Civilian Casualties, Religion, and COIN Operations

[William F. Owen]

That's insightful, I think.

Thanks, but that's Clausewitz!

But some think the only/best way to to establish CG control is to overwhelm the resistance with devastating force - and that overdoing is unlikely to significantly interfere with establishing and sustaining the CG control. CG control - in this model - is a function of coercive power, not political legitimacy.

The "Nouveau COIN," guys like to call the Neo-Classical and/or "Neo-Orthodox" tendency "threat centric." It's true. We are!

...but as Ken very well explains, you focus on the precise, proportionate and discriminating use of violence against those who deserve it, because doing so has political benefit. Military force must serve the political aim.

As fare as I can tell the Nouveau COIN guys want military force to explicitly serve a social-moral aim, which in reality has no relevance without the political context.

[Ron Humphrey]

Thanks, but that's Clausewitz!


The "Nouveau COIN," guys like to call the Neo-Classical and/or "Neo-Orthodox" tendency "threat centric." It's true. We are!

...but as Ken very well explains, you focus on the precise, proportionate and discriminating use of violence against those who deserve it, because doing so has political benefit. Military force must serve the political aim.

As fare as I can tell the Nouveau COIN guys want military force to explicitly serve a social-moral aim, which in reality has no relevance without the political context.

Some Nouveau COIN guys just might, that said It might be that although they might not be completely right they are probably not much further from the truth then those who feel that "any" given political aim is going to be sustained for any reasonable period of time(decades/centuries) sans some sort of social-moral aims without persistent and rather messy enforcement of those political non-social aims.

Then again I could be mistaken. Wouldn't be the first time nor likely to be the last

[Ken White]

"You cannot legislate morality."

I believe that to be true -- and proven. Whether one believes that or not, the simple thought prompts questions.

Should one enforce morality at gunpoint? Should one even try to attempt that? What is the probability of succeeding in doing that? How long should one be prepared to point the weapon?

I'd also suggest that if "any" given political aim has to be sustained for any reasonable period of time (decades/centuries) with attendant social-moral aims by persistent and rather messy enforcement of those social-moral aims, then one is probably attempting to do something one probably shouldn't have contemplated, much less be attempting.

Napoleon is alleged to have said "Old soldiers and old Priests have much in common, they have seen mankind at its worst." Probably an accurate thought regardless of who coined it. That's really about all they'd have in common though. Soldiers break things, that's what they're for. They can do it sensibly and avoid excessive damage, they can and do perform with good judgment and compassion and they can help make room for the spread of sweetness and light, they can clear a path for the social and moral improvement in an area but the actual social / moral effort is not their job. That's the job of the Priest and / or his allies and fellow believers in the goodness of man.

Generally pays to use the right tool for the job. Use the wrong tool for that effort and you'll risk destroying the tool and the population you tried to morally improve. Not a great plan to do more harm than good...

[rborum]

So Randy here is my question. You have heard all the theories are they right wrong? What would you change about them?

slapout9 - There are many SWC folks who have thought about these problems much longer and much better, I'm sure, than I have. It is a privilege to learn from them and I appreciate the gracious engagement.

I began here with two questions - most of our discussion has focused on/around the first: To what extent - and why - do civilian casualties matter in COIN/IW operations? (Is this different when the counterinsurgent is a third-party? Different than in conventional wars?)

I posed the question - which I do understand has been the topic of prior threads and discussion - because I was a bit puzzled and struggling to understand why some analysts seemed to be pushing back against McChrystal's ROE shift to make protecting the population (and minimizing civilian casualties), not increasing militant body count to be the mission's prime directive and metric of success.

Ralph Peters is not the only one to bitch-slap US COIN doctrine and strategy as being too soft and "effete," and its military leaders as being hand-wringers, driven by political correctness. It is a recurringly strident voice, but I can't get a good read on whether it is coming from a very small but shrill fringe minority, or whether this is significant, substantive debate.

My opinion probably has little merit or value, but I'll offer it (in a sprit of great diffidence) since you asked.

1. I generally agree with GEN McChrystal's recent imperatives for success in Afghanistan, and I specifically believe that intelligence-driven kinetic selectivity and concerted efforts to minimize civilian casualties (particularly by a third-party counterinsurgent) should be primary, rather than tertiary, considerations, that serve our longer-term strategic and operational interests in a COIN campaign.

