We still don't grasp the value of translators

[pjmunson]

They did considerably up the language proficiency pay, although not nearly as much as you suggest, Carl. The max is far less than that figure, although nothing to sneeze at, but in order to get the max, you have to be professionally proficient, or nearly so, in three testable languages. Add to the problem the fact that the Defense Language Proficiency Test has nothing to do with your ability to rap with someone in Dari, Pashtu, or Arabic, but has everything to do with whether you can read newspaper and magazine passages and listen to Syrian soap operas and al-Jazeera and then answer questions meant more to stump the chump than to test your comprehension. So our metrics are off because they do not test the skills we need to employ operationally. For those who might think this sounds like sour grapes, I get 3/3 on the Arabic test, so I'm not mad that I can't pass it. I'm mad that the system is so broke and no matter how hard you try, the arrogant "academics" at DLI and the inertia of the bureaucracy there stymie all efforts.

That's where, as you said pretty much, "can do" runs into a brick wall. For a number of reasons, from the agencies where DLI's money comes from, to the cultural factors that affect how the native instructors want to teach their languages, to the fact that they're trying to teach last year's high school grads how to understand passages in a foreign language that cover college level topics (for instance an article about pegged and floating currencies... it made no sense to them, even once translated), the ship there has a broken rudder. And even when they have forums to try to get input, responses range from defensive counters to every point to DoD officials telling students and instructors who try to bring up valid points that they are out of line because they're not saying that DLI is doing great. Eight years and really all they've done beyond some curriculum reorganziation and cramming an extra semester in on the students' backs is to hand out iPods, and I think now laptops, to every stud. As is typical anymore, technology money rains freely down, but if you try to suggest substantive improvements it is too hard or off base.

[Schmedlap]

An anecdote, FWIW

We had great interpreters in Baghdad in 2003. They were individuals whom we recruited ourselves off the street. I worked with several terps who were fluent in as many as six languages. One was a former Iraqi General who spoke 6 languages and knew Tariq Aziz. Another was an ex-pat who returned to Iraq from the UK, relieved that Saddam was gone. He, too, spoke 6 languages. We had several who grew up in Iraq and went to college in the UK. Another was the son of a doctor who went to medical school in California. His English was indistinguishable from that of my Soldiers, to include slang and profanity. I could go on.

We HAD great interpreters. Some worked for free, at first, because we had no means to pay them. Then their pay was eventually upped to something ridiculous, like $3 a day (which barely covered the taxi rides to and from our patrol base). But then the situation deteriorated and they were too scared to continue working with us, so in later deployments we relied on whomever Titan could recruit. That is why in OIF III I once spent 20 minutes struggling through a conversation with an Iraqi Colonel. Finally, in frustration, he started talking to me in English, pointing out that, "your interpreter is incompetent. He doesn't understand English or Arabic."

We once received an interpreter with one leg who was on crutches. You can't make this up. Here we were, an Infantry Company in a patrol base that was covered in 3 feet of dust (I mean, literally, it was like walking through a fresh snowfall) and they send us a guy on LOGPAC who can't even exit the HMMWV without someone helping him. We sent him back on the same LOGPAC. We received another "interpreter" whom we couldn't even communicate with. I don't know what languages he spoke, but English apparently wasn't one of them. I mean, he couldn't even tell us what his name was. Talking to him was more difficult than talking to an Iraqi.

[Ken White]

for 'efficiency' and to preclude 'fraud, waste and abuse.' Effectiveness goes down the tube. The end result is almost invariably greater expense through hidden costs and unintended consequences. Plus it tends to get people killed unnecessarily...

It amazes me that Congress -- the real culprits -- are willing to trust the Schmedlaps to take the sons and daughters of their voters into combat but do not believe they can be trusted to hire interpreters, pay informers or pay for minor projects.

Actually, it isn't amazing, it's just pathetic.

My son's platoon in Iraq had a good interpreter for their whole tour. That, too was before the 'system' took over...

[Brandon Friedman]

You guys are saying that we can't adequately hire, train, and retain our own translators. At the same time, the AP is reporting--as is IntelTrooper--that troops in the field say the contractors can't provide satisfactory interpreters, either.

This means we can't do COIN.

Not so. Just means it isn't easy and you have to work harder and get frustrated more often.

