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Thread: Center of Gravity Construct

  1. #61
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    I suspect you're right about the fluid versus solid thing, Marc. One of the things you learn from history if you study it properly (trying to understand causes and perspectives as opposed to block memorization of dates... ) is that most events are very fluid. Based on this, I think of CoGs as shifting targets and areas of importance. By way of illustration, during one phase of a conflict a CoG may be a country's logistics hubs, while at another phase it could well become their power grid, information systems, or ethnic/cultural differences. One could argue that in the US Indian Wars two vital CoGs were the buffalo for the Plains Indians and a variety of tribal differences among the Apache. Two different "theaters of war," if you will, with two different CoGs, but the same overall campaign. There were others within each conflict, including tribal differences among the various Plains Indians (the different relationships with the Whites held by the Sioux peoples as compared to the Crow, for example), showing that there can in fact be multiple CoGs within a single conflict, and that each in turn can be examined and targeted. Wise commanders understand this, while others look for the lockstep answer.

  2. #62
    Council Member RTK's Avatar
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    Default Definition Submission

    What if we defined COGs as areas of influence, either physical or theoretical, the control of which by either adversarial party places the dominating organization in a position of tactical, operational, or strategic advantage, much like key terrain?

    Any thoughts?

  3. #63
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by RTK View Post
    What if we defined COGs as areas of influence, either physical or theoretical, the control of which by either adversarial party places the dominating organization in a position of tactical, operational, or strategic advantage, much like key terrain?

    Any thoughts?
    I think this comes closer to Clausewitz's original intention, although it should also be considered that CoGs can change over time. A CoG could also be an area of influence that is subject to disruption if not necessarily control.

    One of the more interesting CoG discussions came out of Vietnam, and the contention that the North Vietnamese discovered that American public opinion was a vital CoG for their war aims. They never controlled it, but they did manage to disrupt and influence it in a way that helped them achieve victory.

    I think the term "Center of Gravity" evokes for many a physical image, much like the axis something physically revolves around. This can be hard to overcome, and may lead to some of the confusion that has grown up around the concept.

    On an interesting trivia note, I plugged Center of Gravity into Babel Fish. It translated into German there as Schwerpunkt, which then translated back into Emphasis. Nothing conclusive, but more something I found interesting.
    Last edited by Steve Blair; 09-26-2006 at 03:52 PM. Reason: Trivia note.

  4. #64
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    What if you defined a COG as a person,place,or thing that can exert power over the system?

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    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Perhaps influence might be a better term than power, since a CoG can have an indirect yet powerful influence over decisions. But I may also be quibbling over terms. It's more important to remember that a CoG is fluid, and not fixed.

  6. #66
    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Default "Value added" from academia?!?

    Hi Bill,

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    Marc, you're begining to soften my position on academia. You have made several observations that are value added, and ones that I'll think about at length on my next short TDY.
    Thanks Just don't mention it to any of my academic colleagues, or I would be drummed out of the academy for "Conduct Unbecoming..." (LOLOL)


    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    I find COGs of limited value at the military level, and as some claim if they are constantly moving then they are of zero value. However, using Clausewitz's original definition of a COG (and he admits they don't always exist), then they could be a useful construct at the interagency level, which is what EBO is attempting integrate.
    In all honesty, I suspect that they are a heuristic of somewhat limited value in the type of battlespace we are operating in (i.e. global political, military, economic and symbolic conflict). I think they can be a very useful heuristic at both the interagency level, as you mentioned, and also at the level of Grand Strategy (i.e. the global population is the theatre of operations). Given the prevalence of the concept within the militray, they can also, probably, serve as useful heuristics in more restricted levels of operation.

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    Then on the other hand, as mentioned earlier by one of the council members, it is a fanasty to believe that we actually have other government agencies beyond the military with any real capability to make things happen. State is severely underresourced, so they can stand up and say this is our job all they want, but they can't do it. Who exactly runs our national level IO? Seems to me that every agency plays in this game, but where is the over all coordinator?
    And to add to the list, how about other nations agencies and militaries? If this is a Global War on Terror, then where is the Global co-ordination?