2. Insurgencies are wars. They are different, to be sure, from conventional military battles, but they are wars nonetheless. Insurgent forces kill people, often brutally, and force is often necessary to extinguish their brutality. But targeting and kinetic force deployment should be parts of a strategy, just as information gathering and engendering population security should be part of a strategy.

3. COIN objectives are multidimensional and dynamic. In any operational environment we need to be simultaneously thinking about both adversary and population - The focus is a continuous variable, not a dichotomous one. The nature, degree and scope of that focus is fluid, changing over time, and it both affects and is affected by our intervention. That is, what we do (and where we focus) now, will affect what we do (and where we focus) a month from now. And how we handle adversary/militant engagement will affect the population, just as the way we engage the population will affect the adversary/militants.

4. In the current era of "effects-based operations," we should be explicitly anticipating, measuring, and weighing the moral (in the Clausewitizian sense) costs and benefits of our kinetic strategies and collateral/civilian casualties as part of operational planning.

5. We should better understand the impact of civilian casualties on mission objectives and population perceptions to guide our strategic planning, not just to assume causality. For example, it may be that the negative effects (declining population support for ISAF), arise primarily from how the attacks are portrayed (the "narrative"), rather than whether and how often they occur and to whom they are directed. Whether a particular tactic or kinetic operation does or does not provoke antipathy toward the counterinsurgent might be productively viewed as "effects-based" questions, and we might do well to understand them. The fog of war may be inevitable, but that should not mean that we do not seek clarity.

Or not......

[davidbfpo]

Randy,

Check this thread where the issues are shown: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=2299

Note comments are by on the ground SWC members.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

Randy,

Two immediate comments on your questions.

The urban rioting in the USA, for examples Detroit '67 & Watts, LA '65 and much later in LA '92, all had IMHO a significant impact and some even speculated they were signs of an insurgency. How would those local communities reacted if the nation-state's response had been mainly foriegn troops, say the RCMP in Detroit or Mexico in LA? Would people like Ralph Peters be so "hardline" on the supposed 'effete' action taken? I doubt it.

David Kilcullen in his talks (see previous threads) makes this point, cannot immediately find the thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...hlight=chicago

You have a burglary / crime problem in your community, the local (US) police cannot cope and reinforcements are called for - imagine - the Iraqi police arrive. A police that follows different rules, operating styles - maybe less minimum use of force - and cannot speak English. My variation would be to have the Saudi religious police arrive on your campus and impose their rules.

My point is if you'd not do 'X' at home, why do it abroad?

A current, similar thread on these questions is: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7776

[Michael C]

Mr. Borum,

As for your first question, about whether we should avoid civilian casualties, in my experience avoiding civilian casualties was always the best option. We would be having great success in our AO as a battalion, and as soon as we had civilian casualties, across the AO intelligence reporting would plummet and our Key Leader Engagements would grind to halts and we would gain nothing. This was Afghanistan and the death of one innocent seemed roughly proportional to the death of several dozen "bad guys."

I don't know enough about Islam to answer my thoughts on your questions about whether Islam is engaged through non-kinetic means. I know it isn't really in Afghanistan, just respected and allowed to be. Whether or not we should address Islam more explicitly I cannot speak to because I do not know enough.

The "Nouveau COIN," guys like to call the Neo-Classical and/or "Neo-Orthodox" tendency "threat centric." It's true. We are!

...but as Ken very well explains, you focus on the precise, proportionate and discriminating use of violence against those who deserve it, because doing so has political benefit. Military force must serve the political aim.

As an active duty officer, my question to both Mr. White and Mr. Owen is, what practical examples, what tactics, techniques and procedures do you recommend to better target, distinguish and discriminate on the battlefield? It seems like saying "kill those who deserve it" is as much a platitude as simply saying "win the hearts and minds." As a practitioner, and I am sure there are many others on this board, give us something we can use to better, more easily kill those who deserve it.

[slapout9]

My opinion probably has little merit or value, but I'll offer it (in a sprit of great diffidence) since you asked.

Randy,I think you will find your opinion has a lot of value and merit here.

[William F. Owen]

As an active duty officer, my question to both Mr. White and Mr. Owen is, what practical examples, what tactics, techniques and procedures do you recommend to better target, distinguish and discriminate on the battlefield? It seems like saying "kill those who deserve it" is as much a platitude as simply saying "win the hearts and minds." As a practitioner, and I am sure there are many others on this board, give us something we can use to better, more easily kill those who deserve it.

