QDR and Strategy Changes

[Ken White]

I see no real change. Post 1992, the force for one real war, much less two was not resourced.

The Two MRC label, just as the "We'll move ten Divisions to Europe in ten days" during the Cold War was pure myth. This when we only had ten active Divs and we knew that calling up the ArNG Divs, filling them and training them up for combat would take two to three months.

The CSAF comment was only boilerplate -- He, you or I cannot state that any specific number is 'adequate' to fight a war the dimensions of which are unknown. If you define 'war' down as 'contingency,' what does that mean? If Afghanistan and Iraq are 'contingencies, ' they've pretty well kept a lot of the total force / all services moderately occupied. Any further effort in the ME would've maxed out a lot of things -- and the Far East would've had to wait...

Someone in DC just decided to get real. No big thing.

[Bob's World]

To designate how many of what type of conflict one is willing to resource to is NOT STRATEGY. More policy based on what we are willing to spend; vice strategy to do what we need to do

But then QDR has little to do with strategy and far more to do with buying stuff also.

Sad, on both counts.

[Entropy]

I think Ken and Bob have it about right. I increasingly wonder why we bother with QDR's in the first place since they haven't really had much impact since they were instituted.

[Bob's World]

QDR is important, but one really needs to understand that it has a high Flash to Bang ratio. It is the vehicle that allows the new class of policy types to roll out their policies and get to meet the Service equity guarders.

It also is the field of battle that the services trot out their various schemes for maintaining what they think is important from their own perspectives while attempting to camouflage it as the latest flavor of policy.

There may not be much accomplished, but there is much to be learned; that is there is for one who understands this is far more a grand game of "Show and tell" mixed with the classic shell game; and not a venue to actually craft new strategy and tailor a force to execute it.

[Ken White]

QDR is important, but one really needs to understand that it has a high Flash to Bang ratio...this is far more a grand game of "Show and tell" mixed with the classic shell game; and not a venue to actually craft new strategy and tailor a force to execute it.

It's also a function where squeaking wheels get oiled...

Never mind something else may need more oil.

[Cliff]

Nevertheless, it does act as an effective constraint on the resources that will be available to the military to execute the strategy. In theory it should be the basis of the National Military Strategy... pragmatically (and as discussed recently in the Strategic Compression section by Rob Thorton and others) the means available can (whether you think they should or not) constrain the strategies available to us. Ergo, the QDR matters to strategy. I think that, in reality, it will mainly be used as a means to justify whatever direction folks want to take, not as a means of assessing the overall defense strategy/programs of record.

I understand the CSAF comment is boilerplate, and that we haven't resourced to 2 MRCs in a long time.... which leads to my next question - is explicitly stating our limitations better than keeping a certain level of strategic ambiguity?

[Ken White]

Nevertheless, it does act as an effective constraint on the resources that will be available to the military to execute the strategy...In theory it should be the basis of the National Military Strategy...I think that, in reality, it will mainly be used as a means to justify whatever direction folks want to take, not as a means of assessing the overall defense strategy/programs of record.

That's what's always been true about it -- it is the exercise to divide the pot and strategy has little or nothing to do with it. Actually, the Strategy should drive the QDR to produce an unconstrained requirement sheet and then Congress should make the hard calls on what gets funded. Since Congress really does that but does not want to be seen doing so in case there's a screwup, they fob it off to DoD by statutorily requiring both a National Military Strategy and a QDR. Lights and mirrors, little more.

I understand the CSAF comment is boilerplate, and that we haven't resourced to 2 MRCs in a long time.... which leads to my next question - is explicitly stating our limitations better than keeping a certain level of strategic ambiguity?

Makes no difference in my view. I'm pretty sure I'm not the only guy in the world that can count. That is, most potential opponents have a reasonably good idea of what we can practically do and pay little attention to the rhetoric and news releases which are virtually meaningless.

So really the F-22 is huge for supporting the trooops.

Provided there are opponents for them to be huge with. Who do you see that as being in it's design lifetime; with what and in what quantities? Second question; maintenance costs, OR rate?

I just don't want to see us end up like we did at the start of WWII, Korea, and Vietnam, where we lost air superiority quickly and had to fight to get it back- I don't think we have the resources to take the losses that would entail anymore.

Missed WW II, did make the other two and in the early days of both -- there was no loss of Aerial Superiority in either though in both there were lapses caused by training deficiencies and logistic issues, not by the aircraft involved. There were, however, inadequate for task aircraft in both wars as aircraft designed for specific missions had to be used for other missions.

One could extract from that the quality of training is a more important discriminator than the quality of aircraft AND that using single role, sole purpose aircraft is not the best solution. That might particularly apply in a time of constrained budgets which are certainly going to be here very quickly. That last is almost certainly driving the F22 decision.

