Center of Gravity Construct

[Jones_RE]

Actually, I think that's a great comparison - a lot like the fire triangle (heat+fuel+oxygen=fire).

Personally, I believe that in Iraq and Afghanistan the COG is the people, but a large subset of the people. People fall along a spectrum - some will violently support our cause, more will somewhat support it, most won't support either side, a bunch will support the insurgents and a few will actively and violently do so.

The target of the enemy is, I think, that great mass in the middle. By keeping them cowed they can obtain: intelligence, money, food, water, shelter, clothing, vehicles, weapons, freedom of movement and protection.

My reasoning behind the choice of target is this: they don't need to target themselves, or their immediate supporters, and they can't do much to target those who violently support our side because we make efforts to protect them. So they aim for the middle first - by creating a feeling of danger and the sense that the insurgency is omnipresent and unstoppable.

Successful counterinsurgency strategies don't just try to "win over" people to your side - they also protect those people. If government forces demonstrate that they can keep an individual and his or her family safe, that individual will be able (not necessarily willing) to assist the government. The hearts and minds campaign and addressing the underlying injustice which motivated the insurgency only win information and recruits to our cause if those people are able to help us without committing suicide.

[Jedburgh]

This is little off track but maybe useful. In police world we use the problem/crime or disorder triangle. That is our Holy Trinity. They could also be thought of as centers of gravity...

Another concept from law enforcement that translates well into the COE is that of displacement. It doesn't really describe a Center of Gravity, but just as crime displacement sometimes makes resolving the crime/disorder triangle nearly impossible, I feel it demonstrates why it is so difficult to pin down a COG for us to exploit. In conducting analysis, there are essentially six types of displacement:

Temporal: Shift in time. The bad guys aren't stupid, and operational patterns tend to be easy to detect. Shaking up those patterns puts a kink in their system - temporarily. Too often what is thought to be "random" is simply an irregular pattern; and once the bad guys pick it up the dynamic starts all over again.

It sounds too simple - everyone knows not to set patterns. But I could relate plenty of true stories of unit commanders doing very stupid things with schedules in the hot zone.

Target: Shift from hard targets to soft targets within the same area. But then again, it isn't always the classic hard vs soft target issue. Once a pattern is set of hitting police recruiting centers, mix it up with a strike on a mosque or increase attacks directed at the coalition. Targets become hard once they are known to be targets; and thus they shift resources away from other potential targets. Hit the other target, a knee-jerk shift in finite security resources occurs, move to a different target set. Short target cycles are very productive for the bad guys.

Spatial: Shift from highly protected areas to less protected areas. This ties in closely with "Target Displacement" and has been discussed at length on SWC. In the end, without enough coalition and indig security forces to saturate the country, the bad guys will always be able to shift their AO.

Tactical: TTPs shift to meet counter-measures. This needs no explaining. We have an excellent lessons-learned system in-place to track and analyze shifting TTPs. It just a damn shame that more of our guys don't use the information provided.

Perpetrator: New bad guys replace the old. The "beheading" strategy doesn't work too well in disrupting the bad guys. Of course, that's a general statement, and there are exceptions. But, as a rule, disruptions are temporary - there always seems to be another ready to take his place. Going back to Kilcullen's article, this is one of the most significant differences between "classic" insurgency and the COE. The strict hierarchies that characterized many revolutionary organizations simply do not exist. There will be no equivalent of what happened to Sendero Luminoso or the PKK when their leaders were captured.

Type of Crime: Bad guys shift to an entirely different MO once the reward-to-risk ratio is against them. In the larger context, this may reflect an organization's shift from using primarily terrorist tactics to fighting as insurgents - or a group reducing their insurgent activity while focusing on narcotics trafficking.

This only provides some very brief tactical/operational examples of the application of displacement. As I'm sure is clear to all of you, the six types don't really stand alone - when you look at the operational environment through the analytic lens of displacement you'll see that there's quite a bit of overlap. You should also be able to see that far too often we are the ones reacting, and the bad guys are doing the exploiting.

[Merv Benson]

This poll suggest al qaeda has been firmly rejected in Iraq. Judith apter Klinghoffer writes:

Al Qaeda has desicively lost the Iraqi battlefield.

