We still don't grasp the value of translators

[IntelTrooper]

A colleague who served in Kabul a few years ago referred to working with Swedish-Iranians (as Farsi was close to Dari) and another that Canada has Canadian-Afghans who wish to serve.

We don't really have a lack of Dari speakers. We need Pashtu speakers, who are more difficult to find. Specifically, Pashtu speakers who are also US citizens.

[carl]

The most distressing thing about this thread is that the "can do" "we'll figure something out" attitude of yesteryear has been replaced by a modern attitude that can't get anything done, even if everybody acknowledges it to be important. And I don't mean the guys commenting on this thread, I mean the gov and military as a whole. There is always a good reason why they won't do it.

I know this will never happen, but what if you just made a program whereby any soldier who demonstrated a certain level of language proficiency were given a huge monthly bonus, say $2,000? Let the men figure out how they learned on their own. The idea is to motivate the language "naturals" into action. Would that kind of thing be at all practicable, aside from the bureaucratic reluctance?

Since the F-22 has been mentioned, if you ever really need an F-22, 20,000 world class terps could not substitute. I know the point is about spending money wisely and the F-22 is a shining target but there may come a day...and there will be NO substitute.

[Uboat509]

I suspect that part of the reason that the military does not have more terps in house is that the military takes a long view of the whole thing. Sure, we need a lot of Pashto speakers now but, eventually, we will leave there. In today's contentious political climate you never know if that might not be sooner rather than later. If that does happen, what do you do with all the extra Pashto speakers? That's why the military likes contractors for a lot of things. If we don't need them tomorrow, we just don't renew their contracts. Whereas if we fill those needs in house and the requirement goes away or at least gets reduced a lot then we still have all those bodies that we can't just get rid of. Now we have to either retrain them, which after all the resources spent on training them in the first place is not particularly attractive option, or we have a draw-down, which is also expensive.

SFC W

[pjmunson]

They did considerably up the language proficiency pay, although not nearly as much as you suggest, Carl. The max is far less than that figure, although nothing to sneeze at, but in order to get the max, you have to be professionally proficient, or nearly so, in three testable languages. Add to the problem the fact that the Defense Language Proficiency Test has nothing to do with your ability to rap with someone in Dari, Pashtu, or Arabic, but has everything to do with whether you can read newspaper and magazine passages and listen to Syrian soap operas and al-Jazeera and then answer questions meant more to stump the chump than to test your comprehension. So our metrics are off because they do not test the skills we need to employ operationally. For those who might think this sounds like sour grapes, I get 3/3 on the Arabic test, so I'm not mad that I can't pass it. I'm mad that the system is so broke and no matter how hard you try, the arrogant "academics" at DLI and the inertia of the bureaucracy there stymie all efforts.

That's where, as you said pretty much, "can do" runs into a brick wall. For a number of reasons, from the agencies where DLI's money comes from, to the cultural factors that affect how the native instructors want to teach their languages, to the fact that they're trying to teach last year's high school grads how to understand passages in a foreign language that cover college level topics (for instance an article about pegged and floating currencies... it made no sense to them, even once translated), the ship there has a broken rudder. And even when they have forums to try to get input, responses range from defensive counters to every point to DoD officials telling students and instructors who try to bring up valid points that they are out of line because they're not saying that DLI is doing great. Eight years and really all they've done beyond some curriculum reorganziation and cramming an extra semester in on the students' backs is to hand out iPods, and I think now laptops, to every stud. As is typical anymore, technology money rains freely down, but if you try to suggest substantive improvements it is too hard or off base.

[Schmedlap]

An anecdote, FWIW

We had great interpreters in Baghdad in 2003. They were individuals whom we recruited ourselves off the street. I worked with several terps who were fluent in as many as six languages. One was a former Iraqi General who spoke 6 languages and knew Tariq Aziz. Another was an ex-pat who returned to Iraq from the UK, relieved that Saddam was gone. He, too, spoke 6 languages. We had several who grew up in Iraq and went to college in the UK. Another was the son of a doctor who went to medical school in California. His English was indistinguishable from that of my Soldiers, to include slang and profanity. I could go on.

We HAD great interpreters. Some worked for free, at first, because we had no means to pay them. Then their pay was eventually upped to something ridiculous, like $3 a day (which barely covered the taxi rides to and from our patrol base). But then the situation deteriorated and they were too scared to continue working with us, so in later deployments we relied on whomever Titan could recruit. That is why in OIF III I once spent 20 minutes struggling through a conversation with an Iraqi Colonel. Finally, in frustration, he started talking to me in English, pointing out that, "your interpreter is incompetent. He doesn't understand English or Arabic."