For practical examples, read history or look at current operational analysis. You are spoilt for choice.

Obviously you use the tactics, techniques and procedures that have proved themselves as being effective. As a serving officer you are more than aware of those. ( If you really are on a "battlefield" then kill those trying to kill you, and within the constraints of ROE. )

More generally it's mainly down to good intelligence performing the FIND function within the Core functions. How that is done comes down to how well your operations function as a whole and how effective your various practices and supporting agencies are. Context is critical.

... and let's differentiate between the general and the particular. Given a specific circumstance, we can discuss specific guidance, but do you really want advice as to how to find the bad guys in 100 x 100km patch of jungle, and/or 10,000 person town somewhere in the Middle East? I think not!

I'm sure FM3-24 can provide guidance.... or maybe not.

[Ron Humphrey]

It may be worth ensuring the difference between what you said and I said is well delineated. Don't want any major confusion or misconceptions on the part of casual or skim readers.

"You cannot legislate morality."

I believe that to be true -- and proven. Whether one believes that or not, the simple thought prompts questions.

Should one enforce morality at gunpoint? Should one even try to attempt that? What is the probability of succeeding in doing that? How long should one be prepared to point the weapon?

I'd also suggest that if "any" given political aim has to be sustained for any reasonable period of time (decades/centuries) with attendant social-moral aims by persistent and rather messy enforcement of those social-moral aims, then one is probably attempting to do something one probably shouldn't have contemplated, much less be attempting.

It might be that although they might not be completely right they are probably not much further from the truth then those who feel that "any" given political aim is going to be sustained for any reasonable period of time(decades/centuries) sans some sort of social-moral aims without persistent and rather messy enforcement of those political non-social aims

I was rather clumsily trying to make the point that in any given conflict which seeks as its end state to leave a standing, stable form of political governance upon whom the requirement will be placed to maintain said end state; it seems only wise that we recognize the fact that human beings and thus societies as a whole absolutely do not exist sans some sort of standards (be they Moral/judicious/social-norms, etc). This to me is why trying to approach how to's on any given conflict without taking into account and accepting that whatever those standards are they can and most certainly will affect how things work out would seem to be asking for a major @#$% kicking.


I would probably liken this to when CVC was giving feedback to several officers trying to develop strategy in relation to possible enemy actions.
To para-phrase anyone who seeks to develop strategy without acknowledging that the political aims and or strengths/weaknesses of both parties isn't gonna get it right.
(well aware it ain't perfect but I'll try to look it up to get the wording more accurately, still pretty sure the point remains valid)

Napoleon is alleged to have said "Old soldiers and old Priests have much in common, they have seen mankind at its worst." Probably an accurate thought regardless of who coined it. That's really about all they'd have in common though. Soldiers break things, that's what they're for. They can do it sensibly and avoid excessive damage, they can and do perform with good judgment and compassion and they can help make room for the spread of sweetness and light, they can clear a path for the social and moral improvement in an area but the actual social / moral effort is not their job. That's the job of the Priest and / or his allies and fellow believers in the goodness of man.[/QUOTE]

Absolutely, that statement however does leave out the reality that regardless of the missions non-sociality these are still soldiers who represent a given standard of social (values). (Read Army/Navy/Marines/AF Values).
Can these be left out of planning without effecting the expectations for actions?

Generally pays to use the right tool for the job. Use the wrong tool for that effort and you'll risk destroying the tool and the population you tried to morally improve. Not a great plan to do more harm than good...

Could not be more in agreement.

I can do most the same things with a sledge hammer, a mallet, or a regular hammer. I guess I just figure I might want to be aware of what I'm building before I decide which one to use

[Michael C]

Obviously you use the tactics, techniques and procedures that have proved themselves as being effective. As a serving officer you are more than aware of those. ( If you really are on a "battlefield" then kill those trying to kill you, and within the constraints of ROE. )

More generally it's mainly down to good intelligence performing the FIND function within the Core functions. How that is done comes down to how well your operations function as a whole and how effective your various practices and supporting agencies are. Context is critical.

It seems that there is a huge movement on the SWJ forums (as opposed to the journal and blog) to get rid of yucky "population-centric COIN" that "wants to win hearts and minds." The biggest critique seems to be that population-centric COIN hides behind catch phrases and offers no real solutions to our modern fight.