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    It is a little bit late after the war starts to start thinking if we only had more civil affairs, better IO, more ground troops, etc. We could have (and did) accomplish much in both countries, the only reason it appears that we're struggling is our desire to emplace democracies there.
    One of the things I dislike most about many of my colleagues is their habit of living in the past without using it to bring meaning to the present and help construct the future. You're perfectly right about playing the "what if" game - it is really counter-productive, especially in democracies where it is likely to be used by short sighted politicians for immediate election gains. We need to look at the past to find the problems, opportunities and patterns of action that can help us to achieve our current and future goals.

    On the subject of emplacing democracies, I'm really unsure. On the one hand, there is a certain international perception about the message coming from the Bush administration "Democracy is good, and we'll give it to everyone." The problem I think that many of us have with this idea is that democracy, in the true, philosophical sense of the term, cannot be "given" it must be earned (Thomas Paine had some good things to say about this in Common Sense). At its heart, a democracy relies on an informed and educated citizenry that is both willing to engage in a pluralistuc debate and, at the same time, willing to defend the right of other people to hold contrary opinions.

    At the same time, one pattern that has been repeated over and over again historically is the shift from a democracy into either an aristocracy (e.g. Rome) or a mob-ocracy (e.g. Athens). I'm not particularly sanguine about where democracy will go in either Afghanistan or Iraq. On a purely personal level, and, yes, I know I'm am showing my bias here , I really wish that the old King of Afghanistan had either accepted the throne or let his son do so. Oh, well, that's water under the bridge.

    Marc
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    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
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    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by RTK View Post
    What if we defined COGs as areas of influence, either physical or theoretical, the control of which by either adversarial party places the dominating organization in a position of tactical, operational, or strategic advantage, much like key terrain?

    Any thoughts?
    I'd second Steve's comments on this. Maybe reformulate it as:

    areas of influence, either physical, theoretical or symbolic, the relative influence of which by adversarial parties places the dominating organization in a position of tactical, operational, or strategic advantage

    Marc
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
    Senior Research Fellow,
    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

  8. #68
    Council Member RTK's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by marct View Post
    I'd second Steve's comments on this. Maybe reformulate it as:

    areas of influence, either physical, theoretical or symbolic, the relative influence of which by adversarial parties places the dominating organization in a position of tactical, operational, or strategic advantage

    Marc
    I'll vote for this.

  9. #69
    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Default Just a thought...

    You know, I just had a thought that it would be really interesting to compare the methodologies used to currently determine a CoG with Malinowski's work in Dynamics of Culture Change. At it's core, this particular piece is laying out a methodology designed to find a culture's CoG, although he doesn't use the term, and figure out plans for changing it.

    Marc
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    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
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    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
    http://marctyrrell.com/

  10. #70
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    RTK, maybe change area of influence to point of influence? I think one purpose of defining a COG is to allow concentration, area seems to broad, point seems more focused?? What do you think? Anybody else welcome to comment to.

  11. #71
    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Default Point vs area

    Hmmm, i can certainly see why that might be better. If we want to keep with the analogy from physics, maybe we should keep "area", but with a "locus" or "focal point" that may shift depending on the actions of all forces in the area? The image running through my mind is the accretion disk on a black hole - the infamous "point of no return" - or that 3D graphic showing gravity wells (the one with warped space-time in noxious green lines).

    Marc
    Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
    Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
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    The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
    Carleton University
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  12. #72
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    Instead of expending the limited resource of time in search for COG(s) while planning; wouldnt it be more useful simply to focus on critical vulnerabilities or limitations of our adversary and plan from that point? We all are aware in social systems (such as the Sunni Insurgency) our knowledge of all factors that influence behavior wil be limited and imperfect. Thus, instead of expending countless hours in philosophical debate, why not just focus planning efforts on limitations and vulnerabilities to possibly exploit.

    I doubt that most people know what the center of gravity of their own neighborhoods, workplaces, church, or child's school is, let alone the Iraqi or Afghani Insurgency. If we had such knowledge as to how to manipulate or shape the behavior of adversaries so easily, we wouldnt be faced with uncontrolable criminal violence in parts of our urban centers, growing teen drug abuse, etc. here in the US.

