Horn of Africa historical (pre-2011): catch all thread

[Ken White]

...I just anticipate that invading Somalia will be the next knee-jerk reaction war that we start in order to help a sitting President get reelected.

I didn't say we wouldn't do that...

C'mon, we are spending about $60 Million...looking for barefoot teenagers in skiffs high on khat. Meanwhile, piracy is on the rise.

In reverse order; of course it is -- we've done little or nothing seriously aimed at stopping it. We just throw money at things, whether it make any sense or not. Better than getting Congress involved -- then it REALLY gets screwed up. That's a serious comment and that factor does drive some trains.

As for the high tech, high value 'efforts' -- when all one has is a hammer...

Our CIA is spending about $40 Million per month (WAG) buying the loyalties of a dozen militias, some of whom are then using that money to fight each other.

Yeah. I remember Laos. Quite well; way, way too well, in fact...

Folks expect it to be a "cakewalk," and for the locals to shower our troops with ... do they have chocolates or flowers there ?

Getting serious for a second, I suppose there are some in high places who believe that -- they're idiots (unfortunately, the inmates are sometimes in charge) but most people know better. The broader American polity has a lot more collective sense than do its elected Pols.

The only solution to the high seas piracy is taking action ashore, and we don't trust any locals with that responsibility.

Don't trust any locals or have other, mostly US domestic and political reasons to want to be there? That aspect regrettably drives too much of our interventionist stupidity -- and the majority of it has been stupid; either stupid from the outset or stupidly executed. We do not have the right tools to preclude such idiocy or to properly execute those that cannot be avoided. That not because we're stupid or incapable but because a venal Congress (or, more correctly, a succession of them) will not provide those tools lest it erode their power. They're willing to provide Hammers but not fine cabinetmaking tools...

The problem with Somalia is its location, not AQ et.al. Anyplace with ability to significantly constrict maritime flow through Bab-el-Mandeb is going to attract and hold our attention. Probably should. I just wish we'd do it right.

Still,you're correct that the answer lies ashore -- and we're both correct in saying that any US military intervention there would be probably the least good thing we could do.

I am pretty sure that there are indigenous leaders in Somaliland and Puntland who could fight both of these fights more effectively than we ever could, but our foreign policy is not so flexible as to be able to accord respect to any Somali leaders.

With that I agree.

I could argue that we effectively have no foreign policy -- but you've hit our 'problem' smack on the head:

"We" (the broader US political and governing crowd) believe that only "we" can do things correctly. Since that "we" is insanely fragmented on methods and goals, it is terribly incoherent. That leads to, as I said elsewhere about another area, discombobulated, almost incoherent actions that effectively result in a mess and: "I'm inclined to fault us ... admitting that the locals are, as usual, manipulating us. We're egotistical, arrogant, rich -- and dumb -- really bad combination."

[Dayuhan]

I just anticipate that invading Somalia will be the next knee-jerk reaction war that we start in order to help a sitting President get reelected.

How would starting a war in Somalia help to get the sitting President reelected?

I guess I left that wide open.
Folks expect it to be a "cakewalk," and for the locals to shower our troops with ... do they have chocolates or flowers there ?

And which "folks" are expecting this? It's not something I've heard.

A year ago, President Farole of Puntland (who we do not even officially recognize) said he could stamp out piracy with $8 Million in aid, and I believe him.

Why do you believe him? Did he say exactly how he could stamp out piracy with $8 million? Where the money would be spent? It seems an unlikely proposition at best.

It will start as a training mission, with advisors only. Remember Southeast Asia ?

I am pretty sure that there are indigenous leaders in Somaliland and Puntland who could fight both of these fights more effectively than we ever could, but our foreign policy is not so flexible as to be able to accord respect to any Somali leaders.

Now I'm confused. If we aren't able to trust or respect any Somali leaders, who exactly will we be training and advising? If you want us to work with indigenous leaders, isn't training and advising what we should be doing?

[SWJ Blog]

Winning Hearts and Minds in Kenya?