I am no longer in the warzone. When I was, trust me we shot at the enemy when we could get PID. Trust me, we designed missions to catch the enemy and kill him. We also did constant hearts and minds. What I want to know is, where are the resources to get intelligence from the population without doing population-centric COIN? If the British Army has manuals or recommendations on gathering intelligence, finding and identifying the enemy and operations to kill them, what are they? It seems like the whole of the military has disregarded the approach, both the UK and the US.

As for a scenario, take the Helmand Province and the current Marine operation there. What is the better option then avoiding civilian casualties as they are right now? Without trying to give support to the population, how do we get intelligence to kill the Taliban, HiG and AQ groups there?

[Ken White]

As an active duty officer, my question to both Mr. White and Mr. Owen is, what practical examples, what tactics, techniques and procedures do you recommend to better target, distinguish and discriminate on the battlefield? It seems like saying "kill those who deserve it" is as much a platitude as simply saying "win the hearts and minds." As a practitioner, and I am sure there are many others on this board, give us something we can use to better, more easily kill those who deserve it.

My "You're kidding" was because I suspect you know the answer to the question. It is a fair question. What follows is not snark or smart aleck comment but my best if overlong answer to your question:

[1] In my experience, anyone who fired at me is in what we can call Category 1.

[2] Anyone who did not but seemed likely to fire given a chance is in Category 2A. Anyone who did not and might not was suspect until proven not a potential threat (Category 2B). Anyone who offers cooperation is accepted conditionally and cautiously until some proof of their intent is shown (Category 2C). Anyone who does cooperate, seems unlikely to shoot at me is in Category 2D.

[3] Anyone who fights with me is in category 3A. Anyone who has fought with me on multiple occasions and thus has proven some loyalty or appreciation of the benefits of a mutually rewarding relationship is in category 3B.

[4] Fellow members of my own or closely allied units are in category 4.

As I'm sure you already know Category 1 persons are easily identified on the battlefield and should be killed.

Categories 2-4 persons should not be killed if possible. However, they bear considerable watching and due to necessary action ([1] above), Category 2 persons may be accidentally killed on a sliding scale of A to D with A being of small consequence and B being avoided if at all possible, C being avoided in most cases while killing D is to be avoided even at some cost *.

Category 3 persons should not be killed but 3A persons must be closely watched unless and until they move to Category 3B. Those in 3B must still be loosely watched...

Category 4 persons should not be killed unless they are engaged in wrongdoing. Unfortunately, even some of them bear watching...

As for TTP, METT-TC applies ( * As it does for the asterisked item above) . For distinguishing between categories of persons on the battle field, my experience was that Cat 1, Cat 3 and Cat 4 were easy while for Cat 2, the majority of people to be seen on any FID battlefield, it was difficult if not impossible to diffrentiate. Thus one had to watch them closely, even suspiciously -- all of them -- but also avoid killing them if possible. That possibility must be weighed in your mind at each encounter and the decision must be made based, again, on METT-TC. I suspect you knew and know that, all I can do is affirm it.

As you also know, that unfortunately allows the Cat 2A person to have a chance at becoming a Cat 1 person. This is a disconcerting, even disheartening to some, aspect. It should not be, it just is part of the job, like rain or snow or heat or an 80 pound Ruck.

IOW who to kill is obvious, who not to kill is far less obvious and avoiding killing them while it increases your risk is necessary -- and please remember this:

That is true not only in an FID or COIN operation but in all combat to include major combat operations against a peer force in a war of movement.

If that equates to a platitude, my regrets -- it's reality. FWIW, I suspect Wilf knows as I do that you have a difficult job and are searching for answers. He's likely to provide you a better answer than I did. If he does, I doubt either answer will make a hard job one bit easier, you have to feel your way through it. You'll make mistakes, you'll do some things very well, some days will just be bad days. We all did or do those things and experienced the bad days. Goes with the job. There is no easy way. That's why it's a tough job and a lot of people don't want to do it.

[Ken White]

It may be worth ensuring the difference between what you said and I said is well delineated. Don't want any major confusion or misconceptions on the part of casual or skim readers.

and I can prove that. I still do not fully understand your point as stated in the paragraph of yours that you and I quoted. Still, leaving that aside and going to this:

This to me is why trying to approach how to's on any given conflict without taking into account and accepting that whatever those standards are they can and most certainly will affect how things work out would seem to be asking for a major @#$% kicking.