Overall 94 percent have an unfavorable view of al Qaeda, with 82 percent expressing a very unfavorable view. Of all organizations and individuals assessed in this poll, it received the most negative ratings. The Shias and Kurds show similarly intense levels of opposition, with 95 percent and 93 percent respectively saying they have very unfavorable views. The Sunnis are also quite negative, but with less intensity. Seventy-seven percent express an unfavorable view, but only 38 percent are very unfavorable. Twenty-three percent express a favorable view (5% very).

Views of Osama bin Laden are only slightly less negative. Overall 93 percent have an unfavorable view, with 77 percent very unfavorable. Very unfavorable views are expressed by 87 percent of Kurds and 94 percent of Shias. Here again, the Sunnis are negative, but less unequivocally—71 percent have an unfavorable view (23% very), and 29 percent a favorable view (3% very).

Iraqi confidence in Iraqi forces (as opposed to militias) is increasing while its confidence in US forces is decreasing. Given US policies there can be little doubt but that US forces have lost significant Shia support and gained some Sunni support. I suspect increasing number of Shia no longer believe that American forces are capable of protecting them and with increased confidence in their government's capabilities no longer fear the consequences of an American withdrawal.

...

If the people are the COG is it possible that both sides are losing? The poll results on the Americans seems inconsistent with reports coming out of Baghdad on the reception for US troops being brought back into the neighborhoods.

[slapout9]

Jed, you are dead on it. Displacement may not be a center of gravity, but it is one of, if not the most important concept in LE and COIN. I was going to write about this in the application of the control triangle (to counter the crime triangle) but you have done an excellent job.

There is one part I would like to expand on. Displacement to JAIL or GITMO. They get out!! And they will be meaner then ever. Crime spikes that happen every 5 or 10 years often match prison sentence cycles. They get out and go back to crime, better at it then ever. If and when the prisoners are released from GITMO who knows what will happen,but it want be good.

[selil]

Can I ask a couple of questions?

Is this Center of Gravity an analogy like a black hole has a center of gravity with an even horizon an point of no return, etc.. etc...?

Or is it more like a tire ballancer shows displacement towards the weight thereby illuminating where more effort could be put forth? As an example some object/process such as the population is sucking down everything else and when a threshold is met other elements (food, freedom, determination) get sucked into a vortex never to exit.

Maybe it's a balance?

I'm thinking of a three sided triangle that has politics on one side, resources on the other, and time on the final side (just as an example). If politics becomes weighty than time and resources are light and are lifted. Simlarly if time and politics become weighted resources is exposed further.

[marct]

Hi Selil,

Is this Center of Gravity an analogy like a black hole has a center of gravity with an even horizon an point of no return, etc.. etc...?

When I read Clausewitz many years ago, I just assumed he was using it as an anlogy from Neutonian physics. The discussions and information in this thread (and some others) has really made me wonder about that. For me, the position paper by Krieger was what really changed my thinking on how the concept is actually being used. I've come to the conclusion that the original analogy has been totally reified out of its original context and converted into an institutional formula that is bereft of any anlogic connections.

Or is it more like a tire ballancer shows displacement towards the weight thereby illuminating where more effort could be put forth? As an example some object/process such as the population is sucking down everything else and when a threshold is met other elements (food, freedom, determination) get sucked into a vortex never to exit.

Maybe it's a balance?

I'm thinking of a three sided triangle that has politics on one side, resources on the other, and time on the final side (just as an example). If politics becomes weighty than time and resources are light and are lifted. Simlarly if time and politics become weighted resources is exposed further.

I think that Bill hit it on the head when he said that

I notice this conversation is getting a little more heated, which probably means we're about to break into new ground.

Honestly, I'm not sure if it is a case of breaking "new ground" or breaking through institutionalized mindsets. I'm also wondering what this "new ground" would look like once we start surveying it: a collection of heuristics? an inductive model? a reworked analogy? a formal deductive model?

As the discussion progressed, I certainly started to see it in terms of relinking a useful heuristic (Centre of Gravity) back into a complex system based loosely on analogies from quantum physics. That started me thinking about dimensionality at various operational levels which, in turn, made me think of the Malinowski material since the cultural/symbolic operational level seems to be the one that is least developed in current planning models. I think your suggestion of time, politics and resources is probably a good start at developing a series of dimensional scales, but may be too general.

My current thinking is tending towards the idea of conceptualizing operational levels based on time, information-communications density and format, resources, favoured elementary relational models, and environmental feedback loops (e.g. how information gleaned from the operational environment is processed and new models are developed and communicated back to level based actors). I am really looking forward to RTK's COIN handbook because, from what I gather, he has probably put together a really good model of that operational level (post #39 in this thread).