Entry Excerpt:

"Winning Hearts and Minds?" Understanding the Relationship between Aid and Security in Kenya - Mark Bradbury and Michael Kleinman, Feinstein International Center.

This case study on Kenya, researched and written by Mark Bradbury and Michael Kleinman, is the first in a series of publications presenting the findings of a two-year FIC comparative study on the relationship between aid and security in northeastern Kenya and in five provinces of Afghanistan. The overall study has focused in particular on trying to determine the effectiveness of aid in promoting stabilization and security objectives, including by helping to "win hearts and minds" of local populations. (For more information and links to publications related to the study see the Aid and Security project page.)

Since the late 1990's Kenya's large and thinly populated northeastern region bordering Somalia has become a focus for US government efforts in Africa to counter terrorism, mitigate violent extremism and promote stability and governance. This paper examines the effectiveness of one aspect of those efforts, namely the aid projects implemented by US Civil Affairs teams deployed from the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Garissa and Wajir districts in North Eastern province, and Lamu district in Coast province. The paper argues that these activities were useful at a tactical level in terms of facilitating the US military's entry into regions of potential concern, and in helping them to acquire local knowledge and connections. However, it also highlights some of the limitations at a strategic level of using foreign aid as a tool for countering terrorism or insurgencies and promoting stability and security. For example, the research found that these small-scale and scattered projects did little to win hearts and minds or change perceptions of the US in the communities where the projects were implemented. There was also little evidence that the projects had contributed to improved security by addressing some of the perceived underlying causes of terrorism and violent extremism in the region.

Read the entire report at the Feinstein International Center.



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[SWJED]

25 June Stars and Stripes - Djibouti Mission Fights Terror at its Source.

... “Doing goodness for goodness’ sake is OK, but what we’re really trying to do is ameliorate the conditions that give rise to terrorism,” says U.S. Navy Capt. Stephen Johnson, chief of staff of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa.

“We are investing a relatively small amount of resources in order to help African nations build peace and stability throughout the region. If we’re successful, we may just be able to avoid expending the huge amounts of resources that we have in Afghanistan.”

Or Iraq. Indeed, U.S. military officials openly call the Horn of Africa mission one of avoidance and pre-emption — keeping a low profile, providing small-scale community projects and training local militaries.

The task force was formed in late 2002 and has operated from Camp Lemonier in Djibouti since May 2003. The force’s area of responsibility includes Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, the Seychelles, Sudan, Yemen and, technically, Somalia....

The task force has some 1,500 military and civilian personnel working in an area covering more than 2 million square miles with more than three times the population of Iraq and Afghanistan combined. More than half of the region’s population live in extreme poverty; there are 3.3 million refugees from war and famine; there are 10 million internally displaced persons; and 26 million people have HIV.

[Jedburgh]

For those who have access, there are two older reports that provide good background on CJTF-HOA:

CALL IIR 04-28, CJTF-HOA (AKO Log-in Required)

Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is tasked with conducting operations in the Horn of Africa (HOA) region to defeat transnational terrorists, their networks, to stimulate and assist in the long-term effort to develop a stable environment that is non-conducive to extremist ideologies. This region is large, covering 167,000,000 square miles, roughly two-thirds of the area of the continental United States. This region contains six countries and one failed state as well as numerous ethnic and religious groups that straddle borders. The HOA area if responsibility (AOR) is over three times larger than Afghanistan and Iraq combined, yet it has only slightly more than 1,300 CJTF-HOA personnel. As one of the fronts on the global war on terror (GWOT), HOA provides an effective capability for a relatively modest sized organization. CJTF-HOA has a lower priority for resources than either Iraq or Afghanistan. This presents an overarching problem for the task force in the GWOT. The often used mantra “Do more with less” may not be truer anywhere than with the CJTF-HOA.