Agreed.

To para-phrase anyone who seeks to develop strategy without acknowledging that the political aims and or strengths/weaknesses of both parties isn't gonna get it right.

Agreed.

Absolutely, that statement however does leave out the reality that regardless of the missions non-sociality these are still soldiers who represent a given standard of social (values). (Read Army/Navy/Marines/AF Values).
Can these be left out of planning without effecting the expectations for actions?

They should not be but often are because the egos of the planners cannot visualize that the affected States may not be like nor want to be like said Planners.

I can do most the same things with a sledge hammer, a mallet, or a regular hammer. I guess I just figure I might want to be aware of what I'm building before I decide which one to use

Agreed -- that was sort my point with the added fillip that anyone who expects Soldiers to do morality or social norms might not like what they get. So by all means, we should decide what we're building before we start pounding nails -- we should also be willing in addition to the hammer(s) to use a drill and some screws to avoid excessive pounding that might weaken parts of the structure...

[rborum]

Just read through Wilf's extensive "more killing" thread from a couple of weeks ago. Very thoughtful discourse..for the most part.

Got some additional insights, I think, on my "civilian casualties" question .. albeit from an angle different from whence the question was posed.

Reading through this and a few other related threads, the discussions seem typically to begin as a polemic: winning population support OR killing militants.

Then those debating on each side clarify that they understand BOTH dimensions are necessary.

The lingering and ensuing debates - which I think are related to the controversy over whether "war is war" - seem to huddle around a couple of themes. They are certainly not epiphanies, but I share them for your consideration:

Roles: There seems to be agreement that militants need to be killed/suppressed AND that infrastructure should be built with an engaged population - but some seem to take the view that the military should only focus on the former and requiring them to do both functions gives us sub-optimal results in both domains.

Sequencing: In the thread, Wilf (I think I am recalling correctly) summarized the options as - and I am paraphrasing here - (A) Kill the militants, and then secure the hearts and minds of the population ; or (B) Engage the hearts and minds of the population, and leverage that to defeat the insurgency. I'm sure I lost some nuance here, particularly in what causes what. Some argue you can't address both tasks at the same time. Others say you must address both tasks both at the same time.

Strategic Interoperability: Regardless of how one draws the arrows between the kinetic and nonkinetic they each transactively affect the other. Most people, I suspect, acknowledge this at some level but the extent to which they are integrated together in strategic thinking (as opposed to being viewed in a more linear way) also seems to vary. Who we kill, and how and when we kill them (including collateral casualties) does seem to affect how the non-militant population responds - both in relation to the counterinsurgent and in how they embrace their own sovereign identity. Conversely, how the counterinsurgent treats the population, the extent of their contact, and how they instrumentally influence their social infrastructure seems to affect not only their degree of cooperation/engagement/ industriousness, but also the extent and quality of the HUMINT acquired from them that improves the counterinsurgent's ability to selectively find and kill the real bad guys.

I might wish to add explicitly, a dimension that is embedded in each of these: Outcome/effects. People often raise the question of what it means to "win" an insurgency. If we assume - and I'm sure this is also debatable - that at least one important outcome is indigenous, stable, sustainable governance based on the rule of law, then both winning population support and killing militants are both just means to an end. Neither are the ultimate objective.

Do any of these make sense? Are there critical contrasting dimensions I missed? Do you wish I would stop writing long posts?

[Ken White]

It seems that there is a huge movement on the SWJ forums (as opposed to the journal and blog) to get rid of yucky "population-centric COIN" that "wants to win hearts and minds." The biggest critique seems to be that population-centric COIN hides behind catch phrases and offers no real solutions to our modern fight.

Very perceptive. Do you think it does offer such solutions?

If so, and not to be snarky in the least, your questions here and your Blog do not indicate that you've found any answers that really help. I say that only to point out that ALL doctrine is murky and must be applied with large doses of common sense and in accordance with an important acronym I will not repeat... ...In the end, it's down to bunch of men trying to feel their way in a lonely place with limited information and a population that may be hostile. Been done before.

We who urge caution have watched Armies make doctrinal mistakes by tilting too far to one side or the other; we're simply urging balance -- and, with respect to FID, pointing out there is no golden bullet and every war, every affected populace is different. There is no one size fits all doctrinal answer, never has been, never will be. That really is a good thing, it gives you the latitude to do it in a way that works for you.