Marc

[slapout9]

Professor vego wrote an article in new JFQ edition that has a bearing on this discussion.

His Opinion COG=Schwerpunkt which= Point of main emphasis.

Here is the link.
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pa...Q43%20Vego.pdf

[TROUFION]

What is a Guerilla's Center of Gravity and Critical Vulnerability(ies)?
Strategic Level? Operational Level? Tactical Level?

Here is an example at Strategic-Operational Levels:

WWI, German East Africa. Col Lettow-Vorbeck and his German and Askari defense forces face overwhelming odds presented by the combined British, Belgian and Portuguese forces arrayed against him. Yet they where never 'beaten.' The Center of Gravity for the Germans in EA was their resolve, their will to resist. Note the main goal of Lettow-Vorbeck was not necessarily defense of the Colony but to draw the maximum enemy force possible into Africa and away from Europe. The critical vulnerability at the Strategic-Operational levels was simply Germany itself. Lettow-Vorbeck's force was small mobile and capable of prolonged guerilla resistance, no longer relying on the Colony for support, tying up thousands of troops and large amounts of war material. This resistance could have been continued for some time past the Nov 11th 1918, Lettow-Vorbeck stated he could resist indefinetly, but when Germany lost the war in Europe, his will was broken, their no longer existed a reason to resist.

Mao Tse Tung had a similiar will to resist as his COG. You could kill thousands of his supporters, force him to march a thousand miles, but his resolve remained. What was his CV? What could have broken the Communist insurgency at the Strategic-Operational levels?

I state (it seems obvious) that the global insurgent's COG is his will to fight, this would definetly apply to the levels of war. In this sense, what then is today's guerilla or insurgent, in the global war's, critical vulnerability? This applies to the trans-national insurgent not the local, who would have a different CV all together based on his local conditions.

[slapout9]

Troufion, agree 100% that is why I said a long time ago before you got here that the LE concept of Motive,Means,and Opportunity is a better way to think about Guerilla warfare Strategy then the standard Ends, Ways and Means. The Motive or Cause or his Will must be addressed some how or it will never be over-IMHO.

[wm]

What is a Guerilla's Center of Gravity and Critical Vulnerability(ies)?
WWI, German East Africa. Col Lettow-Vorbeck and his German and Askari defense forces face overwhelming odds presented by the combined British, Belgian and Portuguese forces arrayed against him. Yet they where never 'beaten.' The Center of Gravity for the Germans in EA was their resolve, their will to resist. Note the main goal of Lettow-Vorbeck was not necessarily defense of the Colony but to draw the maximum enemy force possible into Africa and away from Europe. The critical vulnerability at the Strategic-Operational levels was simply Germany itself. Lettow-Vorbeck's force was small mobile and capable of prolonged guerilla resistance, no longer relying on the Colony for support, tying up thousands of troops and large amounts of war material. This resistance could have been continued for some time past the Nov 11th 1918, Lettow-Vorbeck stated he could resist indefinetly, but when Germany lost the war in Europe, his will was broken, their no longer existed a reason to resist.

Mao Tse Tung had a similiar will to resist as his COG. You could kill thousands of his supporters, force him to march a thousand miles, but his resolve remained. What was his CV? What could have broken the Communist insurgency at the Strategic-Operational levels?

Let's not confuse the personal resolve of a leader with the CoG of that leader's forces. Had Lettow-Vorbeck been laid low in 1916 or 1917, I am not so sure that the resistance would have continued. The same is true for the Chicoms under Mao.

The CoG for the guerrillas may very well be their leaders , but it may also be an ideal that is just well expressed by their leaders. In the former case, the loss of the leader probably results in the end of guerrilla operations. In the latter case, this is less likely to be true. I think the WWI German East Africa campaign under Lettow-Vorbeck epitomizes the first case. I suspect the force that comprises AQI is more like the second alternative. (And please do not unload on me for putting AQI under the guerrilla rubric; I know they are terrorists.)

[Lastdingo]

That's greatest misuse of "center of gravity" that I've ever seen. Center of gravity is something 180° different that what's meant here. It has nothing to do with weak spots at all. Ridiculous idea.

And the critical vulnerability of guerillas is definately the support of their base - a certain share of the population.