We once received an interpreter with one leg who was on crutches. You can't make this up. Here we were, an Infantry Company in a patrol base that was covered in 3 feet of dust (I mean, literally, it was like walking through a fresh snowfall) and they send us a guy on LOGPAC who can't even exit the HMMWV without someone helping him. We sent him back on the same LOGPAC. We received another "interpreter" whom we couldn't even communicate with. I don't know what languages he spoke, but English apparently wasn't one of them. I mean, he couldn't even tell us what his name was. Talking to him was more difficult than talking to an Iraqi.

[Ken White]

for 'efficiency' and to preclude 'fraud, waste and abuse.' Effectiveness goes down the tube. The end result is almost invariably greater expense through hidden costs and unintended consequences. Plus it tends to get people killed unnecessarily...

It amazes me that Congress -- the real culprits -- are willing to trust the Schmedlaps to take the sons and daughters of their voters into combat but do not believe they can be trusted to hire interpreters, pay informers or pay for minor projects.

Actually, it isn't amazing, it's just pathetic.

My son's platoon in Iraq had a good interpreter for their whole tour. That, too was before the 'system' took over...

[Brandon Friedman]

You guys are saying that we can't adequately hire, train, and retain our own translators. At the same time, the AP is reporting--as is IntelTrooper--that troops in the field say the contractors can't provide satisfactory interpreters, either.

This means we can't do COIN.

Not so. Just means it isn't easy and you have to work harder and get frustrated more often.

Ken, how exactly would soldiers and marines conduct COIN without competent interpreters?

We had great interpreters in Baghdad in 2003. They were individuals whom we recruited ourselves off the street. I worked with several terps who were fluent in as many as six languages. One was a former Iraqi General who spoke 6 languages and knew Tariq Aziz. Another was an ex-pat who returned to Iraq from the UK, relieved that Saddam was gone. He, too, spoke 6 languages. We had several who grew up in Iraq and went to college in the UK. Another was the son of a doctor who went to medical school in California. His English was indistinguishable from that of my Soldiers, to include slang and profanity. I could go on.

We HAD great interpreters. Some worked for free, at first, because we had no means to pay them. Then their pay was eventually upped to something ridiculous, like $3 a day (which barely covered the taxi rides to and from our patrol base). But then the situation deteriorated and they were too scared to continue working with us, so in later deployments we relied on whomever Titan could recruit.

Do we know each other? We started hiring guys off the street that April for $5 a day with cash out of our own pockets. When we left Baghdad and headed north in May, eight or nine of them came with us after we agreed to up their pay to $10 a day. But, like you said, a few would’ve accompanied us for free. By mid-summer, these guys we’d once picked up off the street in Baghdad were no longer “locals” or “Iraqis.” They were members of the unit.

As ####ed up as things were back then, it’s depressing to look back now and think those were the “good ol’ days.”

[Ken White]

Ken, how exactly would soldiers and marines conduct COIN without competent interpreters?

you smart, better educated guys do it today but I can ask for beer and cigarettes in seven languages. I can get rudimentary military points across in in Hangul, Spanish and Viet Namese. Used to be able to do it in Mandarin and Farsi (the latter being the only one school trained). The ones I recall a bit of were combat related, the other two were not. Now that I have my smart ass answer to your smart ass question out of the way, I will ascend to a sensible and reasonably proper answer.

They would do it with difficulty. That's not the answer, that's a step on the ascension I promised and something I mentioned earlier.

You make (do not suggest, make) your troops learn and use a few words by attempting to converse with locals until you meet one that wants to practice English in return for teaching you the local vernacular -- then you test what he / she says with others to insure you aren't being told that Po ji in Hangul or Coño in Spanish means "Thank You" and not something else. This is how I found out that Salope in French does not mean thank you. Then you counsel any 'teacher' who steers you incorrectly. As I said, not impossible, just makes it more difficult.

Soldiers and Marines generally will do what their leaders do and /or tell them to do. They do not need extensive training to "conduct COIN" (weird phrase, that), they just need competent, capable well trained leaders willing to train them all day every day, in combat and out -- more and harder in combat (they'll bitch but they also know what's needed and they know who's supposed to make them do what's needed...). If the kids have that, they'll do okay no matter what the mission.

I would, as an aside, point out that Soldiers and Marines do not 'conduct' COIN and that as the US has no insurgents at this time, the Army and Marines are not doing COIN work. They are doing FID and SFA work and to do that, one need host nation support or accompaniment. If the host nation is not able to provide such support (as was true in OIF 1 and part of 2) then good units will just cope and hire the best interpreters they can if there is a need -- as you and Schemdlap apparently did.

Perhaps I don't understand the problem. I know I don't see one.

Question for you: What did you do to rectify the problem with the boot substitution? i.e. whose rear echelon tail was properly put in a sling over the swapping occurring due to lack of leadership and supervision?