[John T. Fishel]

a strategy in itself but it is a strategy document. The US military strategy is the National Military Strategy (unclas) plus the Joint Planning Document (JPD - all the classified annexes) All of this is part of the Joint Strategic Planning System and the other strategic planning systems. We used to teach this stuff in C 500 at Army CGSC.

Cliff, as far as USAF fighter systems are concerned, in the last 30+ years the only single purpose fighter aircraft that we have fielded that have not been adapted to a multiporpose role are the F 22, the A 10 and the F 14. The latter has gone out of the Navy inventory and the F/A 18 has been adapted to carry out air superiority missions. Even the Harrier was adapted by the Brits for an air superiority role in the Falklands which it did well enough. The Air Force never liked the A10 and was trying to retire it before DS/DS but its mission is CAS and CAS alone. The F 22 has never been used for any purpose and is not particularly likely to be used. Both the F 15 and F 16 have been used for air superiority, air interdiction, and CAS. The Joint Strikefighter (F 35?) is supposed to be a multirole aircraft that will replace all of the above, as i understand it. In a relatively austere time, doesn't it make more sense to close down the F 22 line and start up the Joint Strikefighter line bringing a new and "better" multirole aircraft online to replace the aging fleet of F 15s, 16s, 18s? Seems to me, this makes more economic and strategic sense. Of course, it might just be a bust - or not as good as advertised like McNamara's TFX.

Cheers

JohnT

[Cliff]

Cliff, as far as USAF fighter systems are concerned, in the last 30+ years the only single purpose fighter aircraft that we have fielded that have not been adapted to a multiporpose role are the F 22, the A 10 and the F 14. The latter has gone out of the Navy inventory and the F/A 18 has been adapted to carry out air superiority missions. Even the Harrier was adapted by the Brits for an air superiority role in the Falklands which it did well enough. The Air Force never liked the A10 and was trying to retire it before DS/DS but its mission is CAS and CAS alone. The F 22 has never been used for any purpose and is not particularly likely to be used. Both the F 15 and F 16 have been used for air superiority, air interdiction, and CAS. The Joint Strikefighter (F 35?) is supposed to be a multirole aircraft that will replace all of the above, as i understand it. In a relatively austere time, doesn't it make more sense to close down the F 22 line and start up the Joint Strikefighter line bringing a new and "better" multirole aircraft online to replace the aging fleet of F 15s, 16s, 18s? Seems to me, this makes more economic and strategic sense. Of course, it might just be a bust - or not as good as advertised like McNamara's TFX.

Cheers

JohnT

JohnT-

I have to disagree on the F-22, sir. It is certainly not a single-role aircraft... it is capable of performing ISR, DEAD, and Strategic Attack. The Raptor actually practices doing TST and CAS as well... although not optomized for either, all it is really lacking is a targetting pod... which could be added fairly easily. Just as the Eagle spawned the Strike Eagle, so will the Air-to-Ground capes of the Raptor build as it matures. If we had a few more Raptors, we would have enough to cover our other commitments and deploy some for OIF/OEF support, and I think you would see them actually being used.

The F-15C always has been and remains a single-mission fighter - Air to Air being the only role.

I laugh when folks claim that the F-22 doesn't represent a joint capability (it is a single service solution) and therefore we should move on to F-35. The Navy, Marines, and most of the USAF are out of the Air Supremacy business- as you mention, the Navy quit back when it turned the Tomcat into the Bombcat around 1993 or so. The entire US military depends on the F-15C and F-22 for Air Superiority. If you look at the results of any big exercise (Red Flag, Northern Edge, etc) on the 1-2 goes per exercise that the other fighters take the air to air hammer, you'll see that you can get the job done but it's going to cost you about like 66-68 in Vietnam did in terms of exchange ratios (2-1 or 1-1, at times worse...). Aegis and Patriot are at best local solutions, which can keep your FOB or CVBG from being attacked, but can't protect a theater.

I'm not saying the Navy or Marines or anyone else can't do it... I'm saying no one practices it because they are focusing on the current fights in OIF/OEF. They can do this and not have excessive risk because someone is practicing it. The F-15C and F-22 allow them to do this. Cut them, and either you accept losing a lot of folks or you make all the air to ground folks practice air to air enough to be viable... which means they will suck at supporting the folks on the ground. So really the F-22 is huge for supporting the trooops.

