Australians in Afghanistan

**Ken White** · 07-24-2009

Originally Posted by Noble Industries

...that perhaps we have been resting when we should have been busy adapting, learning and changing the way we operate.

Davidfbpo

Here in the UK it has taken years for those close to officialdom to openly say "we are in a mess"

George L. Singleton

irregular guerilla fighters whose patterns are changing frequently, simply said. We must do likewise and perpetually keep them off guard until they are KIA.

Western bureaucracies are contraindicated as coping mechanisms for insurgencies not nipped in the early stages by smart and aggressive intelligence, diplomatic and very low key, specially trained military element efforts. Major Western forces will always have a rotation and personnel turbulence problem plus other detrimental factors with which to cope. Those factors almost make the opposition an annoyance -- until it's too late.

The first two comments quoted above are true and the same can be said of the US; we aren't doing this very well. The reasons lie in George's very valid point. Western Armies, lacking an existential threat, will never produce general purpose forces trained, equipped, organized, trusted and risked to properly prosecute a war against a very flexible, highly motivated, aggressive and ruthless enemy who uses our own laws, mores and media as a weapon. Simply, we are unlikely to do what he correctly says is necessary.

All three of our nations and some others are in a constant learning mode due to legal, moral, training and personnel policies. Those policies also impose severe constraints on action. That is unlikely to change and thus we must accept that mediocre performance is the best we're going to get from most of our general purpose forces in such conflicts barring a major change in public and governmental attitudes -- which seems unlikely at this time.

**Taiko** · 07-25-2009

Marston says: "The questions some coalition commanders are asking is when is Australia, as in senior commanders and politicians, going to become embedded within this huge debate that has occurred within the US and British militaries about what went wrong and what went correct in Iraq as well as what needs to be done in Afghanistan?"

A little bit of research goes along way. This is more sensational journalism, than reporting the facts on the ground. There is some scope to criticising the ADF's approach to FID/SFA, however, they are being addressed, to say otherwise is completely false and a disservice to those who are working very hard to come up with solutions. I have no real respect for Australia's media, they are very similar to US media. All to quick to point out our faults but very silent on the atrocities committed by the other side. In many ways they have become little more than tools for A'Q propaganda. Facts don't sell copy anymore, beat ups and sensationalism do. Its fairly obvious that the academic is promoting himself by overstating the case (from now on I shall call it the Kilcullen Syndrome!), a simple one minute search, that any under-grad could of done, would of lead him to such examples of the debate as:

1. Lt. C. John Blaxland: 'Revisiting Counterinsurgency: A Manoeuvrists Response to the 'War on Terror' for the Australian Army. July 2006

2. http://www.defence.gov.au/Army/lwsc/...r_2008_2_2.pdf more recent publications on COIN, Iraq and Afghanistan.

3. Jim Molan has been and is very vocal on this subject area. He is giving a seminar at my Uni on Tuesday title 'Lessons Learnt From Iraq'. His book 'Running the War in Iraq' is now in its second reprint.

There are plenty of other sources and ample evidence of the debate, like I said a little bit of research goes a long way.

While the Americans, in short, are fighting a counter-insurgency campaign, consider what the Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, said about Australia's mission this week. The "underpinning reason" for being there, aside from the US alliance, was "acting against the global threat of terrorism".

One wonders if Miss Banham understands the difference between political messages directed toward public consumption, its easier to sell the war in Afghanistan this way, and the actual political and military focus in Afghanistan. Then again may be its good that she doesn't, why tell the enemy what we are doing?

**George L. Singleton** · 07-25-2009

Taiko's link to THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL curren issue provides the partial quote below, and is much appreciated by this old trooper, even if I am Air Force. I did much work with US Special Operations Command as with FORSCOM as a "purple suit" and have some appreciation of what you land guys and gals are up against.

Only wish the Pakistani Army would pay more attention to land operations, at least special ops, in N. and S. Waziristan, which they cannot subdue, overcome, and occupy without land forces vs. just air and artillery ops.

I have quoted only part of the lead in Editorial to the current issue of THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL which attempts to jump start an ongoing future articles dialogue over counterinsurgency strategy and tactics as applied in Afghanistan today.

Although we had developed considerable proficiency in operating against classical Maoist guerrilla movements in the jungles of South-East Asia, the character of insurgency has undergone significant change since the end of the Cold War. This point is emphasised by Major General Jim Molan in his article in this special edition. He dismisses the hoary myth that our army—or any army—is naturally adept at counterinsurgency. And he stresses the importance of fully grasping the lethality and motivation of the modern jihadist insurgent.

Nor is past success a guarantee of current competence. The Australian Army Journal has consistently advocated the careful study of military history by members of the profession of arms. But, as Professor Jeffrey Grey reminds us, every war is sui generis, and caution must be exercised in seeking to glean lessons from past campaigns.

The pressing importance of understanding counterinsurgency led the Chief of Army to direct the urgent rewriting of Australian Army doctrine for counterinsurgency.

In February this year he convened a two-day seminar to frame an authors’ brief to inform the doctrine writing team. This task is now being undertaken against a tight schedule. That is the reason that this edition of the Australian Army Journal is a thematic special edition. It also explains why we have expedited its production, in an effort to stimulate thinking across the Army about this important issue.

Accordingly, a number of qualifications need to be expressed. This issue is built around a significant number of articles expressly reprinted from foreign military journals. This does not reflect a want of confidence in the calibre of our own officers and soldiers. Nor will it become the standard practice of the Australian Army Journal, which is committed to maintaining its authentic Australian voice.

We hope that Australian readers will read these articles with a critical attitude and ponder their validity in the light of their own experiences of current operations, before writing their own opinions for this Journal.

It would, however, be parochial in the extreme not to acknowledge the vast experience that our allies have accumulated over the past few years. For that reason we have sought the views of some of the leading experts in this field from other nations. We are honoured to publish the views of General David Petraeus and Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszley, whose contributions in this area are without peer. Likewise, the expertise of Ian Beckett and Stephen Metz—highly esteemed scholars both—are valuable additions to this Journal.

Furthermore, there is a distinct land bias in this edition. As Major General Molan emphasises, successful counterinsurgency demands seamless orchestration of joint effects. And the Chief of Army stresses that the multi-agency, comprehensive approach is vital to counterinsurgency, which requires more intimate coordination of political effects than other forms of warfare.

The absence of RAN, RAAF, AFP or NGO perspectives from this edition does not imply a lack of recognition of their fundamental importance to effective counterinsurgency operations.

However, this Australian Army Journal • Volume V, Number 2 • page 7 Editorial edition has been compiled within the serious time constraints applicable to the doctrine writers. In the interests of publishing this contribution in time to be of any relevance to the Army, we necessarily focused on our primary audience.

I am hopeful that contributing Aussie field officers, NCOs, and related Australian government civilians will be addressing psyops and how you deal with essentially illiterate populations whose unwritten variably interpreted by oral tradition Islamic teachings at present enable our enemies in being provided shelter and hiding places vs. the populations having a better awareness that the terrorists are the enemies of Islam and hence their enemies, too. My two cents here, of course.