Civilian Casualties, Religion, and COIN Operations

[Ken White]

That seems to focus on the question of force, working backward to deconstruct and understand why/how it was applied to achieve some objective. I was focusing more on the objective - CG control, e.g. - , and working forward to understand why/how force might facilitate or impede it. But, again, not disagreeing with the general point.

It focuses on the adversary -- he or it should be the determinant on the degree, type and methodology of force -- if any. Force is simply a tool, nothing more. Like any tool it must be used sensibly or you'll damage something you didn't mean to harm. Adversaries do not always require force for containment. In fact, I believe most do not; prompt and early response without force or with very minimal force can stop many such internal conflicts before they escalate to major confrontations.

The point is, once you commit any military elements to the effort, you are committing to use force or will be perceived as being prepared to do so; sometimes the same thing in the minds of many.

... insurgent forces often feel less constrained by international norms or by the explicit and implicit rules of engagement. I suppose, though, that adversary-driven force strategy doesn't necessarily mean doing unto others as they do unto us.

It should not since frequently the primary purpose of insurgents ignoring Mao's rules and antagonizing the populace is to get their opponents to do the same things and thus turn the populace against the nominal counterinsurgents. Most people know this, a few tend to forget it when angry or driven by inane directives or orders from people in faraway places.

...Lyall & Wilson made in their recent study of 286 insurgencies. Kinetic selectivity really seems to be a major driving force in determining whether a population will perceive the third-party counterinsurgent as protectors or threatening invaders. Lack of selectivity seems to embolden insurgent recruitment. They comment that: "With the innocent and guilty equally likely to be punished, rational individuals will seek security and predictability with insurgent groups" (p.77).

I'm dubious -- and that supposition BTW long precedes their study. It is true when force is applied indiscriminately but that rarely occurs. What more often occurs is that force is applied selectively and innocents are caught in the fight. Most people understand the difference and rarely go flocking to either side after such an event. They really just want both sides to go away and leave them alone.

Either way, unmeant or unnecessary killings and woundings will drive some -- but not most or even many -- to the insurgents and of those that go, other than a small number for whom the episode was particularly searing, most will drift away soon as time does its healing magic and the tough life of an insurgent takes its toll.

There are no easy solutions and no pat answers -- if there were, they'd have been found long ago. You cannot codify human responses and develop a matrix for 'what to do.'

[rborum]

Force is simply a tool, nothing more.

Understood. I concur.

the primary purpose of insurgents ignoring Mao's rules and antagonizing the populace is to get their opponents to do the same things and thus turn the populace against the nominal counterinsurgents.

Right. That's what I understand to be the conventional wisdom.

that supposition BTW long precedes their study.

You're right, of course. It is always of interest to me, however, to see data - even with all it's caveats and limitations - that addresses (whether findings support or refute) the suppositions that guide our policies.

There are no easy solutions and no pat answers -- if there were, they'd have been found long ago. You cannot codify human responses and develop a matrix for 'what to do.'

Concur. The notion of "matrix" never even blipped on my radar. Though as a social/behavioral scientist, I quite often bump up against the "matrix mentality" among my engineering colleagues. I know there is no cookie cutter approach to the strategy of kinetic force in COIN, but I hope there are dynamic factors that are (or could be) systematically considered in strategic planning and ongoing assessments of the mission. There is no matrix, but it seems - though perhaps this is naive on my part - that it might be useful to have some method to guide that dimension of decisionmaking. I'm not asking for one here, just wondering aloud about what the foundations or contours of such a method or decision framework might look like.

Thanks again.

[slapout9]

So Randy here is my question. You have heard all the theories are they right wrong? What would you change about them?

[rborum]

So Randy here is my question. You have heard all the theories are they right wrong? What would you change about them?

slapout9 - There are many SWC folks who have thought about these problems much longer and much better, I'm sure, than I have. It is a privilege to learn from them and I appreciate the gracious engagement.

I began here with two questions - most of our discussion has focused on/around the first: To what extent - and why - do civilian casualties matter in COIN/IW operations? (Is this different when the counterinsurgent is a third-party? Different than in conventional wars?)

I posed the question - which I do understand has been the topic of prior threads and discussion - because I was a bit puzzled and struggling to understand why some analysts seemed to be pushing back against McChrystal's ROE shift to make protecting the population (and minimizing civilian casualties), not increasing militant body count to be the mission's prime directive and metric of success.

Ralph Peters is not the only one to bitch-slap US COIN doctrine and strategy as being too soft and "effete," and its military leaders as being hand-wringers, driven by political correctness. It is a recurringly strident voice, but I can't get a good read on whether it is coming from a very small but shrill fringe minority, or whether this is significant, substantive debate.

