QDR and Strategy Changes

[William F. Owen]

FYI While I don't fly Raptors, I have flown with it a lot, and while it has had issues in the past, it is getting the job done now. Most recently, the PACAF IG gave Elmendorf AFB an ORI (full war dress rehersal) during which the F-22 did very well in all respects - resulting in an "outstanding" grade. Results talked about here. Oh by the way, the legacy aircraft aren't doing much better because they are simply wearing out - the cost of maintaining them is steadily increasing and their FMC (OR) rates are falling.

I have to say, I see the F-22 as an article of faith for the USAF. "Good Fighter = must be good."

I am fascinated by air power theory, but the lack of any real theory kinda prevents me taking it seriously. F-22 is a very good example.

• Stealth Aircraft, with a radar!!! yeah. I know you can turn it off and be "networked," -see next point
• Currently available networked electro-optic air defence and passive radar, may make "stealth" greatly less effective.
• Very manoeuvrable, but cannot out manoeuvre many in service missiles, without injuring the pilot.
• 80% of the cost only got a 20% improvement. There is no evidence that it justifies it's return on investment.
• It also rests on the case that air power capability is absolutely related to aircraft performance, - which history shows not to be true.

Now, if someone tells me that there are sound political and industrial arguments for building F-22, then OK, but the operational arguments are pretty weak. Historically, the majority of the evidence shows that Pilots and Air Forces are the least qualified to choose their aircraft. Everyone wants a Ferrari, when what is needed is a pick-up or a Volvo Estate.

[Cliff]

I have to say, I see the F-22 as an article of faith for the USAF. "Good Fighter = must be good."

I am fascinated by air power theory, but the lack of any real theory kinda prevents me taking it seriously. F-22 is a very good example.

• Stealth Aircraft, with a radar!!! yeah. I know you can turn it off and be "networked," -see next point
• Currently available networked electro-optic air defence and passive radar, may make "stealth" greatly less effective.
• Very manoeuvrable, but cannot out manoeuvre many in service missiles, without injuring the pilot.
• 80% of the cost only got a 20% improvement. There is no evidence that it justifies it's return on investment.
• It also rests on the case that air power capability is absolutely related to aircraft performance, - which history shows not to be true.

Now, if someone tells me that there are sound political and industrial arguments for building F-22, then OK, but the operational arguments are pretty weak. Historically, the majority of the evidence shows that Pilots and Air Forces are the least qualified to choose their aircraft. Everyone wants a Ferrari, when what is needed is a pick-up or a Volvo Estate.

Sir-

Anytime I post here about the F-22 I know what is going to happen, and probably I am not convincing anyone.

Have to respectfully disagree, though - since the facts on the F-22 have been muddled lately due to a lot of yellow journalism.

Why do you say there is "a lack of any real theory" - what do you mean by that?

While I can't go into specifics, your first 3 points on F-22 performance do not reflect the actual capabilities. One of the big arguements for the F-22 over the F-35 is it actual can defeat most enemy missiles due to being faster.

What is your justification for 80% and 20%? A brand new F-15C (IE buying a new airframe with the same avionics) would cost $90-100 million.... (singapore payed $1B for 12 F-15SG) an F-22 costs about $140 million... about 40% more, not 80%. Generally the F-22 can handle about 2x as many adversaries as an F-15C... 100% improvement. Pretty good investment if you ask me. OBTW we cannot continue to upgrade F-15Cs and F-16s... the airframes are literally falling apart- and not just the Eagle that broke in half.

Finally, on your last point, why does the F-22 case rest on this? The case for the F-22 is one of A. Economics- see my point above and B. capabilities, which is what you are arguing.

I would say that Desert Storm and OAF pretty convincingly argue that superior aircraft make a difference. While training is important, like I said before no amount of training can overcome physics. And no amount of training can overcome your airplane falling apart.

Is anyone asking the Army to go up outnumbered against T-90s in rusted out M-60A3s? Because that is what you are proposing...

V/R,

Cliff

[Ken White]

I would say that Desert Storm and OAF pretty convincingly argue that superior aircraft make a difference.

The Buff and the Bone did good work.

Is anyone asking the Army to go up outnumbered against T-90s in rusted out M-60A3s?

No. Though they did ask the Army for many years to go up against hordes of T-72s with a few old M-60s and M-48s. Bad allegory, I think. Regardless is anyone asking the USAF to go up against anyone with anything? Only the Indians have enough new aircraft on order to be remotely problematic. The Chinese are getting there but they have other problems. I doubt either of them will appear as an adversary in the near future, they have other things to do. The only serious challenger could be the EU and that is not terribly likely at this time.

Back to the farce of the QDR and NMS; This was your question:

While small wars and interventions need to be a part of our strategy, how they fit in with the other end of the spectrum seems to be the challenge to me. I'm curious to hear your opinions on the strategy change...

