Horn of Africa historical (pre-2011): catch all thread

**SWJED** · 06-25-2006

25 June Stars and Stripes - Djibouti Mission Fights Terror at its Source.

... “Doing goodness for goodness’ sake is OK, but what we’re really trying to do is ameliorate the conditions that give rise to terrorism,” says U.S. Navy Capt. Stephen Johnson, chief of staff of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa.

“We are investing a relatively small amount of resources in order to help African nations build peace and stability throughout the region. If we’re successful, we may just be able to avoid expending the huge amounts of resources that we have in Afghanistan.”

Or Iraq. Indeed, U.S. military officials openly call the Horn of Africa mission one of avoidance and pre-emption — keeping a low profile, providing small-scale community projects and training local militaries.

The task force was formed in late 2002 and has operated from Camp Lemonier in Djibouti since May 2003. The force’s area of responsibility includes Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, the Seychelles, Sudan, Yemen and, technically, Somalia....

The task force has some 1,500 military and civilian personnel working in an area covering more than 2 million square miles with more than three times the population of Iraq and Afghanistan combined. More than half of the region’s population live in extreme poverty; there are 3.3 million refugees from war and famine; there are 10 million internally displaced persons; and 26 million people have HIV.

**Jedburgh** · 06-25-2006

For those who have access, there are two older reports that provide good background on CJTF-HOA:

CALL IIR 04-28, CJTF-HOA (AKO Log-in Required)

Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is tasked with conducting operations in the Horn of Africa (HOA) region to defeat transnational terrorists, their networks, to stimulate and assist in the long-term effort to develop a stable environment that is non-conducive to extremist ideologies. This region is large, covering 167,000,000 square miles, roughly two-thirds of the area of the continental United States. This region contains six countries and one failed state as well as numerous ethnic and religious groups that straddle borders. The HOA area if responsibility (AOR) is over three times larger than Afghanistan and Iraq combined, yet it has only slightly more than 1,300 CJTF-HOA personnel. As one of the fronts on the global war on terror (GWOT), HOA provides an effective capability for a relatively modest sized organization. CJTF-HOA has a lower priority for resources than either Iraq or Afghanistan. This presents an overarching problem for the task force in the GWOT. The often used mantra “Do more with less” may not be truer anywhere than with the CJTF-HOA.

The CJTF-HOA mission has evolved into a mission centered on civil affairs (CA) operations. Many non-CA officers from other staff elements agree the centerpiece of the CJTF is the CA effort. CA is a force multiplier in the fight against terrorism. CJTF-HOA views CA as a method to shape the battlespace and create favorable conditions to enhance stability. To do this, CA assesses areas for projects, hires locals, while involving and publicizing host nation (HN) support for projects. The key is to gain access, establish presence, and in the process empower HN government and non-government organizations. The CA effort in HOA is a good template for the future; it is important the HN takes those steps seen in its national interests. The end-state is to establish a CJTF with sustainable HN capability.

MCCLL, AAR - Visit to CJTF-HOA, Mar-Apr 05 (MCCLL Registration/Log-in Required)

...The non-kinetic and preventative nature of this mission lends it some unusual characteristics. For instance, an important aspect of the task force itself is simply its presence in what is potentially a highly volatile region. Although the task force consists of about 1200 personnel in Camp Lemonier, at the “pointy end of the spear” are, at any given time, less than one hundred US military personnel forming civil affairs and mobile training teams. These teams are primarily involved in building relationships with both the militaries and the civilian population of adjacent countries, namely, Kenya, Ethiopia and Yemen (the task force has a liaison element in the embassy in Sudan but has not yet initiated any engagements in that country). There are no clearly tangible measures of effectiveness for this type of operation, no body counts, weapons caches or captured insurgents to provide physical evidence of success. However, the personnel involved are, from my observations, having a very positive effect on the local populace’s perception of the US military in the regions where they are operating. This, in turn, undoubtedly has beneficial effects on US relations with countries in the region – constituting what is essentially a strategic information operation...