My opinion probably has little merit or value, but I'll offer it (in a sprit of great diffidence) since you asked.

1. I generally agree with GEN McChrystal's recent imperatives for success in Afghanistan, and I specifically believe that intelligence-driven kinetic selectivity and concerted efforts to minimize civilian casualties (particularly by a third-party counterinsurgent) should be primary, rather than tertiary, considerations, that serve our longer-term strategic and operational interests in a COIN campaign.

2. Insurgencies are wars. They are different, to be sure, from conventional military battles, but they are wars nonetheless. Insurgent forces kill people, often brutally, and force is often necessary to extinguish their brutality. But targeting and kinetic force deployment should be parts of a strategy, just as information gathering and engendering population security should be part of a strategy.

3. COIN objectives are multidimensional and dynamic. In any operational environment we need to be simultaneously thinking about both adversary and population - The focus is a continuous variable, not a dichotomous one. The nature, degree and scope of that focus is fluid, changing over time, and it both affects and is affected by our intervention. That is, what we do (and where we focus) now, will affect what we do (and where we focus) a month from now. And how we handle adversary/militant engagement will affect the population, just as the way we engage the population will affect the adversary/militants.

4. In the current era of "effects-based operations," we should be explicitly anticipating, measuring, and weighing the moral (in the Clausewitizian sense) costs and benefits of our kinetic strategies and collateral/civilian casualties as part of operational planning.

5. We should better understand the impact of civilian casualties on mission objectives and population perceptions to guide our strategic planning, not just to assume causality. For example, it may be that the negative effects (declining population support for ISAF), arise primarily from how the attacks are portrayed (the "narrative"), rather than whether and how often they occur and to whom they are directed. Whether a particular tactic or kinetic operation does or does not provoke antipathy toward the counterinsurgent might be productively viewed as "effects-based" questions, and we might do well to understand them. The fog of war may be inevitable, but that should not mean that we do not seek clarity.

Or not......

[davidbfpo]

Randy,

Check this thread where the issues are shown: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=2299

Note comments are by on the ground SWC members.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

Randy,

Two immediate comments on your questions.

The urban rioting in the USA, for examples Detroit '67 & Watts, LA '65 and much later in LA '92, all had IMHO a significant impact and some even speculated they were signs of an insurgency. How would those local communities reacted if the nation-state's response had been mainly foriegn troops, say the RCMP in Detroit or Mexico in LA? Would people like Ralph Peters be so "hardline" on the supposed 'effete' action taken? I doubt it.

David Kilcullen in his talks (see previous threads) makes this point, cannot immediately find the thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...hlight=chicago

You have a burglary / crime problem in your community, the local (US) police cannot cope and reinforcements are called for - imagine - the Iraqi police arrive. A police that follows different rules, operating styles - maybe less minimum use of force - and cannot speak English. My variation would be to have the Saudi religious police arrive on your campus and impose their rules.

My point is if you'd not do 'X' at home, why do it abroad?

A current, similar thread on these questions is: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7776

[slapout9]

My opinion probably has little merit or value, but I'll offer it (in a sprit of great diffidence) since you asked.

Randy,I think you will find your opinion has a lot of value and merit here.

[Ken White]

That's what I understand to be the conventional wisdom.

It's a little more than that, it's pretty much a hard learned fact. It has also been written by some erstwhile insurgents and allied creatures.

You're right, of course. It is always of interest to me, however, to see data - even with all it's caveats and limitations - that addresses (whether findings support or refute) the suppositions that guide our policies.

They can be beneficial. Even if they point in the wrong direction and that is discovered through a bad experience, something is learned.

I know there is no cookie cutter approach to the strategy of kinetic force in COIN...it seems...that it might be useful to have some method to guide that dimension of decisionmaking. I'm not asking for one here, just wondering aloud about what the foundations or contours of such a method or decision framework might look like.

The Army has tried for many years with varying success to do that. The intent was to come up with a methodology or set of best practices that would allow future operations to be better planned and executed. I'm sure you've checked or have access to all the ARI and RAND etc. studies from the 1950-1980 period wherein that was attempted. The effort seemed to have dropped off by the time I retired in '95. Good luck.

[goesh]

".... other than why would you kill people you don't need to kill? " (W.F. Owen)

That pretty much sums it up in my opinion. I think discipline in the ranks is as good as it has ever been historically, maybe better in some respects because of our logistics. Morale can be boosted much faster than before and Officers and senior NCOs are better able to spot bad stress developing in the ranks. My uncle was in N. Africa WW2 and he told me when his outfit was close to civlians, they didn't get to eat much chocolate because they gave most of it to kids. This kind of conduct is not isolated and rare, its pretty much the norm and part of national character - ROE be damned, it has little to do with the number of civilans killed in these modern times of ours.