Identifying will as critical vulnerability is nonsense. No being or force ever does anything intentionally without will. Saying that they stop acting if they lost the will to do so is trivial and completely useless as analysis.

By the way - Lettow-Vorbeck's force was not really a guerilla force. It was something in between guerillas and Xenophon's ten thousand.

[TROUFION]

Lastdingo perhaps you should read Dr. Strange---

http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog1.pdf

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...les/PUB363.pdf

http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/reso...g/art4-w03.pdf

https://www.carlisle.army.mil/srp/ex.../Reilly_J_E_02

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-thry.htm-cog


Will and resolve are considered valid COG.

The question remains what makes up the trans-national guerilla-insurgent-terrorist CV? Based on each level of war. And what would be (genericaly) a local insurgents CV?

It is easy to pick out a counter-insurgents COG and CV. The counterinsurgent is tied to his nation state, or his organization-these are physical. The counter insurgent has to defend physical structures.

Both Lawrence and Vorbeck targeted thier enemies railroad lines-a physical structure. Both gained disproportionate results tieing down large numbers of enemy in static defenses and large amounts of resources in armoring trains etc. Why could they get away with it? Because their 'base' was protected, while the counterinsurgents 'base' was not.

If the 'base' loosely equated to the source of strength, which in turn equates to a COG, is will to resist or resolve to fight then what is the CV?

BTW-I am not stating a fact I am asking a question.

[Ski]

Will is probably the COG that is most important and most difficult to defeat.

I'd also add:

Funding sources
Equipping sources

They don't destroy the will, but will reduce a group to ineffectiveness quickly.

[walrus]

With respect I have to agree with Dingo, the use of the term "Centre of gravity" is misleading.

I think what you really mean Troufion, is what the German General Staff called the "Schwerpunkt" - focus point for your attack, even though in German it does mean "Centre of Gravity".

As a student of the same school as Dr. Kilcullen, the "schwerpunkt" in Iraq has to be denying the insurgents the support of the general population. Unfortunately a very large part of our activities until Petraeus and Kilcullen came along were counterproductive in this respect.

[TROUFION]

The definition for COG that I am using is that put forward by Dr. Joe Strange

Simple version: COG = strength & CV = weakness.

That is very simplifed of course.

The US Joint Pub definition is: COG are characteristics capabilities or locations from which a military force derives freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight.

Perhaps I should rephrase my question- if the guerilla or insurgents COG is the people (or their support), then what is his critical vulnerability?

[Lastdingo]

Oh great, two authors more with that silly idea (actually, I saw two of the texts before and skipped them because they were useless).
No, providing links to texts of some middle-ranking officers who cannot even translate Clausewitz quotes correctly* does not help the argument.

They tell their readers that they're right and others are wrong. This proves that at least one party is wrong in this affair acording to their own opinion.
They're wrong.
One's Schwerpunkt has absolutely nothing to do with one's weaknesses or vulnerabilities.

I've seen 'experts' of other branches working together, citing each other, writing acrticles/books/studies and trying to convince others of their weird theories. Such guys don't impress me at all - a couple of guys writing articles doesn't provide a state of the art for a science.
Being able to link some texts of authors which have the same opinion proves nothing - it would only help if the authors made good points. But these write nonsense.

The concept of Schwerpunkt is old, defined and well understood (by anyone who was able to understand the original works) since about 150 years. It's ridiculus to try to interpret the concept differently.

If they invent a new concept that far away from the Schwerpunkt, they shall invent a new name and stick only to it - and not misuse an old, well-defined name.







__________________

*:
“Denn nur durch diese Entscheidung werden
die Schwerpunkte der gegenseitigen Macht
und die von ihnen ausgehenden Kriegstheater
wirksame Dinge” (Vom Kriege, p. 813). Compare:
“It is the decision that changes the
centers of gravity on each side, and the operational
theaters they create, into active agents”
(On War, p. 488).

Wrong, it's not "active" but "effective". There are nine translations for "wirksam" to english (depending on adjective/adverb and context) and "active" is a wrong one in this context. It has too many possible (in this context wrong) significances and leads to a wrong interpretation. If Clausewitz had meant "active", he would have written "aktiv".
Now maybe he copied this from a english translation and didn't tranlate it by himself, but he's nevertheless wrong and obviously unable to comprehend the original text correctly in its details.