  13. #73
    Council Member Ironhorse's Avatar
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    Default Always great when you can begin at the end

    Concur! Have seen all inexperienced staffs, and many experienced ones, die on the CG-CC-CR-CV hill early in mission analysis.

    Unfortunately, it is a vulnerability's special relationship to the CG that makes it a CRITICAL vulnerability, rather than just a run-of-the-mill or trivial vulnerability. So can't completely dismiss the topic. Just need to move to it and through it more smartly.

    Sometimes that may mean starting in the middle and working in both directions, say from CC or CR. Have seen that employed well. Have also failed miserably myself in attempting to do it, so that is not a panacea.

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    Default Wise commanders understand this

    Wise commanders understand this, while others look for the lockstep answer.
    Steve, I'm not convinced that anyone gets it, and there are plenty of smart people on this site that are debating it. Neither the Marines nor Army nor SOF have yet found anything resembling a COG that we can effectively influence to achieve our objectives in our current conflict. The COG normally has little relevance in COIN, except from the stand point of identifying our own and protecting them.

    The COG isn't a shifting thing or a process, it is a COG. It only shifts when your objective shifts or you didn't properly identify it in the first place, assuming it even exists. Obviously the COG for phase III in OIF is not the same as phase IV, but phase IV is really a different war, not a different phase.

    Our process is MDMP, not COG. Many planners try to use COGs to focus their efforts, and in a strictly kinetic fight that makes perfect sense (it is a form of EBO). Normally, (never say never, and never say always) if you focus your efforts in COIN (e.g. identify the COG and mass your efforts against it), then you're neglecting the the bigger picture, and most likely you'll find what you identified as COG wasn't, such as Fallujah. It was an important battle, but not the COG of the Sunni insurgency that some folks said it was at the time.

    Some of you mentioned using multiple COG's, but excessive COGs limit the utility of the concept in the first place. Every COG has decisive points (DPs) that we target/influence to achieve the desired effect on the COG, but DPs are not COGs. It sounds like the Marines use critical vulnerabilities instead of DPs. I wonder if our terminology and thought processes differ so much due to the French influencing the Marines and the Germans the Army in their formative years? (This was before the French were evil :-), if I didn't that the Corp make think I'm making a jab at them).

    What is missing in this conflict is clarity of intent and thought and ambiguity leads to chaos. If a COG existed beyond their will, then it would be useful, but if it doesn't (I haven't seen one yet) exist, then lets use other models to figure the problem out. We're defending freedom, so let's not be robotic and defend dinasour concepts to the death. No one is rejecting the COG concept completely, but in many situations the utility of it is questionable at best. If it limits our ability to accurately define and solve the problem, shift to another model.

    While I still think EBO has potential, the truth is I haven't seen it effectively integrated into our MDMP, so there is must be alternative models that we can collectively design. That is why this council exists isn't it?

  15. #75
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Default Effects Based Process Special Studies

    Bill,

    We have in process 2 effects-based process studies at the BCT and battalion level that should be out soon. They represent 4 years of work, practice, and operational use and should be of interest to you.

    Best
    Tom

  16. #76
    Council Member RTK's Avatar
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    I finally got around to watching the Emerald Express video from the USMC that was linked from another discussion page on this site. They make a point in the conclusion of the video that "the people are the center of gravity in COIN operations." They make a compelling argument.

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    Default Tom and RTK

    Tom,

    If the studies are available in draft, please send me a link. I'm very interesting in finding a working model. We're looking at a number of contigencies and we can list objectives and effects all day, and they're valid, but transitioning to task and purpose and worse trying to "measure" them is a nightmare.

    We use COG's also, but to be frank that is simply because they're part of doctrine, and in most cases they add very little to the process. I think what I'm discovering that may be a shortfall with Army doctrine is we have basically three category of tasks: decisive, supporting, and sustaining. Normally the kinetic operations are considered decisive, yet in COIN supporting and sustaining may in reality be decisive. You can see that our model doesn't facilitate that type of thinking. I recall one of the CG's in his AAR remarks on OIF mentioning that phase IV was decisive not phase III, which tends to parallel what I'm thinking, and I think that means the kinetic ops in phase III were supporting (set the conditions for decisive COIN supporting and sustaining tasks). Let me know what you think?