The risk of losing air superiority isn't great right now... but it's a lot higher than folks think. 187 F-22s isn't a viable community... oh by the way, when you deploy your Raptors (you'd have to send almost all of them, expecially since DOD is cutting most of the F-15Cs) who is left at home to train, or do Homeland Defense? Once you get there, all your adversary needs is 60-100 flankers and some double digit SAMs, and presto, no ISR, no airlift, no CAS... The F-22 exists to enable the rest of the military to do its job and not have to worry about getting bombed. Folks don't realize how good they have it... What happens when your drones get shot down, and you have no air support, oh yeah, and you can't get medevaced or re-supplied by air because the airlifters and helos got themselves shot down?

The F-35 doesn't have the same ordnance or capabilities in the air to air arena the F-22 has. It is stealthy, but it is speed limited... which means it is more vulnerable, especially to SAMs. The F-15C/F-16 hi-lo split worked well... and that seems like what the F-22/F-35 should be... unfortunately you need a minimum number of F-22s to make the force viable, otherwise you have too few to even do one war.

I don't think asking for 2-3 more years of F-22s (60 ish more) to bridge the gap between now and the F-35 reaching full rate production is asking for the moon. The military requirement for the F-22 is 384.... 240 is the moderate risk force.

I guess what I am saying is I think the country can afford to hedge its bets and at least make sure the F-35 works before we bet our airpower overmatch on it. I know this isn't a popular opinion, but I just don't want to see us end up like we did at the start of WWII, Korea, and Vietnam, where we lost air superiority quickly and had to fight to get it back- I don't think we have the resources to take the losses that would entail anymore.

V/R,

Cliff

[Steve Blair]

I guess what I am saying is I think the country can afford to hedge its bets and at least make sure the F-35 works before we bet our airpower overmatch on it. I know this isn't a popular opinion, but I just don't want to see us end up like we did at the start of WWII, Korea, and Vietnam, where we lost air superiority quickly and had to fight to get it back- I don't think we have the resources to take the losses that would entail anymore.

V/R,

Cliff

I wasn't aware that we ever LOST air superiority over Vietnam. When exactly did this happen?

That said, I don't have a beef with the F-22 as a tech test bed, but I have yet to be convinced that anyone is going to send it into a SEAD environment where it might get shot down (and I mean a real war environment, not an exercise). Remember the fuss when one F-117 got knocked down? A-10s can manage to a great degree because they can take lots of physical damage. Stealth aircraft simply cannot. And as so much of procurement is political, that explains much of the white noise that emanates from congressional hearings. Congress has always liked airpower because it's sexy and (more to the point) because its most strident advocates always promise that it brings war on the cheap.

I don't think anyone's proposing the M-60A3 analogy, but I do think there is a growing sense that the F-22 might be a "bridge" aircraft between the F-15 and the F-35.

[Cliff]

I wasn't aware that we ever LOST air superiority over Vietnam. When exactly did this happen?

That said, I don't have a beef with the F-22 as a tech test bed, but I have yet to be convinced that anyone is going to send it into a SEAD environment where it might get shot down (and I mean a real war environment, not an exercise). Remember the fuss when one F-117 got knocked down? A-10s can manage to a great degree because they can take lots of physical damage. Stealth aircraft simply cannot. And as so much of procurement is political, that explains much of the white noise that emanates from congressional hearings. Congress has always liked airpower because it's sexy and (more to the point) because its most strident advocates always promise that it brings war on the cheap.

I don't think anyone's proposing the M-60A3 analogy, but I do think there is a growing sense that the F-22 might be a "bridge" aircraft between the F-15 and the F-35.

We certainly had localized air superiority at best over Vietnam, and lost a lot of aircraft. We could not afford that loss rate now, at least not with 187 Raptors.

The F-22 is the only aircraft we'd send into such an environment... The F-117 was old enough that it was not survivable, hence why it got shot down. The F-22 actually has a number of survivability enhancements as well.

The F-22 is not a "bridge" to the F-35... the F-35 is inferior to the F-22 in many ways, especially in air-to-air and DEAD. Not as survivable against SAMs either - the F-35 needs the F-22 to be a viable platform in the face of any adversary with double digit SAMs.

And yes, I know, I should follow Entropy's lead and just accept that I am not changing anyone's mind. Guess I'm just too stubborn to give up.

V/R,

Cliff

[Steve Blair]

We certainly had localized air superiority at best over Vietnam, and lost a lot of aircraft. We could not afford that loss rate now, at least not with 187 Raptors.

Loss rates in Vietnam are interesting things, and had a great deal more to do with politics (both in terms of the Johnson administration and the Air Force's own doctrinal preconceptions) than they did airframes. Ken already ran the numbers side, so I won't rehash that ground. But when you consider that SAC's own way of doing business had a large role in the losses suffered during the first phase of Linebacker II it gives you pause.

I'm well aware that the F-22 and the F-35 are not the same. But I'm also not willing to be convinced in the perfection of the F-22 based on exercise results. So we'll just have to agree to disagree.