__________________

Now to clarify:

Auch in einer Hauptschlacht können Nebenzwecke dem Hauptzweck beigemischt sein, und sie wird manchen besonderen Farbenton von den Verhältnissen annehmen, aus denen sie hervorgeht, denn auch eine Hauptschlacht hängt mit einem größeren Ganzen zusammen, von dem sie nur ein Teil ist; allein man muß, weil das Wesen des Krieges Kampf, und die Hauptschlacht der Kampf der Hauptmacht ist, diese immer als den eigentlichen Schwerpunkt des Krieges betrachten, und es ist daher im ganzen ihr unterscheidender Charakter, daß sie mehr als irgendein anderes Gefecht um ihrer selbst willen da ist."

Book 4, Chapter IX. Die Hauptschlacht

This quote tells without doubt that one must consider the main army as the Schwerpunkt. Always. It's there - "immer" = "always" (and = ever, invariably, perennially, throughout, whensoever, at all times...).

In the whole work he repeats (in everytime different words) that the Schwerpunkt is the concentrated power of a warring party.

What those authors misunderstood completely is what shows their superficiality.
Clausewitz repeated many times (influenced by the Napoleonic Wars) that the destruction of the concentrated enemy power (disarmament by destruction of his army) leads to victory (because of the loss of the ability to resist).
It's a thorough misunderstanding to assume that this means that Schwerpunkt means the weak point. It's the strongest thing that can be attacked at all. This is why eventual victory against it shall lead to victory in war - all else is too weak to enable further resistance after the loss of the Schwerpunkt.
It's no recipe at all for an easy victory - if someone wants an easy victory, he should either be very superior from the beginning or he should not use Clausewitz' clash of the concentrated powers/main armies. Clausewitz merely advises to concentrate one's power better and not waste power on secondary and indecisive actions.
Any search of weak points should always avoid the Schwerpunkt as that is the realisation of the enemy's strength, not its weakness.
Defeating an enemy by seeking and hitting his weak points / lifelines is foreign to Clausewitz as Clausewitz and his Schwerpunkt were focused on overpowering.


"Will and resolve are considered valid COG. "
Morale is treated by Clausewitz in Book Three.
http://www.namico.net/non-commerce/l...om_kriege3.php
Original text - have a look. Search for "Schwerpunkt". It's a chapter in "Vom Kriege" without mention of Schwerpunkt.
Sorry, if they want something else than the original meaning, then they should invent something new, with new name. As quoted above, Clausewitz considered the main force (strongest army) of a state or alliance as Schwerpunkt, "immer".
He's the one who invented the Schwerpunkt as military term, so he had the privilege to define it, not some unimportant officers of a foreign army approx. 170 years later.

[Van]

The CoG of guerrillas/insurgents/buzz-name-of-the-day is their sanctuary. No guerrilla who preserves their sanctuary has failed, no guerrilla who has lost their sanctuary has succeeded (although, I would be willing to listen to a counter-example if presented with one). Traditionally, this would be a geographically contiguous location outside the ability of the opponent to attack, but with the internet and FedEx this is no longer necessarily the case. Yemeni and Indonesian sanctuaries supporting folks in CONUS for example.

If you accept that sanctuaries are a CoG, then it follows that sanctuaries and lines of communication between the sanctuaries and operations would be operational and strategic CVs.

Whether the sanctuary is a 'no-go' area within the borders of the sovereign state in the midst of a Small War, or a balmy tropical island half way around the world, the sanctuary, communication with the sanctuary, and movement of personnel and supplies between the operational areas and the sanctuary are the most important strategic and operational targets. The problem with Islamofascism is the extremely decentralized nature of the sanctuaries and lines of communication. The coward mufsid who practice hirabah and send brave but deluded young people to their deaths from sanctuary should be in the sight picture first, as should the even more reprehensible swine who send them money and other resources without sharing their risks. The challenge is squaring this with political and diplomatic needs as they hide in sovereign territory that hasn't authorized direct action yet.

[TROUFION]

Lastdingo, thanks for the german lesson. I am as always impressed by individuals who are bi-lingual or multi-lingual. It takes a lot to be able to converse intelligently in two languages. I see your disagreement with Dr. Strange and Col Irons and the folks that followed their lead. I realize that Clausewitz is translated many different ways. Many of varying quality and as in any translation points and concepts are often lost and very often altered.