I initially responded with "I see no real change. Post 1992, the force for one real war, much less two was not resourced." I used the post '92 period to resonate with the current era but FWIW, we have never since 1944 (or other than during WW II, before, for that matter) resourced our nominal strategy of the time. There is nothing new except that the unclassified variant will be modified to reflect reality to an extent. Welcome to life in an essentially un-militaristic democracy. Note that our nominal allies all have the same problem except most of them have it far worse than us.

Not only the current QDR but the F-22 topic (as well as FCS, the Zumwalt class and other things) also are indicative of a shift from a realistically unsupportable strategy of buying not Silver but Platinum Bullets and having a quasi-conscription based large armed force in being to a more realistic smaller and hopefully far more professional force that has limitations, recognizes them and does not gloss over them by promising more than it can deliver. I anticipate significant pressure to avoid Platinum Bullet purchases, downgrading to mere Silver, in the near future (see the F-35). Be happy it will not go back to the 1950s with Lead Bullets in inadequate quantities.

The combat experienced force of the next few years will still be capable of doing things no one else on the globe can do or will be able to do for certainly the next 10 to 15 and probably the next 20 to 30 years. Thus, worry about hardware for the period 15-20 years out is IMO appropriate; for today, it's not an issue...

Thus I'm not sure there is a problem. If there is, I'm having difficulty seeing it.

[Entropy]

I'm not going to get into this thread because arguing about the F-22 is now like arguing about abortion - no one's mind is getting changed. Besides, at this point I'm pretty ambivalent about it.

However, I thought this anti-F-22 video was hilarious. Only a program this controversial could result in something like this:

[Cliff]

The combat experienced force of the next few years will still be capable of doing things no one else on the globe can do or will be able to do for certainly the next 10 to 15 and probably the next 20 to 30 years. Thus, worry about hardware for the period 15-20 years out is IMO appropriate; for today, it's not an issue...

Thus I'm not sure there is a problem. If there is, I'm having difficulty seeing it.

Sir-

Your last bullet is makes my point for me - the F-22 is the hardware for 15-20 years out. F-35 can't get the job done, and we won't have another fighter till 2040-2050 at best - if at all. Stopping the F-22 at an unsustainable 187 ties our hands for the next 30 years.

V/R,

Cliff

[Ken White]

Your last bullet is makes my point for me - the F-22 is the hardware for 15-20 years out.

A 1990 design will do the job in 2030? Okay, if you say so. Given that most Squadrons field 12-14 aircraft with a 90% OR, the implication is that six or more may be hangar queens but if you're cool with that, so am I...

F-35 can't get the job done

Against what?

and we won't have another fighter till 2040-2050 at best - if at all.

True -- that last. At all. highly possible.

Stopping the F-22 at an unsustainable 187 ties our hands for the next 30 years.

I doubt it but we'll certainly have to wait and see who's correct.

We certainly had localized air superiority at best over Vietnam, and lost a lot of aircraft. We could not afford that loss rate now, at least not with 187 Raptors.

You can't use the total loss rate if you're going to talk the F-22, look at the air to air rate only. Adjust it for the fact that Thuds which had no business even being there but were all the AF had due to bad purchasing decisions got attacked by Mig 21s, SAMs, ADA and small arms. Defending them with a long range missile launcher of a big Fox 4 against an agile Mig took some adaptation. So to did the CAS mission performed by supersonic fighters which got knocked down in the south by small arms fire. You're comparing Apples and Mangoes. Even so, the VN loss rate was far better than that in Korea or WW II. A ratio of roughly 0.4 losses per 1,000 sorties compared favorably with a 2.0 rate in Korea and the 9.7 figure during World War II. LINK. Note the sheer number of aircraft types.

the F-35 is inferior to the F-22 in many ways, especially in air-to-air and DEAD. Not as survivable against SAMs either - the F-35 needs the F-22 to be a viable platform in the face of any adversary with double digit SAMs.

Doesn't the 'dead' bit remain to be seen from an aircraft still in design proof stage? Not as survivable against SAMs based on its lesser stealth characteristics and speed -- or its more modern avionic fit?

Where's John T.? He was the guy who first brought up the F22 on this thread.

In any event, Cliff, I appreciate your defense of the program but you and I are unlikely to agree. You're an airplane driver and I'm a gravel cruncher, so your opinion ought to count more...

Thus I cede the ground, er, air, to you and will stick to the thread henceforth.

[Cliff]

A 1990 design will do the job in 2030? Okay, if you say so. Given that most Squadrons field 12-14 aircraft with a 90% OR, the implication is that six or more may be hangar queens but if you're cool with that, so am I...

The sad fact is that the lifetime of a fighter is probably going to be 30-40 years... our newest F-15Cs are 1986 models, most are 83-84 jets... 26 years old. So yes, the F-22 will do a good job in 2030. So the solution to this problem is to just not buy new fighters, and let anyone who wants to buy better ones from the Chinese or Russians?

