Civilian Casualties, Religion, and COIN Operations
Too Soft, Too Hard, or "Just Right"?
Ralph Peters certainly has a way with words. Many SWJ-ers have probably read his recent indictment of US operations in Afghanistan (and elsewhere). He argues that we are walking on eggshells - tactically and strategically - because we worry too much about offending the adversary's religion and killing civilians and that our moral weakness is causing us to lose the war. Peters says:
As our enemies’ view of what is permissible in war expands apocalyptically, our self-limiting definitions of allowable targets and acceptable casualties—hostile, civilian and our own—continue to narrow fatefully. Our enemies cannot defeat us in direct confrontations, but we appear determined to defeat ourselves.
Peters' analysis - consistent with arguments he has made a number of times before - raises two questions about which I would welcome the thoughtful input and feedback of SWCouncil Members (and other readers).
The first question is to what extent - and why - do civilian casualties matter in COIN/IW operations? (Is this different when the counterinsurgent is a third-party? Different than in conventional wars?)
On one hand we have the view that high-power kinetic activity is necessary to "win" and that winning trumps all other mission objectives. The "butcher's bill" philosophy is that once a nation has decided to go to war, it should "go hard or go home." Peters' observes, for example, that:
The paradox is that our humane approach to warfare results in unnecessary bloodshed. Had we been ruthless in the use of our overwhelming power in the early days of conflict in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the ultimate human toll—on all sides—would have been far lower. In warfare of every kind, there is an immutable law: If you are unwilling to pay the butcher’s bill up front, you will pay it with compound interest in the end. Iraq was not hard; we made it so.
On the other hand, we have the view that civilian casualties actually weaken our strategic objectives and amplify battlespace friction. Some have argued that the rising number of civil causalities in Afghanistan is a major cause of the declining Afghan support for the ISAF. Andrew Exum, a member of GEN McChrystal's advisory team, argues that humanitarian considerations notwithstanding, civilians casualties impede the military mission - at least in Afghanistan:
The reason we do not drop compounds in Afghanistan has more to do with operational considerations than it does with some high-minded moral code or the laws of land warfare. Opponents of COIN doctrine who claim the U.S. Army has gone "soft" would best remember that. If dropping compounds helped us to advance the ball down the field in terms of mission success, we might be more tolerant of civilian casualties and "collateral damage." But the evidence suggests that killing civilians and destroying their property actually harms the mission more than it helps.
The second question is to what extent - and how - our enemy's religion, in this case Islam, is or should be a focus of our war effort (kinetic and nonkinetic)?
One point of view is that Islam itself poses an ideological, existential threat (even if its adherents do not) to democracy and to freedom. The arguments - such as thse made in Robert Spencer's book "stealth Jihad" suggest that core Islamic texts and teachings mandate subjugation of and warfare against non-Muslims (unbelievers), and advocate for Sharia law be globally imposed as the only legitimate source of social and political authority. Accordingly, they argue, there is no such thing as a “moderate Muslim.”
Proponents of this position acknowledge than many Muslims – particularly American Muslims – do not adhere to those tenets in practice, but maintain that these anti-Democratic principles are precisely what the doctrine commands. They see no distinction between the separatist, anti-Democratic, violence-inciting doctrine of those labeled as “violent extremists” or Islamists and the core doctrine of Islam. They believe that their arguments cannot be openly discussed without their being accused of bigotry and labeled as Islamophobes, and that their position is easily dismissed by most of the American public because others are uninformed about Islamic doctrine. Peters, for example, states starkly:
The problem is religion. Our Islamist enemies are inspired by it, while we are terrified even to talk about it. We are in the unique position of denying that our enemies know what they themselves are up to. They insist, publicly, that their goal is our destruction (or, in their mildest moods, our conversion) in their god’s name. We contort ourselves to insist that their religious rhetoric is all a sham, that they are merely cynics exploiting the superstitions of the masses. Setting aside the point that a devout believer can behave cynically in his mundane actions, our phony, one-dimensional analysis of al-Qaeda and its ilk has precious little to do with the nature of our enemies —which we are desperate to deny—and everything to do with us.
A contrasting view - as both Presidents Bush and Obama have asserted - is that the U.S. is not (and presumably should not be) at war with Islam or with Muslims generally. The explanation for this position is that Islam is a religion, but that Islamism (or some other variant on this ideological term), refers not to a religion, but to a radical political ideology driven by a strong anti-Western and anti-democratic sentiment. The argument is that militant leaders – particularly since the late 1980s – have been able to use Islam (the religion) very effectively as a platform or vehicle to transport and deliver this extremist ideology. As evidence of this distinction, they point to the fact that most adherents of the religion do not subscribe to the violent ideology, and that many proponents of the militant ideology are not particularly religious” or pious.
I appreciate you considering these questions and look forward to learning from your insights and responses. This is the first substantive thread I have started here, so please forgive any clumsiness in protocol - and let me know if this question/discussion would be better placed elsewhere.
Originally Posted by rborum
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