Center of Gravity Construct

[RTK]

A great position paper on the subject.

[slapout9]

RTK, great paper thanks for posting.

[marct]

Thanks for posting this, RTK. I think I am going to give it to my students to read since it is one of the best examples of a non-deistic, theological epistemology I have ever seen (wry grin).

What I have found most fascinating in this entire discussion is that there hasn't been any examination of the operational assumptions made by Clausewitz in his original work, i.e. no discussion of the assumed concept of "organization" (it's all ideal types) and no formalized discussion of the offensive | defensive | economic system ratio and how it effects the organization of military / ideological force. I think this ties in with Echevarria's comments about Clausewitz originally envisioning the concept as a process rather than a static.

Even if we go back to the Newtonian model of physics, there are certain processual issues that come to the fore. For example, gravity implies mass and some measure of density. Most mass is also moving along some type of a vector, at least in relationship with other units of mass. This vector is changing based on mutual attraction and / or the application of "force", and that rate of change (ΔV/ΔT) is the acceleration.

Okay, let's translate this analogy back into Iraq and the GWOT. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and the spread of Wahhabist theology is the initial vector, where the "force" applied to produce an acceleration is primarily socio-cultural (e.g. pan-Islamic nationalism, a revitalization movement a la Wallace, a rejection of secular values, an increase in what Durkheim called anomie, the creation of the State of Israel, etc.). It starts as a fairly small diameter (i.e. small number of poeple), highly "dense" institutional / ideological object and gathers mass along its vector, gathering speed (accelerating) as it goes. So far, it is acting exactly the same as any other social movement in the literature.

Where it starts to change its vector is when certain crucial events happen ("strange attractors" in catastrope theory) - the short lived take-over of the Qa'bah, the Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Each of these acts to redirect the vector of the social movement by defining an immediate environment: the core of Islam is under attack, it is possible to run a "pure" Islamic nation state, and the "crusaders" (infidels) have returned and are being aided by apostates exactly the same way as they were during the period of the Crusades.

This parallel to the crusades is crucial for a number of reasons. First, they happened when the Caliphate was internally divided and fighting amongst itself. Second, they happened at a time of a resurgence of non-state Islam based around the Ulama. Third, they were a time when the first serious attempt to reformulate Islam was happening in an integrative manner (cf. al-Ghazali, The Revivification of Religious Sciences; it is also interesting to note that al-Ghazali's work is enjoying a revival in the Sudan and Somalia amongst other places). Fourth, they marked the begining of a period of shame for Islam as the Caliphate disolves and "barbarians" who, while ostensively Muslim do not share the same cultural values (e.g. the Turks, the Mongols, etc.), gain control of large parts of Islamic lands. Fifth, the period produces one of the most reveared "saviour" figures in Islamic history - al-Malik al-Nāṣir Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Yūsuf ibn Ayyūb (the closest Western figure is probably King Arthur). BTW, this is what I meant by a cultural propoganda node in my earlier posting - it is the "mythic" justification for transforming "love of God" into "hatred of the apostate / non-believer".

So, what does this mean operationally? RTK, you described how you operated and the results you achieved. I was particularly impressed when you said that you had been "adopted". In part, what was going on was a hearkening back to an earlier "story" from the height of the Caliphate where Christians, Jews and Muslims worked together for the good of the community (~8th century ce).

What most people don't think about right now is that, at one time, Islam was the most "tolerant" religion amongst the Peoples of the Book, and the period when that tolerance was operational is the "Golden Age" of Islam. This was the time period when the Western Empire had been replaced by barbarian kingdoms and the Eastern empire was a theocratic / bureaucratic state that made Stalinist Russia look like paradise. The main "progress" of civilization was happening in the Islamic world, and Alexandria, Baghdad and Damascus were amongst the greatest cities in the world in terms of civility, technology, law, the arts and intellectual activity. This Golden Age had already started to fall apart when Alp Arslan destroyed Romanus IV's army at Manzikert (the proximate cause of the 1st Crusade).

Back to operational reality and the CoG debate. If the conecpt of a CoG is going to prove useful, then force needs to be aimed at not only the mass (i.e. the open insurgents) but, also, towards changeing the acceleration factors, which is why, IMHO, a strictly kinetic approach is ridiculous - it actually increases the acceleration as we have all seen. The proper application of "force" is to shift the vector from the perception that the proper "story" is the Crusades to the proper "story" is the Golden Age. And that is what RTK was doing - shifting the story one person at a time.

Marc

[Steve Blair]

Good post, Marc. I'm not sure why (perhaps it's the fact that I'm a history type as opposed to a physics type) but I always viewed the CoG as a process rather than a static thing.