What I want to know is, where are the resources to get intelligence from the population without doing population-centric COIN?

There aren't any and I don't think anyone here has suggested not doing "population centric COIN." What many including me have said is do not think that will dispel all your problems and do not lose sight of the fact you are involved in one war at one place in one time -- the Army, as an institution, must work on a far wider scale of possibilities (and if you decide to stay in, so will you...).

If the British Army has manuals or recommendations on gathering intelligence, finding and identifying the enemy and operations to kill them, what are they? It seems like the whole of the military has disregarded the approach, both the UK and the US.

My understanding is that we have a number and they're available on BCKS and AKO. Both Armies tried to disregard it simply because it is messy and debilitating, it grinds down Armies. Unfortunately, Armies do not get to pick who they fight, the Politicians do that, much as Armies hate that and try (usually unsuccessfully) to divert the Pols...

Without trying to give support to the population, how do we get intelligence to kill the Taliban, HiG and AQ groups there?

You don't and no one here to my knowledge has suggested otherwise. What has been said is that you will get some but not enough intel, that some will prove invalid due to local jealousies, disinformation and a host of reasons and it is not likely to get any better. It's a tough and dirty job with no pat solutions.

What I and some others have also said is that most such conflicts should be avoided by better diplomacy, aid and low key SF involvement to stop burgeoning problems before they require GPF deployment because those will always be messy and difficult. Your comments prove that that they are that. It will be no consolation but a lot of us discovered that 40 years ago and our forebears in the Army on the Plains in the late 19th Century probably had precisely the same complaints. As did a bunch of Alexanders folks in what is now Afghanistan 2,340 years ago. The tools may change, warfare may change but war does not.

[Ken White]

Very thoughtful discourse..for the most part.

Why, thank you...

some seem to take the view that the military should only focus on the former and requiring them to do both functions gives us sub-optimal results in both domains.

In reverse order, true on the sub-optimal. Most acknowledge that the armed forces must do both early on in a FID environment, the issue is how robust and how quickly should the efforts of other USG agencies be committed -- that is a wild card, situation dependent. Some of us contend that the armed forces will never do that well and that security must be insured before major projects can begin therefor security should be the initial emphasis, transitioning as the situation develops.

Some argue you can't address both tasks at the same time. Others say you must address both tasks both at the same time.

Again an issue of degree, I think. In FID, one has to do both, the difficulty is that many tend to predicate who does what to who on earlier wars and therein lies the fallacy. Every war, every population is different.

Most people, I suspect, acknowledge this at some level but the extent to which they are integrated together in strategic thinking (as opposed to being viewed in a more linear way) also seems to vary.

Therein lie the problem that leads to the quibbles above -- most people want neat, tidy solutions; an 'open the box and break out the strategy' sort of solution. There aren't any. Each war is a separate, non-repeating function and must have differing approaches. A part of our problem is that our ego will not allow us to learn from history and we insist on blundering in, then rapidly researching 'the history' to find solution that worked. What worked then and there may not work here and now. Our penchant for quick fixes is intruded upon by reality -- and different clocks and calendars...

People often raise the question of what it means to "win" an insurgency.

You cannot win against an insurgent, all you can obtain is an acceptable outcome. There is no victory, no defeat (other than at a tactical level). Those words should be avoided in discussion and pronouncements.

If we assume...that at least one important outcome is indigenous, stable, sustainable governance based on the rule of law...

True as stated. I'd only suggest that the outcome you suggest (and with which many agree) is in some cases not probable enough to merit its acceptance as a goal (e.g. Afghanistan); that the 'rule of law' must be appreciative of the locale (i.e. neither Iraq nor Afghanistan will ever meet western norms even at a low level) and that "sustainable governance" is very much beholder -- and local calendar -- dependent.

Expecting ideal solutions in any FID (or COIN) efforts is unwise.

[rborum]

Thank you Ken.

[goesh]

".... other than why would you kill people you don't need to kill? " (W.F. Owen)

That pretty much sums it up in my opinion. I think discipline in the ranks is as good as it has ever been historically, maybe better in some respects because of our logistics. Morale can be boosted much faster than before and Officers and senior NCOs are better able to spot bad stress developing in the ranks. My uncle was in N. Africa WW2 and he told me when his outfit was close to civlians, they didn't get to eat much chocolate because they gave most of it to kids. This kind of conduct is not isolated and rare, its pretty much the norm and part of national character - ROE be damned, it has little to do with the number of civilans killed in these modern times of ours.