F-22 squadrons are actually 18 PAA right now... supposed to be 24. What folks don't realize is the additional 60 F-22s would give each squadron 24 jets... OBTW, the MC (mission capable) rate is about 68%... which is about where it should be for a new jet. There will typically be 12-14 available per squadron.

You can't use the total loss rate if you're going to talk the F-22, look at the air to air rate only. Adjust it for the fact that Thuds which had no business even being there but were all the AF had due to bad purchasing decisions got attacked by Mig 21s, SAMs, ADA and small arms. Defending them with a long range missile launcher of a big Fox 4 against an agile Mig took some adaptation. So to did the CAS mission performed by supersonic fighters which got knocked down in the south by small arms fire. You're comparing Apples and Mangoes.

Unfortunately, I am talking A-A and SAM loss rates as well... because the main reason we need the F-22 over improved F-15Cs or the F-35 is the SAMs. Double digit SAMs are cheap, and fairly effective... and the F-15C can't go up against them. The F-35 isn't as effective against them either. Trust me, the SAMs worry the folks flying air-to-air fighters a lot more than the Flankers do.

So, the SAM loss rate has to be there. The Thuds were not bought due to bad purchasing decisions... the Thud was bought to drop nukes on the Soviets... period. Unfortunately we bought aircraft only in preparation for (total) nuclear war... and trained mostly for nuclear war. Training and buying for only one type of conflict.... hmm, sound familiar?

You make my point for me by illustrating how the F-4 wasn't suited to the role we had to use it for... just like the F-35 isn't suitable for air to air.

Anyway, I don't think looking at the effect of a new surface to air system on air-to-air combat is comparing apples and mangoes at all.

Even so, the VN loss rate was far better than that in Korea or WW II. A ratio of roughly 0.4 losses per 1,000 sorties compared favorably with a 2.0 rate in Korea and the 9.7 figure during World War II. LINK. Note the sheer number of aircraft types.

Valid. Then again, we were restricted ourselves to not flying over the most heavily defended areas... How many sorties in WWII were considered "Combat" when flown over (essentially) friendly territory?

Doesn't the 'dead' bit remain to be seen from an aircraft still in design proof stage? Not as survivable against SAMs based on its lesser stealth characteristics and speed -- or its more modern avionic fit?

The F-35 has much of the same avionics as the F-22 does. The F-35 does not have the same speed capability as the F-22... which is huge against SAMs. The F-22's DEAD capability is based on the JDAM... I think we've proven that JDAM is pretty effective. Or do you think the JDAM doesn't work?

Where's John T.? He was the guy who first brought up the F22 on this thread.

In any event, Cliff, I appreciate your defense of the program but you and I are unlikely to agree. You're an airplane driver and I'm a gravel cruncher, so your opinion ought to count more...

Thus I cede the ground, er, air, to you and will stick to the thread henceforth.

Sorry for replying, no I didn't want this thread to be about the F-22... but I still feel the need to clear the air since there's a lot of misconceptions. I am absolutely sick of "experts" who have never been up against the threats we're talking about telling the media that the F-22 isn't needed, and the F-35 will be so much better...

I appreciate everyone here at least listening to the AF guy's comments. I look forward to learning more from all of you.

V/R,

Cliff

[Ken White]

I am absolutely sick of "experts" who have never been up against the threats we're talking about telling the media that the F-22 isn't needed, and the F-35 will be so much better...

So am I. However, I don't think anyone on this thread has said or implied that. The policy discussion you started has essentially been on policy, not the technical merits.

The Thuds were not bought due to bad purchasing decisions... the Thud was bought to drop nukes on the Soviets... period. Unfortunately we bought aircraft only in preparation for (total) nuclear war... and trained mostly for nuclear war. Training and buying for only one type of conflict.... hmm, sound familiar?

The Thuds were bought for one war and used in another because the wrong war had been used to justify their purchase.

The announced strategy change, eliminating the myth of two war capability, will presumably be reflected in the QDR. If that reality is indeed reflected in the QDR and if what has been dribbling from most in the DoD heirarchy over the last few months is correct, the focus will be on the full spectrum of warfare and not just current fights. Thus I suggest you have been the one emphasizing training and buying for only one type of war, DoD does not appear to be doing that and no one else on this thread appears to be doing so.

That 'Full Spectrum' bit means that everything from dropping nukes to getting in the mud will be required / desired. We differ on what that means apparently. You see it as focusing on only one type of war, the current flavor thus producing a shortfall in a program you support. I see it as reflecting a realistic apportionment of funds among a number of needed programs -- to include curtailing purchase of one aircraft I've strongly supported as has been stated on this board numerous times.

That apportionment includes attempting to accelerate the purchase of an aircraft with less capability in some respects but which can be exported and for which agreements to buy from other nations exist thus lowering it's net cost to the US and enabling more of those aircraft to be purchased. As well as, of course, honoring those agreements, which may require added R&D or Engineering Change Proposal funding and thus impose unwanted but regrettably necessary unanticipated costs. That, as they say, is life...