Ken, how exactly would soldiers and marines conduct COIN without competent interpreters?

We had great interpreters in Baghdad in 2003. They were individuals whom we recruited ourselves off the street. I worked with several terps who were fluent in as many as six languages. One was a former Iraqi General who spoke 6 languages and knew Tariq Aziz. Another was an ex-pat who returned to Iraq from the UK, relieved that Saddam was gone. He, too, spoke 6 languages. We had several who grew up in Iraq and went to college in the UK. Another was the son of a doctor who went to medical school in California. His English was indistinguishable from that of my Soldiers, to include slang and profanity. I could go on.

We HAD great interpreters. Some worked for free, at first, because we had no means to pay them. Then their pay was eventually upped to something ridiculous, like $3 a day (which barely covered the taxi rides to and from our patrol base). But then the situation deteriorated and they were too scared to continue working with us, so in later deployments we relied on whomever Titan could recruit.

Do we know each other? We started hiring guys off the street that April for $5 a day with cash out of our own pockets. When we left Baghdad and headed north in May, eight or nine of them came with us after we agreed to up their pay to $10 a day. But, like you said, a few would’ve accompanied us for free. By mid-summer, these guys we’d once picked up off the street in Baghdad were no longer “locals” or “Iraqis.” They were members of the unit.

As ####ed up as things were back then, it’s depressing to look back now and think those were the “good ol’ days.”

[Ken White]

Ken, how exactly would soldiers and marines conduct COIN without competent interpreters?

you smart, better educated guys do it today but I can ask for beer and cigarettes in seven languages. I can get rudimentary military points across in in Hangul, Spanish and Viet Namese. Used to be able to do it in Mandarin and Farsi (the latter being the only one school trained). The ones I recall a bit of were combat related, the other two were not. Now that I have my smart ass answer to your smart ass question out of the way, I will ascend to a sensible and reasonably proper answer.

They would do it with difficulty. That's not the answer, that's a step on the ascension I promised and something I mentioned earlier.

You make (do not suggest, make) your troops learn and use a few words by attempting to converse with locals until you meet one that wants to practice English in return for teaching you the local vernacular -- then you test what he / she says with others to insure you aren't being told that Po ji in Hangul or Coño in Spanish means "Thank You" and not something else. This is how I found out that Salope in French does not mean thank you. Then you counsel any 'teacher' who steers you incorrectly. As I said, not impossible, just makes it more difficult.

Soldiers and Marines generally will do what their leaders do and /or tell them to do. They do not need extensive training to "conduct COIN" (weird phrase, that), they just need competent, capable well trained leaders willing to train them all day every day, in combat and out -- more and harder in combat (they'll bitch but they also know what's needed and they know who's supposed to make them do what's needed...). If the kids have that, they'll do okay no matter what the mission.

I would, as an aside, point out that Soldiers and Marines do not 'conduct' COIN and that as the US has no insurgents at this time, the Army and Marines are not doing COIN work. They are doing FID and SFA work and to do that, one need host nation support or accompaniment. If the host nation is not able to provide such support (as was true in OIF 1 and part of 2) then good units will just cope and hire the best interpreters they can if there is a need -- as you and Schemdlap apparently did.

Perhaps I don't understand the problem. I know I don't see one.

Question for you: What did you do to rectify the problem with the boot substitution? i.e. whose rear echelon tail was properly put in a sling over the swapping occurring due to lack of leadership and supervision?

[jmm99]

but something akin to the Urban Dictionary (e.g., "salope", which you won't find in my pocket Larousse, but in my pocket Cousin briefly), would seem useful for key words and phrases. Stan could be more intelligent on this than I.

[pjmunson]

Another thing about DLI... The regular classes refuse to teach any slang or dirty words because they say that the kids will use them in class, which is true. One of the Iraqi teachers, however, came up with a great list of insults and slang for a class to teach other Arabs to be translators in Iraq.

Why are slang and insults useful? Then you know when people are talking sh** to you and know that the situation is going south. I was walking in a crowded Arab city with a female officer, who had been to DLI. Two guys in a storefront said something about her "bzaz" (####) and turned to follow us. When I looked at them and they saw that I recognized what they were saying, they turned around. Only reason why I knew bzaz was because I had learned it from an Arab soldier after I left DLI.