[Brandon Friedman]

[1] In my experience, anyone who fired at me is in what we can call Category 1.

[2] Anyone who did not but seemed likely to fire given a chance is in Category 2A. Anyone who did not and might not was suspect until proven not a potential threat (Category 2B). Anyone who offers cooperation is accepted conditionally and cautiously until some proof of their intent is shown (Category 2C). Anyone who does cooperate, seems unlikely to shoot at me is in Category 2D.

[3] Anyone who fights with me is in category 3A. Anyone who has fought with me on multiple occasions and thus has proven some loyalty or appreciation of the benefits of a mutually rewarding relationship is in category 3B.

[4] Fellow members of my own or closely allied units are in category 4.

As I'm sure you already know Category 1 persons are easily identified on the battlefield and should be killed.

Categories 2-4 persons should not be killed if possible. However, they bear considerable watching and due to necessary action ([1] above), Category 2 persons may be accidentally killed on a sliding scale of A to D with A being of small consequence and B being avoided if at all possible, C being avoided in most cases while killing D is to be avoided even at some cost *.

Category 3 persons should not be killed but 3A persons must be closely watched unless and until they move to Category 3B. Those in 3B must still be loosely watched...

Category 4 persons should not be killed unless they are engaged in wrongdoing. Unfortunately, even some of them bear watching...

IOW who to kill is obvious, who not to kill is far less obvious and avoiding killing them while it increases your risk is necessary -- and please remember this:

That is true not only in an FID or COIN operation but in all combat to include major combat operations against a peer force in a war of movement.

If that equates to a platitude, my regrets -- it's reality.

Ken, I might be misunderstanding you, because in your later comments, I tend to agree with you. But with all due respect, I think your categorizations above badly underestimate the complexity of the situation in Afghanistan and fail to reflect the reality on the ground. Dealing with Afghans (or even Iraqis, for that matter), cannot be broken down into eight simple categories. Relationships in these places are more fluid than you're suggesting. So, assuming I haven’t just misread you (which I might be doing), I have some questions for you:

Do you kill civilians who actively assist the Taliban by offering shelter to their fighters? How do you know whether or not they were coerced into it? What about those who provide the Taliban with weapons? What about civilians who actively assist one Taliban group, but offer you information about another Taliban group? What about farmers who eagerly sell opium to warlords known for attacking Americans? How do you distinguish between those who support the warlords and those who are coerced into supporting the warlords?

What if U.S. forces offend the honor of a local tribe one day, and the next time U.S. forces come around, the locals fire at them? Leaving immediate self-defense aside, are they to be killed? Are they considered the "enemy?" What if they start planting land mines on the approaches to their village to keep U.S. forces out? And what about the ever-present problem of receiving seemingly-good-but consistently-bad information from locals who are motivated by tribal rivalries and/or profit—and not by America’s desire to win the “Global War on Terror?”

There are an infinite number of categories that inhibit the process of knowing who to kill. I’ve never once fired my personal weapon or ordered anyone else to fire theirs without (at least) first being drawn upon by the enemy. That’s because we had no idea who to kill otherwise.

This is why the U.S. military is moving toward a population-centric approach. Sure, it’s not the way I was brought up in the infantry. But when you don’t have adequate intelligence or language skills within American units--and you haven't grown up in the "neighborhood"--being focused primarily on killing the right people is a recipe for disaster in places like Afghanistan--as Michael C rightly notes. We’re just not equipped. If you want to kill the right people, you must first secure the population, give them confidence, and then let the intelligence come to you. Only then should you start looking for fights.

I have no doubt you’ll pick this apart--and maybe I'm misunderstanding you--but if there’s one thing on which we could probably agree, it’s the idea that these situations are best dealt with by avoiding them like the plague in the first place. We certainly agree this:

What I and some others have also said is that most such conflicts should be avoided by better diplomacy, aid and low key SF involvement to stop burgeoning problems before they require GPF deployment because those will always be messy and difficult. Your comments prove that that they are that. It will be no consolation but a lot of us discovered that 40 years ago and our forebears in the Army on the Plains in the late 19th Century probably had precisely the same complaints. As did a bunch of Alexanders folks in what is now Afghanistan 2,340 years ago. The tools may change, warfare may change but war does not.

[Ron Humphrey]

For some reason double posted so please del