    RTK, you'll get no argument from me that people are critical and depending on how you define COG (still debatable) they may be a COG. I don't mean this disrespectfully, but so what? In every type of warfare people are the ultimate target. I think using the population as a COG in many ways is a cop out, because it doesn't get us to the appropriate task and purposes to achieve our end state. On further reflection our COG probably needs to be tied to our end state. This is a lame example, but I'm pressed for time, if we decided to invade Libya and do a regieme change instead of conducting a punitive air raid the COG would have differed. Like everything else the military does, it set conditions for something else to happen (maybe a political solution), so the COG simply can't be tied to the people, it needs to be tied to what we want the people to do (how they behave). Marc made a great comment in an earlier post, where he suggested instead of using people's will, how about their beliefs? That makes more sense. Again the challenge is figuring out how to operationalize it. I don't think beliefs is quite there, but it is closer than their will.

    I notice this conversation is getting a little more heated, which probably means we're about to break into new ground. This is by far the best counsil I have found online and I'm awed by the intellectual input into the collective effort. It is a combination of muddy boots experience and education. I'm heading out for a short period, and not sure if I'll have access to a computer, but look forward to reengaging upon return.

    Bill

  18. #78
    Council Member marct's Avatar
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    Default Breaking new ground

    Hi Folks,

    Bill mentioed that he would like to see drafts of the work Tom is talking about, and so would I.

    You know, I think that we probably are in the process of breaking new ground. I am going to be tied up with other things (teaching, meeting with students, choir practices) until Friday, so I probably won't have much time to make posts. What I am thinking about now is that Bill mentioned that "beliefs" may not quite be there, and I think he's right. The only wording I could put on it now would sound hopelessly theoretical, and I want a chance to mull it over. I think that I will go back to the Malinowski book I mentioned and see if I can get any insights out of how to operationalize "belief change" (as opposed to regime change? ).

    I'll try and put together a cheet sheet on Malinowski's ideas and make it available for everyone.

    Marc
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    Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
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  19. #79
    Council Member RTK's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post

    RTK, ... I don't mean this disrespectfully, but so what? ... On further reflection our COG probably needs to be tied to our end state.
    No disrespect taken.

    THis is exactly the point I've tried to make in other threads, particularly the Strategic Corporal thread. I work off my commander's intent and endstate. I then refine his to develop mine. Endstate drives the train. So I've got all these Iraqis out there. So what? How do they affect me? How do they affect my mission? Where do they tie into my endstate? Looking at things from a purely informational standpoint, you could see these as PIR.

    Perhaps COG is nothing more than a prescribed set of CCIR and key tasks driven towards a defined endstate fulfilling the commander's intent.

  20. #80
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Default the Other Holy Trinity

    This is little off track but maybe useful. In police world we use the problem/crime or disorder triangle. That is our Holy Trinity. They could also be thought of as centers of gravity. I will try to translate this into COIN ops.

    It starts with what is called a problem or crime/disorder triangle.
    It has three COG's
    1-a motivated offender (insurgent)
    2- an accessible target/victim (vulnerable population or physical thing,oil well)
    3-a hot spot location(failing or failed state, nobody in charge).

    If you are teaching this to Bubba it is called the wolf,the duck and the den. All three must be present to have a crime or disorder problem happen.

    To collapse the triangle, you can:
    1-arrest the wolf
    2- protect the sitting duck
    3-clean up the den so it doesn't attract future wolves.
    In the worst case you may have to do all three at once but often they can be done one at a time. the COG may shift during your operation depending on how effective you are and the general situation. No one technique works everywhere or all the time. Criminals are very adaptive.

    The Iraq parallel:
    1-An Bar is a wolf problem or wolves, you have several wolf packs and until you deal with this nothing much will change.
    2- Baghdad is a duck problem (sitting ducks) vulnerable population. To fix this you need boots on the ground and eyes in the sky.
    3-Iraq in general is a den problem a failing state with valuable targets (oil) that will attract a lot of wolves. To make it worse you have problems with the internal infrastructure (elc.,water,jobs,etc.) poor den keeping.

    In summary Iraq is about the worst problem you could have, but it could be solved by applying the outer control triangle, if we wanted to. But that would require a whole other post so I will wait on that.

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