Wasteful Defense Spending Is a Clear and Present Danger

[Ken White]

I'd hate to shut a good thread down because civility got lost. But I will.

ADDED: Ron's post snuck in while I was typing mine; he seems to be relatively chilled and I think I am...

We all need to remember that this is not a good communication medium, nuances and smiles get missed so one has to be pretty careful how one words things, else something not meant to give offense may not be taken as innocently as it was meant.

[Entropy]

...which feels a lot better than being spun-up!

This thread reminds me of a contracting story told by RJ Hillhouse over at her neglected blog. It contains many elements of dysfunction that we probably all see in the current system. The one that strikes me is the experience mismatch between uniformed, government and civilian acquisitions/contractor personnel. In the Air Force, for example, many of the best acquisitions personnel, particularly the technical and science ones with advanced degrees, leave the service because the Air Force is stupid and doesn't mentor, nurture and promote them as it should. The result is that our supposed technology-focused service drives out the technical experts it needs to understand the technology and explain it to the service leadership who must make procurement decisions. I get the sense that the services often don't have the technical expertise to provide proper oversight and management.

Oh, and the process is probably just a bit overcomplicated. Click on the flowchart on that site - yes, it's one powerpoint slide! Need we say anything else?

[Ken White]

Thanks for the link. I think.

The thing that really irks me is that those yo-yos in Congress, the institution who is responsible for much of this -- acknowledging that services do tend to drive out the really sharp techies who can translate things for those senior but unversed (and that I certainly wouldn't want to be an acquisition guy...) -- will get on their high horse in a fraction of a second over any kerfluffle in the process they created...

The terrible thing is that it's likely to get worse before it gets better.

[J Wolfsberger]

If you want to know why we're having such problems, notice that the final Capabilities Description Document (CDD) appears at the top just before Milestone B, and never feeds back into product development. Add in the "Fundamentals of System Engineering Management" ca. 2000, where System Analysis is redefined as a "management and control activity," and I think we can completely explain why 70 out of 74 major acquisition programs out of the last 10 years have been in trouble (GAO report to Congress).

If we really want to improve the process, we scrap the "V" diagram and "Fundamentals," return to the 1990s version with a traditional waterfall approach to development.

[Entropy]

Thanks for the link. I think.

Did you happen to read the fine print on that flow chart? If not, here it is (emphasis added):

This chart is a classroom aid for Defense Acquisition University students. It provides a notional illustration of interfaces among three major decision support systems used to develop, produce and field a weapon system for national defense. Defense acquisition is a complex process with many more activities than shown here and many concurrent activities that cannot be displayed on a two-dimensional chart. Supporting information is on back of this chart. For more information, see the Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Knowledge Sharing System (http://akss.dau.mil).

So that's the "simple" version!

[Ken White]

a competitive fly/shoot/drive/steam off trial of prototypes and then run competitive bids to build the selected design -- as I've been saying for over 40 years -- not that anyone listened...

That negates a requirement for excessive technical detail in specifications, the factor that increases the cost and the difficulty in spec writing.

[Entropy]

a competitive fly/shoot/drive/steam off trial of prototypes and then run competitive bids to build the selected design -- as I've been saying for over 40 years -- not that anyone listened...

That negates a requirement for excessive technical detail in specifications, the factor that increases the cost and the difficulty in spec writing.

I agree, but that only works when one is building prototypes with mature technology. You couldn't, for example, have a bunch of contractors build a complete FCS prototype for competition - it would bankrupt them.

This points to what is, IMO, the biggest problem with procurement - that it is joined to the hip with R&D. We essentially sign-on to buy capabilities that have yet to be invented and then are shocked to discover inventing those capabilities takes orders-of-magnitude more time and money than originally estimated, nevermind the that the services like to constantly amend requirements, further driving up the cost.

Naturally the contractors and the services (and Congress) are happy to underestimate the costs and difficulty of creating technology from scratch for one program. So ISTM the best thing we could do is put a wall between R&D and procurement so that procurement money is only spend on mature technology and R&D money is only spent on R&D. This would also allow our R&D effort to be more efficient and effective since it won't be tied to one program.

I'm not very optimistic that such changes will ever happen, but ever since my wife agreed to marry me I'm of the mind that anything is possible

[Ken White]

I agree, but that only works when one is building prototypes with mature technology. You couldn't, for example, have a bunch of contractors build a complete FCS prototype for competition - it would bankrupt them.

I will however, forego commenting on FCS.

The idea will not work for techno leaps, however, DARPA unconstrained by DoD bureaucracy and service parochiality seems to do that pretty well...

I'm not very optimistic that such changes will ever happen, but ever since my wife agreed to marry me I'm of the mind that anything is possible

I resemble that remark...

[Valin]

Thanks for the link. I think.

The thing that really irks me is that those yo-yos in Congress, the institution who is responsible for much of this -- acknowledging that services do tend to drive out the really sharp techies who can translate things for those senior but unversed (and that I certainly wouldn't want to be an acquisition guy...) -- will get on their high horse in a fraction of a second over any kerfluffle in the process they created...

The terrible thing is that it's likely to get worse before it gets better.

And what about this suprises you?