[Brandon Friedman]

you smart, better educated guys do it today but I can ask for beer and cigarettes in seven languages. I can get rudimentary military points across in in Hangul, Spanish and Viet Namese. Used to be able to do it in Mandarin and Farsi (the latter being the only one school trained). The ones I recall a bit of were combat related, the other two were not. Now that I have my smart ass answer to your smart ass question out of the way, I will ascend to a sensible and reasonably proper answer.

They would do it with difficulty. That's not the answer, that's a step on the ascension I promised and something I mentioned earlier.

You make (do not suggest, make) your troops learn and use a few words by attempting to converse with locals until you meet one that wants to practice English in return for teaching you the local vernacular -- then you test what he / she says with others to insure you aren't being told that Po ji in Hangul or Coño in Spanish means "Thank You" and not something else. This is how I found out that Salope in French does not mean thank you. Then you counsel any 'teacher' who steers you incorrectly. As I said, not impossible, just makes it more difficult.

Ken, I'm not trying to smartass you, but what you're describing isn't realistic at all in Afghanistan. Getting "rudimentary military points across" is not enough. This isn't about being able to say "hello," "stop," or "thank you for the chai." Troops can already do that. It's about being able to sit down with a village leader in a man-to-man setting in order to get things straight. At those times, clear, detailed communication between U.S. troops and locals is an absolutely vital requirement in both Iraq and Afghanistan. And that's not something you can get from simply meeting people and learning some basic phrases like "what is your name" or "how much does this cost."

Question for you: What did you do to rectify the problem with the boot substitution? i.e. whose rear echelon tail was properly put in a sling over the swapping occurring due to lack of leadership and supervision?

Because it was during a period in which a lot of stuff was happening, I don't remember a whole lot about that episode, other than that I became nearly apoplectic when we opened the boxes. I showed the CO, who was similarly infuriated and we (this part is fuzzy now) got word of it to the battalion commander who made some calls. All I know is that a few days later we got some new boots. I would've gone down to the BSB personally, but we were located at a remote CP at Ayn Zalah when it happened (about 50 road miles northeast of the nearest brigade support units at the Tal Afar airfield).

[Ken White]

Ken, I'm not trying to smartass you, but what you're describing isn't realistic at all in Afghanistan.

It wasn't realistic in Viet Nam either. One does what one has to do. My son has two Infantry tours in Afghanistan, he doesn't seem to see it as a major problem.

At those times, clear, detailed communication between U.S. troops and locals is an absolutely vital requirement in both Iraq and Afghanistan. And that's not something you can get from simply meeting people and learning some basic phrases like "what is your name" or "how much does this cost."

In reverse order, the basic phrase bit was in response to your comment:

"Ken, how exactly would soldiers and marines conduct COIN without competent interpreters?"

You said Soldiers and Marines and I responded at that level.

Had I known you really meant "how can Companies and Battalions effectively communicate with the village Maliks or elders," I would've responded differently. That is indeed a different Ball game. My son had no big problems with interpreters at that level in either Afghanistan or in Iraq. I had and saw no problems at that level in Viet Nam as an Interpreter was made available or we could borrow one from the nearest SF Camp. While 'terp quality can certainly vary, I find it hard to believe that a Battalion cannot get a couple of really good ones and send them where needed. Ideally, we'd have US nationals, in the service, who are good enough but that is never going to happen in your lifetime, not in adequate numbers or with the educational system in the US.

In any event, after a couple of years in the ME, I'll note that whatever gets said by the folks in the village during those meetings is highly likely to be nonoperative as soon as you leave.

But, then, you know that -- and, seriously, I know it doesn't mean you don't have to try.

I showed the CO, who was similarly infuriated and we (this part is fuzzy now) got word of it to the battalion commander who made some calls...All I know is that a few days later we got some new boots.

I figured as much; so something got done about it which was the important thing. Whether the Support unit fixed their internal problem can never be known; we can only hope...

My solution to that problem is to transfer the poor performers in the rear to a line unit for a while. Actually, not mine, a Regimental Commander in the 1st MarDiv -- it really worked; after about three of those; support improved by several orders of magnitude. That also has been done recently in Iraq on a back scratching deal between two Colonel commanders from different branches...