cannot provide a viable economic alternative to the tribes? The economy and underground economy are the key competing factions regarding the future of Iraq as a stable state. I think that criminals (who are also frequently terrorists and insurgents) are a bigger threat than the Sunni rejectionists, because they are undermining the very concept of the state.

In summary I think an effects based approach is far superior to the center of gravity construct.

[Strickland]

Unfortunately, I have limited experience with EB planning, and each of those experiences was a poor one. Maybe I am paralyzed by personal experience; however, I believe that EBO requires a level or amount of intelligence that is unreasonable in order to work effectively.

Again, I am not arguing for a single COG; however, am suggesting that in order to get our heads around a complex problem, one must pick something instead of continuously arguing that whatever is selected is wrong.

[Bill Moore]

Larry claims to have a fast OODA loop, but I think we all do or we would simply perish, but speed is not the sole essence of the OODA loop. John Boyd focused on speed when he used the OODA loop model from a fighter pilot perspective, but expanded the OODA loop concept considerably to address what we're now calling 4th generation warfare while he was assigned to Thailand.

We observe, we orient (perceive), we decide and we act, but both sides when they start a conflict are relatively weak at the orientation aspect due to the cultural biases we bring to the table. There is usually a learning curve (or should be) after observing the results of our actions. OIF is a perfect example where we learned after repeated failures that mass search and sweep operations were not effective at catching or killing bad guys, and they further alienated the local population, which in the end played into the enemy's hands. If you have some sort of effects based approach you'll learn and adapt, but if you're beholden to a COG you'll tend to stay the course regardless.

As for simply picking one system (COG or EBO) and running with it, why? Why do we have to have a regimented system that "limits" our ability to define and solve problems? We need less emphasis on planning systems/methods and more emphasis on independent thinking.

I'm not a big advocate of Effects Based Operations methods that are coming out of OSD and JFCOM, and concur with your comments on EBO, the planning episodes I have witnessed have been disappointing to say the least. We have tech centric leadership at OSD now, and if they keep evolving EBO into an information technology reliant system it will fail, as many of us have already seen, yet there are still some good aspects of using an effects based approach that will enable us to become a learning organization. It won't keep us from making mistakes initially, but it will allow us to steer in the right direction sooner (I think).

The pie in sky dream of an on line, all knowing, Operational Net Assessment (ONA) Tool that can lay out every node, predict every effect, etc. is not just a fantasy, but a dangerous one that will make a few contractors rich, and in the end DoD will have wished they spent that money on weapons systems, getting spare parts for helicopters, etc.

[Tom Odom]

Adam,

EBO (strat and opn level) is an extensive process; I won't argue for it or against it.

But an effects based process at tactical level does work and it achieves the magic word "synchronization" of lethal and non-lethal effects. The intel requirements to support such a approach are heavily tactical--that is soldier and small unit; but that is the same in any COIN/stability opns environment.

the key to using an effects process is to modifying it to meet the tactical level; constructs such as COGs must be (and are) adjusted to match the user level.

Best
Tom

[Tom Odom]

The reality is that as we practice tactical effects thinking here, we use COG analysis as a fundamental tool in understanding effects. I would certainly endorse both in this context.


best
Tom

[RTK]

Physical:
- Cities
- Infrastructure (water sources, communications, electricity)
- Line of Communication

Organizational:
- Tribal links
- Religious ideology
- Political parties
- Ethnic factions (Sunna, Shia, Kurd)
- Kurdish political parties
- Iraqi Security Forces

[Larry Dunbar]

I respect most, if not all, contributors to this council, for their contributions to the body of knowledge we are all trying to master...

I am one guy you don't have to respect. As far as COG goes, I think the best maneuver is a flanking move, EBO to me is the firebombing of Japan during WWII, and I believe the forces in Iraq are composed of remnants of the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and the Arabs, not to mention the forces of the USA. In short, I am completely ignorant. I believe COG keeps our troop alive; EBO only works if the General in charge envisions it, and I believe we are in the middle of wars fought long ago for goals both won and lost. I am a simpleton. While this makes me without a place in today’s complex world, I have an extremely fast OODA loop.

In the end, if the Brits can live with Martin McGuiness or Gerry Adams taking a seat in Parliament, then we can live with the Baath Party in Iraq.

I think it is too late for the Baath party, they should be eliminated from the planet earth. Our strategy should be one of transformation instead of reform. This comes from the visions of our Generals and not through our civilian leadership.

[DDilegge]

I am a simpleton. While this makes me without a place in today’s complex world, I have an extremely fast OODA loop.

Sometimes I read all the "smart guy" stuff and wonder what planet that conference was held on...