The CJTF-HOA mission has evolved into a mission centered on civil affairs (CA) operations. Many non-CA officers from other staff elements agree the centerpiece of the CJTF is the CA effort. CA is a force multiplier in the fight against terrorism. CJTF-HOA views CA as a method to shape the battlespace and create favorable conditions to enhance stability. To do this, CA assesses areas for projects, hires locals, while involving and publicizing host nation (HN) support for projects. The key is to gain access, establish presence, and in the process empower HN government and non-government organizations. The CA effort in HOA is a good template for the future; it is important the HN takes those steps seen in its national interests. The end-state is to establish a CJTF with sustainable HN capability.

MCCLL, AAR - Visit to CJTF-HOA, Mar-Apr 05 (MCCLL Registration/Log-in Required)

...The non-kinetic and preventative nature of this mission lends it some unusual characteristics. For instance, an important aspect of the task force itself is simply its presence in what is potentially a highly volatile region. Although the task force consists of about 1200 personnel in Camp Lemonier, at the “pointy end of the spear” are, at any given time, less than one hundred US military personnel forming civil affairs and mobile training teams. These teams are primarily involved in building relationships with both the militaries and the civilian population of adjacent countries, namely, Kenya, Ethiopia and Yemen (the task force has a liaison element in the embassy in Sudan but has not yet initiated any engagements in that country). There are no clearly tangible measures of effectiveness for this type of operation, no body counts, weapons caches or captured insurgents to provide physical evidence of success. However, the personnel involved are, from my observations, having a very positive effect on the local populace’s perception of the US military in the regions where they are operating. This, in turn, undoubtedly has beneficial effects on US relations with countries in the region – constituting what is essentially a strategic information operation...

[SWJED]

... of the Stars and Stripes CJTF-HOA article series:

Building Projects Part of Race to Win Over Horn of Africa

Battle for Beliefs Fought in Slums of Djibouti City

[Jedburgh]

CTC, 1 May 07: Al-Qa’ida's (mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa

The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point is pleased to present the report, Al-Qa’ida's (mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa. Based on a collection of al-Qa’ida documents recently released from the Department of Defense’s Harmony Database, this report provides an analysis of al-Qa’ida’s early operations in the Horn of Africa. These documents, captured in the course of operations supporting the Global War on Terror, have never before been available to the academic and policy community. Al-Qa’ida's (mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa includes a theoretically informed analysis of al-Qa’ida’s successes and failures while operating in Somalia between 1992 and 1994. Case studies on Somalia and Kenya provide a historical and current analysis of al-Qa’ida’s operations in the Horn. Our theoretical analysis and case studies inform policy recommendations on how the U.S. and its coalition partners might address the threat of terrorism in failed and weak states within the Horn of Africa and globally. We have provided brief summaries of each of the released documents with full text translations in English and the original document in Arabic. We hope this report will serve as a useful resource in our collective efforts to better understand and combat al-Qa’ida and its affiliated movements.

[SWJED]

I just uploaded the document to the SWJ - Al-Qa'ida's (mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa (1 May 2007)

[Tom Odom]

Our most important new finding is that al-Qa’ida failed to gain traction in Somalia in the early 1990s because: (1) its members were perceived as foreigners; (2) it significantly underestimated the costs of operating in a failed state environment; and (3) its African vanguard did not understand the salience of either local power structures or local Islamic traditions. In a region dominated by clanbased authority structures and moderate Sufi Islam, the benefits of joining a foreign Salafi terrorist organization paled next to the costs of leaving one’s clan.

I started reading this paper this morning and actually started laughing....it seems that AQ ran into the reality of Somalia where the non-Somali is essentially a target. I also especially like the cautions against over-playing a US or Western hand in such areas.

After reviewing al-Qa`ida’s Horn operations from a theoretical standpoint, we analyze al-Qa`ida’s prospects in two key Horn countries: Somalia and Kenya. The nations composing the Horn of Africa are often aggregated into one overall counterterrorism strategy. However, each Horn country and even sub-regions within these countries present a unique set of socioeconomic, political and religious factors that create specific challenges and opportunities to both al-Qa’ida and to counterterrorism forces. Effective and efficient counterterrorism efforts in the Horn require tailored strategies that exacerbate the endemic challenges that al-Qa’ida encounters in this inhospitable region and minimize friendly government vulnerabilities.