[marct]

Thanks, Steve. Actually, we are probably alike that way - I never could understand how it could be static . 'sides that, even in physics it's a process so if we use it to gain insights, it's probably better to try and use it understanding the context it was written in. I s'pose it all comes out of people looking for a solid "thing" rather than a fluid event

Marc

[Steve Blair]

I suspect you're right about the fluid versus solid thing, Marc. One of the things you learn from history if you study it properly (trying to understand causes and perspectives as opposed to block memorization of dates... ) is that most events are very fluid. Based on this, I think of CoGs as shifting targets and areas of importance. By way of illustration, during one phase of a conflict a CoG may be a country's logistics hubs, while at another phase it could well become their power grid, information systems, or ethnic/cultural differences. One could argue that in the US Indian Wars two vital CoGs were the buffalo for the Plains Indians and a variety of tribal differences among the Apache. Two different "theaters of war," if you will, with two different CoGs, but the same overall campaign. There were others within each conflict, including tribal differences among the various Plains Indians (the different relationships with the Whites held by the Sioux peoples as compared to the Crow, for example), showing that there can in fact be multiple CoGs within a single conflict, and that each in turn can be examined and targeted. Wise commanders understand this, while others look for the lockstep answer.

[RTK]

What if we defined COGs as areas of influence, either physical or theoretical, the control of which by either adversarial party places the dominating organization in a position of tactical, operational, or strategic advantage, much like key terrain?

Any thoughts?

[Bill Moore]

Marc, you're begining to soften my position on academia. You have made several observations that are value added, and ones that I'll think about at length on my next short TDY. I find COGs of limited value at the military level, and as some claim if they are constantly moving then they are of zero value. However, using Clausewitz's original definition of a COG (and he admits they don't always exist), then they could be a useful construct at the interagency level, which is what EBO is attempting integrate. Then on the other hand, as mentioned earlier by one of the council members, it is a fanasty to believe that we actually have other government agencies beyond the military with any real capability to make things happen. State is severely underresourced, so they can stand up and say this is our job all they want, but they can't do it. Who exactly runs our national level IO? Seems to me that every agency plays in this game, but where is the over all coordinator?

RTK, I look forward to reading the paper you attached. In short though, it seems the essence of success is understanding your enemy and understanding yourself, which in some ways it seems that is what we're trying to do with the COG theory (although that use is apparently incorrect). Understanding vulnerabilities, capabilities, motivations, etc. and then taking the appropriate actions. If we understood this up front, e.g. understood our limitations and the enemy's we may have had different objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq.

It is a little bit late after the war starts to start thinking if we only had more civil affairs, better IO, more ground troops, etc. We could have (and did) accomplish much in both countries, the only reason it appears that we're struggling is our desire to emplace democracies there.

[marct]

Hi Bill,

Marc, you're begining to soften my position on academia. You have made several observations that are value added, and ones that I'll think about at length on my next short TDY.

Thanks Just don't mention it to any of my academic colleagues, or I would be drummed out of the academy for "Conduct Unbecoming..." (LOLOL)

I find COGs of limited value at the military level, and as some claim if they are constantly moving then they are of zero value. However, using Clausewitz's original definition of a COG (and he admits they don't always exist), then they could be a useful construct at the interagency level, which is what EBO is attempting integrate.

In all honesty, I suspect that they are a heuristic of somewhat limited value in the type of battlespace we are operating in (i.e. global political, military, economic and symbolic conflict). I think they can be a very useful heuristic at both the interagency level, as you mentioned, and also at the level of Grand Strategy (i.e. the global population is the theatre of operations). Given the prevalence of the concept within the militray, they can also, probably, serve as useful heuristics in more restricted levels of operation.

Then on the other hand, as mentioned earlier by one of the council members, it is a fanasty to believe that we actually have other government agencies beyond the military with any real capability to make things happen. State is severely underresourced, so they can stand up and say this is our job all they want, but they can't do it. Who exactly runs our national level IO? Seems to me that every agency plays in this game, but where is the over all coordinator?

And to add to the list, how about other nations agencies and militaries? If this is a Global War on Terror, then where is the Global co-ordination?

It is a little bit late after the war starts to start thinking if we only had more civil affairs, better IO, more ground troops, etc. We could have (and did) accomplish much in both countries, the only reason it appears that we're struggling is our desire to emplace democracies there.

One of the things I dislike most about many of my colleagues is their habit of living in the past without using it to bring meaning to the present and help construct the future. You're perfectly right about playing the "what if" game - it is really counter-productive, especially in democracies where it is likely to be used by short sighted politicians for immediate election gains. We need to look at the past to find the problems, opportunities and patterns of action that can help us to achieve our current and future goals.

On the subject of emplacing democracies, I'm really unsure. On the one hand, there is a certain international perception about the message coming from the Bush administration "Democracy is good, and we'll give it to everyone." The problem I think that many of us have with this idea is that democracy, in the true, philosophical sense of the term, cannot be "given" it must be earned (Thomas Paine had some good things to say about this in Common Sense). At its heart, a democracy relies on an informed and educated citizenry that is both willing to engage in a pluralistuc debate and, at the same time, willing to defend the right of other people to hold contrary opinions.

At the same time, one pattern that has been repeated over and over again historically is the shift from a democracy into either an aristocracy (e.g. Rome) or a mob-ocracy (e.g. Athens). I'm not particularly sanguine about where democracy will go in either Afghanistan or Iraq. On a purely personal level, and, yes, I know I'm am showing my bias here , I really wish that the old King of Afghanistan had either accepted the throne or let his son do so. Oh, well, that's water under the bridge.

Marc