That said the way I presented COG is based on the Official US Joint definition. You don't have to agree with it, it is what it is. 170 years after Clausewitz's wife published the final version of his unfinished classic the interpretation is bound to change. I imagine Sun Tzu has changed a few million times. The world has changed and warfare has changed. Old Carl would have a hard time fathoming much of what a current battlefield is like just as todays troops would have a hard time marching shoulder to shoulder in line and column with bayonets fixed.

Your critique of the COG definition set currently in use by the US is valid. However, you are not being productive in doing so. Nor are you being gracious in your presentation. What would be more practical would be for you to redefine the argument to suit your classical definition and reset the question. For instance, How would, in your opinion, Clausewitz define the schwerpunkt of the modern insurgent, trans-national and local. I assume you would say it is the people. Then the second part of the origional question, what is the weakness of the insurgent within the people and how would you suggest it be approached. But this is me presenting a hypothetical as to how you might redefine the origional question to fit your definitions.

I am but a simple 'footslogger' meaning I actually have to go out and lead men to battle. Personally I wish we had never borrowed the 'dead german' school to discuss military action. We did and we modified it to fit American arms and the American Way of War. Both are distinctly different from the various European schools. Our definitions of CG and CV may have been born of Clausewitz but they are now ours one hundred percent. I do not claim to be an expert on the definitions but I do know the current ones served me very well in combat, and I think the old guy wouldn't mind that.

-TROUFION

[Lastdingo]

The CoG of guerrillas/insurgents/buzz-name-of-the-day is their sanctuary. No guerrilla who preserves their sanctuary has failed, no guerrilla who has lost their sanctuary has succeeded (although, I would be willing to listen to a counter-example if presented with one).

Mao gave up his sanctuary with the long March, yet succeeded. Actually, many rebellions have no safe heavens / sanctuaries at the beginning. Remember Castro in 1959 - he was hunted around for weeks or months, always on the move. Algerian insurgents around 1960 lost most sanctuaries they had due to aggresive paratrooper tactics - but they won because the enemy lost the will to continue (due to the immorality of his own tactics).



Clausewitz did probably plan to include small wars in his works with the revision that he planned. He told someone before his death that not all wars fit his description and he'd need to read and change the books accordingly sometime.
Death prevented such changes to the books.

The closest thing to Schwerpunkt that Guerillas could have would are imho
- an area of particular strength with most guerilla fighters in it
- an assembly of many guerillas before a large battle (like Dien Bien Phu)
In both cases, it needs to present such a large share of their power that a loss would be a disaster.

Clausewitz is not always correct and gives not always the best advice - his works were not intended to fit small wars (although he for sure knew enough about the Spanish insurgents against Napoleon) and some of his concepts are of limited value for small wars. He ws also quite weak on including naval affairs into his works - English Schwerpunkt was always the fleet, French Schwerpunkt was Napoleon (and at the same time the army he commanded). It was impossible to collide for both Schwerpunkte, a case not considered by Clausewitz as Vom Kriege is essentially a work about land warfare between states / state alliances.

Islamofascism

This is a propagada term, made to mark enemies as especially bad people beyond rational reasoning. It's a PR trick to do things like this - who can name a phenomenon can influence how others sense it.
It's better not to use such a term. In fact, there's little resemblance to fascism.

[goesh]

you always fight for your buddies and your Commander. It is the latter's charisma, his personality, his paternalism, his spiritual power, his personal magnetism that binds the cohesiveness of a unit(s) together. Attached ideologies and goals are extraneous. Guzman from the Shining Path, Boudica of the Iceni and Massoud of the Northern Alliance are classic examples of the cult of personality. On our own land, the 250+ years of Native American insurgency was fueled by strong, competent, inspirational leaders. Seneca, Corn Stalk, Gall, Roman Nose, Geronimo, Quanah Parker, Chief Joseph, Cochise, Louis Rael, Tecumseh, Crazy Horse, 'King' Phillip, Red Cloud, Buffalo Hump, Little Turtle, Blue Jacket, Sitting Bull, Little Crow, Victorio, Pontiac and many others were the driving force behind the insurgency. These Indian guerillas didn't rush the cavalry with cries of " let's save the buffalo!" or " This one's for the deer!" - they charged, fought and died in emulation and loyalty to the men in front leading them. I think sometimes it's difficult for us to realize that people who blow up civilians, torture and behead have a sense of duty, honor and loyalty.