Or as above, it is refreshing that someone actually pointed out that a geographic feature like the "Horn" does not define the social or cultural divisions within that feature. Basically this is a modern caution against a colonial tendency, saying "be careful drawing borders or boundaries, White Man."


More later after I finish looking at this one.

Best
Tom

[Tom Odom]

Alright, I did an admittedly fast and equally surface read of this paper but having said that, I will still say it is very informative, especially to those not initiated to the Horn, Somalia, and Kenya.

The bad news is that it is a long read at 557 pages if you are so inclined. The good news is reading the executive summary will give you what you need with some greater depth spot reading in the first 81 pages.

The paper's key point is that failed states like Somalia may not be the key battleground against terrorism. Instead weak states like Kenya--especially coastal kenya--offer greater opportunities for organizations like AQ.

The paper also offers key points that apply to foreign assistance in larger terms, such as the presence of terrorist activity as a stimulus for assistance promotes the preservation of such activity to continue the flow of assistance. This is not surprising to anyone who has worked refugee or other assistance venues, especially when dealing with a weak/corrupt government. We used to say, "refugees are big business." This report says "so are terrorists" when it comes to prompting assistance.

My concern with this paper is that in itself it presents an equally simplistic view on the issues of failed states and weak states, especially in Africa. I say that with the Congo--never a real state to begin with--in mind. Everything that is played out in this paper as indicative of either a failed state like Somalia or a weak state like Kenya takes place in the Congo everyday. The key is understanding the region, the "country," and the peoples involved before making "big hand, little map" assessments like "Somalia is a breeding ground for Islamists" or "they will see us as liberators in Iraq."

Overall a very good paper and I recommend at least reading the EXSUM.

Tom

[Presley Cannady]

Looks like they moved most of this stuff

Harmony Project main page: http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/harmony_menu.asp

(Mis)Adventures: http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aqII.asp

[jcustis]

I've followed the development of "affairs" in the Horn (and specificaly Somalia) since I left in 1994. This is an important piece of work on a scale that I honestly have a hard time describing. This leads me to wonder, why the transparency, and why now?

What are the differences between the 229 page and 557 page versions? I am glossing over both right now, and honestly there is too much stuff to be able to tell.

[LawVol]

"The Americans Have Landed" by Thomas Barnett http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Af...ed_Africa.html

America is going to have an Africa Command for the same reason people buy real estate -- it's a good investment. Too many large, hostile powers surround Central Asia for the radical jihadists to expand there, but Africa? Africa's the strategic backwater of the world. Nobody cares about Africa except Western celebrities.

So as the Middle East middle-ages over the next three decades and Asia's infrastructural build-out is completed, only Africa will remain as a source for both youth-driven revolution and cheap labor and commodities. Toss in global warming and you've got a recipe for the most deprived becoming the most depraved.

The U.S., through its invasion and botched occupation of Iraq, has dramatically sped up globalization's frightening reformatting process in the Middle East, and with Africa on deck, the United States military is engaging in a highly strategic flanking maneuver.

non-kinetic effects in action...

[Lostcomm]

Gentlemen-
If one had to choose the top ten things a person might attempt to accomplish in a relatively short tour to HOA, what does the collective brain think they might be?

Just wondering...

Lostcomm

[davidbfpo]

The Horn of Africa; I had to ask as abbreviations are not always readily known.

I would have a look at Aidan Hartley's writings / reporting from Somalia recently; one of the few Western journalists to visit there and a white African too (a Kenyan national living on a farm in North East Kenya).

Understand clans and tribes. Be respectful and offer the hand of friendship / respect in meetings; Somalis appreciate this in my limited experience here in the UK.

Consider low tech, alternative technologies; check www.practicalaction.org

All from an armchair and quite possibly not the suggestions sought!

davidbfpo

[jcustis]

in a relatively short tour to HOA

In what capacity, armed or unarmed...peace-making/keeping, security assistance, or humanitarian assistance?